THE CAMBRIDGE WORLD HISTORY

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VOLUME VI

The era from 1400 to 1800 saw intense biological, commercial, and cultural exchanges, and the creation of global connections on an unprecedented scale. Divided into two books, Volume VI of *The Cambridge World History* series considers these critical transformations. The first book examines the material and political foundations of the era, including global considerations of the environment, disease, technology, and cities, along with regional studies of empires in the eastern and western hemispheres, crossroads areas such as the Indian Ocean, Central Asia, and the Caribbean, and sites of competition and conflict, including Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Mediterranean. The second book focuses on patterns of change, examining the expansion of Christianity and Islam, migrations, warfare, and other topics on a global scale, and offering insightful detailed analyses of the Columbian Exchange, slavery, silver, trade, entrepreneurs, Asian religions, legal encounters, plantation economies, early industrialism, and the writing of history.

JERRY H. BENTLEY was Professor of History at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. He was the author of *Old World Encounters: Cross-Cultural Contact and Exchange in Pre-Modern Times* and *Traditions and Encounters*.

SANJAY SUBRAHMANYAM is Distinguished Professor of History, and the Irving and Jean Stone Endowed Chair in Social Sciences at the University of California, Los Angeles, and the Chair in Histoire Globale de la Première Modernité at the Collège de France. He is the author or editor of nearly thirty books, including *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500–1700: A Political and Economic History*, *The Career and Legend of Vasco da Gama* (Cambridge, 1997), and *Indo-Persian Travels in the Age of Discoveries* (Cambridge, 2007).

MERRY E. WIESNER-HANKS is Distinguished Professor and Chair of the History Department at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. She is the author or editor of twenty books, including *A Concise History of the World* (Cambridge, 2015), *Early Modern Europe 1450–1789* (Cambridge, 2nd edn., 2013), *Women and Gender in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 3rd edn., 2008), *Christianity and Sexuality in the Early Modern World: Regulating Desire, Reforming Practice* and *Gender in History: Global Perspectives*.

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THE CAMBRIDGE WORLD HISTORY

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VOLUME VI

The Construction of a Global World,
1400–1800 CE

Part 2: Patterns of Change

*

Edited by

JERRY H. BENTLEY
University of Hawaii

SANJAY SUBRAHMANYAM
University of California, Los Angeles and Collège de France

MERRY E. WIESNER-HANKS
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

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Eugenio Menegon Boston University
Charles H. Parker, Saint Louis University
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Sanjay Subrahmanyam, University of California, Los Angeles, and Collège de France
Kaoru Sugihara, Kyoto University
John Thornton, Boston University
James D. Tracy, University of Minnesota
Francesca Trivellato, Yale University
John E. Wills, Jr., University of Southern California
R. Bin Wong, University of California, Los Angeles

Preface

The Cambridge Histories have long presented authoritative multi-volume overviews of historical topics, with chapters written by specialists. The first of these, the *Cambridge Modern History*, planned by Lord Acton and appearing after his death from 1902 to 1912, had fourteen volumes and served as the model for those that followed, which included the seven-volume *Cambridge Medieval History* (1911–1936), the twelve-volume *Cambridge Ancient History* (1924–1939), the thirteen-volume *Cambridge History of China* (1978–2009), and more specialized multi-volume works on countries, religions, regions, events, themes, and genres. These works are designed, as the *Cambridge History of China* puts it, to be the "largest and most comprehensive" history in the English language of their topic, and, as the *Cambridge History of Political Thought* asserts, to cover "every major theme."

The *Cambridge World History* both follows and breaks with the model set by its august predecessors. Presenting the "largest and most comprehensive" history of the world would take at least 300 volumes – and a hundred years – as would covering "every major theme." Instead the series provides an overview of the dynamic field of world history in seven volumes over nine books. It covers all of human history, not simply that since the development of written records, in an expanded time frame that represents the newest thinking in world history. This broad time frame blurs the line between archaeology and history, and presents both as complementary approaches to the human past. The volume editors include archaeologists as well as historians, and have positions at universities in the United States, Britain, France, Australia, and Israel. The essays similarly draw on a broad author pool of historians, art historians, anthropologists, classicists, archaeologists, economists, sociologists, and area studies specialists, who come from universities in Australia, Britain, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, Singapore, and the United States. They include very senior scholars whose works have helped to form the field, and also mid-career and younger scholars whose research will continue to shape it in the future. Some of the authors are closely associated with the rise of world history as a distinct research and teaching field, while others describe what they do primarily as global history, transnational history, international history, or comparative history. (Several of the essays in Volume 1 trace the development of these overlapping, entangled, and at times competing fields.) Many authors are simply specialists on their topic who the editors thought could best explain this to a broader audience or reach beyond their comfort zones into territory that was new.

Reflecting the increasing awareness that world history can be examined through many different approaches and at varying geographic and chronological scales, each volume

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offers several types of essay, including regional, topical, and comparative ones, along with case studies that provide depth to go with the breadth of vision that is the distinguishing characteristic of world history. Volume I (*Introducing World History* [to 10,000 BCE]) introduces key frames of analysis that shape the making of world history across time periods, with essays on overarching approaches, methods, and themes. It then includes a group of essays on the Paleolithic, covering the 95 percent of human history up to 10,000 BCE. From that point on, each volume covers a shorter time period than its predecessor, with slightly overlapping chronologies volume to volume to reflect the complex periodization of a truly global history. The editors chose the overlapping chronologies, and stayed away from traditional period titles (e.g. "classical" or "early modern") intentionally to challenge standard periodization to some degree. The overlapping chronologies also allow each volume to highlight geographic disjunctures and imbalances, and the ways in which various areas influenced one another. Each of the volumes centers on a key theme or cluster of themes that the editors view as central to the period covered in the volume and also as essential to an understanding of world history as a whole.

Volume II (*A World with Agriculture, 12,000 BCE–500 CE*) begins with the Neolithic, but continues into later periods to explore the origins of agriculture and agricultural communities in various regions of the world, as well as to discuss issues associated with pastoralism and hunter-fisher-gatherer economies. It traces common developments in the more complex social structures and cultural forms that agriculture enabled, and then presents a series of regional overviews accompanied by detailed case studies from many different parts of the world.

Volume III (*Early Cities in Comparative Perspective, 4000 BCE–1200 CE*) focuses on early cities as motors of change in human society. Through case studies of cities and comparative chapters that address common issues, it traces the creation and transmission of administrative and information technologies, the performance of rituals, the distribution of power, and the relationship of cities with their hinterlands. It has a broad and flexible chronology to capture the development of cities in various regions of the world and the transformation of some cities into imperial capitals.

Volume IV (*A World with States, Empires, and Networks, 1200 BCE–900 CE*) continues the analysis of processes associated with the creation of larger-scale political entities and networks of exchange, including those generally featured in accounts of the rise of "classical civilizations," but with an expanded time frame that allows the inclusion of more areas of the world. It analyzes common social, economic, cultural, political, and technological developments, and includes chapters on slavery, religion, science, art, and gender. It then presents a series of regional overviews, each accompanied by a case study or two examining one smaller geographic area or topic within that region in greater depth.

Volume V (*Expanding Webs of Exchange and Conquest, 500 CE–1500 CE*) highlights the growing networks of trade and cross-cultural interaction that were a hallmark of the millennium covered in the volume, including the expansion of text-based religions and the transmission of science, philosophy, and technology. It explores social structures, cultural institutions, and significant themes such as the environment, warfare, education, the family, and courtly cultures on both a global and Eurasian scale, and continues the examination of state formation begun in Volume IV with chapters on polities and empires in Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas.

The first five volumes each appear in a single book, but the last two are double volumes covering the periods conventionally known as the early modern and modern, an organization signaling the increasing complexity of an ever more globalized world in the last half millennium, as well as the expanding base of source materials and existing historical analyses for these more recent eras. Volume VI (*The Construction of a Global World, 1400–1800 CE*) traces the increasing biological, commercial, and cultural exchanges of the period, and explores regional and trans-regional political, cultural, and intellectual developments. The first book within this volume, "Foundations," focuses on global matrices that allowed this increasingly interdependent world to be created, including the environment, technology, and disease; crossroads and macro-regions such as the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia in which connections were especially intense; and large-scale political formations, particularly maritime and land-based empires such as Russia, the Islamic Empires, and the Iberian Empires that stretched across continents and seas. The second book within this volume, "Patterns of Change," examines global and regional migrations and encounters, and the economic, social, cultural, and institutional structures that both shaped and were shaped by these, including trade networks, law, commodity flows, production processes, and religious systems.

Volume VII (*Production, Destruction, and Connection, 1750–Present*) examines the uneven transition to a world with fossil fuels and an exploding human population that has grown ever more interactive through processes of globalization. The first book within this double volume, "Structures, Spaces, and Boundary Making," discusses the material situations within which our crowded world has developed, including the environment, agriculture, technology, energy, and disease; the political movements that have shaped it, such as nationalism, imperialism, decolonization, and communism; and some of its key regions. The second book, "Shared Transformations?", explores topics that have been considered in earlier volumes, including the family, urbanization, migration, religion, and science, along with some that only emerge as global phenomena in this era, such as sports, music, and the automobile, as well as specific moments of transition, including the Cold War and 1989.

Taken together, the volumes contain about 200 essays, which means the *Cambridge World History* is comprehensive, but certainly not exhaustive. Each volume editor has made difficult choices about what to include and what to leave out, a problem for all world histories since those of Herodotus and Sima Qian more than two millennia ago. Each volume is arranged in the way that the volume editor or editors have decided is most appropriate for the period, so that organizational schema differ slightly from volume to volume. Given the overlapping chronologies, certain topics are covered in several different volumes because they are important for understanding the historical processes at the heart of each of these, and because we as editors decided that viewing key developments from multiple perspectives is particularly appropriate for world history. As with other *Cambridge Histories*, the essays are relatively lightly footnoted, and include a short list of further readings, the first step for readers who want to delve deeper into the field. In contrast to other *Cambridge Histories*, all volumes are being published at the same time, for the leisurely pace of the print world that allowed publication over several decades does not fit with twenty-first-century digital demands.

In other ways as well, the *Cambridge World History* reflects the time in which it has been conceptualized and produced, just as the *Cambridge Modern History* did. Lord Acton envisioned his work, and Cambridge University Press described it, as "a history of the world," although in only a handful of chapters out of several hundred were the principal actors individuals, groups, or polities outside of Europe and North America. This is not surprising, although the identical self-description of the *New Cambridge Modern History* (1957–1979), with a similar balance of topics, might be a bit more so. The fact that in 1957 – and even in 1979 – Europe would be understood as "the world" and as the source of all that was modern highlights the power and longevity of the perspective we have since come to call "Eurocentric." (In other languages, there are perspectives on world history that are similarly centered on the regions in which they have been produced.) The continued focus on Europe in the mid-twentieth century also highlights the youth of the fields of world and global history, in which the conferences, professional societies, journals, and other markers of an up-and-coming field have primarily emerged since the 1980s, and some only within the last decade. The *Journal of World History*, for example, was first published in 1990, the *Journal of Global History* in 2005, and *New Global Studies* in 2007.

World and global history have developed in an era of intense self-reflection in all academic disciplines, when no term can be used unselfconsciously and every category must be complicated. Worries about inclusion and exclusion, about diversity and multi-vocality are standard practice in sub-fields of history and related disciplines that have grown up in this atmosphere. Thus as we editors sought topics that would give us a balance between the traditional focus in world history on large-scale political and economic processes carried out by governments and commercial elites and newer concerns with cultural forms, representation, and meaning, we also sought to include topics that have been important in different national historiographies. We also attempted to find authors who would provide geographic balance along with a balance between older and younger voices. Although the author pool is decidedly broader geographically – and more balanced in terms of gender – than it was in either of the Cambridge Modern Histories, it is not as global as we had hoped. Contemporary world and global history is overwhelmingly Anglophone, and, given the scholarly diaspora, disproportionately insti-tutionally situated in the United States and the United Kingdom. Along with other disparities in our contemporary world, this disproportion is, of course, the result of the developments traced in this series, though the authors might disagree about which volume holds the key to its origins, or whether one should spend much time searching for origins at all.

My hopes for the series are not as sweeping as Lord Acton's were for his, but fit with those of Tapan Raychaudhuri and Irfan Habib, the editors of the two-volume *Cambridge Economic History of India* (1982). In the preface to their work, they comment: "We only dare to hope that our collaborative effort will stimulate discussion and help create new knowledge which may replace before many years the information and analysis offered in this volume." In a field as vibrant as world and global history, I have no doubts that such new transformative knowledge will emerge quickly, but hope this series will provide an entrée to the field, and a useful overview of its state in the early twenty-first century.

MERRY E. WIESNER-HANKS

PART ONE

★

MIGRATIONS AND ENCOUNTERS

I

Global migrations

DIRK HOERDER

In the tri-continental African-Asian-European World, three unrelated macro-regional and political developments at mid-fifteenth century were to have major impacts on migration and power relations globally: First, in China, the transoceanic outreach epitomized by Admiral Zheng He's ambassadorial voyages between 1403 and 1433 to the "Western" or Indian Ocean and as far as East Africa's thriving port cities were ended by decree of the Imperial Court. Second, the Crown in Portugal, in contrast, decided to expand outreach by providing state support for merchants venturing southward along Africa's Atlantic coasts. Third, in the Eastern Mediterranean and West Central Asia, the hinge region of trade between China, the Indian Ocean societies and the Mediterranean's city-states, the emerging Ottoman Empire inserted itself between Arab and Venetian merchants. When, in the 1490s, Iberian mariners in search of a westward passage to "the Indies" and its imagined riches hit an unexpected barrier that came to be called the "Americas," a fourth major change resulted, this one demographic: the near-genocide of the population and resettlement. This, for the Europeans, "new world," was a known and lived space to resident peoples; *new* were the in-migrating Iberians' religion and quest for material gain.

The migratory consequences of these developments were many and included six major ones: first, the emergence of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia; second, new patterns of trade and mobility between Iberian and Atlantic Europe and Asia's many regions; third, the importation of bound Africans to Iberia; fourth, a new type of bondage, chattel slavery, with its forced mass migrations in the emerging European-ruled global plantation belt; fifth, population collapse in the Americas brought about by the European intruders' germs, warfare, and exploitation, which emptied the double continent for mass arrival of indentured and free Europeans and enslaved Africans; sixth, the Iberian and Dutch circum-African outreach, which involved few migrants but established a new regime that combined

mercantile expertise with armed state power and in which private investments and profits were subsidized by public-funded soldiery and administrators. This globalization replaced protocols of unarmed trade that had kept transaction costs low; the new, armed trade induced or enforced labor, refugee, and other migrations across the world.

Wherever voyagers, migrants, refugees, and bound or free laborers arrived, they encountered functioning societies with knowledge of the region's ecology and with societal-political structures. The newcomers from Europe, "explorers" in their self-deceiving master narratives, came with different knowledge acquired in their own socialization. They coveted the riches of "the Indies" and the labor of "the negroes" – both constructs of white ideologues. When they encountered resident societies, they could opt for co-existence, intermingling, or violence. Each group's "funds of knowledge" could be supplementary, contradictory, or parallel to others. Those with more guns and with a more aggressive religious, racial, and mercantile ideology imposed direct rule or indirect hegemony. Unarmed trader cultures and regional merchants became middle "men" or, more correctly, mediating family economies, who, because they were bi- or multi-lingual, could translate exchanges between local producers and visitors, whether long-distance merchants or self-imposing colonizers without knowledge of languages and exchange practices. In-migrating men with long-distance connections often associated with or married local women of rank to access their networks and social capital. Such partnership-families connected the local and the distant. Wealthy Europeans' demand for spices, silver or gold, porcelain or silk, and for plantation-produced sugar stimulated production and the demand for labor, and thus also stimulated labor and expert migrations. Information feedback about the options (seemingly) available in newly connected distant regions induced men and women of the poorer classes, who could hardly feed themselves and their children, to depart. So-called "free migrants" left unsatisfactory "homes" under severe economic constraints and societies that did not permit sustainable lives. Establishing themselves elsewhere involved acculturation, a coming to terms with different agricultural and commercial frames – climatic, geographic, spatial, societal, spiritual. Migrants' cultural métissage and non-migrating people's adjustment to the capabilities and impositions of newcomers are a core element of world history's dynamics.[1]

[1] Jerry H. Bentley, *Old World Encounters. Cross-Cultural Contacts and Exchanges in Pre-Modern Times* (New York: Oxford, 1993); Dirk Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002).

We will approach migrations by first summarizing in broad strokes the continuities and changes by macro-region across the globe from the earlier centuries to about 1500 and in some cases beyond. Next the penetration of heavily armed mobile Europeans into the societies of the Caribbean and South America, West Africa, the Indian Ocean's littorals and Southeast Asian islands will be analyzed in terms of displacement of and dominance over resident settled or mobile peoples. Motivations were economic: demand for northern furs, Southeast Asian spices, Chinese luxury goods, and – in the emerging plantation complex – mass-produced consumables including sugar, tea, and coffee. Since the European, powerful newcomers lacked knowledge of the languages, cultures, and customs of the economically or politically annexed territories and peoples, they required intermediaries – a further category of migrants. The mobility of intrusive investors and supportive state personnel ("colonial administrators") resulted in vast, mostly forced, migrations of men and women as laborers to produce for the Europeans' demand. The imposed production and labor regimes, in turn, led to depletion of resources and to involuntary departure of original resident peoples deprived of their means to gain their livelihood. In a further section we will discuss the migration of those Europeans who also had difficulty in gaining their livelihood – the ideology of European superiority and whiteness discourses veil the poverty endemic in many regions of Europe, forcing rural and urban underclasses to depart. But once arriving in the Americas, southern Africa, or Australia, supported by powerful colonizer states, migrants established themselves as settlers over resident peoples and imposed "settler regimes." In conclusion we will offer a comprehensive perspective on migrants and migrations in this period. For a long time historians have paid attention mainly to the long-distance migrations of white men or white women, but we will return to the full complexity of migrations of women and men in almost all societies of the world.

Macro-regional migrations: continuities and changes

Migration and cultural exchange, as constituent processes of societies, are not defined by fixed continents or bounded states. Micro-, meso-, and macro-regions that provide economic and cultural options for life prospects set parameters. They are defined by natural and human-made characteristics: plains, littorals, and mountain valleys, contiguous or connectable by camel or horse, by navigable rivers or seas, or by challenging mountain passes or

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desert-crossing routes. Groups of people, often known by ethno-cultural labeling, developed the knowledge to overcome distances and to use natural resources. By the fifteenth century, all continents had become interconnected spaces. The Indian Ocean's mariners had decoded the monsoon patterns a millennium-and-a-half before this; northern Arab and sub-Saharan black peoples connected along the Nile River valley and across the Sahara. In the sub-Arctic, Norse men and women had migrated in an hemispheric arc westward as far as Vinland and eastward via the Volga River to Byzantium, and had built states in Normandy, Sicily, and Palestine. From mid-thirteenth to mid-fourteenth century, the Mongols, highly mobile horse-borne peoples, expanded by aggression and destruction, then established rule over a trans-steppe realm. Their *pax mongolica* protected the transcontinental "Silk Road" trading. The tri-continental Mediterranean core of the West, after about 1000 CE, was supplemented by connectivity in Europe's land-centered western, central, and eastern sections. In the Americas, the centralized empires of the Aztec and Inca emerged in the central highlands of Mesoamerica and the southwestern Andean slopes in the 1400s. Trade routes radiated northward into the Plains and crossed the Eastern Woodlands.

Asia

Of the "four Asias" – China, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Japan (with Siberia, the fifth, better viewed in connection with the Russian Empire) – the realm of the Ming and Qing dynasties, like all polities, expanded and contracted. From its early Yellow River core, peasant families and urban people had migrated by the millions southward to the fertile Yangtzi Delta and reached what is now Guangdong province in the thirteenth century, while absorbing resident peoples and adapting their techniques for cultivation of specific terrains. The in-migrant Mongol Yuan rulers (1271–1368) were succeeded by the Ming (1368–1644), who came from among the core Chinese ethno-cultural group, the Han; the Ming were in turn replaced by in-migrant Manchu Qing (1644–1912). The empire expanded as far as western Sichuan where resident peoples and mobile armies of Islamic faith from the south stopped further advance. Intensive cultural exchange ensued. Migrating monks from South Asia induced widespread religious change: Buddhism came to co-exist with the indigenous Daoist beliefs and Confucianism. Though continuously incorporating culturally different peoples by annexation and in-migration, the state attempted to exclude northern mobile intruders. The "Great Wall's" construction and maintenance required internal mass migration of workers and soldier-peasant families. The capital,

Hangzhou, housed some two million people of many cultures and multiple migration trajectories around 1400. Zheng He's fleets, thirty times the size of Columbus's and carrying up to 28,000 men, exchanged Chinese, Arab, and African products. A conservative court bureaucracy, hostile to innovation and "foreign" imports, ended the outreach to focus on the multiple and mobile land-based populations which produced whatever society needed. In defiance of such restrictions, however, entrepreneurs of southern Fujian province continued their relations with peninsular and insular Southeast Asian societies; artisans and laborers followed, and a permanently settled diaspora emerged. Men and local women formed families, and mixed children grew up; other men, "long-term sojourners," returned to fulfill Confucian precepts mandating that sons care for the spirits of ancestors.[2]

In Southeast Asia, a productive and integrated macro-region, highly skilled seafaring groups connected island peoples with those of the Malay Peninsula. By the fifteenth century, the Straits' port cities accommodated South and East Asian, Persian, and Arab merchants, along with Indonesian island traders. Arab migrants introduced Islam; Javanese trade missions reached China's Imperial Court; refugees from war-ravaged regions founded new urban agglomerations. After the late-thirteenth-century demise of the Srivijaya Empire, non-state-based mobile entrepreneurs recruited themselves from among migrants, fugitives, outlaws, and escaped slaves of Japanese, Chinese, and African background and became "pirates" or "buccaneers."[3] To the mid-sixteenth century they rendered port-city-based trade and migration unsafe. Depending on the strength of a particular polity or on investment strategies of specific merchants, whether Gujarati or Fujianese, the regions' migratory and cultural exchanges assumed a distinctive character in particular periods.[4]

Japan's rulers, by 1400, had sent soldiers and migrants to annex Hokkaido with its peoples in the north and the northernmost Ryūkyū Islands to the

[2] Ping-to Ho, *Studies on the Population of China, 1368–1953* (Cambridge University Press, 1959); Morris Rossabi (ed.), *China Among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th–14th Centuries* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983).

[3] The term buccaneer, derived from the Arawak word for a wooden frame to smoke meat, originated in the early seventeenth-century Caribbean where highly mobile crews of French, Dutch, English, and probably other men attacked Spanish galleons for private gain (and smoked meat on such frames). The English Crown came to license such crews since piracy was a cheaper way of attacking its rival Spain than outfitting and dispatching the Royal Navy.

[4] Maria A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago Between 1500 and About 1630* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 13–26, 89–115.

south. They also encouraged internal migrations by urbanization. Although in the early seventeenth century they did invade and annex the southern Ryūkyū Islands, in general and in contrast to the Southeast Asian societies, Japanese development and migrations remained land-based and extended no further than to neighboring islands and peninsulas.

South Asia, internally highly diverse by regions, rule, and cultures, experienced in-migration and cultural métissage from invaders and others crossing the Pamir Mountains. Merchants from Gujarat, the southwestern Malabar and the southeastern Coromandel coasts connected to Arabian, East African, and Southeast Asian ports and peoples. Monsoon-driven long sojourns resulted in community formation. Internally, South Asia's societies were both mobile and immobile. Earlier, armed Islamic migrants had penetrated the Indus Valley; in the early sixteenth century the Mughal rulers (Timurid Mongols) arrived from the north and established a state that lasted until the nineteenth century; itinerant Muslim Sufi Orders proselytized; elites and common urbanites lived a fusion of Indic, Persian, and Turkish cultures. Southward-migrating peasant and warrior families from northwestern Vijayanagara established Telugu-speakers among native southern Tamil-speakers; westward migrations from upper Burma established Ahoms in the Brahmaputra Valley. However, Hinduism's prescriptions for purity in everyday food challenged mobility since travel necessitated impure eating practices. In addition, separation (*purdah*) of women into distinct quarters in a family's dwelling restricted their mobility. On the other hand, widespread if regionally specific views of social relations made inhabitants of one (village) community relatives and, in consequence, at marriage women had to migrate to neighboring communities – a short-distance migration which involved adjustment. On the whole, the mobility of common people distant from the littorals was often short-distance; urban cultural fusion hardly touched them, but in-migration, expansion, and religious conversion did.[5]

Africa

Trade and migration connected South Asia's western with Africa's eastern societies; Madagascar had been settled from both Indonesia and Africa. The several Africas – Egyptian-Nilotic, Mediterranean, the eastern, central, and

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[5] Jagadish N. Sarkar, *Studies in Economic Life in Mughal India* (Delhi: Oriental Publishers, 1975); Kirti N. Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750* (Cambridge University Press, 1985).

western sub-Saharan regions, the southern segment – evidenced high levels of mobility. The Mediterranean littoral had been settled from the east by Arab-speaking peoples; in the Nile River valley northern Egyptian and southern (dark) Nubian peoples interacted; agricultural Bantu-speakers of many language variants moved southward and came in contact with the Khoisan. East African trading societies with sedentary urbanites and mobile merchants, using Swahili as *lingua franca*, reached their height in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The savannah's westbound migrating groups brought Islam, and elites of Muslim faith interacted with pastoralists and agriculturalists of animist persuasion. Complex, competing states had emerged before 1400. Each change of rule and societal structures changed opportunities and constraints and induced or forced families and groups to migrate. Muslims' *hajj* to Mecca, extending over years and funded by trading activities along the routes, resembled temporary migrations. Swahili and Hausa speakers established commercial diasporas. In size and sophistication, cities from the East African Coast to the Niger River compared with European ones. Along its Atlantic Coast, from Senegal to Nigeria (modern terms), numerous peoples speaking hundreds of languages moved and mingled; the Kru emerged as a coastal seafaring people.

Various types of bondage were common in Africa. Rights-in-persons practices bound poorer relatives or debtors to wealthier men. Women, knowledgeable agriculturalists, were particularly valued as a rural labor force. In contrast, male war captives were traded over long distances as far as the Mediterranean Arab world. Thus categories of bondage were fluid, ranging from rights-in-persons and short-distance moves to long-distance trade – some 10,000 men were force-migrated northward annually by the fourteenth century. Free, regionally specific migrations included iron- and gold-working craftsmen and women in West Africa and Zimbabwe, service personnel in urban centers, and students and scholars heading for Timbuktu, which from 1400 to 1600 was the most important Islamic center of learning. Portuguese, arriving from the mid-1430s, established fortified trading posts along the Guinea coast to acquire gold, cloth, slaves, and other valuables. Around 1500 some 10 percent of Lisbon's population was of African origin. Initially such slaves remained persons and could intermarry with Iberians. Migrants carried beliefs: Christian missionaries moved south, others adopted veneration of Black Madonnas originating in West African fertility cults or the Egyptian worship of Isis. As everywhere, the designation of peoples as, for example, Fulbe, Wolof, or Bantu, hid the constant reconstitution of groups through migration,

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expulsion, flight, and incorporation of male strangers through community-sanctioned marriage with local women.[6]

The Mediterranean World

In the Mediterranean world, Africa's Arab northern littoral connected via the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean and via the Black Sea and Persia to the trans-Asian Silk Road. Through the economic power of Genoa and Venice but also Amalfi and Greek-founded Neapolis, the European littoral attracted as well as shipped migrants. Their trading colonies, like Kaffa, became nodes of migration and exchange. Seaborne connections to Asia were mediated by Arab, Gujarati, and Turkish merchants. As a center of trade and culture, Alexandria housed Egyptian citizens of standing, in-migrant rural Egyptians, Arabs from many origins, Ottoman administrators and soldiers, Gujarati and Istanbul merchants, Jewish traders and intellectuals, and, among Christians, Sicilian Normans, traders from Pisa, Palermo, Naples, Livorno, Genoa, and Venice, as well as residents of Frankish and English origin. The "Frankish" crusaders' eastbound warrior migrations had been replaced by pilgrim tourism with package tours organized from Venice. Like the *hajj*, such traveling, though not migration *strictu sensu*, involved cultural interaction and could last for years. Regardless of their faith, pilgrims returned with new experiences and with new images of the Eastern Mediterranean cultures.

In this West Asian Levant-Anatolia-Byzantium/Constantinople/Istanbul contact zone, in-migrating Turkic-speaking pastoralists and warriors had transformed their mobile societies into the settled and powerful Ottoman Empire from about 1280. Arriving from Central Asia, the founding migrants adopted Islam and adapted Byzantine Christian institutions. By 1400, the empire was expanding into Southeastern Europe's wooded "Balkans" and into Egypt. The Ottomans had to struggle with state-building Mongol warrior-migrants and confront or cohabit with Venetian and Genoese colonizer-migrants. The empire's leadership designed non-ethnic structures,

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[6] Toyin Falola and Okpeh Ochayi Okpeh, Jr. (eds.), *Population Movements, Conflicts and Displacement in Nigeria* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2008); J. F. A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder (eds.), *History of West Africa*, 2 vols. (1st edn., 1974; London: Longman, 1987); George E. Brooks, *Landlords and Strangers. Ecology, Society, and Trade in Western Africa, 1000–1630* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993); Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, chaps. 5.3 and 6; Bartolomé Bennassar and Pierre Chaunu (eds.), *L'ouverture du Monde, XIVe–XVIe Siècles* (Paris: Colin, 1977), 76–84.

developing a culturally pluralist polity of multi-religious and many-cultured peoples through free and, on occasion, involuntary migrations.[7]

To the east, the Venice/Genoa–Trebizond-Samarkand–China route, the trans-Caucasian routes to Russia and Poland–Lithuania, and the cross-Pamir passes to Mughal India, intersected in Safavid Persia (1502–1736), which was powerful economically, culturally, and militarily. Most of its soldiery came from Turkish-speaking groups. Georgians were deported and resettled, and urban Armenians, at immense population loss, were resettled in New Julfa (1605), close to the capital Isfahan. Entrusted with Persia's trans-European silk trade, Armenian migrant families settled in Venice and other centers of commerce. Urban expansion – accommodation for in-migrants, infra-structures, mosques and palaces – required sizable in-migration of specialized craftsmen, often from other societies. The Safavid court recruited artisans and artists in the luxury trades; scholars, calligraphers, and painters were invited or transported to the capital from recently annexed cities. A new porcelain industry – to reduce imports from China – required skilled workers, while silk and carpet production for export to Europe led to a concentration of silk producing and weaving families. European visitors came, and Christian monks and artillery technicians settled. Migrations were fundamental to innovation of local arts, to military expansion, and to long-distance trade.[8]

In the western Mediterranean, the African-Arab and Kabyl littoral was dotted with highly developed cities experiencing frequent population recom-position, providing a home to Jewish communities and to Muslim urban craftsmen who often produced for Ottoman (formerly Byzantine) and Euro-pean markets. These cities were the terminal of caravan traders and attracted migrants from the sub-Saharan savannah like Mande leatherworking craft families. Each increase or decline in demand, each change of rule and establishment of a new court, each new trading connection to Europe initiated in-migration of skilled artisan families or forced underemployed ones to seek their livelihood elsewhere. From the Christian–Frankish con-quest of Muslim Iberia refugee communities emerged, who – though impov-erished – came with skills and long-distance networks. The expulsion of Muslims after the annexation of Granada in 1492 and the expulsion of all Jews from Spain and Portugal in 1492 and 1498 brought masses of refugees to the

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[7] Reşat Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire: Ottoman Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington, 2009).
[8] Francis Richard, *Le Siècle d'Ispahan* (Paris: Gallimard, 2007), pp. 31–59.

vibrant Maghreb and Egyptian cities. The Ottoman Empire actively recruited Jewish refugees to utilize their human and social capital. In Iberia the economic damage caused by Christian fundamentalist persecutions was partly offset by shifting seafaring and economic activities to the Atlantic ports. This is epitomized by the migration of an underemployed Genoese Mediterranean mariner seeking work in the expanding Atlantic seafaring. His name was Columbus. Tiny Portugal, unable to feed its population, combined stateside resources with mercantile profit strategies: Its vessels traded along the West African coast from the 1430s; merchant migrants established fortified trading centers; the Crown forced families of Jewish faith to colonize São Tomé by establishing plantations and trans-shipment centers for the slave trade.[9]

Europe and Russia

By the 1400s, the intra-European balance of political and economic power had shifted from the Mediterranean to the northwestern seafaring states. By 1492 the Atlantic was being crossed (though Arab sources indicate earlier crossings from Africa) and the Atlantic economies emerged with their intensive Atlantic settlement and worldwide colonizing migrations. Research and public memory have overemphasized these developments, while underemphasizing the high level of medieval Europe's internal migrations and cultural exchanges. From medieval mobilities the Renaissance and Early Modern periods emerged, but in these centuries the directions and, to some degree, the character of migrations changed.[10]

In Eastern Europe, including the regions of Russia, Poland–Lithuania, and Hungary, several distinct long-distance migrations had subsided by the end of the fifteenth century: the Norse expansion, colony-building, and immersion into local populations; the eastward migrations of German-language peasants into neighboring, more thinly settled lands with Slavic-speakers; the expulsion of German- and Yiddish-speaking Jews, who created the Ashkenazi community's culture. In East Central Europe, the enserfed peasantry belonged to the nobility; thus sovereigns had little revenue and could not encourage craft and mercantile activities because the nobility prevented the emergence of an urban bourgeoisie. To address both problems, rulers

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[9] Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, chaps. 5–7.

[10] Michael Borgolte, "Migrationen als transkulturelle Verflechtungen im mittelalterlichen Europa. Ein neuer Pflug für alte Forschungsfelder," *Historische Zeitschrift* 289 (2009): 261–85, and Borgolte, *Europa Entdeckt Seine Vielfalt: 1050 – 1250* (Stuttgart: Ulmer, 2002).

attracted refugee and voluntary migrants, including expelled German-language urban Jews as well as urban Christians, by granting them privileges. "Inserted" middle classes, different by language and culture from the surrounding rural people and nobles, emerged and remained distinct until, in the nineteenth century, newly nationalist ideologues began to question their loyalty and cultural practices.[11]

From the mid-fourteenth to the late seventeenth century several population catastrophes caused massive migrations in Europe. At first, dispersed survivors had to migrate and re-establish settlements viable for economic production, (re-)marriage, and reproduction. Later, when populations began to expand again, regions laid waste could be resettled. The first of these catastrophes was the "Black Death," which emptied vast territories in the late 1340s. Second, the totalitarian hold of Catholicism led to the persecution of individuals in the various inquisitions and of whole groups suspected of independent thought and heresy: In southern France, the Cathars (also known as the Albigensians) and Waldensians, emerging since mid-twelfth century, were annihilated by "crusades" and with them the culture of the *langue d'oc*. In the Baltic northeast, a "crusade" against the Old Prussians and other Baltic peoples, labeled "Saracens of the north," emptied the lands. The aggressors, the military order of the Teutonic Knights, originally composed of men of many cultures who had been expelled from the "Holy Land" when it was reconquered by Muslim forces, had migrated northward in stages. Third, after the Reformation of 1517, century-long religious wars led to the expulsion of Catholics, Protestants, Mennonites, and others depending on who was temporarily victorious, creating a refugee generation and destruction that culminated in the Thirty Years' War, 1618–48. This mass flight and, later, resettlement migrations also involved the eighty-year liberation struggle of the Protestant Netherlands against Catholic Spanish–Habsburg rule. A fourth macro-regional migration-inducing struggle was the Habsburg–Ottoman contest in the Balkans. Muslim Ottoman advances liberated peasant families from (most) Christian feudal obligations; in reaction, to counter this rural awareness of a liberating aspect of Muslim rule, Europe's socio-religious and political elites waged a war of propaganda depicting "the Turks" as bloodthirsty infidels. From among in-migrating Muslims, the modern Bosnian Muslims are the last

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[11] Inge Blank, "A Vast Migratory Experience: Eastern Europe in the Pre- and Post-Emancipation Era (1780–1914)," in Dirk Hoerder et al., *Roots of the Transplanted*, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 1, pp. 201–51.

survivors. After the Habsburgs' reconquest of Hungary, re-Catholicization sent Protestants fleeing.

Across Europe, rural–urban migration brought the growth of cities and denser commercial networks, which encouraged producer migrations to satisfy increasing demand. The Atlantic ports experienced large population increases, as did inland nodes of exchange such as Frankfurt/Main or Krakow. Out-migration from rural regions to urban destinations and war-devastated lands resulted from population growth beyond the contemporary capacity to feed people.

In the land-locked Russian territories, east–west plains and north–south rivers structured mobility. Multidirectional medieval connections transformed into early modern patterns. Via the rivers a Scandinavian–Byzantine route had carried migrant Normans who had established themselves as a ruling Kievan group, over Russian, Finnish, Baltic, and Turkoman peoples. Byzantine Greek and Jewish merchants as well as Eastern Christian missionaries traded in Kiev. This fusion generated the Slavic version of Orthodox Christianity. Russian nobles intermarried with the Byzantine ruling house and later with West European dynasties. Warfare and competition notwithstanding, the nobility – like the merchants – were a trans-European mobile group. From the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, rule of the both highly mobile and state-building Mongols changed culture. The multiethnic Mongol Empire began to incorporate steppe peoples and foreign elites. Some were recruited and assigned specific military, administrative, or commercial functions. The next phase of expansion by migration, transcontinental exploration of the north and of southern Siberia, began a century later than the Iberians' transatlantic outreach.[12]

The Americas

The peoples of the Americas, north, central, and south, followed a variety of life-ways. In North America they were nomadic in the Arctic and plains, settled and agricultural in the northeast, settled and fishing in the northwest, and pueblo-living in the southwest. Those of the central isthmus and along the Andean Pacific slopes lived in complex states and empires and had developed macro-regional and transcontinental trading and migratory networks long before European–American contact – earlier contacts with Asia and Africa, suggested by some controversial sources, had left no lasting

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[12] Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, chap. 5.2, 11, 12, 13.

impact. In the central mesa, southward-migrating agriculturally and scholarly skilled Toltecs joined with Mixtecs, Zapotecs, and others to coalesce into Aztec culture. The imperial Inca and Aztec societies used mobile bound labor of force-migrated war captives and criminals. They raided neighboring peoples to fill labor reservoirs and, it seems, to capture high-ranking persons for sacrificial rites. According to the Spanish – who destroyed all written sources of the conquered peoples to become the masters of historical memory – enslaved people were traded from Nicaragua and Yucatán to Honduras and Guatemala and the Incas uprooted transport workers (*tamemes*) for long-distance trade.[13] In the north, across the Sonoran Desert, from the pueblo regions to California, along the Mississippi, and into the northern woodlands, trading routes were traveled by peoples from many regions, and ceremonial and luxury items influenced distant peoples' cultures. Whole groups migrated and resettled, some as far as from the Arctic Circle to the south central mesas.

Thus, during the fifteenth century, migrations, cultural exchange and fusion connected cultures in the two transcontinental hemispheres. Early modern migrations continued, adapted, changed, and expanded pre-1400 patterns. Road and postal systems were part of the Inca realm, and of Western Europe, and criss-crossed the lands from the Eastern Mediterranean to Japan. Handbooks by an Arab postal expert, an Italian mercantile clerk, a Jewish-Iberian cartographer, and Chinese observers dispersed such knowledge. In China, in addition to roads and rivers, canal systems permitted mobility. Some rulers, including Chinese and Inca, built state granaries to prevent famines and resulting refugee migrations. Migrants traveled established and known routes, even if new to them. During rest stops – encampments, caravanserai, hostels – they interacted with residents of different customs and languages. In-migrating agricultural families learned from and merged with resident peoples. Where, by social convention, migrants were predominantly male and service personnel along the route were female, sexual contacts – consensual, paid, or violent – resulted in children who usually grew up in the mother's culture. Where fathers settled, ethnogenesis, the emergence of a culturally new group, might ensue.

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[13] Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz, *The Population of Latin America: a History*, trans. W. A. R. Richardson (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1974); William L. Sherman, *Forced Native Labor in Sixteenth-Century Central America* (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1979), pp. 15–19.

Connecting and changing global mobilities: the coming of armed Europeans

By 1500 Portugal's outreach along the West African coast and Spain's to the Caribbean, as well as European penetration into the Indian Ocean, changed global economic relations; migrations also changed, although this was often delayed. On the one hand, the newcomers' impact was limited, restricted to armed trading forts along the coasts and distinct quarters in port cities. North America was hardly touched, other than a few assumed summer settlements of Basque fishing crews on Newfoundland and, after 1600, of the fur traders at Tadoussac on the Saint Lawrence excepted. On the other hand, in the Americas, the Iberians' unwitting import of Eurasian germs against which resident peoples lacked immunity brought population collapse in the Caribbean and in Central America. Extreme exploitation of the Arawak, Taino, and other peoples' labor resulted in further mass deaths. In Africa, the deportation of c.12 million enslaved men and women, in a ratio of 2 to 1, resulted in population depletion exacerbated by loss of lives during the raids and by the fact that those enslaved were in the most fertile years of their lives.

In addition to population depletions in the Americas and Africa, four economic developments were to have major long-range consequences for migration. First, European territorial states' combination of state power and revenues – tax-paid soldiery, armies, and later administrations – with merchants' investment and profit strategies and non-territorial long-distance connections changed the protocols of unarmed trade that had framed exchanges, kept transaction costs low, and kept the state and mercantile, the public and private spheres separate. The newly armed state-commercial complex imposed itself across the globe and left only some sectors to traditionally unarmed, macro-regionally active merchant communities, such as those of Fujian Chinese, Jews, Parsees (Indian Zoroastrians), Armenian Christians, and Muslim Hausa. Second, increased demand, whether for furs from the northern regions of the globe or for porcelain from China, induced numerous migrations of producers to meet demand, as well as of transport workers along the routes from production point to wholesale market and consumer. Third, in tropical and subtropical regions, where European investors annexed territories for plantation regime mass production but did not offer wages to attract free labor migrants, forced labor regimes were imposed through several different methods. These included the immobilization and exploitation of resident peoples, the Dutch model in Southeast Asia, and the transoceanic sale of enslaved Africans, the model of the Portuguese and other

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powers in the Atlantic and plantation belt extractive economy. In the case of Americans, called Indians or Indios, forced labor was imposed by the Spanish through the systems of *repartimiento* and *encomienda,* which involved inter-regional forced migrations for work in mines or immobilization for agricultural and service labor. The British and French dynastic states would adopt these practices – migration of colonizer personnel across the globe and forced mobilization or immobilization of colonized labor forces. Fourth, a century or more later, Europe's rural populations without sufficient means of subsistence emigrated, either involuntarily when states exported some of their subjects, or voluntarily through self-paid voyages or systems of indenture in which a third party paid for the passage. Thus colonies of agricultural settlement developed parallel to colonies of exploitation and extraction of minerals and mass-produced food items, especially sugar.

Colonizer expansion by migration and power imposition was not that of a highly developed core to less developed regions, as Euro-centric historical lore has asserted. Capitalist developments in Asian and Eastern Mediterranean economies – and resulting producer migrations – had occurred independently, especially if these economies were connected within systems of trans-Asian and trans-Saharan exchange. When Europe's state-commerce complexes came to rule the seas as well as some territories, the worlds of the Indian Ocean and the Asian seas lost some of their inter-regional cohesion but not their vitality.[14] The age of "discovery and exploration," as this era has long been termed in Western-centered scholarship, was actually an era of the imposition of – increasingly imperial – power on less well-armed people: Columbus's annihilation of Caribbean peoples; Vasco da Gama's atrocities against East African and South Asian ports; the violence of Cortes and Pizarro; or (in the nineteenth century) the British opium wars to force the sale of the drug on China. In the present, such acts of violence are increasingly part of public memory and of school texts in formerly colonized societies. Thus, the migrations of aggressive but numerically few men, who emphasized their Christianity and, increasingly, constructed their whiteness as a mark of superiority, still structure interstate and racial memory in modern times. Twenty-first-century migrants arriving in former colonizer societies carry such knowledge.

[14] Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Alan K. Smith, *Creating a World Economy. Merchant Capital, Colonialism, and World Trade 1400–1825* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991); Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480–1630* (Cambridge University Press, 1984).

Intermediaries and mobilizing and immobilizing labor regimes

Three major types of production with mostly forced and involuntary migrations emerged from the state-commercial-investor imposition mediated through migrant colonizer personnel: the global belt of plantation-regime production; globally dispersed but micro-regional mining; and the belt of fur harvesting in the far north.

Intermediaries

In terms of capabilities, colonizer migrants arrived at their destinations without knowledge of conditions, cultures, and languages. Thus, in Asia, mobile Gujarati, Malabar, and Coromandel Coast merchants, as well as the southern and diasporic Chinese merchants, traders, and artisans in Southeast Asia, acted as intermediaries or continued to trade on their own. Along the West African coast, male warrior states emerged, which raided inland societies to supply the European entrepôts with slaves; to trade imported goods, navigationally skilled mobile Kru boatsmen connected the large European vessels across shallow waters with coastal populations. To distribute goods inland, some Europeans moved deep into African societies and formed unions with resident women who had the cultural capability to trade. Local peoples, the Hausa in particular, also acted as medium- and long-distance traders thus increasing their own traditional mobility.

Intermediaries or "go-betweens" were central to most cultural exchanges following upon migration. Men – whether Europeans in colonial settings or Chinese in the Southeast Asian trading regions – formed temporary or "secondary" families or unions with women of the receiving culture. In other cases the mere exchange of physical items, plants and animals in the Columbian Exchange between Europe and the Americas, mediated between societies and environments on different continents. All intermediaries inhabited a "middle ground" (Richard White) and, in the case of the Americas with Brazil as an example, Alida Metcalf has distinguished three types: men and women who mediate between societies ("physical go-betweens"), who, however, also carried diseases; the "transactional intermediaries," translators, negotiators, and cultural brokers whose role we have discussed; and, third, influential "representational" go-betweens who represent Europe to "the locals" or "the exotic" to Europeans (or to the Chinese Court – to use another example) whose powerful imagery created clichés and shaped discourses. Adding West African societies to the analysis, a fourth type appears,

"landlord–stranger reciprocity," in which resident groups or the powerful men in these permit valued strangers to marry local women, a privilege that integrates them into the community. In such cases the mixed children may form a third group or be integrated into the culture of their mothers. This process was widespread in many regions of the globe.[15]

In the global fur belt from Scandinavia eastward through Siberia to (Russian) Alaska and westward via Labrador and the James Bay region to the Rockies, investor companies in Moscow, Stockholm, Amsterdam, Paris, and London sent men into locally resident communities. Scots came to North America through the Hudson's Bay Company, for example, and French-Canadians through the Northwest Company. Unfamiliar with the terrain, cultures, and hunting possibilities, they formed unions with resident women according to the "customs of the country" and thus pooled resources and long-distance connections with local expertise: language, networks, and connections to hunters. The peaceful, commercial in-migration changed material culture and gender relations: pelt preparation with an iron knife instead of brittle bones simplified women's work, but producing for markets in addition to family needs increased their workload. From these unions, a French- and English-language Métis population emerged; the change from hunting for local demand to harvesting furs for distant markets created inter-tribal rivalries and resulted in dislocations as well as out-migration of whole groups from depleted regions further inland. Already mobile groups thus had to increase the parameters of their migrations.[16]

Intermediaries derived a benefit from their activities; those men and women forced to work for Europeans usually did not. Often their standard of living was reduced to subsistence and bare survival. Many died from overwork or undernourishment.

Labor regimes

The colonizers' labor regimes have usually been associated with forced migrations, slavery in particular. Their impact on migration took a variety of forms, however: immobilizing resident men and women as workers, forcing them to move themselves over shorter or larger distances, or trans-porting them to distant "extractive economies," plantations or mines. At first,

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[15] Alida C. Metcalf, *Go-Betweens and the Colonization of Brazil, 1500–1600* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2006); George E. Brooks, *Landlords and Strangers. Ecology, Society, and Trade in Western Africa, 1000–1630* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993).

[16] Susan Sleeper-Smith, *Indian Women and French Men: Rethinking Cultural Encounter in the Western Great Lakes* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001).

the Portuguese warrior merchants achieved control over shipping in the Indian Ocean and blocked trade through Arab and Ottoman ports (and thus through Venice and Genoa) in favor of the circum-African route and Lisbon. From the 1590s, the Dutch colonizer migrants imposed plantation production on the "South Sea spice islands" by immobilizing local populations, forcing them into short-distance, intra-island migrations, or transporting them between islands for enslaved plantation labor ("factories in the fields"). Subsequently, the mass production for European investors secured by European states enforced mass migrations on West and Central African populations – Wolof, Mandinka, Yoruba, Songhai, and Hausa among others – as well as on some in East Africa. From about 1500 to the end of the trade in the 1870s, over 3.8 million slaves were force-migrated to the British, French, Dutch, and Danish Caribbean, 3.6 million to Brazil, 1.6 million into Spanish America, and 0.4 million to British North America: a total of 125,000 from 1450 to 1600, 1.3 million in the next century, 6 million 1701–1810, and another 1.9 million from the legal end of the trade to the 1870s. At the height of the trade 60,000 men and women were kidnapped each year. Some were force-migrated repeatedly: Those destined for the (still colonial) United States were "broken in" in the Caribbean and, later, when the US coastal regions' soils were exhausted, slaves were moved to the new production region along the Mississippi. In Brazil, slaves were moved from the declining northeast to the new, southern São Paulo plantations or inland to mining operations. Slavery was abolished as late as 1863/65 in the United States and in the 1880s in Brazil and Cuba (serfdom in Czarist Russia ended in 1861). After emancipation, racist exclusion from most economic sectors meant that continent-wide African-Americans' out-migration from plantation regions was slow. Since slaves served terms for life, they had to develop distinct cultures to survive and to socialize their children, even though under extreme constraints. This has best been studied for Brazil to where the voyage from Africa was comparatively short and where men and women from specific African cultures lived in proximity. They re-established religious and social institutions and, given their large numbers, negotiated room of their own from the Portuguese. A population of free Africans, manumitted or self-purchased, added to the vibrant cultures.[17]

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[17] Philip D. Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade. A Census* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969). Curtin's figures have been revised only slightly in subsequent decades. Kátia M. de Queiros Mattoso, *To Be a Slave in Brazil, 1550–1880* (1986; 4th edn., New Brunswick: Rutgers, 1994).

Slaves from Asia were imported to Spanish America via Spanish Manila in a first, brief transpacific migration system, lasting from the 1570s to the 1590s, and free Chinese, extending their practices of diaspora-formation, came as well. Lima, Peru, and Mexico City had Asian-origin populations.

Mining led to various types of migration patterns in different parts of the world. Demand for labor in Peru's silver mines, especially those of Potosí, increased from the 1550s. The new city, temporarily the largest in the Americas, had 120,000–160,000 inhabitants in the seventeenth century. From 1574, the *mita* system of labor allocation forced resident people in a belt extending 1400 km in length and 400 km in width to migrate to the mines. In the months-long journey, *mitayos* had to bring families, food, and other supplies. The *mita de plaza* obliged adult males to work locally or in nearby towns. All *mita* service was disruptive, the Potosí *mita* deadly. The labor reservoirs' total population declined from 81,000 to 10,600 within a few decades. In the Malay Peninsula, in contrast, mine laborers were Chinese credit-ticket migrants who, having worked off the cost of passage, were free. They worked for Chinese investors and Chinese markets and, from the late sixteenth century, for European ore traders. Most came from specific locations in the Fujian region of southern China for a period of several months or years and, with their earnings, supported their families in their villages of origin. In Europe, mine labor was free, but mine workers moved over great distances from exhausted veins to new strikes.[18]

European settler migrations and the expulsion of resident peoples

White settlers, often families, migrated to European colonizer acquisitions as agriculturalists, extending beyond coastal enclaves to ever larger territories: from the later sixteenth century in Spanish America; from the early seventeenth century in North America and increasingly in Portuguese America; as well as in South Africa, which was founded as a half-way provision station between Europe and Southeast Asia. (Such peasant migrations had taken place earlier in sub-Saharan Africa and in China in far larger numbers, but had not involved backing by state power and conquest.) Regions north of the Black Sea and in the Balkans, acquired when the Romanov and Habsburg

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[18] *Cambridge History of Latin America* (ed.) Leslie Bethell, 9 vols. (Cambridge University Press, 1984–2008): Charles Gibson, "Indian Societies Under Spanish Rule," vol. II, chap. 11, and Peter Bakewell, "Mining in Colonial Spanish America," vol. II, chap. 4.

empires pushed back Ottoman rule, attracted peasant migrants. Wherever such settlers arrived, they – or the armies of their states of origin – dislodged resident peoples. In formerly Ottoman regions, for example, agricultural producers of Islamic faith were forced to flee, and the oft-used phrase, "the peopling of the Americas," actually refers to a re-peopling: "First" Peoples were expelled by arriving "Second" Peoples and vast refugee migrations often ensued. The "Second Peoples," seemingly homogeneous as colonizers, were internally differentiated. They consisted of investors and colonizer personnel, self-funded "free" migrants, larger numbers of men and women migrating under indentures, and deportees.

Despite the traditional emphasis on European "settlement" resulting from an ideology of white superiority, before the 1830s more Africans than Europeans came to the Americas. But since the procreation of Africans was hindered through often deadly labor and prohibition of family formation, white immigrants procreated faster. They imposed their superiority by force and rule and, with the exception of the Caribbean societies and Brazil, achieved superiority in numbers.

It also needs to be reinserted into historical memory that up to about 1800, one-half to two-thirds of the migrants from Europe came under indentures, i.e. were temporarily not free. Depending on the laws of their country of origin reflected in their contracts, they had to work for three to seven years to pay off the cost of their passage – longer than the Chinese in Southeast Asia whose credit-ticket system, under which employers advanced the cost of travel, required several months to three years to work of the debt. Since they redeemed their freedom such "indentured servants" were also called redemptioners.

A further aspect of European migrations involved involuntary exile. The "exile from Erin," the migration of millions of Irish displaced by British colonization and the resulting famine, has been well studied. Another case is that of European men and "non-white" women forming consensual unions and families. The men and their families could not return. In South Africa, for example, settlement offered income through the provisioning of ships on the Europe-to-Asia or from-Asia-to-Europe routes with fresh food. Dutch men returning from the Southeast Asian colonies with non-white wives and mixed children had to settle there since racist legislation prevented their return to the Netherlands. "Dutch" settlement in South Africa thus involved migrants from the Netherlands and migrants from Dutch-ruled Southeast Asia. A different case is Australia, first settled by deported men and some women, considered criminal under contemporary English law – often for no

more than the theft of food – and by men deported for political dissent from other parts of the empire such as Canada. Settlement of Australia began after the American War of Independence when the British Empire could no longer deport its "criminals" to North America. In South Africa such settlers displaced or enslaved the Khoi, in Australia the Aborigines. Thus state policies shape migration, and the migrants, in turn, with the help of the state displace resident peoples thus creating further mobilities.

In the British Empire, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were called the "white" colonies – migration and racialization were closely entwined. Racialization has also been part of the historiography of agricultural settlement migration. The focus by historians socialized in Western Europe/North America on the thirteen British colonies that became the United States minimizes the number of Africans in the Americas, as only a relatively small share of the people taken in slavery from Africa ended up in North America. In addition, historians' emphasis on the East Coast British colonies overlooks the fact that the European settlement of North America began with the Spanish. In 1565 the Spanish established St. Augustine in Florida. Spanish settlers came to New Mexico in 1598 – nearly twenty years before English settlers came to Jamestown in Virginia – where earlier in-migrating pueblo peoples had lived for five centuries. The focus on English colonies also ignores the fact that from the later sixteenth century a few Russian colonies emerged along the Pacific Coast and that French immigrants settled the St. Lawrence and Mississippi valleys from 1604. Also, the thirteen colonies were not simply British: In addition to English, Scots, Irish, and Welsh, French-, German-, and Spanish-language migrants came, as did Walloons, Dutch, Swedes, Norwegians, Danes, and Finns. In Spanish Florida, men and women from Minorca, Livorno, and Greece made their homes. Religious refugees included Pietists, Moravians, Huguenots, Mennonites, and Old Order Amish from many parts of Europe. Lutheran Palatines fled devastations of war and overcrowded crafts, Catholics the discrimination in Protestant states. Scholarly simplifications that reduce North America to one *Anglo*-America or – similarly – talk of "*the* Chinese" in Southeast Asian cities and mines, reduce diversity to one imagined group, constructed as superior and dominant if white, as inferior intermediaries if "yellow."

The few and the many: a comprehensive perspective on migrations

This chapter provides a bird's eye view emphasizing major developments in this era: the migrations of armed Europeans, the forced migrations especially

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out of Africa, and the transatlantic settler family migrations to farmlands, which they emptied of the resident peoples. The "settlers" were, in fact, refugee-generating migrants who resettled lands. The bird's eye view thus shortchanges the myriads of moves in all societies of the globe. It also generalizes resident peoples, often highly mobile, into one essentialized and inferior cultural or genetic group. People, regardless of color of skin, moved to feed themselves, escape from the violence of war, avoid elite-imposed tax and labor burdens, or depart from constraining ecologies. They moved with an expectation of improving their living conditions, and studying their migrations emphasizes the breadth of human agency while providing a perspective different from heroic pioneer stories and the lore of intercontinental mass migrations of whites.

In all rural regions across the globe where plots provided subsistence for one single family, only two of all children reaching adulthood could remain on the land. The others had to migrate, whether to less densely settled tillable land or to wage labor in towns and cities. The putting-out system of manufacturing – cloth-weaving, lace-making, small-scale smithery of household utensils – could feed additional mouths, until the centralization of production ended such local income-generation. Rural life and farming families in the Yangzi Valley, in the upper Rhine–Black Forest region, or in Malay society could be sheltering, but such a life was also restraining. Towns and cities permitted increased options and ways of earning a subsistence when land became scarce. Thus rural–urban migrations provided escape from undernourishment or a chance to select between options. Historians cannot trace the multitude of individual migrations, but demographic data on urban growth and decline, on mortality rates, and on the share of in-migrants in a central place's expansion – though incomplete – reflect such human agency. While societal traditions and practices – spiritual-religious prescripts, social stratification, ecological constraints or opportunities – limited migration, perceived options elsewhere provided room for agency to implement different life-courses and to pursue plans and projects. Cities attracted – and in periods of economic contraction pushed out – especially adolescent men and women seeking to become independent from parental families. This was the case in London or Cordoba, Isfahan or Samarkand, Timbuktu or Alexandria, Beijing or Kyoto, Tenochtitlán or Cuzco. Some cities, such as those in the Islamic realm where ritual washings were prescribed, provided a healthier environment than did rural areas. Europe's cities, in contrast, were demographic black holes given the death rates caused by unsanitary conditions. Only constant in-migration could keep a (Christian) city from declining in size, while other (Muslim) ones grew.

At propitious locations, traders or rulers developed nodes of exchange or planned cities to advance economic development and dynastic interests. St. Petersburg is one example, as is Edo, the city that later became Tokyo. Two decades after its founding in 1703, St. Petersburg counted 40,000 inhabitants, while Edo, a coastal village at mid-fifteenth century, had a population of over one million in the early eighteenth. Istanbul's growth required state-enforced as well as state-supported importation of peasant families to surrounding regions to assure food supplies. Such places of exchange required connections: The building of canals in China and of roads in the Inca's realm required mass migrations of earth workers and were utilized to stabilize food supplies between regions and thus reduce need-driven migrations.

Towns and cities – unless destroyed by warfare or expulsion – provide an image of growth and dynamic development, which attracted migrants. By contrast, rural areas have been viewed as culturally immobile – the old "from time immemorial" adage – or, economically, as regions of backwardness and stagnation. Social histories of villages tell a different story, however. In France, for example, few families can be traced for more than three generations in one place; in China young people departed from villages short of land to terrace nearby or distant hills and thus increase usable acreage. Such short-distance migration and terracing also occurred (in an earlier period) among the pueblo peoples in southwestern North America and on the steep Alpine slopes bordering the Mediterranean littoral. The long climatic cooling period from the 1550s to the early 1800s, sometimes labeled Little Ice Age, forced rural families to cope – by adapting grains, reducing food intake, expanding acreage – or to migrate.

Beyond the simplistic rural–urban dualism, variations between regional economies explain patterns of migration. Port cities, mines, and lumbering belts attract differently skilled people. Mining families would not select seafaring jobs in port cities. They might transit ports when being recruited from their region of birth and training, e.g. from the German-language area to sixteenth-century Venezuela or nineteenth-century Australia. Transportation nodes, like ports, are places of transit permitting cultural exchange or a stopover to earn the funds for the next leg of the migration. The construction of migrants as defined by ethnicity, created in the nineteenth century under the national identity paradigm but still in use today, does not reflect actual transcultural interaction often based on craft or religion. In the early eighteenth century in recently founded St. Petersburg, for example, one large building housed an Armenian priest, a German pastor, and artisans of German, English, and French background. In Lima, Peru, a ship arriving in

1544 brought the Corsican owner, the Greek captain, and a crew of Genoese, Corsican, Greek, and Slavic men – mariners' skills rather than ethnicity counted. A city's skilled artisans and merchants often were foreigners: In St. Petersburg, for example, silversmiths and tailors, came from Flemish towns, while traders included English and French.

Thus physical environment and natural conditions provide a frame for settled or mobile life-courses; elite-imposed exactions or development projects expel or attract people; and societal as well as spiritual norms have an impact on migration decisions. The position of women under Confucian, Christian, and some other religions' prescripts reduced their options to migrate. Norms were not always followed, however. Among Christians, the dogma enjoining a passive acceptance of conditions in this world for a paradise in another could be questioned by a realization that better living conditions could be achieved in this world: Migration to a different place and space would not bring paradise, but it would bring more bread. Migrants left local and regional constraint structures in the frame of larger ideological, religious, political, and social-hierarchical discourses. They never left aggregate or generic entities, mere figures of speech – like "China," "England," or any other polity.

Since settler and urban artisanal or laboring migrants had to be able to provide for their subsistence immediately after arrival, they selected destinations where their human capital, skills or lack of them, would be usable without intermediate periods of adaptation (and lack of income). Their "intermediaries" or, better, "facilitators" were earlier migrants from their communities or broader culture of departure. Thus they connected economic regions rather than polities or followed craft routes rather than heading for famous cities. Since realization of human capital requires networks, i.e. social capital, they would head to where fellow craftsmen, sister domestics, kin or immediate family had settled before. Their migration decisions were translocal and trans-regional. Mercantilist states, whether China or the Ottoman Empire, Prussia or Persia, might offer stimulus funds to attract migrants. But their insertion occurred on the regional, local, craft, or agricultural level. Migrants looked for options, rather than for, as nineteenth-century US expansionist propaganda termed it, unlimited opportunities. They left constraining structures for option-providing ones. Such goals could require short-, medium-, or long-distance migrations, with the latter more costly than the former.[19]

[19] Christiane Harzig, Dirk Hoerder with Donna Gabaccia, *What is Migration History?* (Cambridge: Polity, 2009).

Migration both of agricultural families and of colonizer men was to some degree interrupted during the wars for independence in the Americas, 1776–1821, and the revolutionary–imperialist–antirevolutionary wars across Europe. The Enlightenment and revolutionary concepts of human beings and the rights of men – together with economic cost calculations – would come to influence and change forced labor regimes and migrations in the nineteenth century.[20]

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Patterns of warfare, 1400–1800

JEREMY BLACK

War was important. It transformed societies, moulded states, destroyed communities and struck deep into the experience of families. War was also complex as a phenomenon and varied as a means of activity and experience. In trying to provide an overview, some historians prefer unitary arguments, tying seemingly disparate military events, settings, cultures and developments into a coherent theme or superstructure. Although such an approach provides coherence and clarity, thematic descriptions and accounts, notably the established ones, such as the 'Military Revolution', the 'gunpowder empires', or the advent of the 'fiscal-military state', raise many questions. Moreover, there were events and processes that can undermine storylines of technological determinism, Western global dominance and bureaucratic centralisation.

History, indeed, is a messy process, and an understanding of the diversity of conflicts around the globe offers important correctives to the well-established, but overly simple, narrative of modernisation, with its stress on the decline of cavalry and the rise, in contrast, of infantry, artillery and fortifications. Moreover, success and failure were the result of local conditions and demands, rather than reflections of the 'inherent' benefits of certain technologies or formations. These points underline both the more general difficulties in establishing the relative capability of protagonists, and the need for more fresh work in the subject. The latter is especially required for Southeast and Central Asia, for sub-Saharan Africa, and for Iran after 1750. In some cases, there are serious problems with the availability of evidence, but there are always opportunities for more work and for integrating this work into general accounts.

In the period 1400–1550, there were important struggles between the Ming Chinese and the Mongols, as well as the establishment of the Mughal, Safavid, Ottoman and Habsburg empires. In the eighteenth century, the Chinese greatly extended their power over non-Chinese peoples, while the

Mughal (Indian) and, even more, Safavid (Persian) dynasties collapsed, and the fate of North America was largely settled, as was the struggle between Britain and France in India. The claim that supply problems made achieving strategic objectives only rarely possible is not vindicated by the campaigning, much of which delivered results in terms of victories won and territory conquered. Russia became a great power, the Turks were pushed back in Europe, and, in the 1790s, French hegemony in Western Europe was restored, albeit temporarily. War led to the rise of a number of other powers in the eighteenth century, including Afghanistan under the Durranis, Burma under 'Alaung-hpaya, and Gurkha Nepal. The means available could deliver many of the results required.

Some of the consequences of this military activity have lasted to today. British success over France ensured that North America would have a political culture derived from Britain. A French-dominated transoceanic world would have looked to Catholicism, civil law, French culture and language, and to different notions of representative government and politics from those of Britain.

Alongside differences between particular types of conflict and specific contexts, there were fundamentals to warfare throughout the period and across the world. An overall matrix of military activity, in which scale, political development, social characteristics, and environmental constraints were linked and mutually interacting, produces transcontinental parallels.

First and most obviously, but so taken for granted that it was (and is) scarcely subject for mention, the conduct of warfare in all societies was very much the duty of men. The direct involvement of women as fighters was exceptional, although women were closely involved with conflict: their agricultural labour was crucial to the economic survival of societies at war, and they were war's victims, directly or indirectly, sustaining physical, mental, social and economic injuries. In particular, the rape and enslavement of women were habitual in raiding warfare.

Second, the relatively low level of applied technology, even in the most developed societies, ensured that the patterns of warfare worldwide remained subject to common environmental and physical constraints. The absence of any real understanding of the causes and vectors of infectious diseases in humans and animals, combined with low agricultural productivity and the limited nature of industrial activity, ensured that population and productivity figures were low everywhere, by modern standards. The potential pool of warriors was thus lower than what it would be in 1900, and the predominance of agriculture in the world economy meant that fighting men

were most available outside the harvesting season. When compared with the armies deployed today, however, early modern armies were often larger, and represented a much larger percentage of the population.

Third, power sources were limited. Most military labour was probably exerted by generally malnourished human or animal muscle, which greatly restricted the effectiveness of military operations, notably in the ability to move rapidly. In addition, other power sources were natural and fixed: water and wind power and the burning of wood, a bulky and immobile product. These power sources, which did not change during the period, could not be moved with armies or fleets, which further limited their mobility. Military operations were dependent on resources obtained en route, such as the wind to power ships, food raised by contributions or confiscation, and the forage secured for animals.

Fourth, there were no rapid communications on land or sea, which affected both planning and operations. The movements of soldiers, supplies and messages were far slower than after the transformations brought by steam power and telegraphy in the nineteenth century. Messages moved by courier and boat, which caused problems in terms of speed and appropriate responses, and also difficulties in verifying information and instructions.

'Little' wars and 'big' wars

The standard distinction between settled societies and nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples captures contrasts in the scale and organisation of warfare. Nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples, who generally relied on pastoral agriculture or slash-and-burn shifting cultivation, were less populous and their governmental structures were less developed. These people did not therefore tend to develop military specialisation, especially in fortification and siegecraft. While the agricultural surplus and taxation base of settled agrarian societies permitted the development of logistical mechanisms to support permanent specialised military units, nomadic peoples generally lacked such units, and had far less organised logistical systems. Examples include the peoples of North America, highland Southeast Asia, and those of New Guinea and most of Borneo.

The lack of specialisation did not mean that their response to circumstances was in any way primitive. In war, these peoples, and others also lacking a defined state system, often relied on raiding their opponents, and generally sought to avoid battle, although there was also frequently endemic

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violence between villages, clans and tribes, as in North America. As a result, many, if not most, settlements were fortified.

Most history of warfare does not include such conflicts. In part this is because written sources about non-agricultural peoples are generally limited, but also because the standard emphasis in the history of war is on warfare between states and battles between specialised military units. As a result, much of the discussion fails to give sufficient weight to the alternative 'little war' of raids, skirmishes and small-scale clashes that were far more frequent aspects of war, both for nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples and for settled societies with specialised units. Moreover, this 'little war' was an important feature of 'big war' that could undermine or undo the consequences of victory in battle. This level of conflict was one in which the mobility of cavalry and light infantry proved especially valuable, while the slower-moving formations and tactics of the battlefield were largely irrelevant.

As yet, there has been no systematic or global study of 'little war', although distinctions between the regular forces of the state engaged in such fighting and irregulars were often far from clear. Moreover, irregular forces could be very substantial, and several represented bodies with some of the attributes of independent statehood. Although the Chinese over-came the Zunghars of Xinjiang and the Russians conquered and annexed the Khanate of the Crimea, the Cossacks were only really subjugated by Russia in the eighteenth century. Such forces were to be subjugated across the world in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but, prior to that, should not be regarded as necessarily less effective than the 'high end' of warfare.

The assessment of raiding war suffers as well from the extent to which military cultures have been constructed and greatly simplified by outsiders, frequently in a form of Orientalism. This process has involved misleading categorisations in terms of militarism or passivity, sophistication or primitiv-ism, and innovation or conservatism. War-making was in practice culturally specific in particular societies. Moreover, the culture and society of war could change in its characteristics and/or manifestations, as when Japan in the early seventeenth century essentially gave up war while maintaining many of the cultural and social attributes of bellicosity.

Military capabilities and actions were framed in accordance both with the tasks or goals that political and military contexts gave rise to, and with the possibilities they created. These pull-and-push dynamics could be seen in terms of strategies, operations and tactics, each of which reflected tasks and possibilities.

The 'Military Revolution'

Perhaps the most influential general concept of warfare in this period, first posited by Michael Roberts, has been that a 'Military Revolution' occurred in Western Europe during the early modern period from a combination of new weaponry (particularly weapons using gunpowder), new tactics and much larger armies. This revolution, as the argument goes, then spread outward. There are problems with this conceptualisation, however. Many of the changes used to define the military revolution discerned in the early modern West, such as larger armies, greater military expenditure and new tactics, all had medieval precedents. The combined armed tactics – in which different types of weapons were used in the same battle – of the Military Revolution were far easier to discuss in training manuals, which emphasised drill, and to attempt in combat than they were to execute successfully under the strain of battle (Figure 2.1). Moreover, the contrasting fighting characteristics of the individual arms – muskets, pike, cavalry and cannon in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries – operated very differently in particular circumstances, which posed added problems for coordination. So also did the limited extent to which many generals and officers understood these characteristics and problems, which affected the ability to triumph in battle.

These issues of coordination help explain the significance of the move in the 1690s–1700s away from the musket–pike combination, in which soldiers carrying muskets were accompanied by soldiers carrying pikes, to the fusion presented by firearms-mounting bayonets, in which each foot-soldier carried a similar weapon. The simultaneous shift from matchlock to flintlock muskets improved their reliability, and thus also increased the ability to rely on firearms to offer protection against cavalry and infantry attack. These changes possibly increased the effectiveness of Western armies more than had the earlier changes to gunpowder weapons by themselves.

The technology of gunpowder may also have had less of an impact than theories about the Military Revolution attribute to it, as it was introduced into a very varied and dynamic global military environment. These variations helped influence, if not determine, the response to gunpowder weaponry, and thus affected its impact at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Moreover, the thesis of a gunpowder revolution faces other questions, particularly when approached on a global comparative scale. If the earlier introduction of gunpowder in China did not lead to revolutionary changes, why should the situation have been different, or be regarded as different, in the West? Furthermore, although gunpowder provided the basis for different

Figure 2.1: An illustration of the tactical use of artillery from the military manual 'L'Art de l'Artillerie' by Wolff de Senftenberg, late sixteenth century

forms of handheld projectile weaponry and artillery on land and sea, the technique of massed projectile weaponry was not new. Leaving aside models from the ancient world, such as those of classical Greece, Macedonia and Rome that were revived in the Western Renaissance of the fifteenth century, the large, disciplined, trained infantry armies created in China were a basis for subsequent developments in weapons use. Gunpowder weaponry was thus an agent by which changes in warfare were effected, rather than a cause of those changes. Changes in weapons (technology) were important in so far as they were marshalled by doctrine and cultural habit of use (technique).

The timing and rate of change are also issues in assessing whether there was a Military Revolution in the early modern period. The standard account posits one period of revolution from 1560 to 1660, followed by a period of

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conservatism, indecisiveness and stagnation, then a second period of revolution that began with the outbreak of the War of American Independence in 1775, and continued with the French Revolutionary Wars to 1815. However, if military revolutions are sought, then nothing in the West in the period 1560–1815 matched the early sixteenth-century deployment of gunpowder weaponry in long-range warships and on the battlefield, nor the sweeping organisational and technological changes of the last half of the nineteenth century. And if major technological innovations occurred prior to 1500 and if until the nineteenth century change was essentially incremental and frequently at a sluggish rate, then the pace of change was not exactly revolutionary, either.

In addition, the thesis of a Military Revolution that spread as a piece from the West has limited traction. There was a borrowing of certain types of European military technology in parts of the world beyond Europe, for example in Japan in the sixteenth century and in northern India by the late eighteenth century. However, the paradigm-diffusion model of military progress, which proposes that there was an ideal model of activity, and that its methods spread as a piece, has serious problems, not least because it argues for a clear ranking of military powers. Instead, borrowing, where it occurred, was often only effective because it fitted in with, or could be made to appear to fit in with, existing practices and force structures and the related cultural assumptions. This process of fitting in encouraged a borrowing of totemic aspects of foreign practices in the early modern period, rather than a transformation of the military system such as that seen in Japan in the late nineteenth century. For example, Western artillery experts in China in the seventeenth century, notably Jesuits such as Ferdinand Verbiest, provided effective cannon, but these were essentially an add-on to existing structures and practices, and did not transform the nature of Chinese war-making. Indeed, add-ons were the most common form of diffusion and help explain the success of the process. In addition, the close-order tactics employed in battle in Western Europe were not very serviceable in many contexts around the world. The Safavids and the Uzbeks used gunpowder weapons, but not the tactics that have been viewed as an important part of the Military Revolution.

The extent to which the expansion of Western power can be attributed to the Military Revolution is questionable. Other factors played a major role in this expansion, notably the disunity of opponents and the ability to win local support, as in the Spanish conquest of the Aztec Empire. This process was also seen with non-Western expansion in which gunpowder weapons played

a role, notably that of the Mughals in India in the sixteenth century, in which their ability to win local Rajput support was important in their success. It is far from obvious that Western superiority existed in India until the 1750s, and perhaps not until the 1790s and 1800s; it may not have existed in China until the 1830s or, more clearly, 1860. Prior to that, it is more appropriate to note the more complex, contingent and varied nature of relative military capability, and also to give due weight to the non-military factors that help account for differences in success in particular regions. There were other dynamic powers in the world whose success is not necessarily explicable in terms of a Western-style Military Revolution, or, indeed, of developments that parallel those in the West. If a common pattern is to be discerned across the world, it is one in which there was also a considerable measure of continuity with earlier circumstances and practices. Moreover, if military revolution means an abrupt change and a fundamental development in capabilities, organisation or goals, then none occurred in this period; but such revolutions anyway are much less common than is frequently argued. Rather, it is more common for change to occur incrementally, not least in response to the pressure of circumstances.

The Ottomans

One area in which significant changes in warfare developed outside of Western Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the Ottoman Empire, which created a highly effective military system. The Ottoman army, and even more the navy, of 1600 were very different from those of 1450, such that there was a sustained transformation in Ottoman war-making. While not as far-flung as the military ventures of Portugal or Spain, the range of large-scale Ottoman campaigning on land was not matched by any other power. The principal opponents were the Safavids and Habsburgs, and Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–66), who personally led his army on thirteen campaigns, responded pragmatically to the challenges they posed. The list of opponents also included Venice, Moldavia, Malta and Portugal, as well as rebellions in the Ottoman lands.

Ottoman strength was based upon the resources of a large empire, especially of Egypt and the Middle East, on an ideology that saw war against the non-believer as a duty, and on a society structured for the effective prosecution of a war. Troops were deployed in accordance with a grand strategy based on a considered analysis of intelligence and policy options, and drawing on a formidable and well-articulated logistical system. The nucleus

Figure 2.2: Ottoman janissaries armed with guns attack the fortress at Rhodes in 1522, in a miniature from the *Süleymanâme*, a court chronicle prepared at the court of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent

of the Ottoman army was the Janissary Corps – from the Turkish *yeni cheri* ("new troops") – a group of professional soldiers recruited originally from non-Muslim war captives from newly conquered areas, and later primarily from the sultan's Christian subjects in Greece and the Balkans (Figure 2.2). Boys who became janissaries were taken away from their families at a young age, raised in Turkish foster homes, and sent to schools for military and other training. They were legally slaves of the sultan, but they could gain power and prestige through their service; the most capable became senior officials and ambassadors as well as admirals and generals. The highest janissary often

held the office of grand vizier, second only to the sultan. In times of war, the janissaries were supplemented by paid troops recruited from throughout the empire; in the early sixteenth century, Süleyman regularly fielded an army of 150,000 troops every year, equipped with huge siege cannons.

Numerous Western observers commented on the discipline and organisation of the Ottoman army on the march. Its effectiveness included the use and organisation of firearms. Although the majority of the janissaries did not carry firearms until the mid-sixteenth century, the Ottomans made stronger and more reliable musket barrels than did their Western counterparts. Western musket barrels were constructed with longitudinal seams, whereas the Ottomans used flat sheets of steel coiled into a spiral, which produced great strength in the barrel. As was noted during the siege of Malta in 1565, their musket fire was more accurate than that of their Christian opponents. As far as organisation was concerned, the Ottomans had a separate corps of gunners, and another of gun-carriage drivers, leading to a cohesion and continuity in the artillery that was largely absent in Western armies. Benefiting, moreover, from their self-sufficiency in workmen and raw materials, the Ottomans proved a crucial source of firearms technology in the Islamic world. This provision was linked to the impressive and planned effort that enabled the Ottomans to mount naval efforts in the Indian Ocean. These efforts have been presented as part of a globally informed political response to Portuguese power, although the extent of this commitment has also been questioned.

Along with changes in offensive technology, fortifications also changed in the sixteenth century, but the impact of these changes is also not always clear. During the Thirteen Years' War (1593–1606) between the Ottomans and the Austrian Habsburgs, for example, the Ottomans were able to capture many of the fortresses, including Györ in 1594, Eger in 1596, Kanissa in 1600 and Esztergom in 1605, that had recently been modified by the Austrians using the cutting-edge Italian expertise of the period (Figure 2.3). Thus advances in fortifications did not provide a paradigm leap (or revolution) forward in the defensiveness of Christendom, but were only as good as their defenders and logistical support. Thus it is necessary to consider the advances in fortification, like other developments, in terms of particular circumstances. The Ottomans had no equivalent to the *trace italienne*, the star-shaped fortification designed by Italians, or to the extensive fortifications built in the Austrian-ruled section of Hungary or along the coasts of Naples and Sicily against Barbary raids, but they did not require any such fortifications, as they had not been under equivalent attack. They had a realistic perception of the

Figure 2.3: Ottoman armies besiege the fortified city of Neuhausel (now Nové Zámky) in Slovakia in 1663, in an engraving from a book on the Ottoman campaigns in Europe

potential and might of the adversary, and judged they would not need elaborate fortifications (Figure 2.4).

Nevertheless, it would be mistaken to suggest that there was not a change in the balance of advantage in some respects. The Austrian combination of firepower and battlefield fortifications proved particularly effective. Ottoman reports admiring Austrian cannon captured in the Thirteen Years' War suggest that a technological gap in cannon-casting had begun to open by then, although recent work has corrected the earlier view that the Ottomans concentrated on large cannon, rather than larger numbers of more manoeuvrable smaller cannon, and has, instead, emphasised that their ordnance was dominated by small and medium-sized cannon. It has also been shown that they were able to manufacture an adequate supply of gunpowder.

At the same time, the Austrians had improved their military response to the Ottomans not least by regularising the transfer of funds from the empire (Germany) and the Habsburg dominions and by establishing a new administrative system for the frontier. For example, armouries were transformed into arsenals; the activities of military architects were coordinated in the Border Fortress Captain Generalcies by a Superintendent of Construction

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
Figure 2.4: Plan of the Citadel of Turin in 1664, showing *trace italienne*, the star-shaped fortifications designed to withstand cannon

and, after 1569, by the Fortress Construction Commissioner; a new post, the Chief Provisions Supply Officer for Hungary, was established; and in 1577 a military conference in Vienna produced an informed plan for the administration and improvement of frontier fortresses.

At the same time, the improvements in the Austrian military did not match Ottoman capability: there was a lack of standing forces, and the central administration and logistical underpinning of war were overly dependent on the support of the local Estates (Parliaments). The Ottomans were far stronger, which helps explain their earlier conquest of Hungary. The Austrians, indeed, required a formidable effort in order to stem the Ottoman attacks that followed this conquest, and during the Thirteen Years' War they continued to rely on the subordinate parts of their empire, including the Wallachians, for assistance. No clear superiority on land was to be demonstrated until the defeat of the Ottomans by the Austrians and their allies in the 1680s. Thus the effectiveness of any Western transformation of the

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culture of war on land is unclear, and should not be exaggerated, in so far as the West's ability to expand at the expense of other powers was concerned. Indeed, while the pace of the Muslim assault on European Christendom by land and sea greatly slackened in the last two decades of the sixteenth century in part because of the strength of the response, this reduction was also due to the Ottoman focus on war with the Safavids and, to a lesser extent, Moroccan expansion across the Sahara. In the early seventeenth century, the Ottomans suffered their greatest military humiliation not at the hands of Austria or Poland, but from Persia, which did not enjoy any structural, material or tactical superiority, but, rather, the military and political skill of the energetic Shah Abbas. The ability of armies to fight on while under pressure was a key factor, as were experienced troops, other fighting methods alongside fire-power, leadership, and unit cohesion, all of which permitted an adaptation to the circumstances of the day, notably terrain and weather, as well as the moves of opponents. Muslim assaults also resumed with the eventually successful invasion of Venetian-ruled Crete in 1645, followed by offensives against Austria and in Ukraine, campaigns that do not fit with the habitual stress on Western expansion.

Warfare at sea

In the European world, it was British naval mastery and the use to which it was put that brought the most significant changes. This mastery was clear in the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13), when it was devoted largely to the support of power projection in Europe, as exemplified by both the major British presence in the Low Countries and large-scale intervention in Spain and the western Mediterranean.

In the War of the Austrian Succession, the Royal Navy also focused on European waters, in part because of the French invasion attempt in 1744 and French invasion preparations in 1745–6. The British did not gain a clear position of naval mastery until 1747. Two impressive British victories off Cape Finisterre revealed that the French navy was unable to protect its long-distance trade. Having failed to fulfil expectations in the early stages of the war with Spain and, later, France (1739–48), the Royal Navy became an effective strategic force by 1747. By then, however, French successes in the Low Countries were the focus of British concern and planning.

The British position was challenged by the Bourbons in 1746–55, as France and Spain then launched more warships than Britain. Fortunately for Britain, Spain did not join the Seven Years' War until 1762, and, by then, her ally

France had been seriously defeated at sea. The crucial campaign was that of 1759. Choiseul, the leading French minister, planned a naval concentration to cover an invasion of Britain, prefiguring Napoleon's plan in 1805. However, the division of the French navy between the far-apart bases of Brest and Toulon made a concentration of strength difficult, and the British benefited from this division to defeat the French squadrons separately in bold attacking actions at Lagos (Portugal) and Quiberon Bay. All possibility of a major French invasion of Britain was now gone, and the British were confirmed in their view that they were *the* naval power. The way was now fully open for the projection of power. In 1762, Havana, the leading Spanish naval and military base in the West Indies, was captured by a major amphibious operation.

The greater effectiveness of the British navy was largely due to its having more ships, to its extensive and effective administrative system, to the strength of public finances, and to good naval leadership. Britain had a more meritocratic promotion system and a more unified naval tradition than those of France, and a greater commitment of national resources to naval rather than land warfare, a political choice that reflected the major role of trade and the character of the national self-image. The French financial system lacked the institutional strength and stability of its British counterpart, and this lack badly affected French naval finances in 1759. The French also did not have an effective chain of naval command, and trade was less important to their government and their political culture.

Britain's commercial position was enhanced by the protection offered by the Royal Navy. Similarly, the ability to wreck the foreign trade of rivals could cripple their imperial systems and greatly hamper their economies. Even if it was not possible to inflict this degree of damage, higher insurance premiums, danger money for sailors, and the need to resort to convoys and other defensive measures, could push up the cost of trade. Vessels were seized by warships and by privateers – private vessels given licences to take enemy ships. Privateers were smaller and less heavily gunned than ships of the line, but they were more manoeuvrable and of shallower draught, and were thus more appropriate for commerce raiding. French privateering bases, especially St Malo and Dunkirk, proved difficult to contain, and the British suffered from the *guerre de course* (privateering war). At the same time, Britain's relative success against French and Spanish privateers owed much to the size of the navy.

In contrast to differences in size, Western navies were similar in their ships and weapons. Indeed, the thesis of the contemporary British historian Edward Gibbon that a similarity in weaponry would prevent any one Western power from achieving a position of hegemony was inaccurate as far as the

Figure 2.5: Oil painting by the Franco-British artist Dominic Serres (1722–93), the official naval painter for King George III, shows a French man of war surrendering to a British ship

maritime world was concerned, and also with regard to the transoceanic rivalry between Britain and France. For example, Sir Thomas Slade, Surveyor of the British Navy from 1755 to 1771, designed a series of two-decker 74-gun warships that were both manoeuvrable and capable of holding their own in the punishing close-range artillery duels of line of battle engagements, and he did so working from French and Spanish warships captured in the 1740s (Figure 2.5). Benefiting from the general increase in long-distance naval capability that stemmed in part from changes in ship design, the British used weapons and tactics similar to those of their Western rivals. That does not mean that there were no contrasts in effectiveness that help explain British success, however. Superior gunnery was a key point. Britain had an advantage in technology and industrial capability, as well as having good seamanship and well-drilled gun crews who could deliver a formidable rate of fire.

The eighteenth century: Which West? Which East?

Although the standard story of the Military Revolution does not pay much attention to the eighteenth century, this was actually an important period,

not only for determining the relative position of the West, but also for determining 'Which West?' and 'Which East?'

In the West, the struggle between Britain and France (and Spain) dominates attention. In particular, fighting from North America to West Africa, the West Indies to the Philippines, and Europe to India made the Seven Years' War (1756–63) into what is often termed the first global war. However, the relevance of such a description for a conflict that excluded East Asia, an area that is of much greater significance if the world is remapped in terms of population, is unclear. Within India, moreover, the key issue was Afghan expansion, not conflict between Britain and France or British expansion in Bengal. Focusing on Britain and France means emphasising the maritime dimension of the Western account, notably the British perspective, and underplaying the landward dimension of Asian warfare.

The latter, indeed, came to a head in the 1750s as Manchu China finally won its struggle with the Zungars of Xinjiang and then pressed on to conquer part of Muslim Central Asia. This conflict is generally underplayed in military history and is certainly ignored in accounts of the Seven Years' War, but there are some interesting comparisons. One of the most important is that of the role of organisational sophistication and logistical capacity in the case of both the Manchu and the British. The Manchu army advancing into Central Asia required the application of resources in order to project power. This was particularly because food was moved from settled arable regions to the less-populated, nomadic, pastoral interior.

The nature of resource-transfer and power-projection was different in the case of Britain and the combination of the Royal Navy and amphibious forces as they operated across the oceans. Indeed, one of the key problems in the use of force was the ability to deploy it at a distance. This was an important constituent of the global dimension of conflict. Again, the naval component provided a geographical range not seen on land. Thus, there was a contrast between the extension of British power in the New World and the projection of both Manchu power into Central Asia and Russian power into both modern Germany and the Balkans from the 1710s.

Accepting the caveat, therefore, that the Seven Years' War was not global, it is appropriate to consider its range both in Europe and further afield. Within Europe, this was a war incorporating an interacting range of conflicts that stretched from Portugal to Russia (Figure 2.6). That did not mean that all of Europe was involved, however. Indeed, whereas the Italian states had played a major role in the European wars of the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth, this was very much not the case for the Seven

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
Figure 2.6: The bombardment of Prague by the Prussian army in 1757, during the Seven Years' War, in an engraving by the English engraver Peter Benazech

Years' War. That may not seem an important exclusion, but Italy was politically, economically and culturally more significant in this era than in the following quarter-millennium. Moreover, the war did not extend to include conflict between Denmark and Sweden, conflict that had been so common over the previous two centuries. Nor did the Ottoman Empire play a role. Indeed, the grand vizier of the period helped ensure a peaceful direction to Ottoman policy.

Beyond Europe, naval strength facilitated power projection, but a key element in North America was the determination of the British government to act there well before naval superiority was clearly achieved in 1759, which led to the adoption of an offensive strategy in North America and to the dispatch of major British forces. The political atmosphere in government also favoured defending British interests, so British failures in North America in 1755–7 encouraged greater commitments rather than withdrawal. Political priorities, therefore, were very important in the global dimension of the British struggle, and because the British took the initiative, this helped ensure that, as a world war, the Seven Years' War reflected the dynamics, exigencies and contingencies of British politics. There was nothing inevitable about the

choice to focus on North America, however, and this remained the case once large-scale campaigning in North America had begun. At every stage, there were alternative actual or possible commitments, both in Europe and across the oceans.

This result was also not inevitable. If, in 1815, Britain was the strongest state in the world ruling the most powerful empire, the situation had been very different seventy years earlier, as Jacobite forces under Bonnie Prince Charlie (Charles Edward Stuart) advanced on Derby, outmanoeuvring the regular armies sent to defeat them, while the British government feared a supporting French invasion of southern England, which indeed was planned. If, by 1815, Britain was the dominant military power in India, in 1746 the British had lost Madras (Chennai) to the French, who were then the leading Western power in India and who seemed most likely to win co-operation from Indian rulers. Indeed, a Jacobite success in 1745–6 would have altered Britain's position in the world, and the character of the 'West', not only with regard to political alignments but also with reference to the nature of public culture, economic interest and social dynamics.

Choices were also involved in conflicts in Asia, which have been characterised as the question of 'Which East?' The most important of these was debate within China over how far to pursue expansionism and on which frontiers. The question of 'Which East?' was actually less important an issue than in other periods as there was no real challenge to the unity and cohesion of the Chinese state. The situation was very different as far as the wider Manchu Empire was concerned, however, for the Zunghar challenge threatened Manchu control over the eastern Mongols. China's total victory over the Zunghars in the 1750s helped settle the related questions of China's conflict with challengers from the steppe and its dominance of 'near-China'. In contrast, Japan's complete quiescence in international relations meant that the crisis of the 1590s over control of Korea did not recur.

South Asia passed through more profound changes, notably with the near-total collapse of the Mughal Empire in the eighteenth century. Whereas in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Mughals, Ottomans and Safavids had been generally successful in linking their frontier areas with their imperial objectives, and also in controlling interregional trade routes, in the eighteenth century they failed to meet the challenge. By 1740, the Marathas had become a major power in India, although not further afield and not across all of India. They remained a key force in 1800, but were now joined, in eastern and southern India, by Britain. Furthermore, Britain's total victory over Tipu Sultan of Mysore in 1799 demonstrated the extent of change since

1740 and indeed since the early 1780s, when the British were under heavy pressure from Mysore in campaigns that showed the effectiveness of cavalry. Similarly, in 1779, Maratha forces had inflicted a significant defeat on British forces in Western India.

At the same time, there is the major question of relative significance, both to contemporaries and in terms of subsequent developments. The British victory over Tipu Sultan was only one of many important developments in the 1790s, including the White Lotus rebellion in China, the Russian suppression of Polish independence, the successful rising against French rule in St Domingue (Haiti), and the conflicts in Western Europe, the French Revolutionary Wars, which broke out in 1792. By the end of the eighteenth century, a range of effective and dynamic military systems was present around the world. It was far from inevitable in 1800 that the systems of the Marathas and Revolutionary/Napoleonic France were to succumb speedily; the Chinese understood by 1860 that their system was in need of radical change, but this was not clear in 1800.

However, Britain and Russia were clearly impressive powers by 1700 and, even more, by 1800. They and China were the key military successes of the eighteenth century, and that helps attract attention to the period, because, albeit with the USA succeeding Britain as the leading maritime force, this triumvirate still constitutes the world's leading military powers, having fended off a series of challenges, and adapted successfully to a number of key changes.

Thus, the eighteenth century excites attention, not only as the last age of a truly diverse and varied global military situation, but also because the century sees the onset of a modern international system. In contrast to China and the Western states, the Turks, the Safavids and their successors in Persia, and the Mughal successor states all lagged in creating the infrastructure of institutional politics and in establishing stable civil–military relations. The Turkish failure to maintain the strength of their earlier system was particularly notable, for by the second half of the eighteenth century many provincial governors were ready to rebel. The political culture of the Ottoman court and public finances also failed to support the enhancement of Turkish military capability.

Throughout the early modern period, then, warfare in much of the world was planned and waged quite effectively and decisively without reference to Western methods, technology and politics. Moreover, conflict between Western and non-Western powers proved the basis for mutual innovations that shaped war-making in later centuries.

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The first global dialogues: inter-cultural relations, 1400–1800

JOHN E. WILLS, JR.

By 1400 CE, interactions among cultures had a very long and intricate history, but none of them had been global because none had involved the peoples of the Americas with those of Eurasia and Africa. By 1800 people of European and African origin had brought their cultures to the Americas, and a complex and instructive web of interactivity and creativity among them and with Native Americans can be traced. But it seems to be useful to begin elsewhere, with the post-1400 changes in some of the longest interactions, those in Inner Asia. This essay then goes on to look at interactions centered on China, on Islam, on South Asia, and on the eastern Mediterranean, before discussing the new global interactions of the Europeans with the great civilizations of the Americas and of Africans with Europeans in Africa and the Americas.

Tibetans, Mongols, and Manchus

High, arid, thinly populated Tibet was not likely to attract the attention of the Mongols on their way to conquering Iraq, Persia, and China, nor to pose any military threat to them. But there was a logic of political advantage and cultural content in the interactions between Mongols and Tibetans. In Tibet many isolated Buddhist monastic centers claiming supremacy of their own incarnate emanations of the great bodhisattvas could easily slide into warfare with each other that disrupted trade and farming and forced herders to flee the best pastures. A modest Mongol military intervention could give major support to claims of supremacy of a particular lama or sect. Conversely, the Mongol realms were always ready to shatter in fratricidal war at each succession, and the supernatural powers and visual splendors of a great lama's visit could bolster one contender, especially if the lama declared the khan to be a reincarnation of the great Chinggis. The two sides embraced this logic at a remarkably early stage of their relations. In 1244–5 a distinguished monk brought two of his own nephews to the camp of a son of the Great

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Khan. He wrote to other Tibetan leaders urging submission to the Mongols, and left in the Mongol camp the nine-year-old Pakpa and his seven-year-old brother.[1] The boys must have had an excellent staff of Tibetan minders and teachers; Pakpa moved to the camp of the Great Khubilai in 1253, and received full monastic ordination in 1256. In 1261 Khubilai gave him the splendid title of Teacher of the Realm, *guo shi*, with authority over all Buddhists ruled by the Mongols. Pakpa devised a new script, still known as the Pakpa Script, which was supposed to be usable for all the languages of the Mongol realms but never caught on, probably because its letters are hard to distinguish from one another.

The early Ming rulers understood the importance of Tibetan Buddhism for relations with the Mongols, although they made no effective use of that knowledge. Would-be Mongol leaders had to prove that they were blood descendants of Chinggis and now also had to have the recognition of some great lama. The next important turning point in the development of the Mongolia–Tibet cultural connection was the meeting in 1578 of Altan Khan (1507–82), the ruler of the western Mongols, and Sonam Gyatso (1543–88), the current superior of the important Yellow Sect of Tibetan Buddhism. At this meeting Sonam Gyatso declared that he was a reincarnation of an earlier lama, and Altan Khan conferred on him the title Dalai Lama, Lama of Oceanic Wisdom; the title was retrospectively conferred on his two predecessors, so Sonam Gyatso was the third Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama in turn recognized Altan Khan, then aged 71, as a Cakravartin King of the Dharma, a Turner of the Wheel of the Law, Alms-Master to the Dalai Lama's Offering Site,[2] and reincarnation of Chinggis Khan.

Ligdan Khan (1588–1634), the last substantial contender to Chinggisid central power, was crushed in 1632 by Hongtaiji,[3] the ruler of the rising

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[1] Also written Phagspa and variations; I use simplified spellings of Tibetan names from Johan Elverskog, *Buddhism and Islam on the Silk Road* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), and in one case from Susan Naquin, *Peking: Temples and City Life, 1400–1900* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000). Basic sources for the Pakpa episode are Morris Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 40–2, 119, 143–6, and 155–60; Herbert Franke, "Tibetans in Yüan China," in John D. Langlois, Jr. (ed.), *China Under Mongol Rule* (Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 296–328; and Luciano Petech, "Tibetan Relations with Sung China and with the Mongols," in Morris Rossabi (ed.), *China Among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and its Neighbors, 10th–14th Centuries* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 173–203.

[2] These are Elverskog's terms; others use "patron" and "teacher."

[3] Gertraude Roth Li, "State Building Before 1644," in Willard J. Peterson (ed.), *Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge University Press, 1986), vol. IX, pp. 9–72.

Manchu power, which already was involved with Tibetan Buddhism. Of course the Manchus could not claim Chinggisid ancestry, which made the legitimation of connections with an important lama all the more vital for their efforts to control the Mongols. In 1642 the Mongol Gushi Khan sent troops into Tibet during a period of civil war and supported the establishment of the Great Fifth Dalai Lama (1617–82) as the temporal ruler of central Tibet, with his capital in Lhasa. The Manchus, established in Beijing as the Qing dynasty, did not leave the challenge unmet. The Dalai Lama was invited to Beijing in 1653 and splendidly received, but explicitly as a subordinate bearing tribute. In Beijing the first new Tibetan temple was built to house the Dalai Lama and his suite in 1653. Eventually there were *thirty-two* Tibetan temples in Beijing. The most famous of them, the Yonghegong, still a major tourist sight today, at its peak housed 500–600 Mongol, Manchu, and Tibetan monks.[4] Major projects were supported for the printing and translation of Tibetan texts.

The Qing effort to control Tibet was intensified in response to the rise of the Zunghar Khanate in central Asia in the seventeenth century. The Dalai Lama conferred a title on the Zunghar rulers, but the Qing sought to deny them any form of Tibetan Buddhist legitimation. In 1717 the Zunghar invaded Lhasa in support of a candidate to the Dalai Lama succession, but they were driven out by the Qing in 1720. Qing power, with a resident garrison of 1500, was more firmly established there in 1750. The Mongols were drawn into a web of Qing legal administration and division into "banners," units of household registration and military organization; another important factor in the decline of the Mongol threat to China in the 1700s was that 30 percent of Mongol males were monks living in monasteries.[5]

The solidity of the new reality of Mongols-of-the-Qing and the power in it of Tibetan Buddhism was stunningly embodied in the creation, largely in the reign of the Qianlong Emperor (r. 1736–96), of the great complex of buildings and parks at the "Mountain Estate for Avoiding the Heat" (*Bishu shanzhuang*), still to be seen at Chengde, northeast of Beijing beyond the Great Wall.[6] The Qianlong Emperor was personally a serious student of Tibetan Buddhism,

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[4] Naquin, *Peking*, pp. 584–91.

[5] Evelyn S. Rawski, *The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 244–63, and Johan Elverskog, *Our Great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism, and the State in Late Imperial China* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006).

[6] The place is called Jehol Rehe, "Hot River," for its hot springs, in some older literature. The best modern studies are Philippe Forêt, *Mapping Chengde: The Qing Landscape Enterprise* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000), and James A. Millward (ed.),

and had a congenial companion in these studies in Rolpay Dorje, a thoroughly multilingual and multicultural successor in a line reaching back to Pakpa. Rolpay Dorje had been educated in the palace school with the imperial princes in Beijing, and was resident in Beijing for over fifty years. The high point of this connection was the visit of the Panchen Lama, the highest-ranking lama after the Dalai Lama, to Chengde and Beijing in 1780, cut short by his death from smallpox.

China absorbing and influencing

Chinese elite culture in the early Ming was marked by the final victory of the long Neo-Confucian campaign for values and practices sanctioned by the Chinese classics, reinforced by a vehement reassertion of traditional practices and institutions after the great trauma of Mongol Yuan rule, with its radically alien ruling house, wide variety of foreign clients, and limited opportunities for traditional Confucian scholars. A neat three-level systematization of the "ladder of success" of the examination system – with exams at the county, provincial, and national level – was the key to the reproduction of a large elite of ambitious and idealistic conformists. Especially in times of commercial prosperity and widespread commercial printing after about 1500, there was plenty of room for innovation and controversy within the Confucian tradition, however. This was accompanied by lay interest in Buddhism, court interest in religious Daoism, assertions that the three teachings (Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism) were all one, acceptance and condemnation of urban non-conformist lifestyles, and many more trends, none of them drawing heavily on stimuli from outside the empire of Great Ming.

In Neo-Confucian theory all foreign rulers were potentially tributaries of the Son of Heaven, and in the long run the civilizing influence of the Chinese tradition would awe and pacify the barbarians; their envoys were so treated if they sent an embassy to the capital. This attitude did not require much attention to cultural realities outside the empire. Nonetheless, in these centuries there were cultural interactions that stretched beyond China's borders. Within China, people from commoners to local elites to an occasional high official found that they could stay respectable, not in trouble with the authorities, and committed to the core of the Confucian tradition while giving their allegiance and much of their intellectual and emotional energy to

New Qing Imperial History: The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengde (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004).

an obviously foreign teaching, Islam or Roman Catholicism. Korea and Japan experienced dramatic and idiosyncratic responses to Neo-Confucianism, which in Japan blended with anti-Christianity.

Turning first to foreign teachings in China: There had been Muslim sojourners in China, especially in the emporia of its land and sea connections with western Asia, since 700 CE or earlier; the first evidence for mosques is from around 1000. Muslims had been especially numerous and influential under the Mongol Yuan. Foreign Muslims might come with an embassy, spend some years trading, or settle permanently, but the Muslim presence in Ming China was largely Chinese-speaking. Many Chinese Muslims had no competence in Arabic or Persian beyond their basic prayers, and, in striking contrast to the always-foreign Catholic missionaries, they felt themselves to be Chinese. The question of how to be both a good Muslim and a good Chinese was not a simple one.[7] From the mid-1500s on, there was an energetic multi-centered effort to make important Muslim texts available in Chinese and to teach them in mosque schools to many boys and young men, not just to future imams. The scholar Hu Dengzhou made the long trip from the Xi'an area to spend years in Mecca and Medina, brought back texts, and had many students who carried on his work. Careful recording of lineages of teacher–student relations was of course important both in Islam and in other Chinese traditions, Confucian and Buddhist.

By about 1600 these activities had spread to the great cities of eastern China, where abundant printing, overheated consumerism, and a range of options inside and outside Confucianism – even the first Jesuits! – must have motivated many Muslims to seek a firmer grasp of their heritage. An extensive "genealogy" of teacher–student lineages, compiled about 1635, included many stories of more or less miraculous discoveries of previously unknown texts, of scholars with prodigious memories, and of major translation projects. Nanjing emerged as a major center of Muslim learning, where many Persian Sufi texts were translated. Many of the scholars involved were fully trained in the Chinese classics; the Muslim scholarly effort must have been especially attractive during the massive dislocations and limited opportunities for Confucian scholars of the Ming–Qing transition. Some now wrote original texts summarizing basic Islamic teaching in ways that made them complementary to the Confucian mainstream.

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[7] The following is based on Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, *The Dao of Muhammad: A Cultural History of Muslims in Late Imperial China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, Harvard University Press, 2005).

Ma Zhu, a descendant of the prince who consolidated Mongol rule over Yunnan and himself a Sayyid, a descendant of the Prophet, took his elegant *Guide* (*Zhinan*) to the basics of Islam on a long tour of all the major Muslim centers in China, and secured many greetings and endorsements from local scholars and teachers. In the next generation Liu Zhi (1660–1739) wrote three widely read and admired works on Muslim beliefs, institutions, and the life of the Prophet.

In these books and quite a few more that followed, Muhammad is called a Sage (*sheng*), not a Prophet, Islam is called a way (*Dao*), and mosques are described as centers of teaching and study, not of worship. Sagehood and prophethood both can be thought of as states of ordinary human beings, but very different; the Sage draws on his own moral and mental resources to build on the actions and teachings of earlier Sages and create a Way, a set of values and social practices, while the Prophet transmits to his people God's words and commands. Sages may devise Ways to realize human moral potential in different ways in different times or places, but these Ways will be fundamentally the same. The great classical teacher Mencius had noted that sage rulers of antiquity had come from the east and the west, and their ways had fit together like the two halves of a jade tally. Thus, Liu Zhi argued, the Way of Muhammad was the ultimate way for his time and place, and could be practiced even in China without damage to the central Confucian Way. In fact, it contained some possibly useful supplements to it, especially in explaining the origins and nature of the universe. This scholarly construction of a Way of Muhammad flourished throughout the 1700s. Sometimes Chinese Muslims called the core books they treasured *Han Kitab*, combining an assertion of inheritance of great Chinese traditions all the way from the Han Dynasty with *kitab*, the Arabic word for "book."

The Tibetan Buddhist "Mongols-of-the-Qing" were less interested in dialogue with Muslims than some of their ancestors had been. In the late 1700s, in a time of great stress and many rebellions, some in western border areas involving Muslims, a high official in an eastern province reported to the Qianlong Emperor on some Chinese Muslim books, which he found heterodox and dangerous. The emperor replied calmly that these books praised the good qualities of a great teacher and were the works of Muslims of China proper, not of dangerous frontiersmen.

Along with Muslims, there had long been Christians in China, first Eastern rites Christians and then a few Orthodox and Roman Christian monks. In the middle of the sixteenth century the first Jesuits arrived, first to islands and

then in the 1580s to the mainland. Their arrival was most propitiously timed.[8] To many thoughtful Chinese it seemed that traditional values were being violated by a society in which lavish spending and governmental corruption were more important than conscientious scholarship and public service. As some Chinese scholars became acquainted with the Jesuits, they were impressed by two kinds of "substantiality" (*shi*): first, a selfless commitment that had prompted them to voyage so far from home, and second, the solidity and usefulness of their knowledge of astronomy, geography, and much more. The Jesuits, especially the brilliant Italian Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), came to respect the scholars' moral quest, and to argue that Christian teachings in fact supported and supplemented Confucian teachings and helped to combat the tendency to "irresponsibility" that had come from Buddhism. They spent a great deal of time studying the Chinese language, and aroused some interest among Chinese scholars in their maps of the world and their astronomical skills. As they studied the ancient classical texts of the Chinese, the Jesuits began to argue that the ancient sages had known the True God, only to lose that knowledge later as a result of Buddhist influence.

In all this the Jesuits were pupils of some remarkable scholar-officials, several of whom became Christian converts. The most important was Xu Guangqi (1562–1633), a major scholar and compiler of an important encyclopedia of agricultural techniques. When Xu became a high official in the late 1620s he opened the way for the Jesuits to demonstrate their skills in observational astronomy at the Imperial Court, where the astronomical calibration of the annual calendar was an important function of government. The Jesuits' methods were found more accurate than those then in use, and from the 1630s until after 1700 Jesuits were employed at the Imperial Board of Astronomy. Their position at court provided political cover for missionaries and converts in the provinces, even though Christianity was not formally granted toleration until 1692. Under the new Qing Dynasty established in 1644, the Kangxi emperor himself learned bits of astronomy and mathematics from them. Their positions at court survived a misguided Roman effort in the early eighteenth century to legislate the ceremonies Chinese converts were permitted to perform to their ancestors, generally termed the "Chinese

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[8] Willard J. Peterson, "Learning from Heaven: The Introduction of Christianity and Other Western Ideas into Late Ming China," and John W. Witek, S. J., "Catholic Missions and the Chinese Reaction to Christianity, 1644–1800," in John E. Wills, Jr. (ed.), *China and Maritime Europe, 1500–1800: Trade, Settlement, Diplomacy, and Missions* (Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 78–182.

rites controversy," but the Qing forbade their subjects to follow the foreign faith, which survived largely in remote rural areas.

Given the centrality of ceremony and family in Chinese understandings of culture, it is especially interesting to find intricate "interweavings" of Catholic and traditional Chinese practices in the funeral practices of Chinese converts. Missions in Fu'an County, Fujian, stimulated by Spanish Dominicans based in Manila, rejected many of the adaptations to Chinese tradition worked out by the Jesuits. This community survived persecution from the 1720s to the 1850s, and has been reported in recent years alive, well, and not in communion with the state-sponsored Patriotic Church.[9]

Turning to the spread of Chinese teachings out of China: In the 1400s and 1500s the kings and high ministers of Chosŏn Korea devoted much ink and paper and many hours of vehement argument to sorting out which of two or more disputants was the primary heir in an aristocratic lineage. There were some financial advantages to being primary heir, but more important were his social status in a rigid hierarchy and preferential access to high office. The elaborate kinship system gradually imposed in these struggles was acknowledged to be of Chinese origin, the product of the Neo-Confucian movement of Song times. Chinese texts were regularly consulted and survivals of Korean tradition deplored. This strenuous imposition of a foreign pattern on the most personal relations of an elite is one of history's strangest and most instructive cases of cultural interaction. It resulted in a symbiosis of a rigid kinship system and a narrowly centralized aristocratic state that survived past 1900 and has echoes in Korean society and politics today. The imposition of the Neo-Confucian family pattern began with the founding of the Chosŏn Dynasty in 1392, after about 200 years of internal disorder followed by nearly complete subordination to the Mongol Yuan Dynasty. Some aristocrats had already been studying Neo-Confucian texts. Now they were convinced of the urgency of re-building an order that would sanction their dominance of politics, strengthen the state, and reduce or eliminate the power and wealth of the Buddhist monasteries and the prevalence of Buddhist ideas and practices. Chinese Neo-Confucian texts gave abundant support to anti-Buddhism, from metaphysics to funerals. The *simultaneity* of the

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[9] Nicolas Standaert, *The Interweaving of Rituals: Funerals in the Cultural Exchange Between China and Europe* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2008). See also Liam Matthew Brockey, *Journey to the East: The Jesuit Mission to China, 1579–1724* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), and Eugenio Menegon, *Ancestors, Virgins, and Friars: Christianity as a Local Religion in Late Imperial China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asian Center, Harvard University Press, 2009).

cultural and intellectual novelty of Neo-Confucianism in Korea and the intense effort to rebuild political order produced this remarkable transformation.[10]

The remarkable story of Japan's "Christian century" began with the rather accidental arrival of the great Jesuit Francis Xavier in 1549.[11] Catholic preaching fell on the fertile ground of moral and political chaos. The God of the foreigners at first sounded like another of the bodhisattvas to whom some gave total devotion, who of course were also of foreign origin. Neither emperor nor samurai nor Buddhas nor the Way of the Gods (Shinto) were producing a humane society. Regional military rulers in western Japan quickly realized that Portuguese ships were more likely to come to the ports of rulers who had accepted the new faith. Subordinate samurai and commoners followed their lords out of various mixtures of obedience, opportunism, and fervent conviction. There were several near misses at the establishment of all-Christian cities or territories. But in 1587 Hideyoshi, the second great builder of new forms of political order, explicitly compared the Christians to the followers of the Buddhist sects, crushed in the 1560s, that had been most menacing in their rejection of all hierarchy and samurai authority. He revoked Jesuit privileges in the port of Nagasaki and banned the missionaries from Japan. From 1612 on, persecution of Catholicism was brutally thorough. Many missionaries and thousands of Japanese died for their faith, sometimes under terrible torture. The martyrs proved that Catholic teaching had fallen on fertile soil in Japan, and that the Jesuits had known what they were doing. By 1640, however, there were only tiny remnants of Japanese Catholicism deeply hidden, the Portuguese had been expelled from Japan, and Japanese had been forbidden to leave their country in order to avoid renewed Catholic contacts.

At the same time that Christianity was being banned, Japanese interest in Chinese models of government and the values and worldviews that supported them grew rapidly. Confucianism was obviously foreign but thoroughly hospitable to political hierarchy. Some daimyo (regional lords) were interested, and the shoguns (military dictators) of the Tokugawa family who were building a new order of central control eventually became major

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[10] Martina Deuchler, *The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Ideology* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, Harvard University Press, 1992).

[11] Jurgis Elisonas, "Christianity and the Daimyo," in John Whitney Hall (ed.), James McClain (asst. ed.), *The Cambridge History of Japan* (Cambridge University Press, 1991), vol. IV, pp. 301–72.

patrons. More important still was the rapidly growing demand for new forms of education as members of the large samurai class sorted out their lives now that they were expected not to forget swordsmanship and loyalty to the death but to sublimate them in lives devoted to keeping order and keeping records. By 1700 it is likely that almost all samurai were literate. Some teachers were supported by the daimyo in their domains, but some of the most successful were purely commercial.[12]

We can trace a succession of these teachers who attracted hundreds or even thousands of students, wrote a lot, and gave a tone to Japanese intellectual life that still was important in the 1800s and early 1900s. Until about 1860 they did this without ever visiting China. Some had trouble finding a particular Chinese book, but in general Chinese trade to Nagasaki made it possible for them to draw on a wide range of Ming–Qing thought. Their responses to what they read were striking in their range of variation and in their emotional intensity, which were easier to maintain as a solitary reader than in the dense high-culture interactions of a major Chinese city. For example, Itō Jinsai (1627–1705) bluntly criticized the dominant Neo-Confucian teachers for their obsessions with hierarchy, ceremonial detail, and the metaphysics of the Song scholar Zhu Xi. Insisting on reading the Chinese classics and early histories for himself, not as summarized by Zhu Xi and other Song and Ming scholars, he asserted that ancient China offered an example that could be followed of a society built on benevolence and on open-hearted responsiveness to the needs and feelings of others. His school at one time had over 200 students, and was carried on successfully by his son.[13]

Itō and the others discussed here saw themselves as offering "substantiality" or "practicality" (Chinese *shi*, Japanese *jitsu*, the same virtue some Chinese sensed in the Jesuits) in contrast to the "emptiness" offered by Buddhists and some Neo-Confucians. Yamazaki Ansai (1618–82) was as vehement as Itō; his target was Buddhism. His range of "substantial" interests and studies was very wide, from astronomy to famine relief. The school he

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[12] For an excellent summary of the great transformation of Japan around 1600, including the intellectual developments discussed here, see Conrad Totman, *Early Modern Japan* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993).

[13] Totman, *Early Modern Japan*, pp. 179–82; Wm. Theodore de Bary, "Sagehood as a Secular and Spiritual Ideal in Tokugawa Neo-Confucianism," pp. 127–88; and Minamoto Ryōen, "Jitsugaku and Empirical Rationalism in the First Half of the Tokugawa Period," pp. 375–469, both in Wm. Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom (eds.), *Principle and Practicality: Essays in Neo-Confucianism and Practical Learning* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).

founded at one time was reported to have 6,000 students.[14] Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728) was able to draw on another generation or two of Chinese classical scholarship and confronted times when "substantial" solutions to the political and economic problems of Japan were more urgent and less obvious. Accurate understanding of ancient Chinese texts revealed a world, kept in harmony by music and ceremony, which was so different from his own times that there was no way back to it. But Japan had its own spirits to be reverently served by music and ceremony, and Japan, like ancient China, was feudal; its moral and economic stability, he thought, could be restored by getting the samurai away from big spending in the castle towns and instead living in the villages.[15]

The most surprising interaction of Japanese intellectuals with a foreign culture, and one of the most instructive cases of inter-cultural interaction in the early modern world, was *Rangaku – "Ran"* from *"Oranda,"* Holland, *"gaku"* meaning "studies."[16] In ways not altogether different from responses to Confucianism, scholarly samurai, making futures for themselves in a country at peace and worrying about the future of that country, seized on modest stimuli and struggled to understand and translate Dutch books which provided useful information about science, technology, medicine, and a complicated world that sometimes threatened to intrude on Japan's self-imposed isolation. A sense of wary isolation intensified the responses. So did the ease with which some clues to the outside world could be brought to Nagasaki by the Dutch, sold there, and wind up in the collection of some regional lord or the Shogun himself – books, maps, but also telescopes, microscopes, static electricity generators, magic lanterns, and more. A very important focus of exchange was in medicine, on the two important

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[14] Totman, *Early Modern Japan*, pp. 161–75; Okada Takehiro, "Practical Learning in the Chu Hsi School: Yamazaki Ansai and Kaibara Ekken," in de Bary and Bloom, *Principle and Practicality*, pp. 231–305; and Herman Ooms, *Tokugawa Ideology: Early Constructs, 1570–1680* (Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 194–286.

[15] Totman, *Early Modern Japan*, pp. 283–91; de Bary, "Sagehood as a Secular," in de Bary and Bloom (eds.), *Principle and Practicality*, pp. 154–72; and Samuel Hideo Yamashita, "Nature and Artifice in the Writings of Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728)," in Peter Nosco (ed.), *Confucianism and Tokugawa Culture* (Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 138–65.

[16] There is a rich body of scholarship in English on this topic; basic are C. R. Boxer, *Jan Compagnie in Japan, 1600–1817: An Essay on the Cultural, Artistic and Scientific Influence Exercised by the Hollanders in Japan from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Centuries*, 2nd rev. edn. (Oxford, Tokyo, and New York: Oxford University Press, 1968); Donald Keene, *The Japanese Discovery of Europe, 1720–1830*, rev. edn. (Stanford University Press, 1969); Marius B. Jansen, "Rangaku and Westernization," *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. XVIII, No. 4 (1984), pp. 541–53; Grant K. Goodman, *Japan and the Dutch, 1600–1853* (London: Curzon, 2000).

occasions when an intelligent man with medical knowledge was in charge of the Dutch trade at Deshima, at other times when a Japanese sought treatment from a Dutch doctor at Nagasaki, or when a physician accompanying the annual homage trip to Edo was consulted by a physician treating important people at the shogunal court. In 1774 Japanese scholars had in hand a European book of anatomy as they watched the dissection of an executed criminal, and found that the plates matched perfectly what they saw; they worked for years to translate the book into Japanese, and its account of human anatomy was widely accepted within a generation.

These were still fairly narrow Dutch windows on a wider world, affecting small numbers of the literate elite. But the basic structure of Japanese politics, society, and culture continued, under great stress to be sure, after 1800, and Russian probes to the north of Japan led to more urgent debates, in which the Rangaku experts argued for the relevance of their peculiar knowledge to the dangers facing the country; some of the pioneers of Japan's energetic opening to the world in the mid-1800s had studied in Rangaku academies.

Muslims among the unbelievers

Islam had appeared on the world stage in the shape of conquering armies, but for centuries Muslim rule had not led to massive forced conversions of conquered peoples. Especially for Christians and Jews, "People of the Book" sharing Semitic monotheist fundamentals with Islam, there was a well-defined and stable pattern of autonomous administration of marriage, inheritance, and so on by elders of a community who were acceptable to the Muslim rulers. Christians and Jews were also exempt from military service, and instead paid a separate *jizya* tax. For Muslims what mattered was not forcing unbelievers to become Muslim, but not being compelled to live under the rule of unbelievers.

By 1400 there were many areas into which Islam had spread by peaceful means, however, especially long-distance trade, and Muslims had to adjust to living under non-Muslim rule. If some measure of communal autonomy could be negotiated with the non-Muslim ruler, the Islamic integrity of the community could be preserved by finding learned men to lead prayers, administer Islamic law, and teach Arabic and the Quran to the next generation. Adventurous travel in search of such employment was common, as seen in the life of the great North African traveler Ibn Battuta. The requirement that every believer who was able to do so make the *hajj* pilgrimage to Mecca, where he or she would encounter the full power and rigor of the

Islamic way of life, re-enforced tradition far more effectively than, for example, the bureaucratic centralization of the Roman Catholic Church. The Muslim community also grew as members converted their neighbors or as they married local women and sent their children to the Quranic school.

The reach of Islam into the unbelieving world was very strongly supported by the broad trend we call Sufism, and eventually by impressive continuities of Sufi lineages and lodges.[17] Muslims who were impressed by the passages in the Quran on the Divine Light, the Prophet's trip to Heaven, and other intimations of a more vivid and personal relation with the Divine than simply obeying His commands might seek out a teacher or leave home and wander in search of one for years at a time. The teacher would draw on everything in his own experience and the student's, including Greek, Persian, and eventually Hindu and African, heritages. As pupils were initiated into higher spiritual levels and became teachers themselves, Sufi orders emerged with different practices, including ecstatic singing and dancing, and became widespread. A Sufi arriving in a new city would hope to find a lodging house of his order. As stories were passed on of the spiritual powers of a great teacher they might include miracles at his tomb, and tombs of Sufi saints became the sites of teaching and celebration and the goals of pilgrimages.

The organizational power of the great Sufi orders has continued from their origins in the 900s to our own times, and has been especially conspicuous on the fringes of the world of Islam. Here Sufi solidarity and lodging of travelers combined with teachers' openness to all forms of the search for God, as they worked patiently to find ways to make local practices compatible with Islam. Sufism was important, for example, in the spread of Islam into the port cities of the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, and Java, including the densely populated rice-growing plains.[18] One Javanese story of the beginnings of Islam there told of a man who was so impressed by the lack of interest in riches of a passing Muslim holy man that he followed the teacher's orders and sat in a trance for years or decades until the holy man returned and told him that he now knew more than his teacher. Power and knowledge gained through trance has its place in Sufi teachings and connects with the world of Islam,

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[17] Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization*, 3 vols. (University of Chicago Press, 1974), vol. II, pp. 201–54.

[18] The extent of Sufism in the spread of Islam in these regions is a matter of controversy among specialists; M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c.1300*, 2nd edn. (Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 10–13. Named Sufi orders are hard to find until after 1800; the broader personal/mystic style seems unmistakable in many stories.

but here the Hindu–Javanese accent is also unmistakable.[19] In the early 1800s Prince Dipanagara, a Javanese ascetic who led the last futile uprising of the old Javanese order, held long vigils in caves and had visions of a patron goddess, but at the same time insisted on being called Pangéran Ngabdulhamit, after Abdul Hamid II, the reigning sultan in Istanbul.[20] Near the other end of the world of Islam, Sufi lineages in Senegal can be traced to 1500 or earlier.[21] The tombs of the great Sufi masters who brought Islam beyond the Sahara have long been centers of pilgrimage at Timbuktu in modern Mali, and in the spring of 2012 were attacked and partly destroyed by Islamic extremists who saw them as pagan corruptions of the true faith.[22]

Neither Hindu nor Muslim: Sufis, sects, and Sikhs

Between 1400 and 1800 Muslims ruled most of the northern river valleys of the Indian sub-continent and gradually extended their power into the south. Within the Delhi sultanates Muslims ruled, but Hindus were the vast majority of the population. At first sight Islam and Hinduism might seem the most unlikely of partners in cultural exchange, Islam's austere monotheism and prohibition of religious imagery confronting the exuberant polytheist imagery of Hinduism. But there was a great deal of intense dialogue, of which the most impressive product was the Sikh religion. From the Hindu side, some of the conditions for dialogue were created by the *bhakti* movement. Beginning in south India with its variety of languages and cultural backgrounds, *bhakti* centered on the ecstatic quest for closeness to or union with a god, often expressed in singing in a vernacular, not in Sanskrit, accessible to anyone regardless of caste or learning. The old Brahmin dominance and learning might not flourish without a Hindu king as patron, but *bhakti* movements continued to spread under Muslim rulers, and occasionally the leader of such a movement could win the toleration of a Muslim ruler or even, if the legends of Sri Krishna

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[19] Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Developments in Morocco and Indonesia* (University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 27–9.

[20] Peter Carey, *The Power of Prophecy: Prince Dipanagara and the End of an Old Order in Java, 1785–1855* [Verhandelingen van het Koninklijke Instituut voor Taal-, Land-, and Volkenkunde] (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), pp. 150–2.

[21] Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 506–8.

[22] *The Economist*, July 7–13, 2012, p. 47.

Caitanya, first guru of the still lively "Hare Krishna" movement, are to be believed, turn him into a devotee of Krishna.[23]

This mixing of different forms of emotional personal devotion was also characteristic of Sufism, which was important throughout the Delhi sultanates. In Bijapur, for example, new lines of transmission of Sufi teaching emerged as masters studied in the Arab world or Persia and then returned, and as Sufis found favor at the courts of Muslim rulers. They began to compose sermons, songs, and poems in the local vernacular to guide their followers along stages of the path toward God. They began to attract many Hindu devotees, who might gradually absorb their teachings and eventually become real converts to Islam. When they asserted their own closeness to God, their own mediation between their disciples and God, and when many of their most devoted disciples were women, these Sufi teachers moved to the very limits of Islamic orthodoxy or beyond. Their tombs became centers of veneration and pilgrimage; they transmitted their spiritual powers, their devotees, and their grants of land from the rulers to their sons.[24]

Imperial patronage of interaction among traditions reached one of its greatest peaks in the reign of the Mughal emperor Akbar (r. 1556–1605). Akbar had very wide interests, and particularly enjoyed hearing the representatives of various religions debate their beliefs – Sunnis, Shii, Sufis, Hindus of every kind, and even Christians, including Jesuit missionaries from Portugal and Italy. Goa-based Jesuits found in his court and that of his son Salim, later the Emperor Jahangir, discerning and enthusiastic admiration for Catholic paintings, sculptures, and decorative arts. The Virgin Mary, treated with reverence in the Quran, was especially cherished. Jesus was treated as something like the greatest of Sufi teachers, and Akbar presented himself as such a teacher for a society of his most powerful courtiers, the Divine Faith (*Dīn-i Ilāhī*), but seems to have had no interest in propagating such a mixture outside his court.[25]

The Mughal emperors and ministers were witnesses of a great religious movement that rose far from the court. Nanak, who became the first guru, or great teacher, of the Sikh religion, grew up in northern India. He was brought up a Hindu, of a much less bookish kind than Caitanya; his songs

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[23] John E. Wills, Jr., *The World from 1450 to 1700* (Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 54–8 and bibliography on p. 161.

[24] Richard M. Eaton, *Sufis of Bijapur, 1300–1700: Social Roles of Sufis in Medieval India* (Princeton University Press, 1978).

[25] Gauvin Alexander Bailey, *Art on the Jesuit Missions in Asia and Latin America, 1542–1773* (University of Toronto Press, 1999), pp. 112–43.

and teachings are full of simple images drawn from the lives of ordinary people and the ceremonies that mark their stages. Islam was all around him, as a source of religious insight as well as of conquest and repression. In 1496 he had a deep religious experience that led him to proclaim, "There is neither Hindu nor Muslim." As he and his first disciples traveled around northern India they preferred to stay with low-caste friends even when they had elite supporters. Rules about sharing food with other groups are very important in the caste society, and Nanak challenged them directly, eating with everyone, organizing charitable kitchens that fed anyone who was hungry. The gathering of Sikh followers for a common meal has remained one of the central features of this teaching. In the succession of great gurus that followed, many composed poems and songs in simple language, using both Hindu and Muslim vocabulary. While many Hindus believed they had to withdraw from ordinary life to devote themselves entirely to their passionate spiritual quest, the Sikhs from Nanak on believed that the ordinary life of business and family was the best form of a religious life. Their teachings are full of sharp criticisms of the corrupt power of Muslim judges and the fakery of Hindu holy men.

Gobind Singh, the last in the succession of gurus in the late 1600s, taught his followers to "let divine wisdom be your guru and enlighten your soul" not in a forest retreat but in the busy life of a city. In his time the Islamic orthodoxy of the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb and the Hindu revivalism of the Marathas seemed to leave less and less room for people who were "neither Hindu nor Muslim," and Gobind Singh had to assure his followers that it was lawful to take up the sword. By 1690 the Sikhs were fighting full-scale battles against Mughal forces. They have remained some of India's finest warriors as well as some of its best businessmen. And they have a different kind of guru; at the end of his life, Gobind Singh took a compilation of the songs and teachings of the gurus compiled around 1600, and proclaimed that this book, the Granth, would be the teacher of the Sikh people from then on. And so it is down to today.[26]

Texts and science in the eastern Mediterranean

The eastern Mediterranean was the scene of the most dramatic "clash of civilizations" in the world of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The rising

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[26] W. Owen Cole and Piara Singh Sambhi, *The Sikhs: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices* (London: Routledge, 1978).

Ottoman power had settled into the rule of much of southeastern Europe by 1400. Their final occupation of Constantinople/Istanbul in 1453 was a huge shock to Western Christians, perhaps a sign of the apocalyptic coming of the Antichrist. Muslims simply inverted the apocalyptic values; the fall of Constantinople would be followed by the fall of Rome, universal Islam, and the Last Days. And surely it was significant that 1591–2 in the Christian calendar would be the year 1,000 after the Hegira. For some Jews, especially the Sephardim, the expulsion from Spain and Portugal beginning in 1492 was a sign of the impending coming of the Messiah. But somehow merchants, artists, and students of nature and of sacred texts found ways to trade, make friends, and learn from each other. Individuals who settled in a foreign city, learned the language and the culture, and made personal connections might become very important intermediaries in trade and negotiation. Some of them converted to the other religion. In Istanbul they might become "dragomans," placed in charge of trade or negotiations with their old home place. Venice adopted and adapted the dragoman institution in appointing converts from Islam as brokers for Muslim merchants. Wonderful documentation on their conversions, appointments, and arguments about privileges and commissions help us keep in mind the complex webs of personal connection that underlay the intellectual connections.[27]

Traders from Venice and other Italian ports had long seen Constantinople, Alexandria, and other ports at the eastern end of the Mediterranean as their key sources of spices, silk, and other goods from more distant parts of Asia. It is easy to compile quotes from their writings after 1400 on the opulent supplies of spices, fine textiles, rugs, and so on in these cities, and some of their paintings are full of fine goods, exotic animals, people in striking costumes, and much more. The countervailing appeal of the Christian west to the Muslims owed a good deal to the Greek and Roman heritages of Istanbul and much of the territory the Ottomans now ruled. Mehmet the Conqueror had passages from Greek texts read to him regularly as he besieged Constantinople, and was delighted to hire Italian builders to put classical columns and arches on the new Topkapi Palace he began building in 1460.[28] The authorities of Venice were delighted to loan him Gentile and Giovanni Bellini to paint his portrait. Italian effects in oils were superior to

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[27] E. Natalie Rothman, *Trans-Imperial Subjects Between Venice and Istanbul* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012).

[28] Jerry Brotton, *The Renaissance Bazaar: From the Silk Road to Michelangelo* (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 48–52, plate 2.

anything Ottoman painters produced, partly because Italians had sharpened their skills in depth and shading by reading in Latin translation the theories of light and perspective of the great Alhazen (Abu Ali al-Hasan Ibn al-Haytham, d. after 1041).[29] Some time before 1480 either Gentile Bellini or the Neopolitan court artist Costanzo da Ferrara – who was also in Istanbul – painted with deep humanity and delight in luxurious fabric a seated Muslim scribe, a very fine Arabic calligrapher added a short text, and some time later an unknown Ottoman painter copied the pose and attitude, with equal attention to a fine fabric and a change of the subject from scribe to figure-painter (Figures 3.1 and 3.2).[30]

Much harder to follow in surviving texts and art but at least as instructive for the study of cultural interaction was a fitful series of exchanges from the 1400s through the 1600s of astronomic and geographic data and ancient texts among Christians, Muslims, and Jews.[31] Cordial personal connections were possible across the confessional divides, especially because the intellectuals of all understood, in a general "textual-deductive" mindset, the importance of getting the best astronomical and calendrical tables, which put together with the sacred texts would determine the exact dates of the Creation and the end of the world. Muslim astronomers had engaged steadily in checking and improving theories and data from Greek texts, some of the best of it recorded in the form of commentaries on commentaries on Ptolemy and others.[32] Some of the best tables still were those prepared at Ulugh Beg's observatory in Samarkand in the 1420s; they had been used by Copernicus. All were aware of the shaky state of Ptolemaic astronomy, the intriguing possibilities of the Tychonian system, and the daunting dangers of the Copernican. And did the Book of Job (9:6) really proclaim that God "shaketh the earth out of her place, and the pillars thereof tremble"? The best and oldest version of that book might yet turn up, for example among the dissident Jews called Karaites, who stuck strictly to written texts and rejected Rabbinical oral traditions, and such a scriptural authority would give the support of God's Word to Copernicus' rejection of an immovable central earth.

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[29] Hans Belting, *Florence and Baghdad: Renaissance Art and Arab Science* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), esp. ch. 3.

[30] Brotton, *Renaissance Bazaar*, pp. 137–43, plates 7 and 8.

[31] Avner Ben-Zaken, *Cross-Cultural Scientific Exchanges in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1560–1660* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010).

[32] George Saliba, *Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), pp. 1–72.

Figure 3.1: Gentile Bellini (*c.*1429–1507) Seated scribe, 1479–81 (pen and brown ink with watercolour and gold on paper)

This web of interactions reached from Goa to Amsterdam. In 1623 Pietro della Valle, supported by wealthy intellectuals with Copernican and "Pythagorean" interests in Naples, met by chance in Goa Christoforo Borri, S.J., on his way back from his efforts to establish a mission in what is now central

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Figure 3.2: Ottoman portrait of a painter, late fifteenth century

Vietnam.[33] Della Valle, in his quest for ancient manuscripts, especially Jewish and Samaritan ones that could provide older and thus more reliable versions of the Old Testament than either the Vulgate or rabbinical transmissions, had been especially delighted by the leisure, learning, and hospitality of Muslim and Jewish scholars at Lār, near Isfahan. Borri claimed that his explanations of the cosmology of Tycho Brahe, accepted by the Jesuits at that time, had contributed to the conversion of some Vietnamese intellectuals. Della Valle went to work translating a short summary by Borri into semi-adequate Persian, and sent it off to the Lār scholar he thought most likely to be impressed by the superior astronomy. His text mentions warily the new European sightings through telescopes and some of Galileo's ideas, but not his name, and reminds his friend to ask Jews at Lār about ancient texts, especially of the Book of Job. The text somehow wound up in the Vatican Library; we don't know if it made any impression on anyone in Lār or even if it got there.[34]

Another example of open and many-sided intellectual exchanges on very exacting subjects is a book in Hebrew by a Jew of Cretan origin, Joseph Solomon Delmedigo, *Sefer Elim*, that was published in Amsterdam in 1629 by Menasseh Ben-Israel, much sought-after by Christian intellectuals as an expert on the traditions of his people and at one time the teacher of Benedict de Spinoza. Delmedigo had studied with Galileo at the University of Padua and had traveled widely in the Muslim lands around the eastern Mediterranean. Modern scholars have been baffled by his combination of commitment to the new astronomy and his passion for the ancient and esoteric traditions of his own people – Karaite texts of Scripture, the Cabala, and more. But in the mindset of many participants in these dialogues it was vital to get the astronomy right for the exact First and Last Days and to find the best ancient texts to support the best new astronomy.[35]

A final startling example of cultural interchange: One of the many resolutions of Ptolemaic anomalies Copernicus lays out and charts is an explanation of how the apparently oscillating motion of a heavenly body could be derived from circular motion. Copernicus' diagram published in 1543 exactly matches a diagram by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsi (d. 1274); even the lettering

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[33] On Borri or Borrus in Cochin China, modern central Vietnam, see Samuel Baron and Christoforo Borri, *Views of Seventeenth-century Vietnam: Christoforo Borri on Cochin China and Samuel Baron on Tonkin* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Publications, 2006), pp. 15–73 and 85–185.

[34] Ben-Zaken, *Cross-Cultural Scientific Exchanges,* pp. 47–75.

[35] Ben-Zaken, *Cross-Cultural Scientific Exchanges,* pp. 76–103.

matches, with one probably explicable variation, with Copernicus putting a capital A where Ṭūsi had an *alif*, a B for *bā*, and so on. There is no evidence that Copernicus knew any Arabic, and so far no copy of Ṭūsi's text has been discovered that got to Italy, where someone might have helped him read it.[36]

It is important to pay attention to these examples of mutual respect and mutual learning across the ongoing clash of civilizations, but also to recall that for all their intensity they were episodic and fragile. Scientific pioneers as important as Brahe, Kepler, and even Newton, and the rulers and aristocrats who funded their work, often were interested in the astrological and apocalyptic implications of astronomy. In the Ottoman world, orthodox hostility to astrology was intensified by deep unease over weak rulers after the death of the great Suleyman, and the combination led to the demolition of a new observatory in Istanbul in 1580. New techniques of perspective, despite their roots in the work of Alhazen and others, did nothing to encourage Muslim participation in the new fascination with pictures of people, places, and nature that was shaping empirical trends in European culture at the expense of the older shared "textual-deductive" culture.[37]

Spaniards, Aztecs, Mayas, Incas

The Valley of Mexico was the scene in 1518–22 of one of the greatest confrontations in the history of peoples of utterly different cultures, ending in the shattering of the Aztec Empire and the destruction of the great temples and palaces of Tenochtitlán. But out of the ruins emerged one of the most enduring cultural syntheses, still very much alive in our own times; I write in southern California, where I have no trouble finding a statue or mural painting of the Virgin of Guadalupe. The wonderful story of the apparition of the Virgin to Juan Diego on the site of an old temple to an Aztec goddess has been found highly dubious,[38] but there is no question that the energetic and idealistic friars who set out to convert the people of the Valley after 1522 understood the powers of sacred places and the appeal, shared by so many peoples, of feminine forms of holy power. The missionaries learned Nahuatl thoroughly and wrote extensively in it in the Latin alphabet, wrote much about the history and beliefs of the peoples of the Valley, and educated

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[36] Saliba, *Islamic Science,* pp. 196–201.
[37] Ben-Zaken, *Cross-Cultural Scientific Exchanges,* p. 133.
[38] Peter Bakewell, *A History of Latin America*, 2nd edn. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 254–5.

the sons of important people in Latin and Nahuatl, not Spanish. The generation they educated in the new faith was the key to political control at the local level of the native population. Missionary priests and their local helpers did not hesitate to borrow the name or feast-day of an old Mexican god for a Catholic feast or saint's day. Local people of all classes delighted in the creations of artists using inherited styles and skills to express the new faith; the missionaries' focus on schools to train local artists was impressive.[39] Bernardino de Sahagún supervised devoted American scholars and artists in the compilation of a twelve-volume "General History" that preserved much knowledge of the pre-conquest past and was beautifully illustrated in a style that draws on American and European heritages; the images of the much-admired feather-work are stunning. Later local community leaders preserved much local myth and history in "titulos" compiled to support community land claims.[40] Constructions of space melded in powerful ways. Both Spaniards and Aztecs built cities on rectangular grids. Many churches incorporated open chapel spaces suited to local festival traditions. Many were built on old sacred sites, none more impressively than Nuestra Señora de los Remedios at Cholula, built on top of the largest pyramid in America.

These encounters in the Valley of Mexico involved a great deal of local conflict, a few executions for heresy, and some larger conflicts on the frontiers of Spanish rule. Conflicts in the Maya lands and in the highland Inca Empire had more dramatic phases. The Maya explained Spanish domination in terms of their highly developed cosmology and theory of time, and concealed continued worship of the old gods in a landscape full of hiding places; when they were discovered in the 1560s, at least 158 died and more were crippled under ruthless interrogation.[41] But the visitor to Yucatan or highland Guatemala today is a fascinated spectator of the most intricate syncretic practices.

The encounters between Spaniards and Inca began in stunning brutality and thorough destruction of the temples and ceremonial practices of the imperial center at Cuzco.[42] Still some were pleased when the great festival of Corpus Christi was at about the same time of year as the Inca Inti Raimi harvest festival, and many of the old songs and dances became part of the

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[39] Gauvin Alexander Bailey, *Art of Colonial Latin America* (London: Phaidon, 2005).
[40] Bakewell, *History of Latin America*, p. 252.
[41] Inga Clendinnen, *Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517–1570* (Cambridge University Press, 1987).
[42] Sabine MacCormack, *Religion in the Andes: Vision and Imagination in Early Colonial Peru* (Princeton University Press, 1991).

new celebrations. A few intellectuals, especially Guaman Poma and Garcilaso de la Vega, held out hopes for preservation of the best of the old ways in a new synthesis. In Cuzco and other major cities, Spanish insistence on extirpation of old ways advanced steadily, but away from the cities the old ways survived. Mummies of priests and ancestors were worshiped and consulted. The Spanish destroyed them when they found them, but they were easy to hide. The burdens of *mita* labor service in the mines were severe. There was recurring resistance in outlying areas; the last great episode, of Tupac Amaru II around Lake Titicaca in 1780–1, attracted no support from mestizos or the old nobility. The tensions and ambiguities of cultural interaction did not intensify the political upheaval.

There are many paintings of the Virgin Mary, done in Europe and in the Americas, in which the broad triangular expanse of her richly decorated robe expresses a somewhat remote majesty. One such painting, from Potosí, the most important node of the impact of the Americas on the early modern world, makes this majesty American as well as Christian. The patrons in the foreground – king, bishops, priests – are European. God the Father and the Son are placing a crown on the Virgin's head, which is within a great brown triangle of the *Cerro Rico* of Potosí, with paths, tunnel entries, and a small figure in Inca royal dress receiving the homage of his people.[43]

Neo-African cultures from Kongo to Brazil

The history of the "Black Atlantic" centers on some of the great horror stories of world history, the "middle passage" and the brutal work and short life expectancy of slavery on a sugar plantation. But it produced creole languages that are alive and spoken in the twenty-first century; a vibrant range of religious expression from Africanized Christianities to explicitly African forms like Cuban Santeria, Haitian Vodun, and Brazilian Candomblé; and modes of music from rumba to post-modern jazz.[44] How did people create so much under such dire circumstances? To answer this question, it is important to keep interactions on both sides of the Atlantic in focus.[45]

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[43] Bailey, *Art of Colonial Latin America*, p. 96. Permission to reprint this image was not forthcoming, but it can be easily found through a web search, including a version at: www.bolivian.com/cnm/g1–24.jpg (accessed 29/7/14).

[44] Joseph M. Murphy, *Working the Spirit: Ceremonies of the African Diaspora* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1994).

[45] John Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge University Press, 1998), and John Thornton, *A Cultural History of the Atlantic World* (Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 60–99, 209–11, 248–63, and 386–96.

In a surprising and instructive first phase, the Portuguese opened a connection with the kings of the Kongo. A contender for the royal succession converted to Catholicism. He may have had some Portuguese help in defeating his rivals and emerging as king about 1506. He and others who became Christian seem to have sensed that the Portuguese had some previously unknown sources of power, which they saw when a missionary destroyed a traditional religious shrine, when Portuguese masons built solid stone houses, and not least when the soldiers fired their guns. Over the forty-year reign of Dom Afonso, the Christian king of the Kongo, he exchanged many letters with the kings of Portugal, and the pope appointed one of Afonso's sons, educated in Europe, bishop of the Kongo. The Portuguese royal court seems to have taken this relation very seriously and sent advisers, masons and other craftsmen, and more missionaries.

But even before Dom Afonso died in 1545 some grim realities were undercutting this dream of unforced conversion and cultural transformation. Slave trading and raiding spread inland and undermined the unity of the kingdom; it fell apart completely in the 1660s after a war with the Portuguese caused by their interference in Kongolese civil wars. It should be no surprise that Kongolese conversions had not usually involved complete breaks with old beliefs and practices. For ordinary people, there was considerable overlap of comparable attention to omens, dreams, and curing by supernatural powers.

Kongolese local gods frequently were identified with saints. But while Kongolese relations with another world were more or less continuous and recent relations with the spirits of remembered ancestors were very important, Roman Catholicism assumed the basic authority of events long ago and of the right of a present-day hierarchy founded in those events to distinguish the works of God and the saints from those of the Devil. Missionary destruction of idols and spirit houses and rejection of local identities of saints were constant. The risks of such identification peaked in the prophecies of the young woman who channeled teachings from Saint Anthony, drew many followers, and was burned at the stake in 1706.[46] The struggle against Kongolese syncretism was strengthened by the participation of Italian Capuchins, not allied to the Portuguese projects in the area, the authors of our

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[46] John Thornton, *The Kongolese Saint Anthony: Dona Beatriz Kimpa Vita and the Antonian Movement, 1684–1706* (Cambridge University Press, 1998).

best sources on the religious practices they were trying to stamp out. But by that time the practices and conflicts had been transferred to the far larger stage of Brazil.[47]

In Brazil in the 1600s many slaves succumbed to the brutal work and the diseases within a few years. Most slaves were fairly recent arrivals from the ports of modern Angola, and the culture and language of the Mbundu people of that region made it across the Atlantic and were preserved intact for generations. Practices of curing and divination are especially well documented. In the eyes of the Roman Catholic clergy they all were works of the Devil, but quite a few whites turned to them when their own cures and divinations produced no results. Whites as well as slaves wore around their necks amulets (*bolsas* in Portuguese, often called "fetishes" in many European languages) containing herbs, ashes, and perhaps a written Christian prayer.[48] Nominally converted slaves demanded innovations of European priests, such as a hollow stone with a relic of a saint inside it that was thought indispensable for transubstantiation. Pieces of the stone or of a consecrated host might be placed in an amulet. But all these mixings were opposed by most clergy and by planters and officials who feared their power to mobilize the slave majority. Most of the people who sought the services of African-tradition healers were women, and only a minority were white. We can follow the adventures of an adept and charismatic African healer named Domingos Álvares, thanks to his 600-page Inquisition file, and see all the ways in which his efforts were undermined, ending in his exile to Portugal, where he still found people eager to use his healing services but had no African community.[49]

The identification of saints with powerful spirits and ancestors had already been apparent in the Kongo, and supported new forms of social solidarity vital to slaves ripped out of native place and kinship. Especially in the towns, men formed brotherhoods devoted to a particular saint and marched in festive processions with music and dancing that owed a great deal to Africa. Often a brotherhood was limited to people who shared an African native place and language. Devotion to Our Lady of the Rosary

[47] James H. Sweet, *Recreating Africa: Culture, Kinship, and Religion in the African-Portuguese World* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

[48] Sweet, *Recreating Africa*, pp. 179–83, and James H. Sweet, *Domingos Álvares, African Healing, and the Intellectual History of the Atlantic World* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), pp. 62–3.

[49] Sweet, *Domingos Álvares*.

was especially popular; the rosary, like the amulet worn around the neck, was at once a sign of devotion and a defense against a world of cruelty and danger. In the 1700s Angola declined as a source of slaves and most came from the coasts of modern Togo, Benin, and Nigeria, bringing new languages and new gods, which shaped vital cultures in Brazil and around the Caribbean.

Europe and the world

If we ask how these encounters with other cultures affected the energetic and polycentric cultural life of Europe in these centuries, we open up a range of issues and scholarship that would require another essay the length of this one to summarize. Much but not all of that activity was mediated by the spread of printing, including works enlivened by the special powers of engravers, artists, and print-makers (Figure 3.3). For our studies of extra-European interactions, this was not the case. Even in the Mediterranean much depended on manuscript, and especially in the Americas much was entirely rooted in oral exchange. Islam made almost no use of print until after 1800. The variety of fruitful and creative exchanges in which Muslims were involved was a result of the geographic position straddling Eurasia and Africa, of principled tolerance of "People of the Book" and more ambivalent toleration of Hindus, and of the openness of many Sufi masters to non-Muslim metaphors for universal spiritual truths and experiences. In all our case studies we confront major consequences of startlingly contingent connections, like the decision to leave the future Pakpa in the Mongol camp and the Arabic diagram whose lettering Copernicus somehow made his own, but in every case the consequences had underlying logics – the advantages to Tibetans and Mongols of good relations, the common problems and mentalities of Muslim and Christian natural philosophers. We find *no* barrier of cultural difference that was unbreachable. The natural world made some openings: curing, celebrating place, the heavens. Above all, we sense the power of intense emotion and spirituality – African gods and healers in Brazil, apocalyptic excitement in the Mediterranean, Pietro della Valle charmed by the intellectual life of Lār, and most potent of all for the world down to 2013, when peoples of so many different heritages try to understand and build bridges to each other's ways of thought and spirit, the future Guru Nanak on the day of opening he never could explain that led him to a way that was "neither Hindu nor Muslim."

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Figure 3.3: Frontispiece from Bernard and Picart's *Cérémonies et coutumes religieuses de tous les peuples du monde* (1723–43). European printed works included many that depicted other cultures visually as well as in words, such as this engraving of religious practices around the world.

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Legal encounters and the origins of global law

LAUREN BENTON AND ADAM CLULOW

In 1636, the Dutch East India Company official Joost Schouten sat down to pen an account of the kingdom of Ayutthaya, or Siam. In a section devoted to "ordinary Justice," he described what he saw as an exotic and utterly unfamiliar legal system, characterized by despotic excesses and unfathomable customs.[1] The overall picture, duplicated in dozens of European accounts from this period, was of an unbridgeable legal divide separating sojourners like the Dutch from their hosts. And yet an examination of the history of the Dutch factory in Ayutthaya tells a very different story, revealing myriad legal interactions, some marked by disjuncture but many others proceeding relatively smoothly across a shared legal terrain. The goal of this chapter is to propose a way to reconcile these two positions by showing how law was woven into routine cross-cultural exchanges, conflicts, and negotiations in the early modern world.

The study of law has been slow to develop in world history. One reason is the tendency to formulate questions of legal history within the framework of national histories. A second reason is the way the history of international law has been recounted largely as a European story. Historians have recently addressed the first problem with a greater focus on transnational legal processes and on the law of empires in world history. It has proven trickier to broaden the chronological and geographic scope of "international" law to lessen the emphasis on Europe's role. One attempt is found in the work of C. H. Alexandrowicz, who argued in an important and still frequently cited 1967 study that a universal international law, formulated primarily by

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European scholars such as Hugo Grotius but drawing heavily on Asian practices, was in fact already present in the early modern period.[2] This hybrid law of nations supposedly allowed European and Asian powers to operate with a shared set of legal concepts that provided for ready comprehension of treaties and other legal instruments across cultures. Critics pointed to the lack of evidence for this rosy view of cross-cultural legal understanding and also attacked the shakiest part of Alexandrowicz's argument by challenging the notion that European legal scholars had deliberately modeled key legal concepts, most notably the freedom of the seas, on Asian practices.[3]

More recent, and less sweeping, arguments about the global dimensions of international legal history have tacked in a different direction, emphasizing the centrality of the colonial encounter to the formation of international law. Historians have suggested that attempts to account for the "dynamic of difference" between Europe and the territories it ultimately colonized focused the attention of European jurists on a series of problems presented by imperial rule.[4] Connections between colonialism and European legal thought cut across several centuries, from late-medieval Christian debates about the legal status of infidels to arguments by the sixteenth-century Spanish scholastic Francisco de Vitoria about the legal basis for the Spanish conquest of the Indies to nineteenth-century efforts by international lawyers to reconcile the persistence of empires with the emergence of a global system of sovereign nation-states.[5]

This chapter outlines a third approach that builds on some of Alexandrowicz's insights without embracing his conclusions about the emergence of a comprehensive law of nations and that recognizes the importance of empires to the international order without defining non-European law and sovereignty as problems that Western jurists and international lawyers had to solve. We analyze common practices in many different kinds of political communities between 1400 and 1800 that helped to structure relations across polities. These practices fell noticeably short of constituting a universal law of

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[2] C. H. Alexandrowicz, *An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies* (Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 229.

[3] For a recent study that challenges Alexandrowicz's reading of Grotius, see Peter Borschberg, *Hugo Grotius, the Portuguese and Free Trade in the East Indies* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2011).

[4] Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 3–4.

[5] James Muldoon, *Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels: The Church and the Non-Christian World, 1250–1550* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979); Anghie, *Imperialism*.

nations and instead reflected "a crude parallel morphology" in which diverse political communities shared some basic characteristics that allowed legal actors to rely on analogies, rather than elusive cross-cultural understandings, as they engaged with other peoples and polities.[6]

The foundational elements of what we are calling "interpolity law" constituted a repertoire that was available in most, if not all, world regions in this period and to a range of different groups. Regardless of their location and their cultural origins, political communities sought to develop "proper and peaceful relations" with one another, and in order to do so, they had to be able to communicate and to some degree predict others' actions and motivations.[7] Rather than focusing on the writings of legal theorists or the intellectual problems thrown up by global expansion, this chapter is concerned with sets of commonly occurring legal practices that organized certain settled expectations. We discuss and illustrate three categories or rubrics of legal practices that existed widely in the early modern world and generated regional or global legal order: protocol, jurisdiction, and protection. Other categories of legal behavior that could span regions and polities included practices surrounding legalities of war, contract, and property. But the rubrics of protocol, jurisdiction, and protection correspond to especially wide-ranging patterns. Protocol structured diplomatic negotiations and provided a guide to advancing legal claims in strange places. Jurisdiction provided a framework for merchant communities to arrange to manage their own affairs and to sustain connections across states and regions. And agreements about protection represented a way to share legal authority between rulers.

The sum of these parts was not the shared law of nations so confidently outlined by Alexandrowicz or a legal script forced on the rest of the world by Europeans. Instead, the sets of practices that fall under these rubrics provided a loose scaffolding for cross-polity interactions involving a wide range of parties, some European, many not. The resulting framework of interpolity law was global in reach but also geographically uneven. And if Europe was not the progenitor of these practices, it was the unquestioned beneficiary of their wide recognition. The success of European overseas enterprises in the early modern period rested in part on European agents' ability to manipulate

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[6] Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Courtly Encounters: Translating Courtliness and Violence in Early Modern Eurasia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), XIV, pp. 24–5.

[7] Leonard Andaya, "Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions: A Case Study From South Sulawesi," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde* 134: 2/3 (1978): 284.

existing legal concepts and routines in order to establish and maintain legal footholds. Elements of interpolity law, too, tended to change over time from parts of a legal repertoire accessible everywhere to instruments of European rule over disparate and distant lands and peoples.

Protocol

The ability of rulers to perform properly and publicly certain clearly designated rites was central to the internal production of power. The significance of such practices could also extend beyond the domestic realm. Ritualized protocol – a complex set of highly stylized actions and behavior that had to be performed correctly in order to derive a result – provided a basis for cross-polity interactions in the early modern world. Put more simply, a wide range of officials could agree that a prescribed set of actions performed at the right time in the right place in the right way was necessary to confirm authority in a variety of settings even as opinions differed as to the proper content of these actions. As straightforward as it may appear, this expectation worked to facilitate a range of interactions by providing both a form and an implicit standard. Not all such practices related to law, but many did, legitimating legal authority or reinforcing legal claims. Particularly important were diplomatic protocol, which undergirded sovereignty, and protocol surrounding the exercise of legal authority, which supplemented other evidence in support of imperial agents' authority over lands and peoples.

Diplomacy was – and of course remains – bound up with ritualized protocol. In Europe, the "civilities and ceremonies" attached to diplomacy were the subject of elaborate codification and lengthy manuals.[8] In the great hierarchical courts of Mughal India or Ming China, the staging of diplomatic interactions – down to the most minute details of dress and action – was precisely regulated, and in Japan, the first Tokugawa shoguns spent the opening decades of the seventeenth century drawing up "canons of protocol" to regulate interaction with overseas partners.[9] In the Americas, an equally complex system prevailed, characterized by regional variations but also widespread consensus among Indian polities that diplomatic interactions should be "carried out at a specific place and follow a specific sequence of

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[8] Abraham de Wicquefort, *The Embassador and His Functions* (London, Lintott, 1716), p. 127.

[9] Ronald Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu* (Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 170.

actions."[10] Such attention to protocol pervaded Indians' interactions with Europeans and powered a system of "diplomatic reciprocity."[11]

Failure to follow protocol could have disastrous consequences for individual representatives. Captain Cook's murder in the Sandwich Islands (now Hawaii) shows what could happen when, if we follow Marshall Sahlins's interpretation, even a foreigner received as a god failed to follow designated rituals.[12] More generally, host officials regarded the capacity of ambassadors to adhere to protocol not only as a concrete sign of the sponsoring sovereign's wealth and power but also as a key index of legitimacy. According to Abraham de Wicquefort, the great interpreter of seventeenth-century diplomacy, there was no better "Mark of Sovereignty than the Right of sending and receiving Ambassadors."[13]

Distance could strain the ability of ambassadors or other agents to perform ritualized protocol correctly. The opening of new sea routes in the early modern period transported agents to unfamiliar courts where the status of their sovereigns was far from clear. Thrust into contact with an array of rulers and officials, ambassadors nervously rehearsed what was expected of them. One English envoy dispatched to the Ottoman capital anxiously played through the sequence of actions needed to secure appropriate recognition, explaining to his companion how he must enter the court – "betwyxte tow men holdinge my handes downe close to my sides" – and once "lede into the presence of the Grand Sinyor . . . muste kiss his kne or his hanginge sleve."[14]

When knowledge or performance of protocol faltered and things went wrong, they could go very wrong, very fast. One Mr. Edwards, an early English representative dispatched to Mughal India, failed to properly act out the "title and state of an ambassador" and was "kicked and spurned by the King's porters out of the courte-gates, to the unrecoverable disgrace of our Kinge and nation."[15] The threat of failing the protocol litmus test was not limited to European interlopers, and even the representatives of established

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[10] Jenny Pulsipher, "Gaining the Diplomatic Edge: Kinship, Trade, and Religion in Amerindian Alliances in Early North America," in Wayne Lee (ed.), *Empires and Indigenes: Intercultural Cooperation and Conflict in the Early Modern World* (New York University Press, 2011), p. 23.

[11] Daniel Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 87.

[12] Marshall Sahlins, *How "Natives" Think: About Captain Cook, For Example* (University of Chicago Press, 1995).

[13] Abraham de Wicquefort, *The Embassador*, p. 6.

[14] Theodore Bent (ed.), *Early Voyages and Travels in the Levant* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1893), p. 65.

[15] William Foster, *Early Travels in India* (Oxford University Press, 1921), pp. 229–30.

powers with a long history of diplomatic exchange could stumble. This was the fate of a mission sent to Japan by the king of Siam in 1634. Arriving in Nagasaki, the ambassador acted with such arrogance and offered such incomplete explanations that local officials refused to "convey the royal letter to the Emperor of Japan [Shogun], and sent the envoy back to his country."[16] While the monetary costs associated with failed embassies were substantial, the legal repercussions could be far more damaging, particularly since they could last for years on end. The effect of removing a ruler's legitimacy could be to strip subjects of status and protection: Sailors became pirates, soldiers were turned into bandits, and ambassadors were reduced to the status of free agents, or even, to quote one outraged Japanese official confronted with an incompetent Dutch envoy, nothing more than "swindlers" armed with meaningless pieces of paper.[17]

Hybrid organizations such as chartered companies proved especially susceptible to such pitfalls. Awarded a set of state-like capacities, including the right to make war and form agreements with foreign rulers, by their European sponsors, companies often moved aggressively into the business of diplomacy, maritime violence, and, territorial dominion. In Asia and elsewhere, their success hinged on rulers' recognition that the companies wielded sovereign powers in the same way as conventional states, but their failure to master protocol could, and sometimes did, deny them the dispensation they required to operate freely. The result was a period of diplomatic probation in which different strategies were tried and discarded. Some companies opted to bring in diplomatic pinch hitters, specialists familiar with European diplomatic protocols who were expected to transfer their expertise seamlessly to Asia. Perhaps the most famous example was Thomas Roe, who was hired by the English East India Company to restore status to the position of ambassador, which had "become ridiculous, so many having assumed that title, and not performed the offices."[18] Having decided that an "Embassadour of extraordinarye Countenance and respect" was needed, company officials dispatched Roe, "a gentleman of a pregnant understandinge," who would, so the theory went, be able to use his close connection to the English throne

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[16] Iwao Seiichi, "Reopening the Diplomatic and Commercial Relations Between Japan and Siam During the Tokugawa Period," *Acta Asiatica* 4 (1963): 8.

[17] 14 October 1627, Daghregister van de reijse gedaen bij Pieter Nuijts ende Pieter Muijser, oppercoopman, als ambassadeurs aen den keijser ende rijcxraden van Japan van 24 Julij 1627 tot 18 Februarij 1628, VOC 1095: 472v.

[18] Thomas Roe, *Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India, 1615–19*, (ed.) W. Foster (London: Hakluyt Society, 1899), p. 45.

and long experience of court politics to successfully navigate the maze of Mughal protocol.[19]

In other cases, European agents, when faced with these kinds of challenges, sought not to learn but to deceive. As part of its overall diplomatic strategy, the Dutch East India Company (*Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* or VOC) tacitly encouraged its agents to represent themselves not as the agents of a private company based in a republic but as the envoys of the "king of Holland," a tactic designed to enable them to claim the same status as their competitors.[20] The logic was simple: If protocol demanded a monarch, then a monarch would be provided. On other occasions, the company responded to the demands of diplomatic protocol with bizarre delegations designed to muddy the waters in such a way that judgment was rendered impossible. In 1649, the company dispatched an unconventional mission to Japan headed by a dying ambassador who was sent with the expectation that he would succumb to his illness before he reached Japan, thereby rendering him incapable of answering questions as to his mission or status. Once his superior had at last departed this world, the deputy ambassador proceeded to carry out his instructions to prepare the body with "drugs and spices and sewn back together" so that it could be shown to Tokugawa officials as gruesome proof that protocol had been met.[21]

Deception was not the only way to use or abuse expectations about protocol. Envoys sometimes purposely insulted courtly audiences as a way of repaying perceived slights or even provoking violence. In the sixteenth century Deccan, insults, delivered by and to envoys, became part of the fabric of diplomacy and frequent catalysts for war.[22] In places without a long history of contact where it was more difficult to craft subtle insults, representatives sometimes looked for ways to demonstrate their rejection of diplomacy. After Pizarro's band offered gifts to Atahualpa, the Incan ruler paid a return visit to the occupied town of Cajamarca, where, according to several chronicles, he threw a Bible (or a breviary) on the ground. Even taking into consideration the difficulties of language and lack of familiarity with the Spaniards, it is difficult to imagine that the act was intended as

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[19] Roe, *Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India*, iv.
[20] For an extended discussion of the "king of Holland," see Adam Clulow, *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).
[21] Reinier Hesselink, *Prisoners from Nambu: Reality and Make-Believe in Seventeenth-Century Japanese Diplomacy* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), p. 144.
[22] Subrahmanyam, *Courtly Encounters*, p. 80.

anything other than an insult – or a counter-insult to the insufficient defer-
ence shown by the Spaniards.

Imperial agents did seek to master aspects of recognized legal protocol that
they knew might support claims to the control or conquest of new territor-
ies. The European adventurers who departed for overseas reconnaissance
and colonizing missions came from societies where kingly authority was
routinely bolstered by legal rituals, including show trials, public executions,
and proclamations of mercy designed to signal the majesty of sovereigns.
Agents carried such practices with them, improvising as they went, using
rituals to hold together fragile political communities far from home and also
to represent the political power of expedition leaders or colonial officials to
local populations. On early voyages in the Atlantic world, Portuguese,
Spanish, French, and English subjects prosecuted traitors in their midst in
effective demonstrations that they were acting on behalf of distant but
powerful monarchs.[23] On his 1609 expedition to New France, Samuel Cham-
plain ordered the hanging of a locksmith, Jean Duval, who was accused of
plotting to hand over the fort to Basque or Spanish fishermen in the area. By
following the dictates of legal protocol, Champlain turned the execution into
a demonstration less of force than of political authority backed by the French
crown and into an explicit message capable of being understood by multiple
audiences, including not only French soldiers but also other European
groups as well as indigenous residents.[24]

By marking jurisdiction, rituals of judgment and punishment served to
communicate imperial claims to rival powers. Europeans followed a flexible
but relatively stable protocol to claim possession or mark occupation in
territories they sought to control, seeking proofs of their acquisition of
territory according to modes derived from Roman law.[25] The symbolic
vocabulary of possession included founding settlements, mapping, perform-
ing ceremonies with bits of soil and plants, and building stone or wood
structures. To hold a trial or pass judgment was itself an act of symbolic
marking that could support claims to territory. It is not surprising that the
royal instructions carried by Juan Díaz de Solís on an expedition of reconnais-
sance and settlement in the Rio de la Plata region in the early sixteenth

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[23] Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires,
1400–1900* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), Chapter 2.
[24] Henry Percival Biggar (ed.), *The Works of Samuel de Champlain*, 6 vols. (Toronto:
Champlain Society, 1922), II, p. 33.
[25] Lauren Benton and Benjamin Straumann, "Acquiring Empire by Law: From Roman
Doctrine to Early Modern European Practice," *Law and History Review* 28:1 (2010): 1–38.

century included the directive to have "somebody bring a complaint before you, and as our captain and judge you shall pronounce upon and determine it, so that, in all you shall take the said possession."[26] In colonial Taiwan, where the Dutch engaged in a long struggle with Chinese sojourners for influence over aboriginal villages, the execution of "the [Chinese] robber Twakam" had to be "done altogether properly" in front of an assembled audience of "Formosans, who had already been informed of the event" in order to illustrate the company's sovereignty over the island.[27]

As with diplomatic protocol, legal rituals had to be performed well; they also had to be widely reported and enduring to be effective. The Portuguese ritual construction of *padrões*, stone and wood columns, to mark their presence along the West African coast unraveled when Vasco da Gama reached the coast of East Africa. In one place, local residents "demolished both the cross and the pillar" the day after they had been erected, and further along the East African coast, the Portuguese captains would not hazard a trip to shore to raise the columns without first taking hostages.[28] Here and elsewhere, it was not just rival Europeans who could read the significance of such legal ceremonies. Local rulers often tolerated such acts precisely because they understood them to be open to interpretation, potentially supportive of their own positions and claims. When the Portuguese established a fort at São Jorge da Mina in 1482, for example, the local ruler attended the founding ceremony and approved it as a symbol only of his cession of the fort grounds and Portuguese control within it, not as evidence of more expansive Portuguese claims.[29]

Across these examples, the ability to follow protocol helped make inter-polity relations possible, but it did not translate necessarily into cross-cultural understanding, which proved far more elusive. Rather it was the case that ritualized protocol, for all its costs, dangers, and sometimes evident absurdity, was widely accepted as a basic building block of cross-polity exchange.

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[26] Arthur Schopenhauer Keller, Oliver James Lissitzyn, and Frederick Justin Mann, *Creation of Rights of Sovereignty through Symbolic Acts, 1400–1800* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), p. 39.

[27] Tonio Andrade, "Political Spectacle and Colonial Rule: The Landdag on Dutch Taiwan, 1629–1648," *Itinerario* 21: 3 (1997): 74.

[28] Alvaro Velho, Vasco da Gama, and João de Sá (trans. Ernest George Ravenstein), *A Journal of the First Voyage of Vasco Da Gama, 1497–1499* (New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 1995), p. 13.

[29] John Vogt, *Portuguese Rule on the Gold Coast 1469–1682* (University of Georgia Press, 1979), pp. 20–7; Lauren Benton, "Possessing Empire: Iberian Claims and Interpolity Law," in Saliha Bellmessous (ed.), *Native Claims: Indigenous Law against Empire, 1500–1920* (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 19–40.

The reliance on protocol persisted despite the confusion created by multiple standards for diplomatic and legal ritual, each complete with its own set of guidelines.

As European global power rose, Europeans began gradually to refer more confidently to a single standard of diplomatic discourse and behavior and to propose adherence to this as a durable marker of international status. In North America, the withdrawal of the French in 1763 allowed the English to "abandon the protocols that had shaped Native–European interactions for generations."[30] Increasingly, Europeans surveyed Indians' diplomacy and warfare for evidence of their "savagery."[31] In Asia, a similar shift happened later, with one of the more dramatic moments of rupture occurring in 1842–3, when English India Company representatives – the successors of Thomas Roe – appeared before the Mughal emperor.[32] Having consulted the records to see what "etiquette [should be] followed" in order to secure Mughal recognition, they resolved to offer up a ceremonial gift of gold. Presented before the emperor, the envoys made a "low obeisance" after which the sovereign "ordered us to be robed in dresses of honour, and to have turbans bound round our heads." The envoys were then mounted on elephants and "paraded through the chief streets of Delhi as those whom the King delighted to honour." Whereas in past centuries this outcome would have been deemed a success, the Governor-General was furious when he received the news, immediately ordering that no further British representatives should be compelled to participate in such ceremonies. Two centuries of British observance of Mughal protocol were coming to an end.

Jurisdiction

The performance of protocol was often closely related to efforts to establish or challenge jurisdictional arrangements. "Jurisdiction" refers broadly to the scope for exercising legal authority – over persons, places, or categories of activity. Early modern polities typically had plural jurisdictions that were overlapping or parallel; for all its power the state did not possess anything approaching a monopoly on legal authority, which was divided among a jumble of often competing jurisdictions. The key example of persisting

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[30] Pulsipher, "Gaining the Diplomatic Edge," p. 39.
[31] Peter Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2008).
[32] William Edwards, *Reminiscences of a Bengal Civilian* (London: Smith, Elder, and Co., 1866), pp. 55–7.

jurisdictional tension for Europe was a familiar division between church and secular law. Ecclesiastics claimed jurisdiction over clergy as well as categories of especially vulnerable people such as orphans, widows, and travelers, and they also insisted on their legal authority to regulate certain behaviors (for example, marriage, adultery, and blasphemy) and their power to keep secular authorities out of churches and away from church business in general. Similar segmentation existed in other parts of the world. Even in apparently centralized states like China, which has historically been associated with a single, unified legal system, there was ample evidence of legal pluralism.[33] Because of both their size and diverse ethnic makeup, empires were naturally multi-jurisdictional, the overlay of imposed law serving to supplement rather than to erase indigenous or local legal forums. The result was legally commodious political formations, with space within them for communities permitted by the sovereign to have jurisdiction over certain matters and members. Jurisdictional complexity was, in short, a typical feature of politics in the early modern world; the quip by Bishop Agobardus of Lyons that "five men, each under a different law, may [often] be found walking or sitting together" would not have seemed strange in many, or even most, parts of the world.[34]

The unprecedented movement of people in the early modern period exacerbated jurisdictional complexity by injecting new foreign groups into already complicated domestic milieux.[35] The opening up of long-distance sea routes, which gradually stretched out to encompass the globe, enabled thousands of mariners, merchants, and migrants to venture into new regions. Jurisdictional claims traveled with delegated legal authorities and followed subjects around the globe. On the sea, European ships operated as both "islands of law" – floating territories of the realm – and as "vectors of law" carrying sovereigns' legal authority into the ocean world.[36] Ship captains and military commanders overseas operated as delegated legal authorities, conducting inquiries on the ships or forts under their command and meting out punishments for subordinates. In Asia, the maritime laws of Melaka gave the

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[33] Pär Cassell, *Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan* (Oxford University Press, 2012).

[34] Joseph Story, *Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic* (London: Hilliard, Gray, 1834), p. 4.

[35] Lauren Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900* (Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[36] Lauren Benton, "Legal Spaces of Empire: Piracy and the Origins of Ocean Regionalism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, October, vol. XLVII: 4 (2005): 704, 706.

captain absolute power, explicitly designating him sovereign over a tiny floating kingdom: "The captain [*Nakhoda*] is as a king on board his ship. The steersman [*Jurumudi*] is as the Prime Minister [*Běndahara*]. The officer in charge of casting anchor and taking soundings [*Jurubatu*] is as the chief of police [*Těménggong*]."[37]

As jurists, ship captains, and advisers to sovereigns struggled to ascertain the law of maritime spaces that churned with long-distance traders, pirates, privateers, and quasi-naval forces, they returned repeatedly to jurisdiction as a key structuring element. Jurisdiction was not the same as ownership; as the Dutch legal writer Hugo Grotius pointed out in his 1609 tract *Mare liberum* (The Free Sea), the sea could not be possessed.[38] It could, however, be controlled, and travelers on the sea could exercise jurisdiction not only over their own ships but also over many others that crossed their paths. This view matched well with the Portuguese sale of passes (*cartazes*) to ships in the Indian Ocean and the Japanese *shuinjō*.[39] Such systems established the ships of pass-giving sovereigns as mobile outposts of state authority. They also marked vessels carrying passes as clients, with the result that they were often given a wide berth by other potentially predatory fleets. In 1618, for example, a Dutch fleet allowed a Japanese vessel carrying such a document to run its blockade of Manila, prompting Spanish observers to note that because the vessel "carried a chapa, or license, from the Japanese emperor it feared nothing."[40] The result was a tangle of jurisdictional corridors, the complexity of which offered both protection to individual merchants who were able to find security by maintaining or claiming connections to multiple sovereigns and opportunities for raiding by maritime predators who also found ways to game the system of overlapping jurisdictions.[41]

On land, a different jurisdictional patchwork took shape. Most polities allowed foreign merchant communities to regulate their own affairs, except in the punishment of serious crimes or other threats to order. The result was the visible legal pluralism of multi-ethnic port cities such as Melaka, which hosted a bewildering array of foreign traders including but not limited to "Moors from Cairo, Mecca, Aden, Abyssinians, men of Kilwa, Malindi,

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[37] Richard Winstedt and P. E. De Josselin De Jong, "The Maritime Laws of Malacca," *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 29: 3 (1956): 51.

[38] Hugo Grotius, *The Free Sea*, trans. Richard Hakluyt, (ed.) David Armitage (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2004).

[39] Clulow, *The Company and the Shogun*, pp. 56–7, 174–7.

[40] Emma Blair and James Robertson (eds.), *The Philippine Islands, 1493–1803* (Cleveland, OH: A. H. Clark, 1902–9), vol. XVIII, p. 229.

[41] Benton, "Legal Spaces of Empire."

Ormuz, Parsees, Rumes, Turks, Turkomans, Christian Armenians, Gujarartees, men of Chaul, Dabhol, Goa, of the kingdom of Deccan, Malabars and Klings, merchants from Orissa, Ceylon, Bengal, Arakan, Pegu, Siamese, men of Kedah, Malays, men of Pahang, Patani, Cambodia, Champa, Cochin China, Chinese, [and] Lequeos."[42] The widespread expectation that merchant communities would retain some judicial power over their own members facilitated the movement of traders into new territories. Portuguese agents established trading factories in West Africa by negotiating with local rulers who agreed to allow the Portuguese to maintain jurisdiction within their settlements so long as they did not attempt to extend their legal authority over neighboring African subjects.[43] Communities of Armenian and Jewish traders operated in both Catholic and Ottoman territories in the Mediterranean by depending on the widespread recognition of a degree of legal purview over co-religionists. In the port of Calicut on the Indian coast, incoming Muslim merchants were placed under the control of a "Moorish Governor of their own who rules and punishes them without interference from the [Hindu] king."[44]

Plural legal orders – that is, those comprising multiple and even competing jurisdictions – were ubiquitous, and their commonalities helped to regulate interpolity relations. Jurisdictional arrangements were frequently referenced in treaties such as those negotiated between the Dutch and English East India Companies and Indian Ocean states that granted Europeans "authority to execute justice on their owne men offending."[45] Such clauses were not forced at gunpoint; to the contrary they were frequently volunteered by officials attached to regimes like that of Tokugawa Japan, which wielded military and economic resources far in excess of the most powerful European states.[46] By the same token, conquerors often allowed and even encouraged conquered subjects to retain jurisdiction in their own communities. Spaniards in New Spain allowed Aztec legal forums to

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[42] Tomé Pires, *The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires: An Account of the East, from the Red Sea to Japan* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1944), II, p. 268.

[43] Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures*, Chapter 2.

[44] Duarte Barbosa, *The Book of Duarte Barbosa: An Account of the Countries Bordering on the Indian Ocean and their Inhabitants* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1918–21), II, p. 76.

[45] Clements Markham, *The Voyages of Sir James Lancaster, Kt., to the East Indies* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1877), p. 84.

[46] In 1613, the English factory in Japan concluded an agreement with the shogun mandating that "if any of the Englishmen commits an offense, he shall be sentenced according to the gravity of the offense; the sentences shall be at the discretion of the English commander." Derek Massarella and Izumi Tyler, "The Japonian Charters: The English and Dutch Shuinjo," *Monumenta Nipponica* 45: 2 (1990): 198.

continue to function after the conquest, a situation that shifted more as a result of Indian participation in Spanish legal forums than Spanish insistence on Indians' legal incorporation.[47]

Understandings about the routine nature of jurisdictional arrangements did not in any way preclude conflict. In general, the decision to uphold or to violate widely accepted jurisdictional boundaries was often a highly political one, with the result that the subsequent controversies could be bitterly contested. In the VOC factory in Ayutthaya, for example, the question of jurisdiction was relegated to the sidelines until 1636, when two inebriated Dutch merchants were arrested for attacking the servants of the king's brother. The retaliation for the incident was swift; rather than allowing the Dutch to try and punish their own men, the king of Siam moved to execute the offenders. The subsequent storm of protest orchestrated by the local VOC representative led eventually to a compromise after both sides agreed that a symbolic affirmation of guilt would suffice if the Dutch pledged to obey "all the laws and customs of the realm."[48] In this case, relative Dutch weakness in the area led the company to agree to recognize Ayutthayan jurisdiction over its agents, even while keeping the door open to future challenges should the balance of power shift in favor of the Dutch.[49]

Challenges also emerged because jurisdictional divisions often corresponded to religious or ethnic differences, themselves unstable and contested. In contexts such as the Pays d'en Haut in North America, where French traders were traveling into areas in which no single authority held a monopoly of violence and where they could not appeal to established diplomatic circuits to sort out conflicts, disputes about blurred jurisdictional lines were sometimes resolved on the spot, in ad hoc ways that split the difference between culturally different legal procedures. For example, when a group of Indians killed two Frenchmen in an area that neither Algonquians nor Frenchmen held securely, an initial standoff – the Algonquian offer of slaves to compensate the loss and the French demand to punish all participants in the attack – was followed by a negotiated resolution that defied legal logic for

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[47] Brian P. Owensby, *Empire of Law and Indian Justice in Colonial Mexico* (Stanford University Press, 2008).

[48] J. E. Heeres and F. W. Stapel (eds.), *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum*, 6 vols. (Amsterdam: Martinus Nijhoff, 1907–55), I, p. 285.

[49] This is what effectively occurred when, after a naval blockade in 1663–4, a new treaty secured various concessions for the VOC, including the right to refer accusations of criminal conduct to the Governor-General in Batavia. Heeres and Stapel, *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum*, 2: 280–5.

both sides: the execution of two Indians.[50] In other standoffs across legal divides, uncertainties about whether rival groups would turn over accused wrongdoers often led to hostage taking to ensure motivation to negotiate about alternative punishments.

Other variables affecting jurisdictional politics included the differential energies and actions of consuls – agents of distant sovereigns charged with legal oversight of subjects in foreign territories. In the sprawling Ottoman Empire, where a "'customary' diplomatic law" centered on the familiar principle of special jurisdiction for foreign groups, the local consul could influence the way the plural legal order evolved.[51] One commentator noted that some British consuls "had doubts as to their powers, were perplexed and embarrassed in the administration of their authority, feared to give due protection, and left the complaints of British subjects entirely without redress; whilst, in other cases, Consuls exercised their power with a most despotic and an almost intolerable authority."[52] Yet a degree of studied ignorance about complex legal orders also seemed routine and matters seemed to function best when not committed to paper. According to one experienced consul based in Tripoli, any attempt to provide a written record would simply "perplex and embarrass the question, and lead to unnecessary correspondence and much trouble."[53] He was not the last official to appreciate the paradox of a legal system well understood by insiders but difficult to explain, precise enough to be used to resolve complex cases but permissive of an eclectic use of sources and sometimes procedures, and subject to treaty terms but shaped more powerfully by the improvisations of local actors.

These qualities placed jurisdictional politics at the center of key shifts in ideas about sovereignty that began to take shape at the turn of the nineteenth century. The jurisdictional complexity of early modern societies had supported an understanding of sovereignty as divisible – that is, as a bundle of capacities distributed in different combinations within irregular spaces rather than as a monopoly power exercised over bounded territories. A cluster of jurisdictional conflicts reflecting increasing global imperial power began to undergird a shift toward a view of state legal authority as positioned at the

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[50] Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 78–80.

[51] C. R. Pennell, "Treaty Law: The Extent of Consular Jurisdiction in North Africa from the Middle of the Seventeenth to the Middle of the Nineteenth Century," *The Journal of North African Studies* 14: 2 (2009): 235.

[52] Criminal Jurisdiction in the Levant, HC Deb, 14 March 1844, vol. LXXIII, cols. 1007–16.

[53] Papers Relative to the Jurisdiction of Her Majesty's Consuls in the Levant (Parliamentary Papers 1845, LII), 53.

apex of a hierarchy of jurisdictions. Such shifts developed within a world of empires rather than as a result of the rise of a global order of nation-states. Europeans in settler colonies formulated claims to local territorial control and legal hegemony in response to clusters of jurisdictional conflicts with indigenous societies.[54] Conflicts over extra-territoriality – jurisdiction over subjects living in foreign territories – sharpened in several world regions, benefiting from the enforcement of militarized empires and prompting local regimes to respond by ratcheting up their own claims to control over legal affairs within defined territories.[55] Such shifts were subtle and in many places gradual, but it is clear that jurisdictional orders were changing, with far-reaching effects.

Protection

Protocol and jurisdiction are categories that describe form and function. But what was the substance of interpolity negotiations? Much of the talk across political communities centered on protection – services of protection against enemies that might be traded and the protection of subjects traveling in or through foreign territories. The theme of protection pervaded treaties, informal negotiations, the militarization of trading post empires, and rationales for aggression against other states in the early modern world.

In interaction after interaction, protection came paired with its indispensable twin, tribute. The Ottoman relationship with its European vassal states was predicated on the exchange of "obedience" or "submission" in return for the "mighty protection of empire."[56] In the case of Wallachia and Moldavia, this took the form of tribute (*cizye* or *harac*) offered up in recompense for protection (*himayet* or *siyanet*), a transaction that found clear expression in a 1586 document issued by Murad III to Wallachia stating that "this country is under our due protection, and its subjects pay me tribute."[57] On the other side of Asia, a similar exchange animated the Chinese tributary system,

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[54] Lisa Ford, *Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and Australia, 1788–1836* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

[55] Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures*, Chapter 6; Pär Cassell, *Grounds of Judgment*.

[56] Lovro Kunčević, "Janus-faced Sovereignty: The International Status of the Ragusan Republic in The Early Modern Period," in Gábor Kármán and Lovro Kunčević (eds.), *The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), p. 94.

[57] Viorel Panaite, "The Legal and Political Status of Wallachia and Moldavia in Relation to the Ottoman Porte," in Kármán and Kunčević, *The European Tributary States*, pp. 24–5.

which allowed distant states to petition the imperial center not only for recognition but also, as is less frequently discussed, actual protection. In 1403, for example, the sultan of Melaka requested precisely this from the Ming state in return for appropriate submission. The result was an imperial decree that the "Western mountain of the country [Melaka] . . . be enfeoffed as the protector mountain of the country, and a tablet erected upon it."[58] Melaka prospered in the shade of Ming protection, which proved highly effective, even across great distances. In 1419, a possible attack by nearby Siam was warded off by a stern warning from China that the "king of the country of Melaka has already become part of the within [the empire], and he is a minister of the Court."[59]

Protection was ubiquitous in Southeast Asia, where it provided the logic for hierarchical arrangements among states. Individual kings claimed authority over vassals and tributaries that made up a shifting cast, one that might "expand and contract in concertina-like fashion" as tributaries entered and exited spheres of influence.[60] Both sides maneuvered strategically. Strong rulers were always looking for new tributaries capable of buttressing their power, and weak rulers sought new benefactors capable of ensuring security in a dangerous world. The ability of individual tributaries to claim multiple overlords at any one time intensified the continual legal and political jostling.

The interior logic of the exchange between overlord and tributary was predominantly one of reciprocity. A smaller, weaker state would seek shelter from a dangerous neighbor by striking a deal with a potential overlord. But there were also many circumstances in which one paid to protect oneself against the so-called protector – that is, where "oppressive protection" or "mafia-like protection" did not respond to an obvious outside threat, other than the danger created by the one peddling protection.[61] In all cases, protection came attached to genuine concessions, both material costs and the surrender of partial sovereignty by the weaker partner. The most obvious requirement of such arrangements was political submission, which gave the overlord rights to various degrees of legal intervention, effectively extending jurisdiction across borders.

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[58] Geoff Wade, trans., *Southeast Asia in the Ming Shi-lu: An Open Access Resource*, Singapore: Asia Research Institute and the Singapore E-Press, National University of Singapore, http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/516, accessed 3 January 2014.

[59] Wade, trans., *Southeast Asia in the Ming Shi-lu*.

[60] O. W. Wolters, *History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), p. 17.

[61] Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), pp. 84, 88.

European overseas enterprises made full use of the protection rubric. When the Dutch arrived in Asia in the seventeenth century, they had come, so they claimed, to offer protection to sovereigns and people against the rapacious Iberian empires. In some cases, the Dutch emphasized mutual protection, asserting that the company stood as a brother pledged to support its equal partner in times of need. But the relationship was more frequently couched in hierarchical terms, with the offer made to a weaker party in return for a set of specific concessions, in particular access to precious spices over which the company was seeking monopoly rights. In 1607, for example, the sultan of Ternate accepted the Dutch as his "protector" (*beschermheer*) in return for an agreement "not to sell any cloves, to any nation or people" aside from his new allies.[62] In this way, protection provided a mechanism to share authority, affording legal rights to one party while eroding those of the other.

This case and many others suggest that protection functioned as a generally accepted rubric shared by European and Asian powers. Small states in Asia easily traded allegiance to a familiar overlord for a more exotic one when the change served their interests. In the early sixteenth century, Kedah, a strategically located polity on the northern end of the Malay peninsula, attempted to gain the protection of Melaka against the influence of Siam, then fell back into the arms of Siam after an attack by the powerful Sumatran state of Aceh, then rebelled and sought protection from a new power, the Dutch East India Company, which was enthusiastically snapping up allies in the region and had clearly grasped the possibilities of protection peddling.[63] In the late eighteenth century, the British East India Company founded its policy of "subsidiary alliances," designed to extend its influence and control among Indian states, on protection paid for by Indian rulers and guaranteed by the Company.

Increasingly, "protection" carried a double meaning, as it signified shelter from both external enemies and the arbitrary power of petty despots. The term was invoked by British abolitionists who favored extending imperial jurisdiction in the West Indies in order to check the power of colonial elites over slaves and freed blacks by bringing subordinate subjects of the empire under the "protection" of British law.[64] It was cited, too, by officials advocating war against rulers accused of tyranny. After the British took control from

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[62] Heeres and Stapel (eds.), *Corpus Diplomaticum*, I, pp. 51–3.
[63] R. Bonney, *Kedah: 1771–1821: The Search for Security and Independence* (Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 14–22.
[64] Lauren Benton, "This Melancholy Labyrinth: The Trial of Arthur Hodge and the Boundaries of Imperial Law," *Alabama Law Review* 64 (2012): 91–122.

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the Dutch of the coastal provinces of Ceylon in 1785, for example, British officials developed an elaborate rationale for attacking and annexing the Kingdom of Kandy in the island's interior. A series of governors wrote to convince London that the king was a brutal tyrant, while exhorting selected Kandyan elites to "solicit the protection of England" on behalf of the people and invite an invasion that would allow Kandy to be folded into a broader project of legal reform on the island.[65]

As with protocol and jurisdiction, the long nineteenth century brought important shifts in the way protection functioned internationally. Around the turn of the nineteenth century, protection featured prominently in the most important European treaties. Key clauses in the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca between the Ottoman and Russian empires defined the legal protection of Russian Christians living in Ottoman territories. In 1815, the Treaty of Paris made Britain the "protecting sovereign" in the Ionian Islands, stipulating in language so vague that it would result in decades of conflict that the islands would regulate their own "internal organization," subject to the "approbation of the Protecting Power."[66] Such agreements engendered legal conflicts and attempts at revising imperial policies in ways that prepared the ground for later attempts to define "protectorates" as special categories within the international order and to define a doctrine of humanitarian intervention premised on a universally recognized "responsibility to protect."[67]

Conclusion

As large and small polities jostled against one another with a new intensity and frequency in the early modern world, interpolity relations drew from shared expectations about legal behavior. A quality of imprecision in such basic understandings could provide valuable flexibility and prevent conflict. It sometimes also sharpened conflict by introducing new jurisdictional tensions, creating opportunities for flawed performances of protocol, or exposing the

[65] Brownrigg to Bathurst, 20 March 1814, The British National Archives (TNA), CO 54/51, f. 175.
[66] Bathurst to Maitland, 29 August 1816, TNA, CO 136/300.
[67] James Onley, "The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British Resident in the Nineteenth Century," *New Arabian Studies*, vol. VI (University of Exeter Press, 2004), pp. 30–92; Richard Drayton, "Beyond Humanitarian Imperialism: The Dubious Origins of 'Humanitarian Intervention' and some Rules for its Future," in Bronwen Everill and Josiah Kaplan (eds.), *The History and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention and Aid in Africa* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013).

fictions embedded within offers of protection. Yet for all this, such rubrics of legal behavior helped diverse political communities structure and sustain interactions and provided the foundations for regional and even global legal regimes.

Over the course of the long nineteenth century, intensifying legal conflicts accompanied a broad set of changes in the global order. Conflicts over jurisdictional boundaries intensified, contributing to increasingly robust claims by states to a monopoly on legal authority. Extra-territoriality, long a feature of interpolity law, became more closely associated with the rise of European and US global power. And protection developed into a recognized element of international law, first in relation to the formal designation of European protectorates, later in debates about the obligations of all states to act to uphold certain universal standards of human rights. We cannot make sense of such trends without first understanding the elements that formed the foundations for interpolity law between 1500 and 1800.

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PART TWO

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TRADE, EXCHANGE, AND PRODUCTION

The Columbian Exchange

NOBLE DAVID COOK

The now widely used term "The Columbian Exchange" refers broadly to the biological impact of the linking of the Old and New World following Christopher Columbus's "discovery" of unknown lands midway between Europe and Asia as he sailed westward across the Atlantic Ocean in 1492. As a result of the discovery and subsequent voyages of exploration and settlement, the world was transformed by the transfer (exchange) of plants and animals from one continent to another, in a process that accelerated as transportation became faster. The term was popularized by Alfred W. Crosby's seminal 1972 book, *The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492*, which emphasized the transfers of the diseases, plants, and animals introduced as a consequence of the continuous communications between the New World – North and South America – and the Old – Europe, Asia, and Africa.[1]

Crosby stressed the most flagrant uneven exchanges as he highlighted the impact of the acute communicable crowd diseases of smallpox and measles that swept away vast numbers of Amerindians. The Columbian Exchange has both positive and negative outcomes. The Agricultural Revolution in the Americas, coming slightly later than that in the Old World, provided a rich biodiversity of consumable plants. Some, such as potatoes, maize (corn), and manioc (yucca), produced substantially greater caloric values per unit of land than Old World staples, thereby contributing to later population growth. Conversely, a greater variety of animals were domesticated in the Old World, and these introductions (cattle, horses, sheep, goats, and pigs being among the most important) had positive as well as negative effects. Similarly, the movement of Europeans, Africans, and Asians to America was part of the

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[1] Alfred W. Crosby, *The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1972). A 30th anniversary edition was subsequently published (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003).

Columbian Exchange. The biological and cultural consequences of migration and mixing were transformational. Although Crosby emphasized the first decades of the process in his initial book, in subsequent chapters, articles, and books, he carried the argument into the twentieth century as the exchanges of new plants and animals and pathogens continued.

Crosby's contribution was slow to be recognized by professional historians. When the book was published, many major journals failed to review it, and most of the reviews that appeared in professional venues were critical or lukewarm. The practice of history at the time was still dominated by traditional political, biographical, and institutional historians, and Crosby's work failed to fall neatly within any one of these categories. But there were geographers, especially historical geographers, demographers, historians of medicine, and ethnohistorians who were beginning to seriously examine the impact of European overseas expansion. Simultaneously there was a growing interest in the impact of human settlement on the natural ecology. In 1949, American naturalist Aldo Leopold had challenged historians to examine past change with the environment in mind in his *A Sand Country Almanac*, but his call fell largely on deaf ears.[2] By contrast in Europe, members of the Annales School, especially as seen in the work of Fernand Braudel and his student Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, stressed the relation between climate and the physical and cultural landscapes as they situated their subjects.[3] Yet, in the United States there were also beginning to be calls for a rethinking of traditional historical research in order to make it more relevant. Alfred Crosby came of age during a period of intellectual ferment following World War II and the Cold War. His studies and interests extend widely, from the history of medicine through the gamut of the social and the hard sciences. In a short monograph prepared for the American Historical Association in 1987, Crosby extended the horizons of his original thesis to include what he called the economic, nutritional, and demographic consequences of the exchange. These topics had been fleshed out in detail in his sweeping global history, *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900* (1986). The true consequences of the Columbian Exchange are, after all, worldwide. Borrowing from research in demographic history as well as studies in historical epidemiology, nutrition, health, and disease, Crosby stimulated

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[2] John H. McNeill, "Foreword," in Crosby, *The Columbian Exchange, 30th Anniversary Edition*, p. xi.

[3] Peter Burke, *The French Historical Revolution: The Annales School, 1929–1989* (Stanford University Press, 1991), and François Dosse, *The New History in France: The Triumph of the Annales* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1994).

subsequent research in environmental and global history; indeed, he is considered one of the fathers of modern ecological and global history.[4]

The Columbian Exchange begins in the first global age, starting in the mid-fifteenth century, and was dominated by Spain and Portugal until the mid-seventeenth century. The cultural foundations were laid in the fourteenth century, particularly in the cities of northern Italy, with Venice, Florence, and Genoa leading the way. The dynamism was based on commerce between northern and central European states and the Levant and even Asia. The excess wealth gave merchant-bankers of the northern Italian city-states immense influence, as patrons of art and architecture and new knowledge. And enough capital could be raised for risky yet highly profitable ventures if they were successful. Such investments led to long-distance trading expeditions, such as that of Marco Polo's family. His text describing the venture and the wealth of China stimulated further commercial efforts. His trip, and those of others, contributed to European technological advances. The magnetic needle, a novelty that always pointed the same way, was converted to a compass for seafarers. The stern rudders used on Chinese junks were adopted, and, when built into the ships' hulls, proved to be capable of withstanding the massive storms of the Atlantic Ocean. Gunpowder, used by the Chinese for fireworks, found a military application among the constantly warring European states, and when used in cannons and harquebuses transformed warfare. Placed onboard the merchant ships, the new firepower provided the Europeans with the protection they needed to trade in foreign ports and securely transport the goods home.

To the west, the Iberian Peninsula stood at the crossroads of the Mediterranean and Atlantic, Africa, and Europe. Invaded and almost overrun with the expansion of Islam in the eighth century, the small surviving Christian kingdoms began a slow and continuous process of Reconquista that lasted until 1492. Portugal and Spain were among the first European states to consolidate power under a strong monarchy. With a solid population, viable economy, and a large number of mobile young men who had been engaged in warfare, plus a crusading mentality as the result of the long Reconquista,

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[4] Crosby's more important books include, Alfred W. Crosby, *America, Russia, Hemp, and Napoleon* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1965); Alfred W. Crosby, *Influenza in America, 1918–1976: History, Science, and Politics* (New York: Prodist, 1977); Alfred W. Crosby, *America's Forgotten Pandemic: the Influenza of 1918* (Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Alfred W. Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900* (Cambridge University Press, 1986).

as well as sailing experience in the Atlantic, the Spanish monarchs were amenable to the scheme presented by a persistent Genoese navigator.[5]

First generation: the initial Columbian Exchange (1492–1516)

In a brief generation in the circum-Caribbean the die was cast. The impact of the first Columbus expedition of 1492–3 was limited. Columbus's intent was reconnaissance; he wished to prove the viability of his proposal that one could reach eastern Asia by sailing westward across the Atlantic. He hoped to establish a route, claim whatever areas he could for the Spanish monarchs he sailed for, find out what was immediately valuable for trade, and weigh possible trade relations with local rulers. The expedition of three small vessels carried food and drink for the crews, as well as goods for gifts and exchange with the peoples they expected to encounter. Although there was hunger and lack of water during the outward voyage, no sickness was reported on the crossing other than for Columbus who frequently complained of ill health. Neither was there mention of sickness among the Amerindians the Europeans met on the coasts of the Bahamas, northeastern Cuba or Hispaniola. Yet, the exchanges and transformations that would be experienced throughout the Americas were already well under way.

Of diseases as part of the Columbian Exchange in the initial voyage we have only the possibility of syphilis, a disease caused by the bacterium *Treponema pallidum*, responsible for both venereal and non-venereal forms. Shortly after the men of the first expedition returned there was mention of illness whose symptoms resembled syphilis, and it broke out with a vengeance in Italy in 1493, almost coinciding with the messengers sent by the Catholic monarchs to the pope bringing news of Columbus's discovery, along with a request for a privileged role for Spain in the attempt to convert the newly discovered peoples to Christianity. From the Italian peninsula the debilitating sickness spread quickly to France, and beyond. Historical epidemiologists have long mulled over the issue of its origins. Certainly, the archaeological evidence based on scientific study on bone lesions in pre-Columbian Americans by palaeopathologists identifies non-venereal syphilis. But the causative treponemal pathogen, *T. pertenue*, is also found in the Old World, where it seems responsible for cases of yaws. And *T. carateum*,

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[5] J. H. Parry, *The Age of Reconnaissance: Discovery, Exploration, and Settlement, 1450–1650* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982).

commonly pinta, was carried by human migrations to all parts of the globe generations before Columbus. It is possible that environmental factors, clothing, sanitation and nutrition, social customs, and the nature (endemic versus epidemic) and time (childhood or adult) of the original infection, play a role in the evolution of the disease. Debate among specialists has continued for decades, but slowly and with the assistance of new technology, including genetic testing, a more satisfying explanation will allow for a closer approximation, although certainty is impossible. In his preface to the 2003 edition, Crosby apologizes for spending an entire chapter on syphilis, and for suggesting it was Montezuma's revenge in retribution for smallpox.[6]

There were other exchanges initiated during the first Columbus expedition. The Europeans gave gifts, bartered for or stole a variety of plants, animals, and minerals in the Antilles and brought them to Europe to prove the potential that existed. They included parrots, feathers, cotton cloth, probably the pineapple, tobacco, rubber, and a dozen Lucayo (Bahamian) and Taino (from Hispaniola) boys, to display to doubters and to train as translators for the return. The Spanish were forced to leave behind on the northwest coast of Hispaniola about thirty-eight men with some food and equipment in a hastily constructed fort, since there was not enough space on the small caravels *Pinta* and *Niña* after the flagship *Santa María* ran aground on a reef and broke apart on Christmas Eve, 1492. Tobacco appeared to have promise as a medicine, but it would be decades before it became popular and valuable as a "smoking weed," making later settlers and merchants from other nations rich as they engaged in the business of the commodity.

After the Columbus expedition reached the port of Palos on 15 March 1493, news of the discovery and the promise of gold and wealth spread quickly, inflaming the hopes of many restless men. Suddenly a new possibility of becoming rich in lands to the west, only a few weeks away, seemed a reality. Columbus had no difficulty in finding adventurers for his second expedition. They flocked to join, from all elements of society: hidalgos with military equipment, farmers with their implements and seeds, artisans with their tools, miners, and merchants. There were physicians and clergy as well. Quickly they amassed and packed seventeen ships with 1,500 mostly men and sailed from Cádiz on 25 September 1493. In the first week of October they

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[6] Alfred W. Crosby, "Preface to the 2003 Edition," in Crosby, *The Columbian Exchange, 30th Anniversary Edition,* p. x; William D. Phillips and Carla Rahn Phillips, *The Worlds of Christopher Columbus* (Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Consuelo Varela and Juan Gil (eds.), *Cristóbal Colón: Textos y documentos completos* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1997).

reached the Canary Islands, checked the ships, made needed repairs, and took on additional food (including eight sows) and water for the voyage. A document remains with the list of the plants and animals brought on the second voyage: horses, mares, mules, pigs, goats, sheep, all kinds of other animals, wheat, oats, and various types of trees and fruits.[7]

With favorable winds and currents, the westward passage to the Lesser Antilles was swift, as they sighted the first island on 3 November. At this juncture some ships stopped off for food, water, and supplies and to conduct quick reconnaissance at several of the islands as they sailed in the general direction of Hispaniola. There are few records of these initial encounters, but evidence becomes more detailed around 28 November as the ships reached the northern coast of Hispaniola. Thanks to the recent discovery of the *Relación del segundo viaje*, the account of the second voyage prepared by Christopher Columbus that covers the period 1493 to 1496, we have a better understanding of conditions on the island than we did a generation ago.[8] Almost the moment the voyagers set foot on the coast, they began to experience hunger and sickness, and the situation did not appear to be good for the native islanders either. The question is why? The Europeans had brought just enough food and drink for the voyage, with little to spare. They needed to nurture and protect the precious few animals and seed crops they had transported until they could establish root and prosper on American soil. These could not be consumed, although some in desperation did, creating persistent problems. The option for Europeans was to tap the local resources. The large numbers of *conucos* (cultivated agricultural plots) seemed ample at first for both the 1,500 Old World invaders and the hundreds of thousands of Tainos. But the Spaniards were more interested in a headlong search for gold, promised as they joined the expedition. Uncontrollable, they swept over the island, brutally forcing the Taino to serve them, and then torturing them to take them to the elusive source of the gold.

The first months of the encounter were disastrous for both the Europeans and the island residents. Normal subsistence activities were disrupted, resources were wasted or despoiled, and the Spanish began to starve, with the Taino facing hunger as well. The Spanish had little stomach for the new food, and as the wine they had brought disappeared, they drank the water, filled with parasites they had no resistance to. Diarrhea, cramps, dehydration,

[7] Varela and Gil, *Cristóbal Colón*, pp. 235 and 250.
[8] Noble David Cook, "Sickness, Starvation, and Death in Early Hispaniola," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 32 (2002): 349–86.

emaciation, and fatigue combined to make those initial weeks not only memorable, but also deadly for many of the invaders. Within two years around two-thirds of the outsiders had succumbed to the Caribbean environment, so alien to the Europeans. In this weakened state, they were susceptible to the various Old World diseases they may have transported with them. Those already suffering from malaria, endemic in Andalucía, were less likely to survive the challenge of old and new pathogens. Those who did survive the "greening" process in the early decades in the Caribbean formed the core of active participants in the conquest of the Amerindian empires on the mainland.

The Taino simultaneously faced the impact of the invaders and the pathogens they carried. We do know that their numbers fell precipitously. Of a dense aboriginal population of the island of Hispaniola, there remained only a handful a quarter century after 1492. We do not know the exact number at contact, for the documentation is sparse and subject to various interpretations. There is a wide range of estimates, from Verlinden's low of 60,000 to Borah and Sherburne F. Cook's impossible 7,975,000. It is most likely that the number was between 200,000 and 750,000. Historical demographer Massimo Livi Bacci posited 200,000 to 300,000, but he found little evidence of epidemic disease in the initial generation yet several contemporary witnesses attested to the presence of illnesses. Historian Frank Moya Pons, who has spent his life studying Hispaniola's past, has provided a measured range of from 377,000 to 600,000. Some Taino were killed outright in the chaotic first years, others died of starvation as their crops were destroyed by the invaders and their animals, and more succumbed to forced heavy labor. Sicknesses played a role as well. Medical historian Francisco Guerra suggests that influenza was introduced in the Caribbean by pigs on the second expedition. Guerra and others also believe that typhus was brought early. Malaria may have been introduced, but it is unclear if there was an American mosquito vector. The first well-documented smallpox epidemic hit the Caribbean in 1518, yet it might have come earlier. Smallpox was present in Andalucía when the 1493 fleet sailed, and there were young people aboard who might have been infected but did not yet know this. It is conceivable that they passed it to others on the journey and thus introduced it to Hispaniola as they disembarked, but there is no record of this. Of the dozen young male Taino and Lucayo carried to Spain on Columbus's return, six or seven were taken from Seville to the court in Barcelona for display and to train as translators for the return to the Caribbean. Columbus wrote in the recently discovered *Relación del segundo viaje* that "I put ashore [in Samana on

Hispaniola's northeast coast] one of the four Indians that I had taken from there last year, who had not died as the others from smallpox on the departure from Cadiz."[9] It is possible the smallpox virus came with the fleet and passed in a chain of infection between susceptible young men until they landed on Hispaniola in 1493. Whether it did or not, smallpox reached the Antilles a generation later, in December 1518. That well-documented epidemic swept away most of the remaining Taino and quickly spread to the mainland, contributing to the Spanish conquest of Amerindian states whose populations dwarfed the number of invaders.

Disease

The Columbian Exchange resulted in the transfer of Old World diseases to the Americas, and vice versa. The time of arrival of the diseases varied depending on the nature of the disease and the mode of transmission. The diseases arriving soonest were those that existed in active or latent form in the victims and could be passed by close contact, by touch, breath, or cuts that permitted blood to blood contact between individuals. Syphilis, smallpox, measles, and typhus were the principal Old World diseases discussed by Crosby, but others were transferred as well. They include bubonic and pneumonic plague, malaria, mumps, scarlet fever, whooping cough, and typhoid fever. Precise dating of the appearance of each of these diseases is difficult. Yellow fever in epidemic form first appeared in the Caribbean in the 1640s and cholera in the 1830s. Chagas's disease, Oroya fever, and verruga peruana were New World diseases that did not transfer as easily. But there were several diseases with variants in both hemispheres: tuberculosis, syphilis, leishmaniasis, and hemorrhagic fevers.

Smallpox and measles, diseases spread by direct human contact, by air or touch, did the first damage. Despite being childhood diseases in the Old World with relatively modest mortality, both took a heavy toll when they erupted in areas in which there had been no prior exposure. Measles for example took up to 30 percent and smallpox 50 percent or more of those in populations that had not been previously exposed. Even Old World

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[9] Varela and Gil, *Cristóbal Colón*, p. 242: "que pusiese alli en tierra uno de los cuatro indios que alli avia tomado el año pasado el cual no se avia muerto como los otros de viruela a la partida de Cáliz." Noble David Cook, *Born to Die: Disease and New World Conquest, 1492–1650* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 23; and Massimo Livi Bacci, "Return to Hispaniola: Reassessing the Demographic Catastrophe," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 83 (2003): 3–51.

populations living in areas that escaped these two diseases for a generation or more experienced high levels of morbidity and mortality similar to Amerindians. Old World residents were not genetically protected from the killers, but those living in areas with frequent outbreaks had the protection of an acquired immunity. Sixteenth century Spanish physicians were generally able to identify both by their symptoms and the nature of the progression of the disease, although mistakes in identification of measles frequently occurred, because a skin rash often develops in various infections with high fevers.[10]

The Spanish also mention disease outbreaks in America that seem to be symptoms of diphtheria, mumps, and scarlet fever. Both are passed normally by close contact, by touch or cough, although scarlet fever can be carried also in infected milk. Scarlet fever is caused by group A hemolytic streptococci, diphtheria by *Corynebacteria diptheriae*, and mumps by a virus. In the premodern period it was almost impossible to distinguish them from one another, since all involved high fevers, general malaise, and soreness and swelling of the throat. But in the case of diphtheria the throat and neck could become so enlarged that victims could suffocate. In the case of scarlet fever the throat pain is severe, there are intense headaches, and a rash appears after three days. The wide distribution of related streptococci and bacteria that produce similar symptoms in infected human populations is a challenge for historical epidemiologists.

Diseases carried by insect vectors such as typhus, the plague, malaria, and yellow fever also exacted high mortality. Old World migrants to the Americas were also susceptible to these diseases, and many died, although their mortality rate was lower for a variety of reasons. Although infected individuals carrying the arthropod vectored diseases periodically arrived from the Old World, the evolution of outbreaks in the New depended on the availability of the preferred hosts to maintain a disease reservoir. In the case of malaria, the preferred mosquito carrier is the anopheles, with several species capable of transmitting it. There are three distinct strains of the malaria plasmodium: The most deadly is the *P. falciparum*, with intermittent, daily chills, prostration, and death. *P. vivax* is responsible for the "tercian malaria" with fevers every three days, and *P. malariae*, the quartan variety, with fevers coming every four days. Many people survive these lesser forms, but the result is a weakened population. Given the fact that malaria was common in the Mediterranean region, it likely arrived with infected passengers and

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[10] Kenneth F. Kiple (ed.), *The Cambridge World History of Human Disease* (Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Table 5.1. *Viral, bacterial, and protozoal agents introduced to the Americas*[*]

Transmission mode	Viral	Bacterial	Protozoal
Direct	influenza measles mumps rubella smallpox	pneumonia scarlet fever pertussis	
Zoonotic	yellow fever	anthrax bubonic plague typhus	malaria

[*]From Ann Ramenofsky, "Diseases of the Americas, 1492–1700," in Kiple, *World History of Human Disease*, p. 324.

mosquitos traveling on the second Columbus fleet. It did not take long to spread through the circum-Caribbean, and its major ports of Cartagena, Nombre de Dios, Veracruz, and Havana became centers for its spread (Table 5.1).[11]

Yellow fever, a viral disease, is also carried by a preferred mosquito host, the *Aedes aegypti*. Found in the tropics, it can extend its range well into temperate climate in warm, humid summer months. At onset the patient is lethargic, feverish, with a slow pulse, and ultimately jaundiced, hence the "yellow" fever label. Vomiting of almost black blood often signals impending death. It is endemic in much of tropical Africa, and weakens those who have it. Mortality varies widely, but is highest when it is in epidemic form in urban areas. Although it was surely introduced in the Americas early, the first well-documented outbreaks occurred in the Caribbean in the 1640s. Gradually extending into the temperate coasts of North America, yellow fever was much feared and deadly during the late summer months well through the nineteenth century.

Epidemic typhus was common in early modern Europe, and was especially deadly in times of war, as urban dwellers or troops were housed in close quarters with inadequate food and unsanitary conditions. Transmitted by the body louse, *Pendiculus humanus*, the pathogen, *Rickettsia prowazekii* enters the human body through skin abrasions. Symptoms include fevers,

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[11] Noble David Cook and W. George Lovell, "Unraveling the Web of Disease," in Noble David Cook and W. George Lovell, *"Secret Judgments of God": Old World Disease in Colonial Spanish America* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), pp. 227–9, and Kiple, *Cambridge World History of Human Disease*.

headache, malaise, and a rash after four to six days. If fevers are high and continue for over fourteen days there is generally delirium, followed by a coma, and death. Mortality rates are relatively low for children at 5 percent, and highest for the elderly, up to 50 percent. The rash could be confused with measles, but the more elevated reddish spots and their location on the middle of the body were seen by Spanish physicians to signal typhus, or *tabardillo* as they called it after a sleeveless cloak, or tabard. The troops during the final stage of the Reconquista, the war in Granada, experienced typhus in epidemic form, and many of these fighters were on the second Columbus fleet, just two years later. Some have suggested typhus was introduced into Hispaniola at this time, but given the Taino habit of little clothing and frequent bathing, it is not likely to have led to a major epidemic. But it did reach mainland Mexico as early as the Hernán Cortés conquest. There are reported epidemics in temperate highland Mexico and the Andes of South America in the mid-1540s, and it would reappear periodically, with a mortality of 5–20 percent in a healthy adult population.[12]

The most feared disease for the Europeans, from the time of its appearance in the mid-fourteenth century, was the plague, in bubonic or pneumonic form. The plague (*Yersinia pestis*) is carried by a rat flea (*Xenopsylla cheopis*) and, when bitten, the human victim, after the incubation period, will display swollen lymph nodes varying in size from walnuts to softballs, which can be deadly if septicemia sets in. The word "bubonic" comes from the Greek word for these swellings. In the two to three years after it appeared in 1346, mortality in Italy ranged from one-third to half of the population, with urban centers usually having the heaviest death toll. It spared few sections of Europe in its inexorable spread, and sporadic outbreaks occurred for the next three centuries. There were periodic outbreaks in Seville, the major center for the Atlantic trade for the first century and a half after Columbus. Sevillian physicians described in detail the symptoms, leaving no doubt about its identification. The 1649 epidemic was one of the deadliest, with over half of the population extinguished. In its pneumonic form the disease is passed to another person by sputum, cough or touch and goes directly to the lungs; after a short incubation the temperature falls, there are intense coughs, then blood from the lungs and death. The mortality rate from pneumonic plague is close to 100 percent. Smallpox and typhus in hemorrhagic form mimic

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[12] Cook and Lovell, "Unraveling the Web of Disease," in Cook and Lovell, *"Secret Judgments of God,"* pp. 225–7.

Table 5.2. *Major New World epidemics, 1493–1600*[*]

Date	Disease	Location
1493–8	influenza (swine flu?), smallpox (?), malaria (?)	Hispaniola
1498	epidemic syphilis	Hispaniola
1500–2	generalized sickness, fevers (malaria?)	Hispaniola
1514–17	influenza (modorra)	Isthmus of Panama
1518–28	smallpox pandemic	Caribbean into mainland
1530–1	*dolor de costado* (pleurisy), flu, pneumonic plague	Central America
1531–4	measles	Mesoamerica to Andes
1538	smallpox	Mesoamerica
1545–8	typhus, pneumonic plague	Mesoamerica and Andes
1550	mumps	Mesoamerica
1557–62	measles, smallpox, influenza	Andean America
1559–64	measles, flu, mumps, diphtheria	Mesoamerica
1557–62	measles, flu, smallpox	Andean America
1566	cocoliztli	Central Mexico
1576–81	typhus, smallpox, measles, mumps	Mesoamerica
1585–91	typhus, smallpox, measles	Andean America
1587–8	cocoliztli	Central Mexico
1590	influenza	Central Mexico
1592–7	measles, typhus, mumps	Mesoamerica
1597	measles	Andean America

[*]Based on Cook, *Born to Die*, p. 132.

pneumonic plague, making accurate diagnosis in the era before modern medicine speculative (Table 5.2).[13]

[13] Recent archaeological research using DNA and protein signatures specific to *Yersinia pestis* has confirmed that the Black Death that swept away millions in the 1347–53 pandemic was indeed this disease, and skeletal remains also confirm the subsequent outbreaks in Europe. See Stephanie Haensch, Rafaella Bianucci, *et al.*, "Distinct Clones of *Yersinia pestis* Caused the Black Death," *PLos Pathog* 6 (2010), e1001134.doi:10.1371/journalppat.100134. Another team using DNA to screen for the *Y pestis*-specific *pla* gene in the teeth of victims provides evidence that the Justinian plague of 541–3 was a strain that died out and that the plague epidemic of the fourteenth century is a distinct strain of *Y pestis* that has survived to the present. See David M. Wagner, Jennifer Klunk, *et al.*, "*Yersinia pestis* and the Plague of Justinian 541–543 AD: a Genomic Analysis," *Lancet Infectious Disease* (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1473–3099(13)70323-2; Cook and Lovell, "Unraveling the Web of Disease," in Cook and Lovell, "*Secret Judgments of God*," pp. 224–5; and Alexandra Parma Cook and Noble David Cook, *The Plague Files: Crisis Management in Sixteenth Century Seville* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2009).

The consequence of the introduction and subsequent reintroduction of these disease pathogens was a rapid decline in Amerindian populations. Smallpox decimated the remnants of Hispaniola's Taino population in 1518, and when the pandemic swept central Mexico in the next years it contributed directly to the Spanish victory over the Aztecs. In the Andes of South America disease killed the Inca ruler Huayna Capac, setting off fratricidal conflict that led to the ease of Spanish conquest. It is impossible to determine how far from the original centers of infection smallpox extended during the pandemic. On the one hand, native trade networks served as a conduit for wide coverage; on the other, entire regions escaped. Where smallpox did most damage, 30 to 50 percent of victims succumbed. Fresh disease introductions compounded the damage: Measles raged from Mesoamerica to the Andes in the early 1530s, and again from 1557–64. Typhus and perhaps pneumonic plague swept both regions in 1545–8. There were periodic outbreaks of malaria, influenza, and mumps. The most devastating crisis occurred when several disease outbreaks coincided, as in 1576–81 in Mesoamerica and 1585–91 in the Andean region. Historians have adequate parish and census records, beginning in the 1570s, to measure the impact of successive waves of high mortality. Children and the elderly suffered most, and the number of children who reached reproductive age was insufficient to grow the population, or even to maintain stability. It would not be until the mid to late seventeenth century, as the epidemics settled into an endemic pattern and were regularly experienced, that the Amerindian populations began their increase. In the meantime, small populations, especially in hot, humid zones, were among the most vulnerable, especially as a majority of the people fell ill and no one was available to provide the care needed to bring the stricken back to health. Fear of those not infected often led to flight, making the spread of the infection more rapid. Areas with dense populations in cooler, more temperate climates suffered less. In some places entire ethnic entities almost disappeared; in more fortunate ones declines were less catastrophic (Table 5.3).[14]

Plants

Old World plants preferred by the Europeans took slow and tenuous root in the Caribbean islands. The weather was too hot and humid for the temperate

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[14] Cook and Lovell, "*Secret Judgments of God*," and Kiple, *Cambridge World History of Human Disease*.

Table 5.3. *Major regional New World epidemics, 1600–1650**

Central America	
1604	measles, typhus, mumps
1607–8	typhus
1613–14	smallpox, measles, typhus
1620–30	smallpox, "general pestilence"
1631–2	typhus
1647–9	yellow fever (Caribbean basin)
1650	"pestilence"

Andean Region	
1606	diphtheria
1611–14	measles, typhus, diphtheria
1618	measles
1630–3	typhus
1651	smallpox

Brazilian Coast	
1611–16	smallpox
1616	smallpox
1621–3	smallpox
1626	smallpox
1630	epidemic and hunger
1637	epidemic and hunger
1641–4	smallpox

Northwestern Mexico	
1601–2	smallpox, measles, typhus
1606–7	smallpox, measles
1612–15	typhus, smallpox?
1616–17	smallpox and/or measles
1619–20	various sicknesses
1623–5	smallpox, typhus, pneumonia
1636–41	smallpox and other sicknesses
1645–7	fevers (malaria?)

*Cook, *Born to Die*, pp. 168, 170, 191, 193.

climate grains to prosper. Similarly the fruit trees – apples, pears, plums, and cherries that require cold winter temperatures for the best results – failed to take hold. Cabbage, carrots, radishes, and green peas also generally failed. But the Old World rice, chickpeas, and onions did survive in the Caribbean and on the mainland of America as well. Because of the heavy labor investment to produce it, rice did not become an American staple for many decades.

Although the Taino had a rich and varied diet, Spanish food preferences were fixed, and it took some time before they willingly ate American foods, let alone acquired a taste for them and adopted them. Wheat was the preferred staple, but it was not until the conquest and settlement of Mexico in the 1520s that its introduction and consumption was assured, thanks to the temperate climate of the central plateau. Similar introduction of the staple grain took place in the Rio de la Plata and the temperate valleys in Andean South America, with ideal ecological niches ranging from Colombia to Chile, beginning in the mid-1530s. In most cases, the individuals responsible for the first introduction of the grain, often women, became cultural heroes. In Peru María Escobar and Inés Muñoz share in the attribution. Both were widows of important and wealthy *encomenderos* – men who had received grants of native tributaries from the Spanish crown – and both quickly remarried to rich husbands. Both had received sacks of grain from Spain around 1537–41, and had distributed and saw to its planting. Inés Muñoz was also credited with the introduction of olive trees, thanks to her second husband Antonio de Rivera, who brought three young trees from Spain as a gift to his wife.[15] In the case of Mexico the person who claimed in his service report to the Crown to have planted the first wheat some time between 1521 and 1523 was the Black African Juan Garrido, a former slave who had been freed for his military service. Garrido had participated in the conquests of Cuba and Puerto Rico, and the discovery of Florida, before he joined Hernán Cortés's conquest of Mexico.[16] Mexican wheat was soon exported to settlers in tropical regions for making bread. Havana for example received shipments for the annual fleet returning to Europe, for the sustenance of soldiers in the fort, and for the support of the military outpost of St. Augustine, Florida. By the second half of the sixteenth century wheat was grown by European settlers in many regions of temperate America, including Argentina, where it was introduced along with barley.[17]

The other elements of the Mediterranean food triad, olives for oil and grapes for the production of wine, were also introduced, took root, and finally bore fruit predominantly in the temperate and Mediterranean climate zones in the Americas. Both of these plants required several years before the trees and vines were mature and ready for harvest and subsequent

[15] Luis Martín, *Daughters of the Conquistadores: Women of the Viceroyalty of Peru* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1983), pp. 38–43.
[16] Herman L. Bennett, *Africans in Colonial Mexico: Absolutism, Christianity, and Afro-Creole Consciousness, 1570–1640* (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 2005), p. 16.
[17] Aylen Capparelli, *et al.*, "The Introduction of Old World Crops (Wheat, Barley, and Peach) in Andean Argentina during the 16th Century," *Veget Hist Archaeobot* 14 (2005): 472–84.

processing. For decades Spanish producers of olive oil and wine, and the merchants in Seville, profited by exporting to supply the growing American market. The royal treasury also profited from the duties, but when New World production began to threaten Spanish exports, the Crown issued regulations prohibiting or limiting severely American competition.

In his report of the second voyage, Columbus noted prophetically that sugar cane should be planted, as it would be highly productive. Sugar cane thrived in the climate of rich soil, heavy seasonal rainfall, and warm temperatures, and in spite of the heavy labor needed for production, the already existing strong European market for sugar was ample incentive for investing. Within a generation it was transforming the island with an increasing number of sugar mills. Hispaniola became an economically viable exporter by 1520, and the island quickly replaced the Canary Islands as the major source for the Spanish sugar trade. Sugar also transformed the demography. Sugar was labor intensive and, with the rapid decline of the native population, the importation of African slaves accelerated. The destructive sugar economy not only required heavy manpower, it also consumed a vast number of trees needed for carbon for the sugar processing. Lumber was also needed for the homes of settlers, for storage facilities, and furniture, plus ship repair. The demand resulted in rapid deforestation of Hispaniola, and many other islands. By 1650 the ecological landscape of the islands would have been almost unrecognizable for the original Taino.[18] Sugar soon expanded beyond Hispaniola. The Portuguese first had a tenuous hold on the coast of Brazil with little of economic value save for dyewoods, but in 1550 replaced this with a proprietary structure of governance by a royal governor and introduced sugar, which set the stage for success. Sugar production based on African slave labor was the economic foundation for their permanent presence on the South American mainland.[19]

Because ships leaving Spain for the Indies were required to include detailed records of what was loaded aboard for the voyage and potential planting in the new lands, we can trace the travel of foodstuffs westward. Similar documentation was not required for eastward voyages, but we know that food for the mariners and passengers returning to the Old World included some American products. Since the annual treasure fleet departing the Caribbean congregated

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[18] Alejandro de la Fuente, *Havana and the Atlantic in the Sixteenth Century* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), and Carl Ortwin Sauer, *The Early Spanish Main* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1966).

[19] Sidney W. Mintz, *Sweetness and Power: the Place of Sugar in Modern History* (New York: Penguin Books, 1986).

in Havana to prepare the Atlantic crossing, it was there that many of the victuals were loaded. The Atlantic return averaged six to eight weeks,[20] so it was important to have a mix of some fresh fruits and vegetables if possible, as well as foods that could be stored dry. Tomatoes can be picked green and ripened during storage, as can some other items such as pineapples and avocados. Manioc, maize, and potatoes (sweet) were clear possibilities, as were dried beans, fruits, and nuts. Via its port of Veracruz, Mexico was a main supplier of wheat flour for bread or *bizcocho* (hardtack). Most passengers returning to Europe were acclimated to American foods, and although they may have had a preference for the food of their homeland, they could survive eating New World staples on the return voyage. Given the high productivity of some of the American staple crops, some travelers must have recognized the potential commercial value of producing them in Europe, if the plants could prosper in the Old World soils and climate. Maize, in small amounts, was grown in Castile as early as 1498, at least according to Columbus. And by the mid-sixteenth century it was planted in small parcels not only elsewhere in Spain but also in parts of Italy. Acceptance of maize was somewhat slow in Europe, but by 1650 it was in France. Because its growing season was much shorter than that of wheat and it produced substantially more caloric value per unit of arable land, maize soon became one of the foods for commoners as well as for livestock.

Similarly the New World potato was transported to Europe. By the 1570s there are records of the production of Andean potatoes in Malaga, and by the 1580s they were seen as a source of sustenance when the wheat crops failed as a result of disease, drought, flood, or pest infestations. The acceptance of the potato in Europe was a slow process, with sharp regional variations in its adoption, and it was viewed alternatively as an aphrodisiac or a cause of leprosy, among other things. Maize was adopted more quickly in sub-Saharan Africa than in Europe, in warm areas of ample rainfall. American sweet potatoes and manioc were soon accepted as a food in Africa as well, as knowledge of their use spread outward from the Portuguese trading posts into the interior. Peanuts were also planted and harvested, and via Spanish and Portuguese trade they became popular along the Asian Pacific rim.[21]

Although Europeans were relatively slow to adopt American foods, they assiduously collected, catalogued them, and sent samples along with their

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[20] Pablo E. Pérez-Mallaína, *Spain's Men of the Sea: Daily Life in the Indies Fleets in the Sixteenth Century* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 14.

[21] James C. McCann, *Maize and Grace: Africa's Encounter with a New World Crop, 1500–2000* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), and Alfred W. Crosby, *Germs, Seeds, and Animals: Studies in Ecological History* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 148–66.

seeds back to Spain. Hernando Colón, Christopher Columbus's son, filled the garden plot of his house in Seville with hundreds of American plants. Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo (1478–1557) traveled to the Indies nine times, and wrote numerous texts on the natural and human environment. He likely started writing his *Sumario de la natural historia de las Indias* (Toledo, 1526) and a much more extensive history in 1514. The first volume of his longer general history (*Historia general. . .*) was published in Seville in 1535. In the *Sumario* he described in detail maize and the way Amerindians made it into "bread." Oviedo also described how yucca had to be prepared to extract the poison. He also wrote about the American animal world, from birds to the giant edible *hutias* of Hispaniola that reminded the Spaniards of rats. From anteaters to insects, the descriptions continued. Mamey, gunabano, guayaba, coconuts and other fruits and nuts were covered. Oviedo also dealt with medicinal plants and their preparation and use. One American plant, the *guaiacum* called the *palo santo* in Spain and Holy Wood by the English, became a common treatment for syphilis. Oviedo's book was quickly translated and published in English, French, Italian, and Latin. Another of the most important works was that of Dr. Francisco Hernández (1513–87), who was sent to Mexico in 1570 to systematically study plants, especially medicinal, of the Nahua. During the next seven years he identified and described over 3,000 unknown plants. His multivolume manuscript that included paintings was sent to Philip II and was consulted for decades by others. Other similar compendiums appeared. One of the best was Jesuit José de Acosta's *Historia moral y natural de las Indias*, which was published in 1590, and translated into English in 1604. The speed of acceptance of American foods varied, depending on multiple factors. Pineapples, easy to grow and transport, and sweet, juicy, and flavorful, were relished, as can be noted in still-life paintings of the period.[22]

By the 1530s small test plots were planted, especially for medicinal plants, in order to evaluate their use. The value of undiscovered medicines was well recognized. Royal physician Dr. Alvarez Chanca was sent by Queen Isabel on Columbus's second expedition. His primary assignment after seeing to the health of the expeditionaries was to search for potential cures for disease.

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[22] James C. Murray, *Spanish Chroniclers of the Indies: Sixteenth Century* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), pp. 100–8; Francisco Morales Padrón, *La Ciudad del Quinientos* (University of Seville, 1977), pp. 314–5; Francisco Hernández, *The Mexican Treasury: the Writings of Dr. Francisco Hernández*, Simon Varey (ed.) (Stanford University Press, 2000); and Jon Arrizabalaga, John Henderson, and Roger French, *The Great Pox: The French Disease in Renaissance Europe* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 187–8.

Profits coming from the sale of successful ones could be enormous. Horti-culturalist Simón de Tovar published his *Hispalensium pharmacapoliorum recognitio* in 1587, and kept an extensive collection of medicinal plants and herbs that was important enough for Philip II to order it placed under continued care after Tovar's 1597 death. Famed Sevillian Dr. Nicolás Mon-ardes had established a garden filled with American medicinal plants by mid-century; in 1565 he published his important text, *Historia medicinal de las cosas que se traen de nuestras Indias Occidentales que sirven en medicina*, and in 1574 he published an expanded edition of this massive work. The book covers tens of dozens of usable plants, such as sarsaparilla, tobacco, and sassafras that were viewed as a treatment for a variety of ailments. Guaiacum promised to be a cure for syphilis, a false hope. Monardes' text was rapidly translated and published in Latin, Italian, and English and re-issued in Spanish in 1579. Jesuit Agustino Salumbrino, a trained pharmacist, was interested in native cures and noted that the Quechua in the Andes used the bark of a tree to control the effects of fevers. Fellow Jesuit Bernabé Cobo (1582–1657) may have introduced it on his return to Europe around 1638. Quinine can be extracted from the bark and it reportedly controlled dangerous malarial fevers. The scientific genus (*Cinchona*) of the tree assigned by eighteenth-century biolo-gist Linneus was based on its successful use to treat the wife of the Peruvian viceroy, the Countess of Chinchón. Originally called "Jesuit Bark," the quinine extracted was soon viewed as the only effective treatment to control malaria. Its introduction into all world regions where malaria was endemic was another positive consequence of the Columbian Exchange.

Tobacco was another plant of the Columbian Exchange, and was soon harvested and prepared for sale in markets of Europe, Asia, and Africa (Figure 5.1). The Spaniards initially noted tobacco's widespread use in indigen-ous medicine, and in their tests the leaf proved to have some important medicinal qualities. Just over a century later, in the 1620s, the English discovered tobacco production and sale were the only ways to make their Virginia settle-ment viable, since they found nothing else they could successfully produce. For them, and their buyers, the enjoyment and good feeling that the nicotine in tobacco provided as it was smoked were more important than its medical properties, and led to its popularity and ultimately to addiction (Table 5.4).[23]

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[23] Padrón, *La Ciudad del Quinientos,* pp. 316–7; Cook and Cook, *The Plague Files*; and Fiammetta Rocco, *The Miraculous Fever-Tree: Malaria and the Quest for a Cure that Changed the World* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003). A modern facsimile edition of the 1574 Monardes text was published in Seville by Padilla Libros in 1988.

The proper name of it amongſt the Indians is *Piciek*, The name
For the name of *Tab-co* is giuen to it by our Spaniards, by *of it.*
reaſon of an Iſland that is named *Tabaco.*

It is an hearbe that dooth growe and come to bee very The *deſcrip*
greate : many times too bee greater then a Lemmon tree. *tion of it.*
It caſteth foorth one ſteame from the roote which groweth
bꝛꝛg;t, without declining to any parte, it ſendeth foorth
J 2 many

Figure 5.1: Tobacco plant, in an English translation of Nicolas Monardes' work, "News
of the New-Found Worlde," 1596

Table 5.4. *Origins of the most important domesticated plants. The list is incomplete and includes only better known and widely used products*[*]

Old World plants

wheat
barley
rye
rice
oats
millet
sorghum
okra
yams
lettuce
cabbage
kohlrabi
carrots
beans
peas
chickpeas
black-eyed peas
onions
apples
pears
plums
apricots
walnuts
citrus (oranges, lemons, limes, grapefruit)
bananas
figs
dates
sesame
sugar cane
coffee beans
tea
cotton

New World plants

corn (maize)
potatoes
quinua
cañihua
beans
squash
pumpkin
sweet potatoes

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Table 5.4. (*cont.*)

New World plants
manioc (yucca, cassava)
chilli peppers
peanuts
tomatoes
pineapples
avocados
pecans
cacao beans
matte
tobacco
quinine
rubber
cotton

*Nelson Foster and Linda S. Cordell (eds.), *Chiles to Chocolate: Food the Americas Gave the World* (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1991); Julia García París, *Intercambio y Difusión de Plantas de Consumo entre el Nuevo y el Viejo Mundo* (Madrid: Servicio de Extensión Agraria, 1991).

Animals

Specimens of many of the animals of the Americas were sent to Europe for display and study, but none became popular food items save for the turkey. By contrast, there was a literal tsunami of Old World animals landing on American shores. Except for the American camelids, the llama and alpaca in the Andean region that were similar to the camels of the Old World, there were no native beasts of burden, and American camelids would carry only up to 85 pounds before stubbornly refusing to move. As noted, with the arrival of Columbus's second expedition horses were introduced into the Caribbean. They were critical for early reconnaissance and subsequent offensive and defensive actions to establish and extend Spanish control over the Amerindians. Cattle, goats, sheep, and pigs also arrived with the second expedition. Cattle did well, and by the mid-1540s hides from Hispaniola and Cuba were exported to Europe. Goats and sheep did not prosper until they were introduced into temperate, cooler regions on the mainland. Pigs, because of their high number of offspring and ability to forage on almost anything, multiplied with abandon, quickly providing Europeans with a meat they knew. A pair of pigs was often left on deserted islands with the expectation that food would be available when the Europeans returned.

The introduction of Old World domesticated animals, especially pigs, did serious damage to native crops and contributed to a crisis of traditional Taino agricultural practice. Given the heavy rainfall, the Amerindians generally prepared *conucos*, raised beds that were easy to plant and cultivate. They were double-planted with tall and short plants: manioc, maize (corn), beans (nitrogen fixing for soil fertility), sweet potatoes, and sometimes other plants as well. With natural fertilizers at least two harvests per year were possible. Columbus and others marveled at the seemingly uncountable number of *conucos* that supported a substantial population. Pigs found these plots irresistible and wreaked havoc as they multiplied without control. Damaged plots soon filled with grasses and weeds, ideal grazing grounds for cattle that by the late sixteenth century replaced the human population that had been decimated by disease and exploitation. The rapid ecological transformation of the island of Hispaniola was a portent of what would happen elsewhere in the Americas as a consequence of the Columbian Exchange.[24]

The introduction of Old World animals into Mesoamerica was also quick. Within a quarter century following the conquest of central Mexico by Hernán Cortés the countryside changed radically. In Mexico's temperate plateau cattle and sheep prospered and multiplied. The quickly expanding populations of goats, horses, donkeys, pigs, and chickens destroyed traditional agricultural systems. The upheaval was so grave that indigenous diviner Juan Teton from northwest of Mexico City in 1558 preached that those baptized as Christians and who ate the meats of the newcomers – pork, beef, lamb – must have been transformed into the animals of the Christians. Only in this way was the sudden explosion of the Old World animal population in Mexico, coupled with the demise of indigenous people, explicable.[25]

Turkeys were the only New World animals that became widely accepted as a food not only in Europe but Asia as well. Turkeys taken during the conquest of the Aztecs were probably shipped to Spain and to Charles v, along with other "gifts" Hernán Cortés sent as proof of the potential riches. They reached England soon afterwards, perhaps via English ships engaged in the Levant trade as they stopped in Seville on their return. This may explain why the English referred to them as Turkey hens. Their size, the quality of

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[24] Sauer, *Early Spanish Main*.
[25] Reay Tannahill, *Food in History* (New York: Stein and Day, 1973); Elinor G. K. Melville, *A Plague of Sheep: Environmental Consequences of the Conquest of Mexico* (Cambridge University Press, 1994); and León García Garagarza, "The Year the People Turned into Cattle," in Martha Few and Zeb Tortorici (eds.), *Centering Animals in Latin American History* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013), p. 39.

Table 5.5. *Origins of the most important domesticated animals. Note the list is incomplete. It includes only better known and widely consumed or used as draft animals**[*]

Old World domesticated animals
dogs
cattle
water buffalo
elephants
sheep
goats
pigs
camels
horses
donkeys
chickens
geese
ducks
pheasants
peacocks

New World domesticated animals
dogs
llamas
alpacas
guinea pigs
muscovy ducks
turkeys

[*]Crosby, *The Columbian Exchange*; Tannahill, *Food in History*; Garagarza, "The Year the People Turned into Cattle," p. 39.

their meat, and their ease of care led to their quick acceptance and by the 1650s turkeys could be found on the tables of the elite during special occasions (Table 5.5).

People

The movement of people constitutes a major element of the Columbian Exchange. Crosby stressed disease, the transfer and impact of pathogens, plants and animals, and pointed to human migration as well, but he paid less attention to the "exchange" of people. European and African migration to the Americas was transformative, in a biological as well as cultural sense. The periodicity and volume of the flow varied during the first century and a half.

The first Columbus expedition carried fewer than 200 mostly European males to the Caribbean, and only 38 were left behind to establish a presence. None of them survived; most died within a few months at the hands of the Taino. The second fleet was large, and among the 1,500 aboard there were a few women and slaves. Mediterranean slavery involved all human groups, although in the Americas it soon was composed primarily of Africans. Migration often resulted in premature death. At least half of the original members of the second Columbus expedition were dead within two years. The land of wealth advertised by the promoters of the venture did not materialize. What gold there was on Hispaniola was difficult to extract from small "mines" or panned from the riverbeds. Few of the newcomers intended to earn their wealth by agriculture or any other form of manual labor, and the first decade in the Caribbean consisted predominantly of small reconnaissance expeditions. Another large fleet was not mounted until Governor Nicolás de Ovando in 1502 was sent to assume royal authority over the unstable venture. A new major fleet came in 1508. These and subsequent arrivals provided the foundation for efforts to establish bases on the mainland and other islands. The city of Darién near the juncture of today's Colombia and Panama was founded in 1510. Cuba's and Puerto Rico's permanent conquest and settlement began in 1511. By 1513 Balboa had sighted the Pacific Ocean and founded Panama City on its shores in 1519. It was clear by that date that the aboriginal population, and therefore the main labor force of the islands, had rapidly declined, and that the attempt to establish a viable Caribbean settlement based on mining had failed. It was also evident by 1514 that sugar cane and the export sale of processed sugar could provide the economic foundation for the Greater Antilles. But the sugar economy extracted a high human cost, and to make up the labor shortage the Spanish resorted to the purchase and transportation of slaves from the source they knew best, Portuguese merchants who had established trading posts along the coast of Africa.[26]

Although the movement of Old World peoples to the Americas got off to a slow start, it rapidly accelerated. The Mexican treasures sent by Cortés to Charles v stimulated popular interest, and a decade later news of Inca Atahualpa's ransom of gold and silver sent to Spain by Francisco Pizarro resulted in a deluge of fortune seekers. The discovery of a mountain of silver in Potosí and the riches that began to flow regularly to Spain by the 1560s contributed to both expanded Spanish migration to America and serious

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[26] Kenneth F. Kiple (ed.), *The African Exchange: Toward a Biological History of Black People* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987); Sauer, *Early Spanish Main*; and Mintz, *Sweetness and Power*.

attempts by the English and French to gain access to the riches. By then the Portuguese, concerned by the increasing presence of foreigners along Brazil's coast, began to take steps to block further attempts. But even as late as 1650, the Amerindian population was substantially greater than that of the Old World immigrants.

Researchers for decades have wrestled with the question of the number of migrants, their origin, and destination as they traveled from the Old World to the New during the Age of Reconnaissance. During the past half century some of the best work has been on African, especially enslaved African, migration. The primary source of data has come from slave ship records because those engaged in the trade needed proof of numbers, costs, approximate age and sex, ports of origin, numbers of deaths in passage, and the place of disembarkation. Some were contraband and escaped the record. Meticulous research by historians and anthropologists has led to a fuller understanding and appreciation of the role that Africans, both slave and free, played in the Columbian Exchange, and the cost they paid. The number of those who began the transatlantic crossing was substantially larger than the numbers actually "counted," or more appropriately estimated, at various times as they were settled. The death rate was high, both in the original crossing and as a result of heavy labor in unsafe environments, especially in mining and agricultural work. Separation of the sexes reduced the birth rate, depressing any internal regeneration. Disease took its toll. The result was a constantly rising demand for slaves as the exploitative economies grew. The greatest populations of Africans were found in the areas of plantation agriculture, especially sugar, in tropical coastal regions from Brazil to the islands and mainland of the circum-Caribbean. This was true for the English and French as they later gained control and settled sections of the Caribbean. There were relatively few Africans along the English or French American Atlantic seaboard until after 1650, and these were engaged in the production of other commodities – tobacco, indigo, rice, and, especially later, cotton. There were clusters of African slaves engaged in dangerous gold placer mining, and there was a significant population in the silver mining center of Potosí. Each major city in Spanish and Portuguese America contained a substantial number of Africans, slave and free. For example, in 1614 over a third of the population of Lima, capital of the viceroyalty of Peru, was African.[27] Many of the women in these

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[27] Herman L. Bennett, *Africans in Colonial Mexico: Absolutism, Christianity, and Afro-Creole Consciousness, 1570–1640* (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 2005); John Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1680* (Cambridge

cities were domestics and many men were involved in blacksmithing, leather-work, and carpentry. Some were healers using traditional African medicines.

The Columbian Exchange involved Asian migration as well, which centered on the Pacific coast of America from Mexico southward into the viceroyalty of Peru. By 1613 dozens of Chinese, Filipinos, and people from India were carefully enumerated in the Lima census. Although the Portuguese were already well established at fortified trading posts from southeastern Africa to Goa in India, Macao, and the spice islands of today's Indonesia, the Spanish still wanted an outpost in Asia. That came with Miguel López de Legazpi's fleet of five ships, sailing out of the Mexican port of Acapulco in 1564. By the mid-1570s the Spanish established Manila, well situated in a chain of islands well off China's coast that they named the Philippines. From that position they were able to set up direct and indirect trade with Chinese merchants. By the 1580s twenty large Chinese ships arrived annually to trade for the silver. Although the Chinese had a vast array of luxury goods the Europeans were interested in acquiring, they suffered a dearth of silver. The silver mines of Mexico, and especially Potosí in the viceroyalty of Peru, provided the foundations for the commerce. With Spanish control of the islands and their commercial base in Manila, increasing numbers of Chinese merchants made the trip from the mainland to sell porcelains, silks, fine furniture, gems, ivory, and jade objects. Tobacco may have reached China via Portuguese merchants by the 1540s. It was certainly introduced from America via Mexico and the Manila galleons. Many Asian commodities that were transported to Acapulco were sold to wealthy settlers in the major cities in America. The bulk was carried across Mexico to Veracruz and exported on the annual Atlantic fleet for sale in Europe. The annual Manila galleons were the likely source of the introduction of American foods into Asia. Sweet potatoes soon became popular in the Philippines and from there they were probably introduced into China by merchants by the 1590s. Maize entered China through both Portuguese Macao and the Spanish Philip-pines, and ultimately peanuts arrived as well. All three crops would become staples in parts of the warm and humid climates of Asia.[28]

University Press, 1992); Frederick P. Bowser, *The African Slave Trade in Colonial Peru, 1524–1650* (Stanford University Press, 1974); James H. Sweet, *Africa: Culture, Kinship, and Religion in the African-Portuguese World, 1441–1770* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); and Matthew Restall (ed.), *Beyond Black and Red: African-Native Relations in Colonial Latin America* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005).

[28] Charles C. Mann, *1493: Uncovering the New World Columbus Created* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011); Carol Benedict, *Golden-Silk Smoke: a History of Tobacco in China,*

Table 5.6. *Regional estimates for the Aboriginal American population in 1492*[*]

	1492
North America	3.8
Mexico	17.2
Central America	5.6
Caribbean	3.0
Andes	15.7
Lowland South America	8.6
Total	53.9

[*]In millions. William M. Denevan, "The Pristine Myth: the Landscape of the Americas in 1492," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 82: 3 (1992): 369–85.

From the beginning European explorers, conquistadors, clerics, and settlers were interested in the number of people that were there when they arrived, and why they seemed to die so rapidly. Numbers vary wildly, often based on personal reasons for inflating or depressing them. Demographers agree that the exact number cannot be established, but that knowledge does not eliminate attempts to do so. The range of estimates for the Amerindian population as a whole in 1492 is nearly as broad as for Hispaniola. In the past century historians, archaeologists, and anthropologists have used a variety of methods to estimate population: carrying capacity, depopulation ratios, analogies with other regions, and mostly reviews of the "literature." The estimates range from Alfred Kroeber's 8.4 million to Henry F. Dobyns' 90 to 112 million. Most specialists accept historical geographer William M. Denevan's figure of 53.9 million for the population of the Americas in 1492. His caveat that with the "margin of error of about 20 percent, the New World population would lie between 43–65 million. Future regional revisions are likely to maintain the hemispheric total within this range" is plausible (Table 5.6).[29]

Perhaps the most systematic effort to estimate population was that of N. D. Cook, but that was only for the original population of Peru at the time

1550–2010 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011); and William Lytle Schurz, *The Manila Galleon* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1939).

[29] William M. Denevan, "The Pristine Myth: the Landscape of the Americas in 1492," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 82 (1992): 370; Suzanne Austin Alchon, *A Pest in the Land: New World Epidemics in a Global Perspective* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2003), p. 171; and Noble David Cook, *Demographic Collapse: Indian Peru, 1520–1620* (Cambridge University Press, 1981).

of Spanish contact with the Inca Empire. Denevan's estimate for the "Andes" refers to the area covered by the Inca Empire, from southern Columbia to northern Argentina and Chile. Cook's analysis is based on review and evaluation of the results of several methods for population estimation: ecological (carrying capacity), archaeological, depopulation ratios using known data, social organization complexity, disease mortality, and census projections, as well as estimates of contemporary observers. He finds the disease mortality and census projection models to be most trustworthy, and concludes the Peruvian population in 1520 must have been within the 5.5 to 9.4 million range. In the second half of his study, he analyzes the nature of population change in six major regions, three of them coastal and three highland, over the next century in order to determine levels of mortality based on environmental and socio-economic factors. He finds in general, moving through the three northern and southern highland regions, the rate of population decline falls as one moves southward into the highest elevation basins and puna grasslands. The three coastal regions where people were densely concentrated in narrow irrigated valleys suffered the most catastrophic Amerindian falloff, with Europeans, Africans, and some Asians replacing them. The overall decline between 1520 and 1620 was about 93 percent.[30]

Mestizaje, the biological mixing of peoples and cultures of many continents, is one of the most significant consequences of the Columbian Exchange. The long-distance migration of people between continents accelerated slowly at first, but volume increased decade after decade. Migrants carried with them their panoply of cultural characteristics: religion, social structure, marriage and kinship patterns, food preferences and the manner of food preparation, material technology, and languages and thought patterns. All the European states involved in the Columbian Exchange attempted initially to replicate in the places they controlled the type of world they had left behind, and mixing happened slowly. For example, the population of Lima, the largest city and capital of the viceroyalty of Peru, in 1614 was 38.9 percent Spanish, 41.9 percent African, 7.9 percent Indian, and only 0.8 percent mestizo and 3.0 percent mulatto. Given deeply rooted cultural prejudices, often enforced by laws, officially recognized marriage between individuals from different groups was not always possible, and other types of sexual relationships varied in their frequency. They were most common in times and places with a sharply imbalanced sex ratio in the migratory group.

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[30] Cook, *Demographic Collapse*.

The mixed offspring of such relationships were often viewed as lazy, ugly, shiftless, and untrustworthy, and it was rare in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for such descendants to be "respected." The celebrated writer, Garcilaso de la Vega, "El Inca" (1539–1616), was an exception, but he was the son of a conquistador and an Inca princess who left Cuzco for Spain as a young man. The majority of those of mixed parentage suffered discrimination for generations. On the basis of a review of the literature, Angel Rosenblat estimated the mestizo population of America to have been only 3.23 percent in 1650, and the mulatto 2.17. Over 80 percent of the New World's population was still Amerindian.[31]

The migration of Europeans, Africans, and some Asians led in spite of cultural, religious, and economic taboos to the slow but inexorable rise of mixed populations, however. A similar process occurred in foreign outposts along the African coast, on the South and East Asian mainland, as well as in the Spice Islands off the Southeast Asian coast and the Philippines. From the time of stable settlement the complex and shifting process of transculturation began, a process that continued for generations.

People, plants, animals, and pathogens are the foundations of the Columbian Exchange, but these were only the biological elements of the transfers unleashed by the linking of the hemispheres during the Age of Reconnaissance. The transfer of knowledge and the interactions of alien religious, political, economic, and social systems had even greater repercussions. Old World assumptions were challenged as new discoveries unfolded. The integration of knowledge of the "other" required generations to absorb, to weigh, and to accept or reject in a process of transculturation. Given the relative slowness of communications, the exchange allowed for freedom of experimentation. What worked in the changing environments survived, and what failed was cast aside. How does one assess the full impact of the exchange? Certainly the human cost was high for all parties, although the Amerindians suffered most. As a result of imported diseases, coupled with conquest, labor exploitation, forced migrations, and the disruption of native agricultural systems, over 90 percent was lost. The introduction of African

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[31] Claudio Esteva-Fabregat, *Mestizaje in Ibero-America* (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1995); Magnus Morner, *Race Mixture in the History of Latin America* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1967); Cook, *Demographic Collapse,* p. 151; Kiple (ed.), *African Exchange*; and Angel Rosenblat, *La población indígena y el mestizaje en América* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Nova, 1954), vol. i, p. 59. There has been substantial research since his estimates were published, but percentages regarding distribution of the population are similar.

slaves to work on the plantations and in the mines and houses of the Europeans exacted a heavy human toll as well. On the positive side of the exchange, new animals and food plants introduced into the Americas provided assistance to human labor and additional forms of nutrition. More positive may have been the transfer of New World plants to the Old. Although not a direct cause of the population growth that began in the eighteenth century in Europe and in the nineteenth in Africa, American food crops were a significant contributing factor. Adoption of American food plants in some parts of Asia allowed for an increasing supply of foodstuffs that were productive on marginal lands. The transfers of medicinal plants and knowledge also can be weighed as positive. Even more important was the transformation of the mind, as new knowledge challenged previous beliefs, contributing to the ferment of the European Enlightenment.

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The slave trade and the African diaspora

JOHN THORNTON

The diaspora of African people to the Americas as a result of the trans-atlantic slave trade was the largest forced migration in history, in terms of both the length of time and the numbers of people involved. Considering the terrible suffering and high mortality that the Africans endured during the trade, it was also a great human tragedy, and it is not surprising that an international gathering in Durban, South Africa declared it a Crime Against Humanity in 2001.

Imported African labor was vital to the development of the European occupied Americas, from the sugar plantations of the Caribbean and Brazil, to the tobacco and cotton farms of North America and the mines of several South American countries. African forced migrants outnumbered European migrants, often many times, in every region except North America.

Beyond the demographic implications of the slave trade, the African Diaspora was a massive cultural movement. A significant portion of Africa's vast cultural diversity was transported to the Americas, and although as slaves Africans could not bring as much or re-create as much of their home culture as free migrants might have, they still contributed significantly to the visual, musical, and verbal culture of all the Americas.

Historiography of the slave trade and the African Diaspora

The study of the slave trade and the African Diaspora has had several primary themes over the past half century. One has been the long discovery of the volume and direction of the slave trade itself; a second examines how the slave trade worked in Africa and the impact it had on the continent; and a third seeks to understand how and in what ways African culture moved from Africa to the Americas.

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The study of the volume and direction of the slave trade took its modern direction with Philip Curtin's pioneering census of existing literature in 1969, the first overall picture of the quantitative issue.[1] Curtin's work set off a wave of research, anchored for the most part in the painstaking discovery of the thousands of shipping records, reports, fiscal returns, and other mundane documents that would allow serious quantification to take place. The first fruits of this effort were put together in Harvard University's DuBois Institute's publication of the Transatlantic Slave Trade database in 1999, followed in 2010 by a second and vastly expanded database online.[2] This database has been employed by a number of scholars and is now considered a standard way of accessing the numbers, direction, mortality, and ethnicity of African slaves carried to the Americas. David Eltis and David Richardson have compiled a large atlas illustrating the principal findings of the database.[3]

Understanding the origins of the slave trade and its impact on the continent, the second theme, has proven harder than determining the numbers of people involved. The generation of scholars who studied African history in the 1960s through 1970s, while necessarily interested in the slave trade, did not generally study it systematically, as their primary interest was political history. The move toward more social history in the 1980s and 1990s was also quite focused on the domestic realities of African societies. Following this, there was a great fall-off in interest and research on the African societies that participated in the slave trade. Some works did not follow these trends, however. Robin Law's work on the Slave Coast was one of the pioneering works that integrated the slave trade into his understanding of the workings of Dahomey and its neighbors, and John Thornton's work on warfare also sought to understand the slave trade in terms of African military history.[4] More recently Walter Hawthorne and Stephanie Smallwood have attempted to integrate understanding of the processes by which people were enslaved and transported.[5]

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[1] Philip Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969).

[2] www.slavevoyages.org/tast/index.faces

[3] David Eltis and David Richardson, *Atlas of the Transatlantic Slave Trade* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010).

[4] Robin Law, *The Slave Coast of West Africa, 1550–1750: The Impact of the Atlantic Slave Trade on an African Society* (Oxford University Press, 1991); John Thornton, *Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500–1800* (London: Routledge, 1999).

[5] Walter Hawthorne, *From Africa to Brazil: Culture, Identity and an Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600–1830* (Cambridge University Press, 2010); Stephanie Smallwood, *Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

In recent years, the third theme, that of the role of African culture in the formation of African American societies, has come to be predominant. Here the focus has been on the African Diaspora and the slave trade material has been analyzed primarily to determine what African cultures were most significant in which areas. Thus, understanding exactly where in Africa slaves were taken and where they went in the Americas has become important in understanding what their cultural impact might be. The question of African survivals in American culture goes back to the 1940s and 1950s, with Herskovits' claim that African culture played an important role in making American culture and Frazier's contention that it did not. The issue was reborn in a more recent debate that started with Mintz and Price's suggestive essay proposing that Africans were drawn from a wide range of very diverse cultures, and Thornton's book on African influences in the Americas during the slave trade period highlighting factors that tended to concentrate slaves from specific ethnicities in particular American societies.[6] Much of the literature that follows these, such as that of James Sweet on Brazil, argues for considerable influence from Africa in the Americas.[7]

New insight into the ways African culture moved from Africa to the Americas comes from Ira Berlin's research on the role of "Atlantic Creoles" in the formation of African American culture.[8] Berlin argued that some parts of Africa had been in touch for longer with European culture and segments of the African population brought elements of that culture with them. This idea was more fully developed by Linda Heywood and John Thornton, who studied the origins of African American culture in early English and Dutch colonies and linked them to West Central Africa, where European culture had made a profound impact, especially in the introduction of Christianity.[9]

Other scholars, including Sylviane Diouf and Michael Gomez, have begun to pay special attention to Muslim slaves and their impact in the Americas.[10] João José Reis drew special attention to the role of Muslim slaves in the

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[6] Sydney Mintz and Richard Price, *The Birth of African American Culture: An Anthropological Approach* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1992); John Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1800*. 2nd edn. (Cambridge University Press, 1998).

[7] James Sweet, *Recreating Africa: Culture, Kinship, and Religion in the African-Portuguese World, 1441–1770* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

[8] Ira Berlin, *Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries in North America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).

[9] Linda M. Heywood and John Thornton, *Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles and the Foundation of the Americas, 1585–1665* (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

[10] Sylviane Diouf, *Servants of Allah: African Muslims Enslaved in the Americas* (New York University Press, 1998); Michael Gomez, *Black Crescent: The Experience and Legacy of African Muslims in the Americas* (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Brazilian slave revolt of 1835 and more largely in Brazilian history.[11] Discussions of the role of Africans practicing Abrahamic religions in the Americas are likely to be highlighted as the religious life and influence of Africans is more thoroughly examined in the future.

The slave trade

Slaves from some portions of Africa that eventually engaged in the Atlantic trade had been involved in the trans-Saharan slave trade since the tenth or eleventh century, so for many African regions, especially the West African savanna and Sahel, the export of people was not new. But for other areas of Atlantic Africa, the voyages of exploration initiated by Portugal after 1415 brought them into contact for the first time with people interested in acquiring slaves to carry outside the continent.

Initially the Portuguese raided the African coast and carried people away into slavery, but that period was short-lived, as Africans proved capable of defending their coast once the initial surprise wore off. After a series of diplomatic negotiations led by Diogo Gomes from 1456 to 1462, Portugal agreed to engage in peaceful trade in all commodities with the countries it met. When Portuguese ships reached Lower Guinea in the 1460s and 70s they did no raiding, but instead established peaceful trade from the beginning.

One of the surprising consequences of this turn from raiding to trading was its impact on the slave trade. Portuguese vessels never captured more than a few hundred people a year and suffered casualties of their own while raiding, but once the Portuguese established diplomatic relations with African leaders, they were able to purchase several thousand slaves every year. In part this was because Africans in the region that the Portuguese first reached had already established slave trading relations with the Mediterranean across the Sahara, but also because there and elsewhere there was already an established institution of local slavery in place.

In this case, "slavery" means primarily a legal system in which there was a class of people over whom other people had important powers, including the right to sell them. The aspect of African slavery that facilitated the Atlantic slave trade was not labor conditions or the social position of the slaves, but the legality of a transfer to foreigners who would carry the slave out of the country. Details of the roots of this legal system are lost for much of Africa's

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[11] João José Reis, *Slave Rebellion: The Muslim Uprising of 1835 in Bahia* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).

engagement with the Saharan slave trade, and the absence of early documentation about legal systems in many other areas makes the power to sell others difficult to trace. This lack of evidence lays open the possibility that the complex of legal obligations that rendered a person a slave was a new development.

But for West Central Africa, and particularly the Kingdom of Kongo, the development of local literacy within a few decades of contact makes the pattern clear. King Afonso I of Kongo (1509–42) wrote a lengthy series of letters to Portugal dealing in part with slavery and the slave trade. As early as 1514 he indicated that slaves could be purchased in existing markets in his country and that Kongo elites also held and retained slaves themselves. He also revealed that successful wars, such as one his army waged in 1512, resulted in the capture and enslavement of people, probably an important source of slaves for sale.

Afonso's correspondence also shows that there were rules within the country about who could be enslaved and who could not. In 1526 Afonso ruled that some slaves had been taken illegally and that Portuguese merchants had been at least complicit in the purchase of illegally enslaved persons. He subsequently established a committee to inspect slaves being prepared for export to insure that the legal conditions had been met. Subsequent rulers even obtained the return of people who had been wrongfully enslaved. For example, slaves taken by the invading "Jagas" in 1570 and sold to Portuguese merchants were returned, as were over a thousand slaves captured by an invading Portuguese army from Angola in 1622.[12] Unfortunately nowhere else in Atlantic Africa has similarly detailed documentation of the development of the African legal background to the slave trade on the coast.

Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European commercial records do allow us to understand the mechanisms of purchase. We can distinguish broadly two modes of purchase of slaves: The first is what might be called shipboard trade and the second is factory trade. In shipboard trade, European vessels would anchor off the coast or perhaps in a river estuary; commerce with local merchants would begin either on the ships or very near them, without any permanent presence of Europeans. In factory trade, Europeans were permitted to build small colonies on the coast to manage the trade and to station merchants, supervisors, and soldiers there. These colonies were often

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[12] Linda Heywood, "Slavery and its Transformation in the Kingdom of Kongo, 1491–1800," *Journal of African History* 50 (2009): 1–22.

fortified to prevent runaways, guard valuable commodities such as gold, and protect the trading interests of the merchants from interlopers, rival commercial interests (often from other European countries), and pirates.

Europeans engaged in trade through factories around the mouth of the Senegal and of the Gambia, and in Sierra Leone. There was a large cluster of factories and forts on the Gold Coast (mostly modern Ghana) originally built to meet the need to secure gold while it was awaiting shipment, and factories were also established on the so-called "Slave Coast" mostly in modern-day Benin. Elsewhere, factories were intermittent: The Dutch maintained a factory near the ancient kingdom of Benin in the eighteenth century, but abandoned it around 1740; England in the 1720s and Portugal in the 1780s established factories on the Loango Coast (around the modern-day Republic of Congo), but they were both driven away by local forces.

The Portuguese colony of Angola, founded in 1575, was different from other European establishments in that it was a large area ruled directly from Lisbon and with a substantial armed force (mostly drawn from African allies and feudatories) that actively engaged in combat and captured slaves for export. Angola was the only place in Africa where slaves captured by European-led armies accounted for a considerable percentage of exports, although the Portuguese also acquired many slaves in Angola from commercial contacts and had factories in the interior as well.

Enslavement and sale

With the notable exception of Angola, most slaves that Europeans acquired for the whole of the Atlantic slave trade period were purchased from African sellers and not acquired by direct capture by Europeans or armies under European control. Some scholars have proposed, following leads opened up by Abolitionist writers in the eighteenth century, that European merchants were able to control the sale of munitions in such a way as to force otherwise reluctant African leaders to capture slaves in order to acquire weapons to defend themselves from rivals who accepted European military supplies, thus leading to what is often called the "gun–slave cycle." A variant of this idea, largely used to explain the Saharan trade, proposes that the control of the trade in cavalry horses, which could not be bred in West Africa, was a similar means of leveraging potentially reluctant leaders of the Western Sudan to participate in the slave trade.

Other scholars have argued that Europe possessed a more highly developed economy than Africa, and that the productivity and efficiency of

European workers allowed merchants to compel Africans to trade the few valuable commodities they had, which in many cases was only slaves. This balance of trade model supposes that Africans needed European suppliers to meet their needs for such things as metal goods and textiles, in which European industry was alleged to have an advantage.

Arguing against these interpretations is the absence of direct evidence for the manipulation of weapons sales in the extensive European commercial records that have survived. Instead, these show that European traders competed with each other in such a way as to prevent much in the way of trade manipulation. Moreover, there are many cases of military actions between African states that did not involve the use of European arms, especially in the first century of the slave trade. In addition, the direction, volume, and quality of European trade goods suggest that these were not so vital to African economies that Africans would trade for them if conditions were not profitable or acceptable. Africans often *did* produce high-quality metal goods and textiles, at times in remarkable quantities. Regions that produced the most textiles also sometimes imported the most, which indicates that the trade in textiles or metal goods was not simply established to make up for supposed shortfalls in African systems of production.[13]

Because the trade was in the control of African authorities, not every African region participated in the slave trade, even when they did trade in other commodities. The Ivory Coast (or Kwa Kwa Coast as it was sometimes called) traded with passing European ships in cloth and ivory, but rarely, if ever, in slaves. The same was true of the Gabon Coast in northern Central Africa, which received European merchants but rarely sold slaves. The most interesting case is that of the Kingdom of Benin, in today's Nigeria, which began trading slaves to the Portuguese in the early sixteenth century, but abruptly broke off slave trading around 1530. Benin continued to trade with Europeans, however, selling ivory, cloth, and pepper. Then in around 1716, during a civil war, Benin resumed slave trading only to stop again following the peace in 1732.[14] The capacity to leave and enter the slave trade while continuing trade in other commodities strongly suggests that no African power could be compelled to trade in slaves through economic or military pressure alone.

Markets on the African coast were often closely controlled by the African polity where they were located or whose shores were visited by shipboard

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[13] Thornton, *Africa and Africans*, pp. 13–42.
[14] A. F. C. Ryder, *Benin and the Europeans, 1485–1897* (London: Prentice Hall, 1969).

traders. In many of these, a complicated process involving taxes and fees was established, which then regulated pricing systems for acquiring slaves. Depending on the exact situation, the state or its agents had special control over the trade and often demanded more lucrative conditions for their own slaves before allowing private African merchants to sell slaves.

Where the trade was in the hands of a large coastal state, such as Dahomey, the state might control a substantial share of the exports, especially of slaves as they were so often captured in a successful military campaign that took place under state direction, and from which the state itself took a sizable share. In places such as the Gold Coast where coastal sovereignty was fragmented, merchants might be the most important suppliers. For example, the Akani merchants from the interior sent regular caravans down to the coast with the captives of the powerful Asante kingdom, but any given coastal state might serve as much as a transit point for people enslaved further inland as for the victims of campaigns within the coastal region. Such a situation was even more pronounced in the Niger Delta region, where the city-states that managed the final stages of slave exports might be dealing with people who had already changed hands half a dozen times between their original captivity and their final export.

Testimony of coastal merchants, European visitors, and of slaves themselves given in the Americas allows us to see the usual means by which people were enslaved: through warfare; the illegal activities of bandits and highway robbers; judicial action by courts through fines or to settle debts; and sometimes sale by relatives. While these categories are easy enough to establish, it is much harder to determine the proportions of people falling into each category. There is no statistically valid sample for any period or region that allows us to determine the relative balance between enslavement in war, banditry or court action. Some suggestive and non-quantitative data points to warfare as the leading reason for enslavement, followed fairly closely by banditry, with judicial enslavement following a fairly close third. Of course, the historical circumstances may well determine the proportions: When major wars were ongoing, most would have been military captives; in periods of political instability or loss of order, banditry might be more important; and in periods of peace and stability perhaps judicial enslavement would lead the group.

It seems most likely that detailed knowledge of the state of politics in all the regions from which Africans were exported could be the secret to understanding the pattern of enslavement. Dahomey, for example, was a stable state with strong internal order and thus unlikely to supply many

people through banditry, but we also know that it engaged in regular, even annual, campaigns against its neighbors, which sometimes resulted in the enslavement of thousands of unfortunate people. Despite Dahomey's reputation as a ferocious military kingdom, it frequently lost its wars, and with this its own people were captured and sold as slaves; in other cases the wars might have gone favorably for Dahomey's armies from a geo-strategic point of view, but did not result in many captives. Given the sometimes strict laws of Dahomey, the kingdom may also have exported a fair number of people judged guilty of crimes.[15]

In the Niger River Delta, on the other hand, a plethora of village communities dotted the landscape and there was no central authority. As a result banditry and petty inter-village wars prevailed in the capture and sale of people. The Arochukwu Oracle, a religious institution often called upon to settle disputes between parties, sometimes seized slaves as penalties and was alleged to have engaged in its own slave capture and sales. Oftentimes, people would be enslaved and pass through many hands before reaching the Atlantic traders.

At times, the disorder of civil war might result in a surge in banditry that would feed the slave trade. In the Kingdom of Kongo, for example, expansionary wars directed against southern and eastern neighbors fed the trade, but when Kongo expansion stopped in the early seventeenth century, the country only sold slaves during intermittent civil wars that took place during interregna. It managed to repel attacks by Portuguese Angola and even managed to have slaves taken in some of these wars returned to Africa. But when Kongo declined into lengthy civil war following its defeat by Portugal in 1665, internal strife between rival candidates for the throne became the primary means by which its people were enslaved.

At times, permanent raiding forces also contributed, as the southern Saharan nomads did in the capture of slaves in the Senegambian region, intervening in wars, serving as mercenaries, and sometimes raiding on their own volition.[16] The Portuguese colony of Angola also sometimes served in this capacity, during its expansionary wars against Ndongo and its neighbors in the seventeenth century. When military operations were no longer successful to its east, it shifted to attacks on southern neighbors through its outpost at Benguela in the eighteenth century.

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[15] Patrick Manning, *Slavery, Colonialism and Economic Growth in Dahomey, 1640–1960* (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[16] Boubacar Barry, *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade* (Cambridge University Press, 1997).

The volume of the trade and its impact on Africa

A massive investigation of slave trading records in the last quarter of the twentieth century has defined a widely accepted estimate of the total numbers of Africans who left their home continent bound for America in European ships at somewhere around thirteen to fifteen million, the disparity largely being due to variable estimates of smuggling and poor accounting.[17] Because of the incredible mortality of the slave ships, only around eleven to twelve million of those Africans reached their American destinations alive. Around a million Africans were exported between the start of the trade and the mid-seventeenth century; some nine million were exported between the mid-seventeenth century and the English decision to abolish its slave trade in 1807. British abolition and its lobbying of other countries to follow suit notwithstanding, more than three million more Africans were exported to the Americas (primarily Brazil and Cuba) in the sixty years after 1807, almost as high an annual rate as that of the most active years of the eighteenth century.

African departures in the slave trade were regionally diverse, but relatively steady throughout most of the period. Almost half of the enslaved left from West Central Africa; of the remaining group, Lower Guinea supplied about a third and Upper Guinea only about 15 percent. In the decades following British abolition, the slave trade concentrated on fewer and fewer areas, with West Central Africa providing by far the largest percentage and the ports of Lower Guinea many fewer but more than the rest of Africa. Southeast Africa (Mozambique in particular) was a late entry into the slave trade, but it contributed a fairly large number in the last years of the trade.

Africans were purchased primarily to perform labor in the Americas, and ships' captains and American buyers had specific preferences: They primarily wanted adult males in good health, although they also wanted some women; children for the most part were not as much in demand. Because Europeans did not capture the slaves themselves, however, they were often forced to take people of ages or genders that were less desirable.

Over a fairly long time period, males made up between 60 and 65 percent of the cargoes, though shorter periods and specific areas might differ from this norm. From the Bight of Biafra (mostly modern eastern Nigeria) in the

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[17] The following, and all statistical information on the slave trade, is largely based on David Eltis and David Richardson, *Atlas of the Transatlantic Slave Trade* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010) and the supporting website "Voyages: The Transatlantic Slave Trade Database," http://slavevoyages.org.

eighteenth century, for example, males might have been as little as 57 percent of the cargoes, while in the Mozambique trade in the eighteenth century males made up over 70 percent.

Children were also not taken as much as adults. In general children made up around 25–30 percent of all cargoes, but there were substantial anomalies: In the late trade of the nineteenth century, for example, children made up nearly half of all the slaves taken from West Central Africa and over a third from the other regions. At this late stage, in fact, because of the predominance of West Central Africa among the exporting regions, nearly half of all the enslaved arriving in Caribbean ports (virtually all to Cuba) were children.

The sheer numbers of people involved and their age and sex ratios were likely to have had an impact on the overall population. This impact is magnified when we consider that many were enslaved as a result of violence and for every person who left Africa on a slave ship there were others who had died in combat, as a result of collateral damage (famine from destroyed crops, for example) or while traveling to the coast and awaiting shipment. Total population would in all likelihood have declined as the export of people depopulated areas, especially in the later centuries of the trade when the losses were both relatively high and concentrated in relatively few regions.

While it is difficult to determine the demographic impact of any population movement without statistical information, and Africa has very little for this period, some ideas have been advanced, mostly focused on impacts on the size and demographic structure of the population. For example, simulation models predict that the sex-skewed loss of population would alter sex ratios in West Africa to about 80 men per 100 women in the adult age brackets, but in West Central Africa the lower total population and high export levels would reduce the male to female ratio to much lower numbers. In fact, a study of the Angolan census of 1776 does point to a male to female ratio of 43 to 100, meaning that there were more than two adult women for every man in the region at the time. At the same time, the relatively low loss of children meant that sex ratios for children hovered close to the normal 100 to 100 ratio.[18]

The potential impact of this population loss would be manifold. First, because the losses were mostly borne by adults, the dependency ratio, that is

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[18] Patrick Manning, *Slavery and African Life: Occidental, Oriental, and African Slave Trades* (Cambridge University Press, 1990); John Thornton, "The Slave Trade in Eighteenth Century Angola: Effects on Demographic Structures," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 14 (1980): 417–28.

the ratio of working and productive adults to the non-productive and dependent population (mostly children), would be much higher than expected. This in turn would mean that the remaining population, mostly females, would have higher levels of labor to support the relatively large number of dependants.

In addition, in societies with a structural division of labor, the amount of work each adult man had to perform would be higher as there would be fewer men relative to the number of people they were supplying. Divisions of labor might be hard to adjust, as skills normally acquired by males during the socialization process could not be easily learned by adults. Agricultural skills and industrial skills were often assigned to sexes, and this work would either be underperformed or would have to be compensated for by imports. These theoretical models combine categories such as export numbers, on which there is good statistical data, with those such as total population on which documentation is poor, but there is a little anecdotal evidence to support their conclusions.

It is much harder to judge non-demographic impacts on Africa. For example, some scholars contend that participation in the slave trade caused African societies to become more unequal, or that it led to a rise in militarism. Others assert that all African losses in wars and related famines and other social dislocations were the results of the slave trade, which assumes that African wars had no other causes.[19] In fact, decisions about going to war were almost always freighted with non-economic considerations, rivalries between families and states, geo-political considerations, commercial maneuvering, and other factors that have led humans to fight each other over the ages.[20]

At the same time, however, no African ruler was likely, when considering a war, to leave out the costs of fighting and the supply of munitions. To the degree that Africans did purchase and use European manufactured weapons, the probability that a successful campaign would also be able to pay the cost of these weapons might have played a role in the decision. Indeed, the prospect of capturing and selling enemy subjects in exchange for the weapons of war, often obtained on credit, might tip the balance of decision making toward war. On the other hand, the outcome of war was frequently uncertain – states that started wars did not always win them. In a study of

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[19] Manning, *Slavery and African Life*; Paul Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa*, 3rd edn. (Cambridge University Press, 2011).
[20] Thornton, *Warfare in Atlantic Africa*.

Dahomey's wars of the eighteenth century, for example, Werner Peukert noted that Dahomey only won about a third of them to a level that allowed the export of many slaves; one third were inconclusive; and they lost another third of their military encounters and with them their own people.[21]

Middle Passage

Once Africans were enslaved and brought to the coast, a process that is very poorly documented and understood, they stood for sale to Europeans and Americans to bring them across the sea. Transatlantic voyages, in fact all long seaborne voyages, were difficult and dangerous, even for free people going from Europe to America, but there was really no maritime experience quite like the Middle Passage. While it was not unusual for travelers to die at sea, slave voyages routinely killed some of their cargoes and at times very many, and in fact the crews of the ships died at almost as high a rate as the slaves.

Well-managed voyages, with proper provisions, ventilation and sanitation, adequate food, and minimum crowding might cross with little or no mortality, though they could hardly be described as comfortable. In fact statistics show that voyages of the mid-eighteenth century with experienced captains could bring cargoes safely across the Atlantic. Careful and experienced sailors suffered both low losses and high profits, and were able to make many voyages. The problem was that very many captains only made one voyage and their inexperience, and often their greed, caused very high mortality of their human cargoes. Even the survivors suffered greatly. Voyages often failed and usually a voyage with high mortality was ruinously unprofitable, which meant that overall profitability was quite low.

The length of the voyage was an important factor in determining how difficult the Middle Passage could be for the slaves. A voyage from West Africa to the Caribbean took three months on average, though in the nineteenth century that fell to about two and a half months thanks to improved ship technology. Voyages to Brazil, on the other hand, took about one month and had the lowest mortality of all. The longer the voyage, the higher the mortality, especially since longer voyages had greater probability of running out of food or fresh water. Dehydration was particularly dangerous as the voyage took place in tropical latitudes with high temperatures,

[21] Werner Peukert, *Der Atlantische Sklavenhandel von Dahomey, 1740–1797: Wirtschaftsanthropologie und Sozialgeschichte* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1978).

and the crowded conditions and security measures meant that the slave holds would be consistently very hot. The difficulty in providing for adequate waste removal meant that aside from dehydration, fecal-borne diseases could spread rapidly and kill many people quickly and make almost everyone seriously ill.[22]

The voyage, coming as it did relatively soon after the capture and an often brutally supervised trip to the coast, could only have been traumatic. Occasional reports by people who traveled on the ships recount wailing, screaming, and crying as the ships left their African loading points to cross the Atlantic. However, the necessity of the slaves living and suffering together in close quarters also meant that they often cooperated with each other and formed in this way very tight bonds of friendship, which carried over into their lives in America. "Shipmate" (in English America) or "malungu" (in Brazil), to name just two, were terms that indicated two people had known each other in the Middle Passage and retained that special relationship in the New World.

The process of bonding was either helped or hindered by the ethno-linguistic diversity of the slaves on board. Diversity could result from the slave ship engaging in "coasting" as many ships from North America did, visiting first one point and taking a part of a cargo and then moving down the coast to perhaps two or even three more points to finish the cargo off. Clearly this would bring in a very diverse cargo and might make it harder for people to communicate or cooperate, though of course there would still quite likely be numbers of people from the same ethno-linguistic group on the ship.

At the other extreme, ships that made a voyage to a single point in Africa and took all their slaves there might encounter a situation in which a large war supplied all the slaves from that area at the time. In this case the enslaved people might speak the same language, have lived in near proximity to each other, and even be related. Not all single-stop voyages concentrated close neighbors, of course, and there might be considerable diversity even in a single-stop voyage if the supply came from several different interior sources.

Bonding and perhaps slaves' military service in Africa may help to explain shipboard revolts, which obviously require a community to form and take up arms. A remarkably high number of revolts took place in ships departing from Senegambia, far more than any other place. While Senegambians did

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[22] Marcus Rediker, *The Slave Ship: A Human History* (New York: Penguin Books, 2007).

come from diverse communities, there may well have been concentrations from specific wars in the interior. Moreover a common religion, Islam, may also have allowed ethnic boundaries to be crossed.[23]

Life and labor in the Americas

From a strictly statistical viewpoint the majority of the Africans transported to the Americas came to produce sugar. Nearly two-thirds were shipped to the sugar-producing regions of Brazil and the Caribbean. Next to sugar was mining, mostly in southeastern Brazil, which absorbed perhaps another 15 percent. Together sugar and mining accounted for about three-quarters of all of Africa's human exports. The labor regimes in those regions were nothing short of murderous; in addition to high death rates from accident and disease, these areas had low rates of reproduction due to the relative shortage of adult women. Those women who did survive were burdened with low rates of reproduction and even higher rates of infant mortality, as around four out of every ten babies died before their first birthday, a very high rate even by seventeenth- or eighteenth-century standards.[24]

On the other hand, those Africans who went to areas where the regime of labor was lighter, such as growing provision crops and some of the cash crops, craft production, or domestic service, typically had higher rates of survival and higher birth rates. The best example of this was the North American population, which was self-sustaining by the middle of the eighteenth century and was growing rapidly by natural increase by the time of the American War of Independence.

The consequence of this demographic regime was that the heavy labor areas of the New World never obtained a self-sustaining population, and thus a large percentage, or at times a majority, of the African-descended population was born and socialized in Africa. This feature made African cultural elements much more important than in areas where labor regimes were lighter. These elements were also more important during the period of slavery than they would be in later periods, when people of African ancestry were more likely to be American born. American-born slaves (often called "creoles") were socially dominant in labor regimes that centered on

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[23] Eltis and Richardson, *Atlas*, pp. 188–91.
[24] Amanda Thornton, "Coerced Care: Thomas Thistlewood's Account of Medical Practice on Enslaved Populations in Colonial Jamaica, 1751–1786," *Slavery and Abolition* 32 (2011): 535–59.

supervision, personal service, and craft production, and they later became dominant in heavy labor areas as well.

Social groups and identity

The slave trade delivered Africans to the Americas from many cultural groups and regions of Africa. However, the process was not uniform and the diversity of cultures found among Africans in various parts of the Atlantic World was itself very uneven. There were, for example, "waves" in which the trade was dominated by people from one region: Spanish America experienced a Senegambian wave in the late sixteenth century, and the whole of the Atlantic went through an Angolan wave in the first half of the seventeenth century, when usually at least half and often virtually all the slaves arriving were from Angola.[25] Mexico and Pernambuco in Brazil were particularly affected by this Angolan wave, as were the early Dutch, English, and French colonies.

Patterns in later periods varied as well. While Pernambuco remained supplied largely from Angola (nearly 90 percent), and Rio de Janeiro did as well (99 percent), in Bahia people from the "Mina Coast" (the region defined mostly by modern Benin and Togo) made up more than half. But for much of Brazil's later history Bahia and Amazonia both split their imports between just two coastal regions of Lower Guinea and Angola. Such two-nation combinations took place elsewhere. In Saint Domingue before its revolution, slaves from Congo and from Benin made up more than 80 percent of the arrivals.[26]

For most American regions, however, Africans came from many if not all of the African exporting regions without any one group predominating. In this way, cultural diversity was the norm in most European colonies in the Caribbean (with Saint Domingue being the exception) and in most of North America.

In many of the American colonies, Africans appear on records with indications of their "nation" or "country" that relate to the African region from which they originated, and study of the inventories helps to further elaborate the cultural heritage they brought from Africa. The national designations do not appear to relate to specific African ethnicities or polities,

[25] Linda Heywood and John Thornton, *Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles and the Foundation of the Americas, 1585–1665* (Cambridge University Press, 2007).
[26] Eltis and Richardson, *Atlas*.

but rather to larger areas defined by common languages or the presence of regular interactions between people speaking a common lingua franca. They are, in other words, cultural designations and not political ones, and they took into consideration people who were related through networks of cultural and economic interaction.

The "nations" appear to have had considerable meaning to the Africans living in the Americas. Most African-born people were members of a nation and they participated in national activities. Owing to the high mortality, especially among the African born and newly arrived, the most common national activity was funerals, and there is abundant evidence that masters permitted slaves to attend national funerals. There were also cultural events of an unspecified nature, which in English were sometimes called "country plays." These events allowed the participation in religious and cultural activities familiar from Africa and, more than that, allowed people to speak in their native languages with others. As such, the presence of a sense of national solidarity permitted the continuation of African language and the reconstruction of African cultural practices in the Americas. Because African-born people were a strong presence in the heavy labor sectors of the economy, there was a constantly renewed African infusion throughout the period of the slave trade, although the surviving children of that group and of the more privileged slave community created a different cultural pattern.

However much Africans might have wished to labor and socialize with people from their home cultures in the Americas, for most regions outside Brazil they were forced to reside in one place. Security measures as well as labor regimes created fairly fixed residential communities in towns or on plantations and mines. These residential communities were multi-national and culturally diverse. It was inevitable, therefore, that Africans in such communities would form bonds of friendship with at least some people from other African nations.

On large estates it might have been possible for people to find enough others from their nation that they could still have maintained their closest bonds with people of the same nation, but for people from minority nations or on smaller social units this was impossible. Intense cultural interaction thus tended to be the norm. Where data exists on the national origins of couples united in marriage (in Catholic regions) or forming households, there was a strong tendency for people to marry within their own nation, but people from smaller nations and a percentage of those from the larger ones formed bonds with people from another nation.

The multi-national nature of the residential unit meant that African languages were unlikely to survive in those areas. Since all the African laborers on American estates had to learn at least a smattering of the colonial language spoken there, this language became a lingua franca for the estates, and would become the native language (or at least one of the native languages) of American born people. While the African-born might struggle to speak a pidgin form of the colonial language with limited grammar and vocabulary, the American-born mastered a creole form of the language, with full grammar and vocabulary, but different from the standard form of the language spoken by Europeans.

In this situation, African born slaves continued speaking their home languages with fellow nationals and used their knowledge of the colonial language in a pidgin form when communicating with non-national Africans, creoles, and Europeans. If those slaves formed child-bearing bonds with slaves that were not from their nation, the children would most likely learn only the colonial creole language as a native language. For those born of same-nation unions, the parents might well transmit the language of their forefathers to their children, but these children, unlike their parents, would also acquire native proficiency in the creole form of the colonial language. Second generation unions would not have the same cultural or linguistic restraints as those of first generation people and the African language simply would not survive past that. It was only because of the constant influx of newly enslaved that one could still find many speakers of African languages at the end of the period of the slave trade.

If the multi-national nature of residence put negative pressure on language retention, it had quite a different effect on other aspects of African culture borne by slaves to the Americas. Musical performances, for example, were radically shaped by the cultural environment of the American world into new and unique forms. Africa had an extremely diverse musical culture, but unlike languages, which are learned in childhood and require great effort to learn as adults, taste in music is effortlessly acquired, and thus a person sampling musical performances might easily adopt new forms or accept changes in old ones.

In addition, music, especially performed music at funerals or plays, tends to fall into the hands of a limited number of particularly skilled and talented individuals who support themselves by receiving the patronage of the rest of the community. In order to win their patronage, African musicians had to adapt their music to appeal to the many African cultures that were represented in their communities. Thus musical forms that combined elements

drawn and reworked by talented musicians from multiple cultures, blended to please as many constituencies as possible, quickly emerged in the Americas.

The producers of this new American music stood to benefit if they could also include elements drawn from the music of their European and Euro-American masters, as winning their patronage promised even greater rewards. Thus African American musicians adopted instruments and musical elements from European cultures as well. In the process they created a powerfully evocative musical tradition intended to win the patronage of many different communities. As a result the roots of much of modern world music were shaped in the early globalization of the slave community in the Americas.

The forces that shaped music also shaped other artistic forms, including the most obvious one of dance, but also verbal and visual art. At present, however, there has not been enough solid research to comment on precisely how and in what ways African patterns of speech (especially through creole languages) have shaped the culture of their descendants or the wider world, or what African descended artisans, craftsmen, and even professional artists have drawn on to produce things that are distinctive.[27]

Religious life

While much of Africa followed traditional religions, several large regions had come to embrace Islam (in northern West Africa) and Christianity (in Kongo in Central Africa). Traditional religions were formed and altered through a process of continuous revelation; that is the understanding that messages from the Other World were received more or less constantly and potentially could change at any time. Those who claimed religious authority did so largely by constantly demonstrating that they could receive and interpret revelations and advise clients on what the Other World required. While a priesthood was found all over Africa, it was precarious, and constantly in danger of losing its authority if it could not prove its ability to render successful advice on weather, personal fortune, and moral behavior.

Traditional African religion was not automatically bounded by a fixed (or discontinuous) set of revelations, nor by an ethno-linguistic community. A deity, a spirit, an oracle or a human intermediary that emerged in one area or within one community could travel to other communities, as long as its

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[27] John Thornton, *A Cultural History of the Atlantic World, 1250–1820* (Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 386–96.

efficacy (and hence its reality) was demonstrated. Thus a priest from the Yoruba-speaking Oyo Empire could bring a deity with him to the Fon-speaking community in Dahomey, or followers of a shrine in the Gã-speaking community of Accra could argue that another shrine found in Twi-speaking Fante had greater power and efficacy than their own shrine.

The African penchant for continuous revelation also shaped how Christianity and Islam were received. Islam's earliest arrival, in the eleventh century, took place through a revelation made by the miraculous ending of a famine through Islamic prayer. Likewise the arrival of Christianity in Kongo in 1491 was vouchsafed by revelations and miracles. In both cases, however, local thinkers incorporated a great deal of the flexibility of the day-to-day experience of continuous revelation into a Christian or Islamic tradition.

In both Islamic and Christian Africa, people schooled in the more fixed traditions of the Abrahamic religions sought to reform the local versions of these religions. In West Africa this took the form of revivalists seeking to bring local practice into line with the prevailing norms in the core Islamic regions. Such movements were periodically effective, in the seventeenth century in Senegal under Nasr al-Din, in the eighteenth century in Futa Jallon (modern day Guinea), and again in Senegal under Abd ar-Raman and much more widely in the nineteenth century.

In Christian Central Africa the movements usually came from outside. The Italian Capuchins sought tirelessly to reform Kongo's and Portuguese Angola's Christianity to conform to Counter Reformation ideas without notable success, as state authorities in both regions showed little enthusiasm for putting resources behind the reforms. The most striking movement, in fact, the Antonian Movement in Kongo led by a Kongo woman named Beatriz, was not intended to return Christianity to some European original root but was itself in the form of a continuous revelation accompanied by miracles and preaching a radical Kongo-centered version of Christianity.

As Africans crossed the sea to America they brought their religious understanding with them, especially as the majority came as fully socialized adults. A fairly large number, perhaps a third, came from regions which had a Christian or Islamic background, and the rest from areas where those religions had made little or no progress. They expected, in both cases, to discover deities and supernatural beings in the Americas as they did in Africa, but they probably did not expect to find the same ones, with the exception that Christians and Muslims knew of a universal god.

We know, too, that they brought with them the religious tools necessary to find those supernatural beings, thanks especially to the investigations of

the Inquisition in Spanish and Portuguese America. They made use of divination techniques to achieve continuous revelation, and for many these revelations brought Christian saints, indigenous American spiritual entities, Jesus, the Virgin Mary, and perhaps entities from no other tradition. The survivors of those who died on the way probably also confirmed that ancestors were translated to the spiritual world.

In time, these revelations resulted in conversion to Christianity. In Protestant North America, mass revelations took place during the first (eighteenth century) and second (nineteenth century) Great Awakenings, though the outcome was not always the same for the African descended converts as it was for European Americans. The Africans continued to accept continuous revelation as conjure in North America and often through Vodou, Calinda, and other religious manifestations that appeared as heterodox to Christians from Europe or America.[28]

Christians from Central Africa sometimes evangelized their fellow slaves, at least in the Virgin Islands and Brazil, but surely elsewhere as well. Muslims had their own encounters with America. While it appears that most African Muslims simply accepted the American continuous revelations and became Christian, those of the more reformist traditions refused to yield. They prayed according to Islamic law, made talismans from verses of the Qur'an, and often resolutely remained Muslim. In Brazil, in particular, they used reformed Islam to lead revolts.[29]

Resistance

Slave owners in the Americas bought Africans primarily to work for them and, in order to extract maximum profit from their workers, forced African slaves to work long hours often without adequate rest and food to sustain the labor. The desire for quick profits, especially when supervision was in the hands of intermediaries for overseas owners, often led to ruinously harsh conditions with high mortality and morbidity rates from malnutrition, sleep deprivation, and accidents. Virtually all witnesses to the American slave regime thought it extremely rigorous, more than any regime in regular practice in Europe, and Africans must also have recognized it as a harsh regime.

Slaves in turn sought to escape from this demanding regime by running away or by engaging in low-level resistance, violence, and refusal to

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[28] Thornton, *Cultural History*, pp. 410–19; 456–63.
[29] Reis, *Slave Rebellion in Brazil*.

cooperate. Day-to-day resistance, such as deliberately working slowly, breaking tools, or otherwise disrupting production, is difficult to document or to prove, although it seems likely that it took place. Running away for a few days, which in French colonies was termed *petit marronage*, was one form of resistance used often as a bargaining device, in that workers would absent themselves and return voluntarily.

Beyond simply running away, it was not uncommon for slaves to take up armed resistance. Most often, the aim of the armed resistance was a break out, an escape from slavery to travel to an inaccessible area or to join with unconquered indigenous people. Only rarely was resistance an attempt to take over whole areas or engage in revolutionary action. Most runaways went to or founded small village-sized communities in inaccessible areas and simply sought to keep away from their masters. At times, however, these villages might grow to be very large or multi-settlement conglomerations that took on significant military potential. Communities of runaways might in turn raid the plantations and free people or capture them to be wives or to expand their numbers. They might also welcome additional runaways.

These communities were dangerous in the eyes of the planters not because a few slaves had escaped, but because the formation of communities gave people still in slavery a target to run away to, which would allow people to run away singly rather than as an armed group. As a result colonial governments sought to eliminate them, first by armed force, but when that failed, they usually made agreements that recognized the runaway community and then allied with it either to defend the colony against other rebels or to return runaways. Such agreements covered such communities as those formed by the 1612 Mexican runaways, or the Palenque community in New Granada (Colombia) in 1693. The Jamaican Maroons agreed to similar terms in 1739 and 1740 and then kept them; they returned runaways regularly and assisted the colonial government in putting down the revolt of 1760.[30]

Sometimes runaway communities grew truly large, as did the one that formed in the hinterland of Pernambuco, Brazil in the 1630s. As runaways from the Portuguese–Dutch war over Pernambuco fled in larger and larger numbers, the community eventually grew into a regular state with as many as 30,000 residents in several large towns and dozens if not hundreds of villages. Determined Portuguese campaigns failed to stop it, and a peace agreement was ultimately rejected by the majority of the rebels. In 1694,

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[30] Mavis Campbell, *The Maroons of Jamaica, 1655–1796: A History of Resistance, Collaboration, & Betrayal* (Granby, MA: Bergin and Garvey, 1990).

a large Portuguese–indigenous army took the main town and occupied it permanently. Although the state of Pernambuco, which had threatened the whole colony, was broken, the smaller communities remained intact.[31]

On occasion revolts do appear to have had taking over the colony, or a portion of it, as a goal. This was alleged to be the objective of the Jamaican revolt of 1760, and it was, of course, the eventual effect of the Haitian Revolution that began in 1791 and took advantage of a complex geo-strategic environment to create an independent state as Haiti in 1804.

The history of the African Diaspora has changed considerably from its origins in the study of the slave trade, and now it has become much more complex and multi-faceted. Africans are increasingly regarded in history as more than just mute workers brought against their will to form a silent backdrop to American history. The history of their African homelands, and the nature of their cultural lives and influences have all come more to the fore in the last forty years of study. Yet, their study is far from complete, many sources are as yet untapped, or only lightly tapped, and far more work remains to be done before the process of assessing the significance of the African Diaspora is complete.

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[31] John Thornton, "Les États de l'Angola et la formation de Palmares (Brésil)," *Annales: HSS* 63 (2008): 769–97.

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The organization of trade in Europe and Asia, 1400–1800

FRANCESCA TRIVELLATO

The mid-fifteenth century marked a turning point in world history. In 1433, at the death of Admiral Zheng He, the Chinese emperor put an end to the commercial and military expeditions that had brought hundreds of ships and thousands of men as far as the Red Sea and East Africa. Meanwhile, the Portuguese king's younger son Henry (1394–1460), known as the Navigator, was promoting an aggressive plan of maritime exploration and conquest along the coast of northern and western Africa. In 1415 the Portuguese troops conquered Ceuta, in northeastern Morocco, and by the 1450s, the Venetian explorer Alvise Ca' da Mosto, financed by Henry the Navigator, reached the islands of Cape Verde, off the Senegalese coast. During the following 350 years, the pendulum of economic and military dominance over global trade swung progressively away from Asia and toward Europe.

The modalities and temporality of this global re-orientation remain controversial to this day, so much so that the study of the organization of trade in Europe and Asia during the early modern period cannot be easily separated from what is labeled as "the rise of the West." Karl Marx and Max Weber set the scholarly agenda for generations to come and, for all their differences, converged in shaping the comparative analysis of early modern European and Asian political economy along two axes: an east–west axis that contrasts Asian extractive and autocratic agrarian empires with European commercially oriented polities and a north–south axis that pits an industrious Protestant Europe against a re-feudalized Catholic and Eastern Europe. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, changes within and outside academia – including new approaches to the study of world history and the meteoric economic growth of developing countries like China, India, and Brazil – have challenged the empirical validity and cultural traction of these traditional narratives. Yet a persistent imbalance in the primary sources and in the available literature stands in the way of an integrated and comparative approach to the study of the organization of trade across early modern Eurasia.

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The imbalance in the production and preservation of textual and archaeological evidence is particularly pronounced at the level of firm records and statistical records about prices, interest rates, and customs duties. We have nevertheless come a long way from older views that portrayed all Asian traders as nothing more than small-scale, itinerant peddlers. Ottoman court documents have allowed historians to reconstruct the operations of regional and international merchants. Growing interest in the maritime world of East and Southeast Asia and in the commercialization of inland China has transformed our image of those societies in the period before 1800. Recent studies have also uncovered the records of merchant communities originating in Asia that operated across Europe and the entire globe, further questioning the aptness of clear-cut labels such as "Europe" and "Asia."

In addition to new evidence, new approaches to the writing of comparative history have lifted the burden of proof from the non-Western world. The most provocative among these new approaches focus on the comparison between the European and Chinese economies before industrialization. For Kenneth Pomeranz, until the late eighteenth century the most economically advanced areas of China resembled England in their land markets, agrarian productivity, and wage levels. If long-distance trade played a role in the industrialization of England, it was not via superior property rights or institutions but through the forced migration of millions of Africans across the Atlantic and the extractive labor regimes of the New World plantations.[1] In comparing the organization of long-distance trade in China and Europe, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and R. Bin Wong start from the premise that different societies can face different problems or find different solutions to the same problems. A vast and geographically contiguous agrarian empire, China was less concerned with maritime trade than a small coastal country like the United Provinces or an island like Great Britain, but had vibrant domestic markets of cash crops and handicraft. Moreover, the existence of a unified legal system in China facilitated long-distance trade, whereas Europe's political and jurisdictional fragmentation added hurdles to the environmental perils of long-distance trade.[2]

From a mere quantitative perspective, the majority of exchanges across pre-industrial Eurasia involved small-scale transactions and remained

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[1] Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton University Press, 2000).
[2] Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and R. Bin Wong, *Before and Beyond Divergence: The Politics of Economic Change in China and Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).

confined within a short radius. There are nonetheless good reasons to focus on long-distance and inter-continental trade in this chapter. The key issue in the organization of trade was what economists call "the problem of agency" and what historians more commonly refer to as "the problem of distance," namely how to ensure that delegated agents in distant locations would provide reliable economic services.[3] Some of the solutions devised to curb these risks were the same everywhere, while others varied considerably depending on the ecological, technological, and institutional conditions. A contentious point of comparison concerns the degree of legal formality with which merchants operated in Europe and in Asia. An exclusive focus on this issue, however, would obscure equally important factors affecting the conduct of long-distance trade, including the militarization of commercial ventures. European states lent considerably greater military protection to their merchants in the Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans than their counterparts in Asia did.

Technology and infrastructure

Environmental and climatic conditions constrained the timing of when and the ways in which merchants were able to deliver goods, funds, and information. Wind patterns, mountain rims, deserts, and forests affected overland and overseas transportation in different ways. So accepted were these constraints that merchants normally calculated geographical distance not in linear units of measurement but in terms of the time it took to travel from one location to the other during a certain season. Epidemics as well as man-made violence ranging from warfare to piracy and robberies disrupted the regularities of established patterns and often proved hard to anticipate. Because transportation costs were high, most of the goods that traveled long distances had high value: bullion, silk, spices. But as transportation improved, so did the distribution of bulk cargoes, including basic food staples, such as grain or sugar, and even timber.

Were there major breakthroughs in the rapidity and security of transportation during the early modern period? The answer depends on how one defines breakthroughs. In the pre-industrial era, technological change mostly

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[3] Douglass North, "Institutions, Transactions Costs, and the Rise of Merchant Empires," in James D. Tracy (ed.), *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires* (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 22–40, p. 25 and K. N. Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750* (Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 5, respectively.

took the form of incremental "micro-innovations."[4] A transport revolution properly speaking only occurred with the appearance of railroads and steamships. Until then, powerful seasonal winds (monsoon) determined all crossing of the Indian Ocean, for example. The combined effect of smaller innovations, however, improved the safety and velocity of transportation, although it is difficult to measure by how much precisely. Ship design was highly localized, but transfer and experimentation happened everywhere. At the onset of our period, Chinese and Southeast Asian maritime technology was very advanced. Armed with the compass, sailors also had at their disposal a gamut of sturdy and yet maneuverable vessels. High-sea navigation was conducted on massive, four-deck, flat-bottom ships that are generally known by the name that the Portuguese gave them, *junks*, adapting the Javanese word *jong*.[5] No matter how well crafted the vessels and how sophisticated the navigation instruments on board, however, European and Asian ships proceeded mostly near the coast and made frequent stops out of practical and economic concerns. Most of the trade conducted by private merchants consisted in the purchase and sale of multiple small lots. Exchanges in bulk commodities, including grain, over long distances were the exception rather than the norm, and often the purview of large contracts by state and religious organizations. Only with the growth of the plantation economy in the New World and the import of massive cargo ships from Asia did auctions become a routine form of wholesale trade in Amsterdam and London.

The most dramatic improvements in shipping technology between 1400 and 1800 occurred in Europe. The best known of the new small vessels developed in the early part of this period is the caravel, a two-mast, lateen-sail ship that had the distinctive advantage of being able to sail against winds and currents and was thus employed for the crossing of the Atlantic. During the sixteenth century, the Dutch developed the *fluitship*, which sailed faster, required a smaller crew, and had a larger cargo capacity than its predecessors. Devised for the Baltic salt and grain trade, it was soon dispatched to the Mediterranean as well and is regarded as "a technological breakthrough of

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[4] Joel Mokyr, *The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress* (Oxford University Press, 1992).

[5] Pierre-Yves Manguin, "New Ships for New Networks: Trends in Shipbuilding in the South China Sea in the 15th and 16th Centuries," in Geoff Wade (ed.), *Southeast Asia in the Fifteenth Century: The Ming Factor* (National University of Singapore Press, 2010), pp. 333–58, 351, n5. See also Joseph Needham, with the collaboration of Wang Ling and Lu Gwei-Djen, *Science and Civilisation in China*, vol. IV, Part III: *Civil Engineering and Nautics* (Cambridge University Press, 1971).

Figure 7.1: A busy Dutch harbor scene at Dordrecht, 1651, showing a variety of types of ships, in an oil painting by Simon Jacobsz Vlieger (*c.*1600–53)

the greatest importance."[6] The "full-rigged" or "Atlantic" ship, with three or more masts and two or three decks, combining square sails and a lateen rig, emerged in the mid-fifteenth century out of the convergence of northern and southern European shipbuilding traditions. It has been called "the great invention of European ship designers" and provided the basic model for seafaring transport throughout the period.[7] Commercial and military ships were built in both private and state shipyards (Figure 7.1). In spite of European advances, in the seventeenth century, China still probably had the largest shipyard in the world, that of Nanjing, on the Dragon River.

Not all long-range commodity trade was conducted by sea. Mules, horses, and camels carried goods across vast stretches of land. During the sixteenth century, overland trade could still be competitive: a transcontinental route

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[6] Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1815* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 297.

[7] Richard W. Unger, *The Ship in the Medieval Economy, 600–1600* (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 216.

linked the Low Countries to southern Germany and northern Italy; Lyon, located along the land and river ways through which the Spanish-American silver was carried to the Low Countries, developed into a center of finance, silk manufacturing, and redistribution of Asian spices; caravan routes connecting the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf to Egypt and Syria remained thriving long after the Portuguese circumnavigation of the Cape of Good Hope. When forwarding their letters to Constantinople, Italian merchants did not trust the relatively tranquil waters of the Adriatic and sent second copies via Vienna and the Balkans as well.

Technological innovations in ship design and navigation instruments (wind charts, tide tables, lighthouses) were not the only factors that improved the safety and reliability of long-distance trade. Institutional changes proved just as important, if not more. Improved packaging techniques, the expansion of services offered in harbors and transit places, the regularity of courier services, marine insurance, and other financial contracts all reduced transaction costs and generated economies of scale. European transoceanic navigation became more secure in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries because of the institutional support that the Dutch and English made available to their vessels (such as the reduced duration of provisioning stops) rather than because of dramatic technological improvements.[8] Transport costs declined in the British Atlantic more rapidly than in any other geo-political area during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as evidenced by the remarkable decline in freight costs for the import of tobacco from Chesapeake to England, which decreased, on average, by 1.4 percent a year between 1619 and 1775 – a remarkable decline due primarily to a rationalization of the size and placement of the containers in which tobacco was stored on board a ship.[9]

Before the invention of the telegraph, rarely did information travel more rapidly than people and merchandise. To avoid the tortuous and dangerous route linking the city of Aleppo with its port, Iskanderon, merchants experimented with pigeons to carry letters, though this solution hardly proved a universal panacea. Though not tools that increased the rapidity of information transfer, merchant manuals across most of Eurasia contributed to the

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[8] Jan de Vries, "Connecting Europe and Asia: A Quantitative Analysis of the Cape Route Trade, 1497–1795," in Dennis O. Flynn, Arturo Giráldez, and Richard von Glahn (eds.), *Global Connections and Monetary History* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 35–106.

[9] Russell R. Menard, "Transport Costs and Long-range Trade, 1300–1800: Was there a European 'Transport Revolution' in the Early Modern Era?," in Tracy (ed.), *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires*, pp. 228–75, 254–7.

standardization of knowledge and the creation of a shared commercial culture among different communities. Starting in the late sixteenth century, the printing presses of several European cities began to print lists of prices and currency exchange rates; stock valuations, auction gatherings, advertisements, and estate sales were added later. Printed periodicals included news of events affecting the conduct of trade, such as the outbreak of a war or the arrival of a convoy (Figure 7.2). In some regions of the world, notably the British Atlantic, the development of regular courier services enhanced the frequency and reliability with which news circulated among a larger number of agents. All through the period, however, printed economic information supplemented more than it replaced hand-written correspondence, news reports, and contracts, but only through private letters was it possible to acquire candid assessments of a merchant's reliability or conduct secret dealings.

Periodical markets where buyers and sellers could meet and inspect the merchandise (or at least samples of it) were a universal solution to the weakness of information networks. In parts of China, a highly developed system of waterways connected market towns, which provided the outlet for rural industries. General or specialized fairs were more common where urban agglomerates were sparse. Across the Balkans and Anatolia, they proved essential to the circulation of capital and goods. Large towns and cities, in turn, could function as permanent fairs. Fernand Braudel thus dates the decline of commercial and financial fairs across Europe to the rise of Amsterdam as a truly international market in the 1620s.[10] Competitive bidding was the standard price mechanism in markets the world over. After they conquered Manila, the Spanish instituted a system (*pancada*) for the seasonal market of all Chinese imports at fixed prices in 1589, but soon had to replace it with free-market exchanges. Taxation and other forms of regulation affected prices of certain goods, such as food staples in times of famines or colonial imports in protectionist regimes.

Even within the most highly commercialized cities it was common for the authorities to designate a separate space, normally a square or an appropriate building, to market activities. This urban geography facilitated the self-policing of merchants and the inspection by external regulators. The same separation often also betrayed fears of contamination by foreign traders and foreign goods. Whether in Mocha, Gombroon, Constantinople or Venice,

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[10] Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism 15th–18th Century*, vol. II: *The Wheels of Commerce*, Siân Reynolds (trans.) (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992), p. 92.

Figure 7.2: Page from a Dutch newspaper "Hollandsche Mercurius" of 1653, showing Oliver Cromwell as Lord Protector of England and a convoy of ships below

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foreign merchants were housed in separate quarters to circumscribe their interactions with the local population. In sixteenth-century Venice, the urban geography and architecture of various foreign quarters reflected the perceived risks associated with each ethno-religious merchant group. The German trading house stood adjacent to the main marketplace, while Ottoman merchants were relegated to a building further away whose windows and balconies had to be walled up in order to minimize the contact with passers-by. In the port-cities of the Muslim Mediterranean, Christian merchants were grouped by "nation," each assigned a *funduq* where they lodged and transacted with locals and others. In an attempt to regulate foreign trade, the Chinese emperors and Japanese shoguns assigned an island, Macao (1557) and Deshima, in the Nagasaki harbor (1639), respectively, to European merchants and settlers. The Spanish followed the example in Manila and relegated a growing Chinese population outside of their walled colonial city in a district named Parian, where Dominican friars were actively proselytizing. Amsterdam, the only European city with no restrictions whatsoever on foreigners' involvement in trade, was the exception rather than the norm.

The more diverse the merchants flocking to a marketplace, the more it was necessary to offer services that would reduce the costs of transacting with strangers, ranging from translation services to legal mediation. Groups and institutions charged with these tasks emerged spontaneously in all corners of the world. All-purpose or specialized brokers and foreign resident representatives with knowledge of local weights, measures, and currencies, as well as of multiple languages and legal customs, were staples of large market towns. They facilitated transactions, although they could as easily extort rents. Around 1700, the Chinese authorities sanctioned a de-facto situation whereby Guangzhou (Canton), on the Pearl River delta, became the only Chinese port where Europeans were allowed to trade. As before, Portuguese, English, and Dutch merchants made little efforts to learn Chinese and Mandarin, hiring instead licensed linguists and relying on Hong merchants, those Canton businessmen to whom the Chinese authorities entrusted the exclusive right to trade with foreigners. Transactions were conducted in Portuguese and, later, in pidgin English, but the opportunities for miscommunication and deception abounded. The increase of cross-cultural trade in the early modern period, in short, meant neither the tumbling of all cultural barriers nor the rise of impersonal markets. A host of local solutions were devised for the safe conduct of everyday business.

Business forms and commercial enterprises

Though precise statistics are not available, sole proprietorships and family firms likely constituted the most prevalent form of business organization in long-distance trade. These small-size firms faced two main challenges: how to raise capital for high-risk investments that, even in the best-case scenarios, required several months, if not years, to yield any profit, and how to recruit capable and honest partners or agents in distant localities. Across Europe and Asia, kinship ties offered partial but not universal solutions to both problems. Kinship ties also took different forms across time, place, and communities. Portuguese traders groomed nephews, cousins, and godchildren alongside sons, particularly when the latter showed less than a natural talent for business. In China, families linked by agnatic descent organized themselves in "lineages" that held property in common. Lineages were particularly influential in land ownership, but in some cases helped organize overseas trade and other business enterprises. Among the merchants who dominated the Yangzi River Valley during the Ming period (1368–1644), some preferred to do business with their most immediate relatives, while others favored the larger lineage. Additional creative solutions emerged. Fukien traders, for instance, adopted foster children whom they then sent overseas. The status of women varied considerably. In Southeast Asia women played an autonomous role, whereas in Europe they mostly took up their late husbands' businesses when they became widows. In general, women participated in handicraft (in and out of the household) and in local retail more than in the day-to-day operations of international trade and finance.

In a path-breaking publication in the field of world history published in 1984, Philip Curtin argued that, from the Neolithic revolution to the dawn of industrialization, "trade diasporas" were ubiquitous "special institutional arrangements" that assisted merchants in trading across cultural lines, which in most cases also meant across vast distances. Trade diasporas were formed by merchants "linked to one another by several kinds of mutual solidarity: common profession, religion, language," or geographical origin.[11] These bonds of solidarity are seen as lending members of a trade diaspora a competitive advantage over those merchants who lacked such a support network. Countless trade diasporas have been identified across the globe: the Hausa of West Africa, Overseas Chinese, Bugis in Indonesia, Sephardic

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[11] Philip D. Curtin, *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History* (Cambridge University Press, 1984), i, p. 46.

Jews, Huguenots, Iranian Armenians, Multanis in Central Asia, as well as a host of Gujarati-based communities such as Sinhdis, Parsis, and Jains. Two salient features characterize these disparate groups: geographical dispersion and lack of an autonomous sovereign state. Upon closer scrutiny, however, both features conceal as much as they explain the ways in which each of these trade diasporas operated.

Geographical dispersion was an asset in a time of fragile communication and transportation technology because it facilitated the circulation of individuals, capital, and information. But these dispersed merchant networks remained vulnerable: they needed to keep their own members in check, to devise ways of contracting with outsiders from what was often a position of economic but not legal advantage, and to negotiate their status with rival political authorities. Different groups achieved these goals through different methods. Iranian Armenians operated as a dispersed network with a central node: New Julfa, in the Safavid capital, Isfahan. There, a corporate assembly of merchants aided the enforcement of agreements that linked sedentary merchants to their scions traveling across Eurasia and as far as the Pacific (Figure 7.3).[12] Sephardic merchants in Western Europe and the New World, by contrast, developed a multi-nodal structure in which family and community ties between various cities increased conformity within the group at large but also facilitated the building of credit relations with non-Jews. Sephardic merchants took on different risks and used different precautions depending on whom they traded with. They built family partnerships with sons, cousins, and in-laws to whom they delegated ample decision-making power, while they hired a myriad of non-Jewish agents to perform specific tasks that allowed them to broaden their operations.[13]

The workings of all trade diasporas depended at least in part on their association with sovereign authorities. Their leverage was primarily economic. They could threaten a boycott or anticipate large sums as tax collectors more than they could deploy military or diplomatic force. In a gesture designed to downplay Western exceptionalism, Curtin included under the rubric of trade diasporas the employees of the European chartered companies that held a national monopoly and often mobilized

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[12] Sebouh David Aslanian, *From the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic: The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011), pp. 185–97.
[13] Francesca Trivellato, *The Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009).

Figure 7.3: Armenian merchant, from a French travel journal, *The navigations, peregrinations, and voyages made into Turkie*, by the French geographer Nicolas de Nicolay, 1568

military violence in the name of their state. The analogy is meant to underscore the challenges that even these European companies faced in the world of early modern trade and put their alleged superior coordination and enforcement methods into perspective. But in the absence of a sustained comparison between stateless diasporas and European chartered companies, Curtin's analogy remains little more than an academic provocation.

Classic and recent efforts at comparing the forms of business organization that prevailed across early modern Europe and Asia find that European merchants operated with a higher level of formality than their counterparts in Asia.[14] Formality here refers to the legal infrastructure that facilitated collaboration among non-kin. While there is more than a grain of truth in this broad picture, its empirical and analytical bases require further scrutiny. Merchants from Europe continued to rely on informal incentives and deterrents to secure the compliance of their agents and partners. Conversely, Chinese merchants regularly utilized legal contracts and third-party dispute resolutions. When compared with the political and jurisdictional fragmentation of Europe, the unity of the vast Chinese empire may have facilitated the development of far-flung merchant networks.[15] Moreover, different types of obligations required different forms of oversight, even within the same region. Private contracts could be highly formalized even when no regulating bodies assured their enforcement if the contracting parties believed in the effectiveness of existing extrajudicial conventions to settle disagreements. In eighteenth-century Canton, defying official regulations, private traders from Europe lent large sums to Hong merchants at interest rates varying between 10 percent and 20 percent per year on the basis of agreements written in Chinese that they could not read and that the Chinese authorities were unlikely to uphold.[16]

Private merchants operating across vast distances could resort to a variety of governance forms: they could trade in partnership with someone overseas who had full autonomy and shared full liability with the main house; they could hire a junior partner to carry goods to faraway destinations and bring back commodities unavailable locally; they could use a constellation of commission agents who were remunerated on a percentage of the value of

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[14] R. Bin Wong, "Formal and Informal Mechanisms of Rule and Economic Development: The Qing Empire in Comparative Perspective," *Journal of Early Modern History* 5 (2001): 387–408.

[15] Rosenthal and Wong, *Before and Beyond Divergence*, p. 87.

[16] Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast 1700–1845* (Hong Kong University Press, 2005), pp. 150–6.

the transactions they negotiated; or they could hire branch-managers and other employees in a highly hierarchical structure of responsibility and oversight. This heterogeneity of governance forms coexisted across time and space more than it evolved along a continuum of development, since each had different pluses and minuses.

The early modern period inherited from the medieval Mediterranean a business contract generally known as *commenda* (in Italian) or as *qirad*, *mudaraba*, and *muqarada* (in Arabic), which allowed a resident partner to hire traveling agents to conduct business overseas. Aside from some variations, these contracts had two salient features: the senior resident partner invested all or a large portion of the capital and bore all the risks of loss, while the traveling agent invested only his labor or a mixture of his labor and a fraction of the capital and shared only the profits with his principal. Moreover, each contract covered one round-trip sea voyage, normally to specific destinations and sometimes for the transaction of specific items.[17] Variations of the *commenda* existed throughout Central Asia but not in China or England.[18] The absence of *commenda* contracts, in any case, did not mean the absence of associations between non-kin. At the beginning of our period, merchants involved in long-distance trade and based on the southern coast of the Fukien province had the option of employing salaried employees, of pooling capital together to rent space on board a ship, or of borrowing money at a fixed interest rate for the duration of a round-trip voyage.[19] Seventeenth-century Hindu merchants established family firms but also partnerships in which "kinship was not involved."[20]

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[17] Abraham L. Udovitch, *Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam* (Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 170–248; Robert S. Lopez and Irving W. Raymond, *Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World: Illustrative Documents* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), pp. 174–84; Murat Çizakça, *A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships: The Islamic World and Europe with Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archive* (Leiden: Brill, 1996).

[18] Scott C. Levi, *Indian Diaspora in Central Asia and Its Trade, 1550–1900* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 109, 173–4, 210. Limited liability was introduced in China in 1904 and in England in 1907: Madeleine Zelin, *Merchants of Zigong: Industrial Entrepreneurship in Early Modern China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 54, and Ron Harris, *Industrializing English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization, 1720–1844* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 20, respectively. On possible borrowings from Arab and Persian *commenda* contracts by merchants from South Fukien in the Song period, see Billy K. L. So, *Prosperity, Region, and Institutions in Maritime China: The South Fukien Pattern, 946–1368* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 216.

[19] So, *Prosperity, Region, and Institutions*, p. 214.

[20] Ifran Habib, "Merchant Communities in Precolonial India," in James D. Tracy (ed.), *The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350–1750* (Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 371–99, 389.

For all its advantages, including the ability to forge bilateral partnerships between strangers, the *commenda* had a major downside: it bound the traveling merchant to the terms of the contract and thus limited his ability to seize unforeseen opportunities as they came about. To obviate this drawback, after they had developed a reliable network of correspondents, sedentary merchants often preferred to rely on distant agents paid on commission. In the accounts of his travels to Persia, the French Huguenot Jean-Baptiste Chardin (1643–1713) noted that "trading by commission, and by the way of change by letters, is little used here; but as I have observ'd it, every one goes to sell his own goods, or sends his deputies or children to do it." That said, he added, "there are some Persian traders who have deputies in all parts of the world, as far as Sweden on the one side, and China on the other side."[21] A recent study confirms Chardin's observation: Armenians from New Julfa used *commenda* contracts to hire traveling agents more than they resorted to commission agents, and yet reached all corners of the world.[22] In other words, the presence or absence of a highly formalized contract such as the *commenda* is not sufficient evidence to draw broader conclusions about the impersonality of commercial relations. The widespread availability of brokerage, deposit-banking, insurance, and other institutions across the commercial hubs of South Asia calls into question the appropriateness of a clear-cut opposition between outward-looking European merchants and inward-looking Asian merchants. Wherever merchants disposed of dense networks of reputation control and dependable information and legal services, transaction costs declined and markets grew more impersonal. At the same time, even in the areas of Western Europe and the Atlantic where the most formalized contracting institutions existed, merchants resorted to a combination of formal and informal governance tools. In the eighteenth-century Atlantic, increasingly a British sea, private merchants dominated certain commodity chains, such as the lucrative trade in Madeira wine, and operated with only limited state support at the crossroads of multiple empires.

Credit markets and financial institutions

Raising funds to finance long-distance trade was no less a problem than securing competent and reliable associates and agents abroad. Prohibitions

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[21] *Sir John Chardin's Travels in Persia...* 2 vols. (London: Printed for the Author, Sold by J. Smith, 1720), II, p. 322. The first edition of this multivolume travel account began to appear in French in 1686.

[22] Aslanian, *From the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic*.

against lending at interest existed throughout the Christian and Muslim world, but a variety of contracts emerged that allowed merchants to bypass those prohibitions. The absence of anti-usury laws in China is often blamed as the cause of high interest rates but praised in the United Provinces as the precocious sign of a robust self-regulating money market. Evidently, comparative institutional analysis needs to be placed in a larger framework.

The simplest way for merchants to pool capital together was to form a general partnership, in which all members contributed different sums and shared full liability. Given the risks involved in such an arrangement, general partnerships were normally formed by kin who had extra-economic incentives to behave honestly. They were very common, even if they are difficult to study because they have left faint traces in public records as a result of their meager contractual specifications. In Europe, women's dowries commonly provided an influx of capital (they were added to the partnership's accounts) and shielded partners from external creditors since, in case of bankruptcy, dowries took precedence over other credits in the debt settlement. Limited partnerships, by contrast, distinguished between the managing partner(s), who maintained full liability, and external investors, who could never lose more than what they invested. They had the twin advantage of permitting entrepreneurs to raise additional capital from non-family members and allowing external investors to gain from trade while minimizing their risks and, especially important for noble investors, while avoiding the social stigma of direct involvement in trade.

Limited and general partnerships among private merchants rarely lasted for very long, exposed as they were to liquidity shocks. The chartered and joint-stock company was the most dramatic innovation in the early modern methods of capitalization. It differed from regulated companies, such as the Muscovy (1555–1698), North Sea (1579–1689), Levant (1581–1753), and French (1609–67) companies in England, which were cartels of autonomous private firms licensed by the Crown. Joint-stock companies like the English East India Company (EIC) and its Dutch counterpart, the *Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie* (VOC), created in 1600 and 1602, respectively, progressively acquired the features of modern corporations: permanent capitalization via tradable shares; separation of ownership and management; and limited liability for both managers and investors. Rather than a sudden break in institutional form, joint-stock companies emerged out of a piecemeal process and went through long trial-and-error phases. The VOC was the first commercial entity to be financed entirely via the stock market; its English counterpart issued its first stocks for multiple voyages in 1613. Not all

chartered companies succeeded, either immediately or in the long run. The EIC was restructured multiple times, in 1657, 1693, and, most successfully, in 1709. The Royal African Company (1672–1748) and the Dutch West India Company (1623–1791) were marred by structural failures. Other European countries, notably France, Denmark, the Holy Roman Empire (Ostend Company), and Sweden, nonetheless imitated these early examples in a race to reap off profits in Asia. Unlike modern corporations, the early modern ones were also the official military and administrative arms of the state and as such governed swaths of overseas territories. Whatever economic supremacy they imposed in the regions where they operated, it derived at least as much from their military force as from their managerial and financial organization (Figure 7.4).

Private financing remained the principal source of capitalization for international trade across Eurasia. The stock exchanges of Amsterdam and London attracted foreign investors in large numbers and funded large corporations with close ties to the state, but small- and medium-scale independent firms nourished the boom of French and British transatlantic trade in the eighteenth century. Meanwhile, Chinese entrepreneurs devised new, indigenous forms of organization that resembled those in Europe even if they were born in a very different institutional structure. Joint-stock private firms with corporate ownership, independent management by non-kin, and tradable shares existed not only in the large and lucrative salt-producing plants of the Sichuan region, but also among smaller-size companies in the North specializing in pickled vegetables, soy sauce, and other foodstuffs.[23]

For merchants trading from afar, the problem of raising funds for their enterprises was compounded by the risk of transferring funds to distant marketplaces. An important solution to this problem emerged in the thirteenth century in the most commercialized regions of Europe (Tuscany, Genoa, Provence, and the fairs of Champagne) in the form of bills of exchange. These bills were simultaneously a credit and a currency exchange contract. In the medieval Islamic Mediterranean, the use of drafts (*suftajas*) to redeem funds elsewhere, and sometimes to convert currencies, is amply documented among small traders, large-scale merchants, and government officials.[24] Promissory

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[23] Zelin, *Merchants of Zigong*, pp. 60–2; Kenneth Pomeranz, "Traditional Chinese Business Forms Revisited: Family, Firm, and Financing in the History of the Yutang Company of Jining," *Late Imperial China* 18 (1997): 1–38.

[24] S. D. Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza*, vol. 1: *Economic Foundations* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 230, 241–2.

Figure 7.4: The Dutch siege of the Indian city of Pondicherry in August 1693, in an illustration from the travel diary of a Jesuit missionary

notes were also widespread in eighteenth-century China. Credit instruments similar to the European bills of exchange circulated in Tokugawa Japan, in Mughal India (*hundis*), and across Central Asia. Nowhere outside of Europe, however, did these bills develop into purely speculative instruments that were traded in specialized financial fairs, such as those of sixteenth-century Lyon. After its creation in 1609, the Bank of Amsterdam (*Wisselbank*) became the clearing-house for many of the large bills of exchange issued across Europe.

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Private capital markets were also linked to the development of the public debt, where this existed. A large secondary market of government securities existed in parts of Europe since the thirteenth century and arguably favored the diffusion of financial expertise and the expansion of money markets. A veritable financial revolution occurred in England. The public debt came under the control of Parliament (1688), rather than the king, and its management was soon transferred to the Bank of England (1694). Although the evidence is disputable, this revolution in public finance may have contributed to reduced interest rates in private credit markets as well. The effect in China of the absence of a public debt on private credit markets is unclear. Connections between the public and private debt, at any rate, were not always virtuous. In 1720 two misguided speculative schemes designed to consolidate the public debt via the sale of equities, the South Sea Company in England and John Law's Mississippi Company in France, burst enormous fortunes into thin air. Half a century later, crises of the Amsterdam stock market in 1763 and 1773 sealed the eclipse of the Dutch economic Golden Age.

Merchants and the state

Sovereign states affected the organization of long-distance trade in many more ways than through the management of the public debt. Wars disrupted trade routes and drove insurance rates up. Diplomatic agreements opened up or closed off markets. Tariffs and other regulations determined the boundary between licit trade and contraband. Each and every one of these state policies had far-reaching consequences, but comparisons between the political economies of Asian and European states hinge on two primary phenomena: the military protection extended to maritime trade and the structure of fiscal regimes. Predatory Asian rulers have traditionally been described as indifferent to the interests of merchant groups and fending off foreign trade, either on ideological grounds or because of the vast agricultural holdings on which they could levy taxes. Within Europe, emerging bourgeois societies and limited governments in northern Protestant countries are contrasted to the royal capitalism of the Iberian and French monarchies. Empirical studies and more parsimonious models of comparative analysis cast doubts on these sweeping generalizations. It is nonetheless undeniable that the form and the extent of state intervention in overseas trade across Eurasia displayed remarkable differences.

Cannons placed on board ships literally parted the waters for Europe's overseas expansion while the Chinese, who had first devised firearms,

rejected the use of heavy artillery for naval warfare. Upon arrival in the Indian Ocean, the Portuguese carracks, sometimes described as "floating cities" for their mammoth size, began to sell licenses (*cartazas*) to carriers wishing to cross the maritime routes they controlled. Gujarati merchants, Muslim Arabs, Persians, and others who had been moving freely for centuries in those same waters now faced a militarized system of extraction. The Dutch later improved upon the Portuguese system, even if they never managed to control all the routes they hoped to. Ultimately, the end of "ecumenical trade" in the Indian Ocean did not mean the single-handed triumph of the Europeans.[25] Some Asian powers hired European military force to pursue their own goals, while others sought to challenge European commercial supremacy openly and still others altered their own commercial routes according to the emerging powers. Even relatively small kingdoms and sultanates in southern India curtailed the Europeans' ambitions. One faction at the Ottoman court pushed for an aggressive military and commercial expansion in the Indian Ocean, which military defeats more than ideological choices ultimately halted. At the onset of the seventeenth century, the Safavid Empire forcibly resettled its large Armenian population to New Julfa and lent it exclusive rights over the export of raw silk, thus striking a serious blow to EIC aspirations to control this branch of trade in Central Asia. The Tokugawa policy of exclusion of foreign traders (*sakoku*) did not prevent samurai from making room for the demands of townspeople and merchants. In the southern province of Tosa, for example, feudal lords oversaw the expansion of import-substitute industries such as paper, sugar, eggs, and gunpowder.[26]

Ming China organized its trading relations with foreign powers by way of a tributary system designed to extract revenues and control the terms and actors involved in these exchanges. Until 1567, Ming emperors only permitted licensed merchants to engage in foreign maritime trade and did not lend support to the so-called pirates (*Wokou*) who operated without those licenses. Aspects of these policies resembled the English Navigation Acts, which imposed tariffs on foreign goods, but the English Crown did not shy away from backing pirates in its expansion in the Atlantic. Moreover, the EIC and VOC were given the right to wage war on behalf of their respective states, while Chinese mainland authorities left overseas Chinese to their own

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[25] Curtin, *Cross-Cultural Trade*, p. 127.
[26] Luke S. Roberts, *Mercantilism in a Japanese Domain: The Merchant Origins of Economic Nationalism in 18th-century Tosa* (Cambridge University Press, 1998).

Figure 7.5: The crowded harbor of Canton, *c.*1800

devices, even as they suffered bloody massacres at the hands of the Spanish in Manila and the Dutch in Batavia. At the onset of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), the Chinese tribute system still applied to Korea, Japan, and the Ryukyu Islands (then an independent kingdom), but more and more trade along the southeastern coast flourished in ways that undermined this system. Macao and Canton became sites of regulated foreign trade while Xiamen (Amoy) developed as a major hub without a European presence (Figure 7.5).

The fiscal base of vast territorial empires oriented the political economy of the Mughal, Ottoman, and Chinese empires in a markedly different direction than that of the small United Provinces or the British archipelago. In 1753, the year for which we have the most comprehensive Chinese official tax returns, covering all lands of the empire, salt administrations, and native custom stations, 78 percent of imperial revenues came from privately owned land and 12 percent from the salt tax.[27] International trade remained confined to the South China coast and maritime customs were fairly insignificant in the overall imperial accounts. That the Chinese emperors raised taxes from agriculture does not mean that fiscal pressure was high. In fact, in peacetime, Qing emperors imposed lower per capita taxation rates than Western European states. Chinese authorities also spent more than their European

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[27] Yeh-chien Wang, *Land Taxation in Imperial China, 1750–1911* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 69–72.

counterparts on public goods, such as granaries and water management plants, which alleviated the needs of the poor and favored a division of labor between regions of the empire. This evidence provides an important corrective not only to theories of Oriental despotism, which depict Asian states as choking economic development, but also to their antithesis, the notion of a limited state according to which Asian states promoted market expansion by refraining from regulating private initiative.

The forms and extent of a state's involvement in commerce naturally affected the opportunities for upward mobility available to those involved in mercantile activities. Local and political conditions shaped these opportunities more than civilization cleavages or confessional predispositions to business acumen. Although the Ottoman governance structure afforded many opportunities for Christian and Jewish subjects to exert an influential role in foreign trade, Ottoman officials were also involved in that same trade. In South Asia, the separation between trade and politics was even less pronounced. Along the southern Indian coasts, together with the intensification of commercial exchanges with Europeans, indigenous moneyed elites emerged, whose careers trod the commercial, military, and political spheres. In northern India, too, a hierarchical separation between military aristocracy and merchants persisted, but the latter exercised more and more political influence by the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The rise of commercial interests similarly eroded the feudal structure of Tokugawa Japan. Whether in Old Regime France or Tokugawa Japan, moneyed elites had to juggle their attraction to commercial profits with the need to cultivate social respectability. As China experienced a "second commercial revolution" between 1550 and 1820, when rivers and canals improved internal transportation, silver imports led to increased monetization of all transactions, the textile industry developed, and government authorities relaxed their market regulations. The social status of merchants and bankers among the educated elites and the civil servants was also greatly enhanced.[28]

Changing patterns of Eurasian trade

These multiple patterns of commercial development should be mapped onto the structural changes that affected the geography, volume, and composition of Eurasian trade flows between 1400 and 1800. We can identify five

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[28] Richard John Lufrano, *Honorable Merchants: Commerce and Self-cultivation in Late Imperial China* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997).

moments of discontinuity across this period. The first voyage of Admiral Zheng He in 1405 marked the rise of Southeast Asia's "age of commerce."[29] Vasco da Gama's sailing around the Cape of Good Hope in 1497 charted a new ocean route for the import of Asian spices to Europe and in the process altered both Eurasian and intra-Asian dynamics. The regular voyages of Spanish galleons between Acapulco and Manila after 1571 inaugurated a new chapter in the history of global commerce by connecting the sources of American silver to its outlets in East and South Asia. During the seventeenth century the center of Europe's world economy shifted away from the Mediterranean and toward the Atlantic. Lastly, the composition of the European cargo ships returning from Asia changed considerably at different moments in time. Taken together, these shifts amounted to major reconfigurations of world trade through the early modern period.

In the fifteenth century, Venetian and Genoese merchants bought pepper, nutmeg, cloves, ginger, and other spices primarily in Alexandria, Aleppo, and Damascus, the end points of extensive caravan routes. Silver and copper mines from central Europe financed Venetian imports, while the Genoese were able to export commodities, too. The Portuguese opening of the Cape route displaced these circuits, even if Venetian spice imports from the Levant enjoyed a renaissance in the mid-sixteenth century and a coexistence of overland and overseas imports characterized the entire sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Another novelty was the fact that after 1500, India was no longer the only source of Asian spices flowing to Europe: the Portuguese, English, and Dutch competed for the control of production and export of pepper, cloves, nutmeg, and mace from the Indonesian archipelago.

During the sixteenth century, Portugal was the dominant European power in the Indian Ocean and turned Antwerp, in the Spanish Low Countries, into the European entrepôt of colonial goods. Venice stood to lose the most from this re-orientation of Eurasian trade flows. During the last quarter of the century, English and Dutch ships further challenged waning Venetian maritime primacy by supplying grain and cheap cloths to Mediterranean markets. By the 1660s, English trade with the Levant had reached its early modern peak. That was also the time when English commercial interests began to veer more sharply toward the New World, paving the way for the French to assert their primacy in the Mediterranean throughout the following century.

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[29] Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce*, 2 vols. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988–93), II, p. 12.

In the Indian Ocean, the Europeans did not alter the pre-existing patterns of intra-Asian maritime commerce, which the English called "country trade," as much as they expanded them. In fact, the Portuguese soon discovered that intra-Asian trade was generally more lucrative than inter-continental trade. For centuries, local merchants had exchanged Indian textiles for Indonesian spices. The Dutch settlement in Java proved a greater threat to these circuits than did the Portuguese, who remained dependent on local producers and intermediaries in South Asia to acquire export goods. The Dutch came to control the spice production in Indonesia by developing a new slave plantation economy similar to that of the New World, and further unraveled the Portuguese networks in East Asia by gaining a firmer foothold in Japan and Taiwan, from where the Jesuits and the Portuguese were expelled (Map 7.1).

Asian goods remained a luxury for the vast majority of European consumers until the mid-eighteenth century. Meanwhile, European ships returning from India brought back different commodities. During the seventeenth century, spices gave way to textiles, and Indian colored cotton textiles in particular, as well as a variety of other goods (saltpeter, Chinese porcelain and silk, dyestuff) among Dutch and especially English imports. The appeal of Indian calicoes eventually defeated European protectionism and even spurred new manufacturing establishments designed to imitate the original varieties. Still, European commercial ventures in Asia remained plagued by the need to secure adequate means of payment for the luxury items they were after. Enormous quantities of foreign silver were poured into China between 1500 and 1800. Initially, the Portuguese smuggled silver into the country from Japan. After the relaxation of the ban on private maritime trade in China (1567) and the establishment of a Spanish colony in Manila (1571), even larger quantities arrived on convoys carrying silver from the Mexican and Bolivian mines across the Pacific. Considerable disagreement exists about the precise amounts of these silver imports and their impact on the Chinese economy. Orders of magnitude are nonetheless indicative of the relative prices of silver across the globe: the gold/silver ratio in the sixteenth century was roughly 1:12 in Europe, 1:10 in Persia, 1:8 in India, and 1:5–6 in China.[30] Little wonder that Europeans hurried to ship silver to East Asia and Chinese merchants flocked to Manila to sell silk textiles, tea, and porcelain.

The late eighteenth century saw the most dramatic shift in the patterns of intra-Asian trade since the 1500s and, simultaneously, a meteoric rise of

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[30] Richard von Glahn, *Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000–1700* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 127–8.

Map 7.1: Long-distance maritime trade routes, c.1700

European imports of coffee and especially tea. Originally grown in Yemen, coffee first reached Venice in the mid-sixteenth century. The Dutch transplanted its seeds to Java and Ceylon, but experienced tough competition from the Caribbean plantations, where sugar and tobacco also became cash crops. Tea, by contrast, remained a Chinese specialty throughout the eighteenth century, when it was planted in large scale in India. More and more people across the Ottoman and Safavid empires acquired a taste for these drinks, but it was the skyrocketing demand for tea in Britain that triggered changes with enormous geo-political consequences. Between 1720 and 1790, imports of Chinese tea to Britain grew more than sixteenfold.[31] To feed this demand, the British found a new expedient, which also allowed them to alleviate their dependency on bullion exports: instead of silver, they brought to China opium grown in the regions of northern India that had come under their direct control, including Bengal (1757) and Surat (1759). More than the officers of the EIC, British privateers conducted this trade with the complicity of the Customs Superintendents (*Hoppos*) of Guangzhou, which in 1757 the Chinese authorities designated as the only port that foreigners were allowed to frequent. This illegal trade acquired unprecedented dimension and eventually precipitated the first (1839–42) of several Anglo-Chinese wars known as the Opium Wars, which ushered in a new era for British colonialism in East Asia.

Comparisons, connections, causation

Three broad issues fuel current scholarly research in the organization of trade in early modern Asia and Europe: the comparison of business forms utilized in the two continents; the role of commerce in creating a more interconnected or a more hierarchical world on a planetary scale; and the impact of transoceanic trade on the rise of the West, and of British industrialization more specifically.

Every merchant involved in long-distance trade faced similar problems no matter where he was: how to ensure the safe delivery of his goods; how to minimize the chances of recruiting incompetent or fraudulent associates; how to raise and transfer funds; how to acquire timely information; how to gain access to new markets; and how to avoid being entangled in prolonged and potentially unfavorable legal procedures. Family and social ties invariably

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[31] Louis Dermigny, *La Chine et l'Occident: Le Commerce à Canton au XVIIIe Siècle, 1719–1833*, 3 vols. (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964), II, p. 539.

assisted merchants in all these efforts. When these resources were lacking, specialized brokers cropped up everywhere to facilitate transactions between strangers. In many instances a diverse array of corporate authorities mediated disputes before they ended up before a judge. For all their similarities, some of these arrangements also took different forms across time and space. In this regard, an old and vexed question is still on the table: to what extent did European legal institutions reduce uncertainty and favor the creation of more impersonal markets in contrast to a greater reliance on kith and kin in the organization of Asian trade? While a growing literature stresses the complementarity of formal and informal arrangements that made long-distance trade safe and profitable all across the world, the question is bound to fuel energizing debates for years to come.

Comparisons of business organization cannot hide the fact that alongside families, trade diasporas, and other merchant communities, state and large-scale organizations were instrumental in the growth of long-distance trade during the early modern period. After the 1490s, and especially after the 1570s, the maritime worlds of Europe, Asia, and Africa became more interconnected than ever before. At the hands of the Iberian monarchies and the northern European chartered companies, commercial expansion was accompanied by warfare, coercion, and territorial conquest. It was the amalgam of economic and military pursuits that ultimately altered the history of the world. The timing and paths of this transformation remain a controversial subject. Even within the same ideological camp, we find contrasting views. Marxist scholars of world-system analysis depict a greater (Immanuel Wallerstein) or lesser (Andre Gunder Frank) continuity between the European domination of Eurasian trade after 1500 and the world of modern capitalism.[32] Non-Marxist historians are equally divided. For some, the Europeans' rounding of the Cape of Good Hope and the establishment of the EIC and VOC marked a sharp break in the history of global commerce.[33] Others, by contrast, find that, even when boarded with heavy artillery, European ships largely adapted to pre-existing commercial networks, at least until the opium trade with China. In the first aggregate quantitative analysis of Eurasian trade between 1497 and 1795, Jan de Vries calculates that a total of 10,781 ships left Europe for the Indian Ocean between 1501 and 1795; of these, a total of 7,731

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[32] Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*, vol. 1: *Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974); Andre Gunder Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998).

[33] Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilisation*.

returned to Europe from Asia, while the remaining 3,050 were either lost at sea or in battle or remained in Asia to engage in intra-Asian maritime trade. He thus concludes that "the impulse toward globalization in these three centuries was held in check by both technological and political factors that preserved a polycentric world economy despite the establishment of permanent and growing intercontinental trade flows."[34]

Even if polycentric, the world economy in 1800 did not resemble that of four centuries earlier. In 1400, China maintained a technological leadership. By 1800, Britain was undergoing the first industrial revolution and had established the largest non-contiguous empire in the history of the world. It is thus not surprising that the specter of industrialization has long haunted the study of transoceanic trade. Yet the direct impact of external trade on England's industrialization, apart from the cotton industry, is even more difficult to measure than that of agricultural productivity, the price of coal, or wage rates. Arguing that neither living standards nor access to coal gave England an edge over the most developed Chinese regions before the late eighteenth century, Pomeranz points to the American plantations, with their enslaved labor, cheap raw materials, and outlet markets for the homeland's manufacturing sector, as the main source for Britain's leap forward.[35] He does not resolve a long-standing controversy on the profit margins in the Atlantic slave trade and their impact on the investments that sustained England's industrial development.[36] But even with shaky statistics at hand, it is impossible to deny the role that warfare and human exploitation had in propelling England ahead.

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[34] de Vries, "Connecting Europe and Asia," p. 38. [35] Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence*.
[36] Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1944); Stanley L. Engerman, "The Slave Trade and British Capital Formation in the Eighteenth-Century: A Comment on the Williams Thesis," *Business History Review*, 46 (1972): 430–43; Barbara L. Solow and Stanley L. Engerman (eds.), *British Capitalism and Caribbean Slavery: The Legacy of Eric Williams* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

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Entrepreneurs, families, and companies

CHARLES H. PARKER

"Production, exchange, and consumption," observed Fernand Braudel, "are elementary obligations for all populations." Because of these basic human needs, buying and selling goods have constituted one of the enduring structures of everyday life in all societies, regardless of culture, religion, technological sophistication, or political organization. Even in the earliest civilizations, whole salers loaded products onto pack animals, wagons, and boats and transported them from distant places to retailers back home. In a world already filled with all sorts of merchants, the early modern period stands out as an epoch in which rising levels of population and production, combined with the development of maritime technology and a rekindled interest in distant lands, quickened the pace and elevated the volume of trade. The tentacles of long-distance trade reached across vast stretches of land and sea, linking local and regional markets, fairs, and bazaars that dotted the globe. The remarkable expansion of trade gave rise to increasingly complex financial instruments and new organizational structures, even though this development was by no means linear or progressive. Over time, the spread of contractual partnerships, bills of exchange, complex forms of credit, as well as the creation of insurance companies and joint-stock corporations generated economies of scale that stitched together most regions of the world. The early modern period was truly "an age of commerce" in which long-standing Afro-Eurasian trading zones incorporated American commodities into the first genuinely global mercantile networks.[1]

In this age of international trade, the long-distance enterprises of heavily capitalized and state-supported European trade operations have tended to monopolize scholarly attention. Yet the ongoing vitality of family-based operations also remained integral to commerce in all parts of the world.

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[1] Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism 15–18th Century*, Siân Reynolds (trans.) (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982), vol. II, p. 114.

European organizations, both the Iberian state-controlled enterprises and the monopolistic English, Dutch, French, and Scandinavian trading companies, coexisted alongside, competed with, and profited from commerce with a wide variety of indigenous merchants, brokers, and small mercantile associations. Obviously important differences in structure, scale, and reach emerged between the large corporations that arose in the seventeenth century and local or regional firms. Yet small associations and large corporations also shared many of the same challenges inherent in cross-cultural exchanges, such as minimizing uncertainties and mitigating risks. These concerns took on greater significance because increased travel in the early modern period posed formidable obstacles, transactions became more complicated, and contractual agreements often depended on private enforcement. For individual merchants and small associations, the common ties of kinship, ethnicity, and religious persuasion could help foment the trust crucial to finance and transact business, especially over long distances. Family and merchant communities did not take trust for granted, but constructed horizontal networks of social control to maintain a sense of confidence in the marketplace. Large trading companies a long way from home also invested in protection strategies to gain leverage and to offset the odds of violence and fraud. Protection costs ranged widely from paying customs duties and transaction fees, to hiring guides and guards, to paying bribes to local groups or rulers, to partnering with other parties, to outfitting companies with naval and military capabilities.[2]

Not only did individual merchants and firms from around the world encounter comparable complications and obstacles, but successful traders large and small also possessed a similar dynamism and versatility. Stephen Dale has shown that Multani traders resident in Isfahan and Astrakhan exhibited an "entrepreneurial spirit" typically identified as unique to "the great merchant" of the Italian Renaissance. Just like their counterparts in Europe, Indian merchants within the central Asian trade diaspora involved themselves in a broad assortment of activities and displayed remarkable resourcefulness. Dale invoked Irfan Habib's view that Italian and Indian businesses utilized analogous forms of organization and methods and that a number of innovations occurred in Asia parallel to or even preceding

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[2] Francesca Trivellato, *The Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), pp. 7–8, and Sebouh David Aslanian, "Social Capital, 'Trust' and the Role of Networks in Julfa Trade: Informal and Semi-Informal Institutions at Work," *Journal of Global History* 1 (2006): 383–4.

European developments.[3] Thus, there is compelling evidence to suggest that a rough symmetry in commercial development, along with a stubborn continuity in organization, occurred in many of the major intercontinental trading zones across Afro-Eurasia. The dynamics of local and trans-regional trade shared fundamental characteristics among widely disparate geographies and cultures. Keeping in mind both disparities and similarities across space and time, this chapter considers the connections between local exchanges and global networks of economic interaction by focusing on merchants and their communities.

Merchants and trade circuits

Merchants who moved staples and luxury items across long distances in the early modern period utilized routes within distinct commercial zones that had endured for many centuries. The most active theater of long-distance commerce in the world was the port-city trading network along the coastline of the Indian Ocean basin. Following the annual rhythm of the monsoons, vessels stopped at ports from southern China, the Malay peninsula and Indonesian archipelago, to the Malabar and Coromandel shorelines of South Asia, and cities on the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and along east Africa. Traders rarely navigated the entire circuit, but operated within specific routes that linked regions, such as from China's Fujian province to Sumatra or from maritime Southeast Asia to Bengal or Surat. The port cities served as points of distribution for products from the interior of these territories to other lands, linking various cities and regions to others. The most important ports of call across this immense maritime zone included Macau, Guangzhou (Canton), and Quanzhou on China's southeast coast; Melaka on the southern tip of Malaya; Aceh on the northwestern edge of Sumatra; Surat, Bengal, Calicut, Goa, and Masulipatam along the Indian coastlines; Colombo on the island of Sri Lanka; Hormuz (an island itself) just off the coast of Iran in the Persian Gulf; Aden on the tip of Yemen; and Mogadishu and Kilwa in east Africa. A remarkable variety of peoples participated in these long-distance exchanges; most ports contained merchant groups of Gujaratis (Indian), Hokkiens (Chinese), Persians, Armenians, Portuguese, Dutch, English, Jews, and Arabs.

Belonging to the ancient Silk Roads, the caravan routes of central Asia formed a well-defined trading zone that complemented the maritime trade

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[3] Stephen Frederic Dale, *Indian Merchants and Eurasian Trade, 1600–1750* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 134–5.

along the Indian Ocean littoral. Caravans of camels or horses transported merchandise typically consisting of lighter luxury items, such as silks, precious stones and metals, musks, dyes, woolen and cotton cloth, candles, and other small finished goods. Diasporas of Armenians, Persians, as well as a variety of Indian and Afghan ethnic groups (Punjabis, Khattris, Pushtuns, Mariwaris, Multanis) fanned out across the expansive territory from northern India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, across Iran, Iraq, and Armenia, to southern Russia.[4] Central Asia experienced vigorous commercial activity until the decline and collapse of the Mughal and Savafid empires in the early eighteenth century. Close family and personal connections between Indian, Armenian, and Persian merchant groups generated trade in this region. Merchant firms from these areas made contact with one another in a number of vital cities, such as Isfahan, Kandahar, Tabriz, Multan, Astrakhan, and Baghdad.

The Mediterranean Sea served as a commercial zone that linked the movement of goods from three continents – Africa, Asia, and Europe. The westernmost edges of the Eurasian overland and maritime routes filtered into the Levant from the Red Sea into Egypt and from the Crimea and Istanbul into the Aegean Sea. North Italian merchants in Venice, Genoa, Padua, and Florence acquired Asian and African merchandise from their agents in Cairo, Alexandria, Istanbul, Damascus, Baghdad, and other cities along the coastline. Italians brought Asian products, especially spices, but also silks and porcelain, and resold them at a cluster of fairs held in France in the county of Champagne, just northeast of Paris. Local people, elites, and their trade representatives purchased these items at the fairs for clients or for resale in urban areas across Europe. The trans-Saharan caravan traffic in gold and slaves from the Senegal, Niger, and Gambia rivers to northern coastal cities incorporated African merchants into Mediterranean networks. As a result, a series of thriving merchant-based empires emerged in north and west Africa.

Unlike the continuities between long-standing routes in Eurasia and early modern networks, the rise of a transnational commercial structure in the Atlantic was a new and revolutionary event. European exploration and expansion in the Atlantic basin initiated the development of commercial networks that absorbed large portions of sub-Saharan Africa and America. In the so-called Triangular Trade, Europeans extracted gold

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[4] Dale, *Indian Merchants*, p. 45.

and silver – much of which ultimately found its way to China and India – cultivated commodities, exploited natural resources on an unprecedented scale, and populated the Americas with millions of enslaved Africans. Genuinely global economic networks emerged in this period.

In these matrices of trade, it was the relentless ambition of merchants that formed the driving force behind commercial growth in the early modern period. Expanded prospects for economic gain stoked the entre-preneurial initiative of merchants across Afro-Eurasia from Multani traders in northern India, to Hokkien dealers in Southeast Asia, to Wangara vendors in the Sudan, to Venetian cloth importers in northern Italy. The particularized character of trade in pre-modern times required that a local merchant manage an astonishing assortment of responsibilities, balance many competing demands, and seize on opportunities quickly, though not too hastily. Early modern merchants thus displayed remark-able versatility. They engrossed themselves in all sorts of enterprises: raising capital to finance other ventures, trading both locally and far afield, participating in both wholesale and retail markets, dealing in many differ-ent goods, seeking contracts for collecting duties and tax farming, and currying favor with political powers across wide stretches of territory. For example, Mirza Muhammad Taki, a prosperous Persian merchant in the late seventeenth century, maintained far-reaching political alliances across India and Persia and for a brief period took a leadership role among Mughal traders in Surat. Similarly, Shaikh Hamid, an Arab merchant in India and contemporary of Taki, mixed trading with shipping and even devotion to Sufism.[5]

Merchants or their representatives traveled widely to buy and sell at fairs and markets, to gain inroads into mercantile communities in strategic locations, such as Venice, Amsterdam, Aleppo, Surat, Astrakhan, and Kandahar. Cities within all the trading circuits of the early modern world, whether in the Mediterranean, along the Silk Roads, in the Indian Ocean, across the Sahara Desert, or in northern Europe, were filled with com-mercial spaces that connected local production of spices, metals, slaves, cotton, silk, and other goods to the wider world.[6] Within the trans-regional commercial zones, cities concentrated buyers and sellers in

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[5] Ashin Das Gupta, *Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat c.1700–1750* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1994), p. 75.
[6] Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism*, vol. II, pp. 115 and 117.

"primary nodal markets" that connected local and regional producers to the wider world of international markets.[7]

Merchants and family networks

Though merchants often acted as independent contractors, they did not conduct trade alone. At the local operational level and even across the diffuse circuits of trade, the most elemental and enduring form of a mercantile partnership was the family. Usually combining both the nuclear household and extended relatives, family networks formed the traditional basis of general partnerships and helped forge an age of commerce across all trading zones, routes, and hubs. General partnerships based on informal, unwritten contracts that extended indefinitely allowed all members to share in decision-making and reap similar rewards, but also share common liabilities.[8] A family business encompassed more than simply members of a household and blood relatives, but usually functioned as a coalition of overlapping partnerships that involved non-related parties as well. As commercial operations expanded and became more complex, family businesses took on additional partners and investors outside the bonds of kinship. Thus family members worked together but mixed easily with outsiders.

Two examples of family networks provide tangible detail of the versatility and opportunism of the most successfully run operations. In the early 1500s, the Stroganov family of Russia made a fortune by exporting salt from the lake of Solvychegodsk in the extreme north. When Ivan the Terrible began to open up Kazan in the Volga River basin in the 1550s, he granted Anika Stroganov large tracts of land in the region. The Stroganov family financed military operations and the construction of fortified settlements in eastern Siberia in return for a monopoly on most revenues. In the late 1500s and early 1600s, the Stroganovs became the richest family in Russia.[9]

The Sceriman/Shahriman family prospered in the new Julfa community under Safavid shahs in the seventeenth century. They established branch houses, staffed by family agents, in Astrakhan and Venice, trading in diamonds, precious stones, and silk. After a number of the family members converted to Roman Catholicism, their operations began to gravitate toward

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[7] Kirti N. Chaudhuri, *The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660–1760* (Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 139–40.
[8] Trivellato, *Familiarity of Strangers*, pp. 139–40.
[9] Terence Armstrong, *Russian Settlements in the North* (Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 14–15 and 142.

Italy and the Mediterranean at the end of the seventeenth century. Sebouh Aslanian describes the clan as "a shrewd and strategizing band of brothers and male cousins who seem always to have not only the future of their family's commercial interests in mind but also its survival and staying power in new lands . . . while still being bound . . . to their original home in Iran." Even though business organization tended toward limited and more non-familial partnerships in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, smaller firms still worked within the framework of a domestic economy just as large corporations also exhibited familial characteristics. The timeless association of trade with family remained central to early modern commerce.[10]

The household, which shaped most aspects of production and consumption in all pre-modern societies, also gave commerce its administrative and functional structure. Since goods in pre-modern societies were produced within the spatial confines of a household, the administration of family affairs overlay the management of business dealings. In scholarship on European societies, a number of historians have shown that the domestic and public spheres blurred especially in the world of production and commerce. The household was not so much a refuge from the hustle and bustle of buying, selling, and trading, as it was a vital part of the production and exchange that coursed through societies.[11] Despite the wide-ranging diversity of Asian and African societies, the household functioned in similar capacities. A stronger division between private household and public domain prevailed in some Muslim lands, however, because of religious strictures against social mixing between women and men outside their families.

Even though public trade organizations, such as guilds, generally excluded women in the early modern period, the domestic organization of production placed women firmly within the orbit of commerce despite formal constraints. Legal documents in a number of urban areas in the Ottoman Empire have recorded the activity of women acting as owners of property or proprietors of workshops, and even overseeing tax-farming operations. Many affluent widows designated male agents, often younger family members, to conduct business and make investments in the market place for their female

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[10] Sebouh David Aslanian, *From the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic: The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011), pp. 149–68, quote on 158; Trivellato, *Familiarity of Strangers*, p. 132.

[11] Richard Grassby, *Kinship and Capitalism: Marriage, Family, and Business in the English-Speaking World, 1580–1740* (Cambridge University Press, 2001); Maria Ågren and Amy Louise Erickson (eds.), *The Marital Economy in Scandinavia and Britain, 1400–1900* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005); Julie Hardwick, *Family Business Litigation and the Political Economies of Daily Life in Early Modern France* (Oxford University Press, 2009).

employers. Women loaned not only to family, but also to non-relatives. In Istanbul, Cairo, Aleppo, Damascus, Kayseri, and Cyprus, courts registered women buying, selling, and lending in these cities. In Kayseri, the court regularly upheld the security and integrity of property owned by women. Wealthy women demonstrated their piety, as well as their financial practicality, by endowing charitable foundations (*waqfs*). Women's involvement in business, of course, varied widely according to local contexts. In areas where households possessed a significant measure of autonomy and there were traditions of female inheritance, women tended to exert considerable influence in trade and commerce. In Southeast Asia, although men dominated long-distance overland and maritime trade, women were prominent in domestic markets and small-scale trading because they were generally regarded as financially astute and the management of the household economy rested in their hands. Foreign traders recognized indigenous women in the East Indies, Malaysia, and South Asia as an entrée into local market networks. It was not unusual for émigré merchants trying to infiltrate local trading complexes or make local connections to cohabit with or marry native women for their expertise and their connections. European, and possibly Hokkien, merchants in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries married Balinese, Malay, Javanese, and Filipina women, sometimes temporarily, to establish business contacts and to navigate indigenous cultures.[12]

Within households, collaboration among all family members, certainly husbands and wives, was crucial to financial success. In Europe, women often assumed leading roles in managing the affairs of the household, including its mercantile enterprises especially when their husbands were away. Even when husbands and sons were present, women kept accounts and responded to changing market conditions (Figure 8.1). Widows frequently took over sole control of family businesses after the death of their husbands in Christian and Muslim lands. The correspondence between the

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[12] Fariba Zarinebaf-Shahr, "The Role of Women in the Urban Economy of Istanbul, 1700–1850," *International Labor and Working Class History* 60 (2001): 142; Ronald Jennings, "Women in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records: The Sharia Court of Anatolian Kayseri," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 18 (1975): 65, 78, 97, and 104; Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 852; Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik, *The World that Trade Created: Society, Culture, and the World Economy, 1400 to the Present* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2012), p. 6; Stewart Gordon, *When Asia was the World: Traveling Merchants, Scholars, Warriors, and Monks who Created the "Riches of the East"* (Philadelphia, PA: Da Capo Press, 2008), pp. 85–6; and Craig A. Lockard, "'The Sea Common to All': Maritime Frontiers, Port Cities, and Chinese Traders in the Southeast Asian Age of Commerce, c. 1400–1750," *The Journal of World History* 21 (2010): 228–32.

Figure 8.1: Nicolas Maes (1634–93), *The Account Keeper,* 1656 (oil on canvas)

Nuremberg merchant, Balthasar Paumgartner, and his wife Magdalena Behaim in the sixteenth century highlights the mixture of marital affection with hard-headed pragmatism of working relationships between spouses engaged in commerce. In April 1594, Magdalena wrote to him while he was away on a business trip, "I have given your brother Jörg the money that belongs to Bartel Albrecht to deliver to him. Brother-in-law Jörg tells me

that someone has already written to you about your estimated payments in Frankfurt ... Kind, dear treasure, I have nothing more to write at this time ..."[13]

Among merchant families, women brought much needed resources into businesses, as dowries formed important sources of capital, particularly when they took the form of cash payments. A significant degree of family capital came from dowries that women brought to a marriage. For example, Thomas Jeffereys, a merchant in Exeter, acquired a dowry of £1,600 and supplementary amount of £4,000 from his father-in-law, sums that allowed him to underwrite a number of business ventures. Dowries provided a particularly valuable capital resource for Sephardic merchant families. Two factors made this possible. Jewish marriage customs, unlike Christian tradition, permitted marriage among relatives within the third and fourth degrees of consanguinity. Consequently, marital unions between cousins, as well as uncles and nieces, were not uncommon. Consanguineous matrimony allowed extended families to keep capital within the lineage or to shift it from one branch to another. Just as significantly, in Jewish marriages both the groom's and the bride's family contributed payments to the union, which came under the direction of the husband. He retained control of his wife's dowry if he survived her and likewise the wife regained her dowry upon her husband's death plus at least a sizeable portion of his contribution. Since dowry payments usually took the form of liquid assets, the financial dimension of marriage infused and transferred capital into family commercial initiatives.[14]

Extended kinship groups shared fully in local and long-distance trade. Commercial initiatives were in many instances part of a larger network of kin, an affiliation that remained invaluable in making connections, securing financing, penetrating new markets, absorbing losses, and extending opportunities. Relatives regularly served as foreign agents for family firms across Europe and Asia, according to *commenda* (in which one partner supplied the capital and a second acted as the foreign agent) or other general partnership arrangements. Despite variations, the typical arrangement paired an

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[13] Martha C. Howell, *Commerce before Capitalism in Europe, 1300–1600* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 100; Jennings, "Women in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records": 97; and Steven Ozment, *Magdalena and Balthasar: An Intimate Portrait of Life in 16th-Century Europe Revealed in the Letters of a Nuremberg Husband and Wife* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), pp. 70–1.

[14] Grassby, *Kinship and Capitalism*, pp. 286–7, and Trivellato, *Familiarity of Strangers*, pp. 133–5.

investing party that advanced the bulk of the capital with a traveling party that transacted business on location. The partners split any profits or losses according to the proportion of investment. If the traveling partner supplied none of the capital, then he derived his share either from the value of his labor or from a percentage of the profits as specified in the contract between parties. Sephardic and Christian merchants in Italy and northern Europe dispatched relatives to markets in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. Extensive ethnic-based trading networks frequently originated out of the initial migration of relatives from a family business. As they became settled in a new land, developed contacts, and established a presence, other kinsfolk and people from the point of origin joined them. The large migration of Wangara merchants into the Hausa and Bariba states of North Africa, Chinese merchants venturing into the East Indies, and Indian merchants moving into the Volga Region represent clear instances of this process. In China under both the Ming and Qing dynasties, mercantile kinship groups formed thick complexes along the coast, major rivers, and Grand Canal. In all areas of intensive trading activity, merchant associations overlapped with leading local families. Within Indian, Arab, and Turkish merchant communities in Surat, for example, powerful clans, such as those headed by Muhammad Saleh Chellaby and Mulla Abdul Ghafar, directed commercial traffic among their own social and ethnic groups. Likewise, Fujian merchants who migrated throughout maritime Southeast Asia organized themselves around kinship groups, as well as home territory.[15]

Family partnerships drew on the benefits of blood ties that fostered trust, provided access to capital and credit, and increased the reach of commercial ventures. Families could possibly provide stronger bonds of trust than relations with non-family members; they could pool resources and keep profits within the domestic corporation. Relations served as agents, investors, brokers, and employees that enabled entrepreneurs to initiate or expand projects beyond their initial capacities. Yet, the connections of kith and kin

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[15] Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 117, 217, and 220; Trivellato, *Familiarity of Strangers*, p. 132; Lockard, "'Sea Common to All'": 225; Grassby, *Kinship and Capitalism*, p. 413; Das Gupta, *Indian Merchants*, pp. 75–7; Scott C. Levi, *The Indian Diaspora in Central Asia and its Trade, 1550–1900* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), p. 221; Sevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 77–8; Dale, *Indian Merchants*, pp. 67 and 69; Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and R. Bin Wong, *Before and Beyond Divergence: The Politics of Economic Change in China and Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 152; and Paul E. Lovejoy, "The Role of Wangara in the Economic Transformation of the Central Sudan in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries," *Journal of African History* 19 (1978): 185.

could also derail commercial associations, as nepotism and other sorts of favoritism acted against economic rationality and efficiency. The extent to which family firms incorporated outsiders and remained flexible to market conditions and internal inefficiencies improved their odds of financial buoyancy. Nevertheless, family partnerships remained a permanent fixture in the commercial circuits of the early modern period.[16]

Merchants and companies

Kinship networks overlapped and interacted with several types of partnerships that grew out of long-standing practices, but also began to evolve into new forms with the uptick in trans-regional commerce. The *commenda*, utilized in central Asia and the Mediterranean for centuries, continued to provide an influential model for business associations involved in long-distance trade. *Commenda* arrangements came in different shapes and sizes based on the needs of business partners. In China, merchant houses located in a certain region, such as those in Huizhou and Fujian, established semi-autonomous branch offices at strategic sites, like Jiangnan, in this case to take advantage of its thriving textile market. Another organizational form, known as *shirka*, remained significant along the overland Asian routes. The distinctive feature of the *shirka* was its collective partnership in which members combined capital and shared equal standing, even though they usually had invested different sums in the business. Islamic law sanctioned commercial partnerships, promoting the cooperative use of capital and a shared stake in profits and debts. Provided they recovered their investments, partners allocated profits proportionately; all shouldered losses evenly. From the general framework of the *commenda*, partnerships in the early modern period, by and large general, family-based firms, remained the dominant mode of business organization in most areas outside Europe.[17]

In the sixteenth century, European merchant companies increasingly gravitated toward the pattern of limited liability partnerships and employed salaried agents. Formed out of written contracts for a specific tenure, limited partnerships greatly reduced the agent's liability or eliminated it entirely. These contracts did not typically involve family members. In Tuscany, Christian merchants adopted an organizational structure known as the

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[16] Grassby, *Kinship and Capitalism*, pp. 389–93, 408, 410, and 413–16.
[17] Rosenthal and Wong, *Before and Beyond Divergence*, p. 71; and Dale, *Indian Merchants*, pp. 118–20.

accomandita, which stipulated the length of the contract and defined the liability of each investor. Later, some Sephardic Jewish firms embraced these principles. Another arrangement rooted in the medieval Mediterranean, the *compagnia*, spread across Europe in some of the major commercial enterprises, such as the Fuggers in Germany and the Ruizes in Spain. In this corporate design, different commercial operations came under the management of one executive officer, not unlike a modern holding company. As larger firms emerged across central Asia, the Mediterranean, and Europe, they dispatched agents to foreign markets on a permanent or semi-permanent basis. Some agents worked off of commission (and are conveniently referred to as commission agents), whereas other agents or factors simply drew salaries from their employers, rather than getting a cut of the profits. It was not uncommon for resident agents to conduct their own business on the side or eventually to develop into independent brokers.[18]

Regardless of their form, business partnerships took place within the framework of larger trade networks that served to regulate most aspects of commerce, either formally by statute or informally by social custom or informal mechanism. Like many features of trade discussed thus far, these networks were not new, but became transformed over the course of the early modern period by the increasing volume and changing dynamics of commercial exchange. Some organizations became outmoded and met their demise in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. Perhaps the best example of obsolescence because of new trading conditions was the European merchant guild of the Middle Ages. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, merchant guilds functioned as formidable organizations that established controls over the movement of specific goods, protected merchants from predatory lords, and settled disputes among members. By the sixteenth century, however, merchant guilds had ossified into conservative institutions rendered ineffectual by the political power of city and regional governments, as well as the influx of foreign traders and overseas goods. The Hanseatic League, a cooperative association of merchant firms, guilds, and cities on the Baltic that flourished during the Middle Ages, disintegrated in the sixteenth century with the rising mercantile power of northern European states.

In the arena of long-distance trade, mercantile networks remained fluid, adapting to the needs of traders, markets, and the fluctuating political circumstances that encased commercial zones. Scholarship on these networks

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[18] Trivellato, *Familiarity of Strangers*, pp. 132, 142–4, and 153, and Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony*, p. 117.

has undergone considerable revision since Philip Curtin expanded the concept of trade diasporas to analyze and compare merchant communities that bought and sold goods over long distances. According to Curtin's model, merchants from the same ethnic background and national affinity formed tightly knit societies in common foreign locations for the purpose of reducing risks and penetrating markets. Essential to trans-regional trade before corporations and state-directed enterprises, trade diasporas were apolitical, cohesive enclaves that served as cross-cultural brokers between a host society and alien agents. While historians still recognize the descriptive value of trade diasporas, recent critiques have stressed the political negotiations between foreign merchants and territorial powers, the competitive tensions among those within the merchant community, and the porous boundaries between all people engaged in commerce in a given region.[19]

The most nuanced and multi-dimensional analyses of long-distance trade networks have depicted them as circulating commercial societies. These were circuits flowing around nodal points of trade, along which flowed "merchants and things," that is, people, goods, credit, and information. Traders from interrelated ethnic and national groups (e.g. Indians, Europeans, Armenians, Jews, and Chinese) reinforced their ties through endogamous marriage and common religious affiliation. In northern Africa, the migration of Wangara traders into the Songhay Empire and later Hausa states in the Sudan opened up commercial expansion in this region. Aslanian has distinguished two basic types of circulating networks. One was a monocentric association connected to a central hub that "defines and regulates the identity and economic vitality of the network as a whole." The clearest example of this matrix was the Armenian diaspora centered on the New Julfa district in Safavid Iran.[20]

The Armenian diaspora of the 1600s and 1700s stemmed in part from the military conflict between the Ottomans and Safavids. In the early 1600s, Shah Abbas 1 forcibly resettled a large number of Armenians in a suburb of Isfahan. Named New Julfa, this settlement formed the basis of an extensive Armenian commercial matrix centered in Iran with the political support of the Safavid rulers. Christian Armenians enjoyed political patronage. In Iran, Shi'ite rulers gave them protection throughout the 1600s and, in most areas

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[19] Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Introduction," in Sanjay Subrahmanyam (ed.), *Merchant Networks in the Early Modern World* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1996), pp. xiii–xxvi; and Aslanian, *From the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic*, pp. 8–12.

[20] Aslanian, *From the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic*, pp. 13–15; and Lovejoy, "The Role of Wangara": 32.

in Europe and Asia, Armenian merchants moved with relative ease in their host societies. From New Julfa, and later Bandar Abbas in the Persian Gulf, Armenians established far-flung merchant communities throughout Europe and Asia, sending out tens of thousands to settle in commercial centers such as Amsterdam, London, Marseilles, Venice, Astrakhan, Gujarat, Aleppo, Cairo, as well as many other places. Armenian fortunes turned sour in the mid-1700s as the Safavid dynasty deteriorated. They scattered into south Asia to connect with the British Indian trade. Armenians could also be found in almost any commercial venue in Eurasia, from Amsterdam to Melaka, brokering Persian silks, Indian spices and cloths, Russian furs, and European textiles.[21]

The other form was a polycentric model, exhibited best by communities of Sephardic Jews, which had scattered across the Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Asia. These groups did not have a single, central home base, but functioned independently within their particular theaters of trade. Expelled from Spain in 1492 and forced to convert to Christianity in Portugal in 1497, Sephardic Jews immigrated into North Africa, Italy, and the eastern Mediterranean, the Spanish and Portuguese empires, Amsterdam, and throughout Ottoman realms. As a result, Sephardic Jews and New Christians (Jews who had officially converted to Christianity) positioned themselves at key geographical points to take advantage of the growing global networks in silver and sugar. Jews and New Christians were eventually forced to flee to safer environments, as Iberian inquisitions intensified their efforts against Jewish converts whom they regarded as Judaizing backsliders in the American colonies in the first half of the seventeenth century. Sephardim also emerged in the major northern European commercial metropoles (London, Amsterdam, and Hamburg), and in the Mediterranean, New Christians formed a significant commercial presence along the Dalmatian coast, in Venice, Livorno, and Ancona. Sephardic Jews found the most welcome refuge in Ottoman Muslim lands because of the relatively accommodating social policies towards religious minorities. Allowed to organize their own semiautonomous communities, Sephardic Jews were able to utilize their skills and extensive networks in the eastern Mediterranean and in Arab lands. They served as intermediaries between European Christian and Muslim merchants in the overland routes across western and central Asia and in the port cities of south Asia. Because of the nature of commerce, Sephardic Jews interacted

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[21] Charles H. Parker, *Global Interactions in the Early Modern Age, 1400–1800* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 85.

closely with peoples in host societies, though in most cases they lived in distinct precincts, followed their own customs, and practiced their own religious observances.[22]

As these examples indicate, relations with political authorities varied considerably for foreign merchant communities and demarcated the boundaries of commercial opportunity. Local and regional governments in European and Chinese port cities heavily regulated markets, fairs, and the business activities of all merchants, including foreign and non-resident ones. Averse to trade and foreign intrusion, the Qing dynasty labored to limit European commercial contact with Chinese merchants to the port cities of Macau and Canton (Guangzhou) by the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Conversely, management of commerce in European cities, such as London, Amsterdam, Antwerp, Lyons, and Florence, grew out of an interest in promoting trade. Cities opened their gates to merchants from other cities and territories, finding a place for them in urban marketplaces. Welcome from a ruler, however, often produced howls of protest from local merchants and residents, fearing a drain of native wealth to foreigners. In response to outcries from Russian merchants, tsars from the 1640s to 1680s issued edicts curtailing the privileges of foreign merchants, prohibiting them from doing business in Moscow, and restricting them to the port cities of Archangel and Astrakhan. Tsars balanced these acts of appeasement with special exemptions for Indian and Armenian agents in Astrakhan that were similar to the capitulations that Ottoman sultans offered Jews and Europeans in their domains. As a general rule, Safavid and Mughal emperors allowed a much greater degree of autonomy for commercial exchange among both local and foreign traders.[23]

Within all trading networks, but most especially in those in which traders enjoyed a freer hand, merchant communities established their own regulations and customs to protect against fraud. In European cities, merchant guilds, and later organizations such as the Company of Merchant Adventurers in London, played a central role in formulating trading policies and protocols. Armenian merchants had developed a body of commercial law and created a court of arbitration (the Assembly of Merchants) to mediate disputes and to ensure the stability of the marketplace. In New Julfa, a

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[22] Aslanian, *From the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic*, pp. 14–15; and Jonathan Israel, *European Jewry in the Age of Mercantilism, 1550–1750* (Portland, OR: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1998), pp. 5–36.

[23] Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism*, vol. II, pp. 131–2; Dale, *Indian Merchants*, pp. 95–9; and Das Gupta, *Indian Merchants*, pp. 89–90.

kalantar served as mayor of the trading community, collecting customs duties and serving as a judge in the court. Even though Chinese authorities worked to regulate trade with foreigners in port cities, Chinese merchants within the empire often found themselves in environments beyond the range of the state's capacity to enforce contracts. In these situations, business districts developed their own institutions to monitor trade relations. Even more importantly, in all merchant communities a horizontal means of policing emerged that ostracized those who violated communal norms, providing ample motivation for merchants to conduct themselves in an honorable fashion. The example of the Fujian diaspora into maritime Southeast Asia indicates that reputations followed merchants overseas. The social capital of Fujian-based traders provided them an entrée into local communities of Chinese sojourners, a prized commodity that merchants dared not jeopardize by underhanded dealings.[24]

Entrepreneurs, partners, and business firms depended on many sundry institutions, instruments, and agents to mediate exchanges in the growing commercial environment of the early modern period. A heterogeneous collection of agents performed very similar tasks necessary to the conduct of trade across significant expanses, from providing cash and credit, exchanging currencies, introducing buyers and sellers, and transporting material goods over sprawling and treacherous routes. These ancillary functions, referred to by economic historians as mediating trades, were integral elements of commercial networks, especially since those who engaged in these activities also pursued mercantile opportunities themselves whenever possible. In Western Europe, private banking houses, most famously the Fuggers in Augsburg and the Medicis in Florence, made money available to businesses, as well as to princes, large and small. The rise of big banking in Europe started with Italian firms that expanded the use of bills of exchange (promissory notes redeemable at remote sites) in the late Middle Ages. With the rise of maritime commerce in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, the center of international banking moved north to public institutions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The banks of Antwerp, Amsterdam, and London created bills of exchange that transferred capital more easily and safely, which ultimately attracted the business of merchants and firms. Amsterdam

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[24] Rosenthal and Wong, *Before and Beyond Convergence*, p. 152; Aslanian, "Social Capital, 'Trust' and the Role of Networks": 384, 388–9, and 392–4; and Lockard, "'Sea Common to All'": 225.

and London became the hubs of international banking in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[25]

Lending and credit proliferated in other areas as well, even though documentation is sparser than that available for those in Europe. The meager documentation in many regions does not mean that financial markets and credit institutions did not exist, but rather that they were carried out informally and privately among kin and neighbors. Recent scholarship on early modern China, for example, has uncovered a small sample of written contracts that suggest an extremely wide and active market for credit and capital. These credit exchanges spread across northern China from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, as several distinct financial establishments (*zhangju*, *piaohao*, and *qinzhuang*) made loans to merchants and accepted deposits from investors. Commercial organizations in Huizhou, Shanxi, and later in Jiangnan instituted banks and facilitated rising networks of exchange. In India, the Banian caste had issued bills of exchange, offered credit, and sold insurance similar in function to European banks for centuries. Banian networks continued to prosper and expand their influence in South and Central Asia throughout most of the early modern period. In addition, *sarafs* exchanged currencies and set the value of coins, enabling merchants from different regions to transact business. Banks as depository and credit institutions did not appear in Muslim lands until the eighteenth century largely because of the persistence of traditional lending practices and the Islamic prohibitions against usury. Just as merchants found ways to circumvent these strictures in Christian societies, Muslim entrepreneurs did so as well. In Ottoman lands, family partnerships and *commenda* arrangements facilitated the financing of trade and the transfer of debt that fell within Muslim orthodoxy and precluded banks.[26]

Beyond the specialized domain of finance, an assortment of middlemen in more commonplace professions also brought together people and goods for commercial exchange. In many different regions across Eurasia and the African coastlines, merchants and their agents relied on brokers of various

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[25] Dale, *Indian Merchants*, p. 64; Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1815* (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 129–31; and Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks, *Early Modern Europe, 1450–1789* (Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 220–1.

[26] R. Bin Wong, "The Search for European Differences and Domination in the Early Modern World: A View from Asia," *American Historical Review* 107 (2002): 450–2; Rosenthal and Wong, *Before and Beyond Convergence*, pp. 68–71; Das Gupta, *Indian Merchants*, p. 85; Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism*, vol. II, pp. 124–5; and Pamuk, *Monetary History*, pp. 77–8.

types. Before their own migration into the Sudan, Wangara businessmen had originally worked in Jenna and Timbuktu as brokers for traveling Songhay merchants. These mediators introduced buyers and sellers of particular commodities, including textiles, dyes, spices, and finished goods. The most well-connected and prominent brokers retained large numbers of individual clients or commercial groups. European trade companies dealt with powerful local brokers in Asian port cities in order to locate quality goods and reputable vendors, as well as to navigate the idiosyncrasies of local markets. Guides, shippers, and other agents of transportation also united merchandisers and consumers, and thus played important mediating roles. Nomadic tribesmen, like the Afghan *powindah*, served as natural transit carriers, hauling goods via caravan along the hazardous routes that linked India, Iran, and the Middle East. Mariners in the Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Indian Oceans carried freight along ports of call, connecting rural agricultural production to urban nodes of exchange across different parts of the world.[27]

The joint-stock companies chartered by the English and Dutch governments in the early 1600s (and later Swedish and Danish corporations) were more abundantly capitalized and elaborately organized forms of limited partnerships. Traditionally, historians have hailed the overseas joint-stock companies as the first modern corporations. Given the previous forms of partnership, however, it is perhaps more appropriate to regard them as transitional organizations, bridging earlier forms of business organization and modern corporate structures. In the 1400s and 1500s, European firms interested in gaining direct access to Asian spices and silks, African gold, and later American silver suffered from the disadvantages of geography. In an effort to muster all the resources needed to launch long-distance trading expeditions, English and Dutch companies began to draw from Italian practices of raising capital by dividing ships into shares that merchants offered to investors. In France and the Holy Roman Empire, mines and mills sold shares that could be resold on secondary markets. Offering stock shares to public and private investors consequently emerged as a means for companies to raise large amounts of assets and spread risk among a wide group of shareholders. The record-keeping that these transactions required contributed to a growing bureaucratization in European business practices. For merchants with aspirations of importing goods from Africa, America, and Asia, a joint-stock configuration satisfied the demands inherent in such

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[27] Lovejoy, "The Role of Wangara": 132; Das Gupta, *Indian Merchants*, pp. 84–6; and Dale, *Indian Merchants*, pp. 64–6.

enterprises. English merchants first put this model to the long-distance trade test by forming the Muscovy Company in 1555 for trade to Russia and the Levant Company in 1581 for trade to the eastern Mediterranean. The largest joint-stock corporations, the English East India Company and the Dutch East India Company, arose in England in 1600 and the Netherlands in 1602, respectively.[28]

The Dutch East India Company emerged as the most well-endowed and powerful joint-stock company involved in long-distance trade in the seventeenth century. In order to end competition among Dutch companies vying for trade in Asia, the States General forced them to merge into a united corporation, known as the VOC (*Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*). The leaders of the previous companies became directors of the new organization, divided into six "chambers" that assumed responsibilities for offering shares, shouldering costs, outfitting trading posts, and selling imports. Gaining control over strategic routes and outposts in the East Indies, the VOC achieved remarkable prosperity derived from its leverage over nutmeg, cloves, and mace, as well as its substantial share in pepper and cinnamon. In order to address trade imbalances in Asia, the company inserted itself into the extremely profitable intra-Asian trade between Japan (silver), India (textiles), and East Indies (spices). Over the course of the seventeenth century, the English East India Company asserted itself in the Indian Ocean and developed into a formidable competitor from its base in India. The success of these operations inspired the formation of a number of other joint-stock companies from France, Scandinavia, Scotland, and the empire for trade in Asia, Africa, the Americas, and the Mediterranean.[29] (See Map 7.1, p. 184.)

The prosperity of joint-stock companies depended heavily on the almost unqualified support of European states. British, Dutch, French, and other governments granted the companies national monopolies over commerce in a designated region, and gave them authority to arm and conduct military operations with little or no intrusion from state authorities. The close identification of state authority with corporate enterprise rendered joint-stock companies as quasi-states themselves. Directors and local governors gained legal jurisdiction over their employees, possessed jurisdiction over ships and subjects within territorial outposts, and had the ability to wage war.

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[28] Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism*, vol. II, pp. 439–54.
[29] Pieter C. Emmer and Femme S. Gaastra, "Introduction," in Pieter C. Emmer and Femme S. Gaastra (eds.), *The Organization of Interoceanic Trade in European Expansion, 1450–1800* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1996), pp. xvi–xxi.

Since other countries did not universally recognize the monopolistic rights of others, companies had to defend them militarily, giving rise to a host of naval wars and engagements in sites of contention around the world. The Seven Years' War (1756–1763), for instance, was fought in India, America, and Europe between the major European commercial and imperial powers.

Trade in Asia, Africa, and North America largely remained in the hands of indigenous merchants until the second half of the eighteenth century when most maritime commercial outposts began to come under colonial rule. Nevertheless, joint-stock companies occasionally used armed trading to secure leverage over indigenous merchants and political leaders or to control the production of local goods. The VOC in particular earned the reputation for the unflinching use of military force to dislodge their military rivals, as they did against the Portuguese and the English, and to control indigenous markets. When the rulers of Banda did not abide by monopolistic contracts with the company, the Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon Coen in 1621 waged a ferocious punitive campaign, destroying crops and massacring local populations. Empire-building served the interests of commerce.

States ceded authority to private enterprises in the northern European joint-stock companies, whereas in the Portuguese and Spanish overseas ventures that got under way earlier in the 1400s and 1500s trade fell under the direct control of the states. The *Casa da India*, a government office, oversaw Portuguese trade in Asia, and the *Casa de Contratación* attempted to monitor Spanish commerce in America. Since officers in the pay of the crown conducted business operations on behalf of their employers, profits came directly to royal coffers. Attempts at regulation, however, proved largely ineffective, as rampant informal, private trading by opportunistic merchants and parties drained profits away from the Spanish and Portuguese monarchs. The state-sponsored operations of European countries, whether through monopolistic corporations or government-managed organizations, incorporated West Africa, the Caribbean, and large swaths of territories in the Americas into the first global networks of exchange.[30]

Conclusion

The accelerated tempo of commerce in the early modern period drew from long-established structures and processes in expanding the reach of

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[30] Emmer and Gaastra, "Introduction," in Emmer and Gaastra (eds.), *Organization of Interoceanic Trade,* pp. xvi–xvii.

mercantile activity across great distances. As a result, families and kinship networks remained vital to commerce and provided a bridge to new forms of organization. With the growth of commercial operations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, credit and capital markets developed increasingly complex instruments. The trajectory of early modern mercantile organization in the long term tended away from the generalist entrepreneur to more complex organizations and more depersonalized markets. Transitions from general to limited liability partnerships, from kin-based to non-familial organizations, from bi-lateral to more segmented contractual agreements occurred, albeit unevenly, during the age of commerce.[31]

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[31] Howell, *Commerce before Capitalism*, p. 23; and Trivellato, *Familiarity of Strangers*, p. 35.

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Silver in a global context, 1400–1800

DENNIS O. FLYNN

Having been manufactured in the form of ornaments and monies for ages, including state-sanctioned silver ingots stamped in Cappadocia more than 4,000 years before, silver was the paramount monetary substance in the world prior to the ascendance of "the Gold Standard" during the second half of the nineteenth century. Pre-eminence of the white metal continued during Greek and Roman times, including the Hellenistic Near East. Over 5,000 tons of silver (140.5 tons per year) in the form of coined silver talents were issued during 330–294 BCE, thanks largely to acquisition of Persian treasury by Alexander the Great.[1]

Babylonian price data gleaned from tens of thousands of cuneiform documents have led R. J. van der Spek to view silver objects (including coins) as trade items suitable for supply-and-demand analysis within silver markets themselves, while specifically rejecting the portrayal of silver flows as balancing items that passively respond to trade imbalances in "real" (i.e. non-monetary) sectors.[2] Silver flowed to, and was retained within, Hellenistic Babylonia because population growth and economic development attracted specific types of silver used for tax and other payments in the regional economy. The stock of silver increased via importation due to silver's high valuation within Babylonia, an elevated price caused by strong demand-side forces in that region. Babylonian textiles and other exports were exchanged for equivalent silver imports (some coined, some not coined). From this point of view, van der Spek sees the influx of silver, and the efflux from silver-source areas, in terms of bi-directional trade that was balanced.

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[1] Alain Bresson, "Coinage and Money Supply in the Hellenistic World," in *Making, Moving, and Managing: The New World of Ancient Economies (323–31 BCE)*, edited by J. K. Davies, V. Gabrielsen, and Z. Archibald (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2005), p. 59.
[2] R. J. van der Spek, "The Economies of Hellenistic Societies, Third to First Centuries BC," in *The Economies of Hellenistic Societies, Third to First Centuries BC*, edited by Zosia H. Archibald (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 402–20.

Silver flowed relentlessly into China throughout most of the time period covered in this chapter, yet the situation was quite different earlier. During the thirteenth century, silver and silver-backed paper money substituted for copper-based coins, but despite this transition away from copper toward silver-based monies, the unification of trade across Afroeurasia under the Mongols led to the *export* of Chinese silver in reaction to powerful demand-side forces in Muslim states from Persia to Spain, where silver's purchasing power rose to double its level in China.[3] In sum, demand-side forces helped raise the purchasing power of silver in West Asia and the Mediterranean, while silver's purchasing power had fallen in East Asia due to substitution of paper money that served as a substitute for physical silver within China. It was profitable to relocate silver from low-value markets within China to high-value markets in western Asia, Europe and North Africa.

Decisive transformation occurred again during the fifteenth century when Chinese fiscal crises led to massive issuance of paper money that was supposed to be backed by silver. Official silver reserves were nowhere near adequate to maintain confidence in the context of over-issuance of paper monies, however, so the market value of paper money plummeted. Resulting bouts of hyperinflation destroyed China's silver-exchange standard in the 1430s. Marketplace abandonment of paper money meant that private merchants and local governments increasingly relied upon physical silver itself, leading to relentless "silverization" forces that eventually spread empire-wide, notwithstanding repeated Ming efforts to halt the dominating spread of silver. Since explosive demand-side expansion occurred during a time of sharp decline in Chinese silver mine production, the market value of silver in China surged to double (100 percent price premium) silver's value in the Mediterranean world.[4] Thus, *overvaluation* of silver within Ming China completely reversed prior *undervaluation* of silver in China during the Mongol period. The neighboring Choson court subsequently permitted silver mining in Hamgyon province in 1515 and Korean "silver continued to flow out of the country and even gained a reputation in China as high quality silver."[5]

I have not encountered argument to the effect that high Chinese silver prices stimulated the mid-fifteenth century Central European surges in silver

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[3] Richard von Glahn, *Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000–1700* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996), p. 60.

[4] von Glahn, *Fountain of Fortune*, pp. 83–113.

[5] Seonmin Kim, "Borders and Crossings: Trade, Diplomacy, and Ginseng between Qing China and Choson Korea," Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 2006, p. 213.

mine activity, but such a conclusion is plausible. Venetian silver exports eastward alone were double the combined mint output of England and the Low Countries. According to John Munro, "The very marked difference in bimetallic ratios certainly indicates that silver was generally always scarcer and thus relatively more valuable . . . in eastern Asia than it was in Europe."[6] Ottoman conquest of Central European mining regions eventuated in a 1503 Ottoman–Venetian treaty, and the English Levant Company was founded in 1581, both formed for the explicit purpose of exporting silver through Ottoman commercial networks. Multiple Ottoman maritime and overland trade routes, including silk roads, carried silver eastward during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries.

Japan had traditionally imported silver from China from the late eleventh century into the fifteenth century, since the only significant Japanese silver mines then were located in Tsushima province, an island that also served as a vector for the introduction of Chinese mining technology into Japan via Korea. "Despite its later reputation as a primary silver supplier to China, Japan was in fact not always an exporter of precious metals. In the mid-fifteenth century, the silver and copper coins circulating in Japan were largely from foreign countries. . . The major source of foreign currency was Korea. . . It was in the mid-fifteenth century when silver began to be smuggled from Korea to Japan."[7]

China's exportation of significant quantities of silver to the Mediterranean, to Japan and elsewhere prior to Chinese monetary and fiscal collapse in the 1430s contrasts sharply with China's subsequent ascendancy as earth's most prolific importer of silver. Indeed, China's transformation into world history's largest silver "suction pump" led to the birth of global trade during the sixteenth century.[8] Within a few decades of the Columbian voyages, the world's greatest silver mines were discovered in the 1540s in Mexico and Upper Peru, leading to a pattern of American silver exports to China that persisted into the twentieth century. Motivation for sixteenth-century silver production was clear: Silver's purchasing power in China had soared to double its European value, which itself far exceeded silver-mining costs in

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[6] John H. Munro, "South German Silver, European Textiles, and Venetian Trade with the Levant and Ottoman Empire, *c*.1370 to *c*.1720: A Non-Mercantilist Approach to the Balance of Payments Problem," in *Relazione Economiche Tra Europa E Mondo Islamico, Secoli XIII–XVII*, edited by Simonetta Cavaciocchi (Florence: Le Monnier, 2007), pp. 925, 944.

[7] Kim, "Borders and Crossings," p. 214.

[8] V. Magalhaes Godinho, *Os Descobrimientos E Economia Mundial* (Lisbon: Editora Arcádia, 1963), I: 432–65; Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, "Born with a 'Silver Spoon': The Origin of World Trade in 1571," *Journal of World History* 6, no. 2 (Fall) (1995): 201–21.

Spanish America. This provides a straightforward example of arbitrage at work – buy where price is low and relocate it for sale where price is high – a lesson intuitively understood by merchants throughout the world. Thanks largely to robust demand emanating from China, silver prices (though declining gradually) managed to exceed silver production costs for a century. A Spanish empire could not have existed in the absence of profits generated (directly and indirectly) through trade connected to American silver and its Chinese markets. Indeed, the Portuguese, English, Dutch, and others who subsequently entered Asian waters were likewise motivated by profits generated by cargoes overwhelmingly comprising Spanish-American silver.

This trade pattern existed simultaneously within Asia, since prodigious Japanese silver mine discoveries from the 1530s fundamentally altered the trajectory of Asian history. The Shogun gained complete control of Japanese silver mines, which enabled him to subdue roughly 250 formidable lords (*daimyos*) and thereby pave the way for the unification of Japan in 1600, initiating two and a half centuries of *Pax Tokugawa* that lasted into the second half of the nineteenth century. Japanese silver was destined primarily for Chinese end-markets, of course, throughout the sixteenth and much of the seventeenth century. The Portuguese initially served as convenient middlemen for the export of Japanese silver to China via Nagasaki Bay, until the Shogun inserted Dutch intermediaries in place of Portuguese in the 1630s.

In sum, world silver production flowed relentlessly into China because tremendous profits accrued to those who transferred silver toward/to end-markets within China. Massive Chinese exports were required in order to purchase vast silver imports. Balance between exports and imports was achieved through global market mechanisms beyond the control of anyone.

Visualization of supply and demand mechanisms

This chapter portrays silver's progression through space and time via application of supply-and-demand mechanisms that elucidate market forces that drove – and continue to drive – production and relocation of monetary and non-monetary items alike. The supply–demand approach presented below contrasts sharply with traditional historical depictions that portray region-to-region physical transfers of silver coins as responses to alleged trade imbalances. Trade-imbalance arguments seem sensible at a surface level. If an individual spends more than their income, then they must either surrender savings (or borrow) to make up the difference. Similarly, if a region's imports exceed the region's exports, residents of the net-import region must

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surrender coins in order to pay for purchase rates that exceed the rate of sales abroad. According to this line of reasoning, monetary-sector outflows are *effects*, while trade deficits (i.e. non-monetary imports in excess of non-monetary exports) are *causes*. Thus, coin outflows are deemed derived, residual monetary effects caused by trade imbalance, the root cause of which is net-imports of non-monetary items across borders.

According to this formulation, direct supply-and-demand analysis is confined to flows of non-monetary items. Direct application of supply–demand analysis to cross-border *monetary* flows (including silver coins) is deemed unnecessary, since monies are perceived to merely counter-flow in sufficient quantities required to offset non-monetary trade imbalances across regions. For instance, economic historian David Landes has written that the eighteenth-century "European appetite for Chinese goods grew rapidly . . . [which] posed a payment problem. The Europeans would like to pay with their own manufactures, but the Chinese wanted almost nothing they made. . . So the Europeans paid in bullion and specie."[9] Similarly, Jonathan Spence stated that "growing demand in Europe and America for Chinese . . . goods has not been matched by any growth in Chinese demand for Western exports. . . The result was a serious balance-of-payments problem for the West."[10] Flow of precious metals (as monetary items) to Asia was required in order to pay for Europe's trade deficit with Asia: "Europe tended to import more from Asia, in the form of spices, silk, textiles, and other goods, than it exported to the east. The difference was paid in the form of specie. . . They [Ottomans] could not prevent the outflow of specie to the East arising from the trade deficits in that direction."[11]

Evidence from global monetary history contradicts this traditional trade-deficit explanation by economic historians, however, since "money" did not in fact flow across borders in response to non-monetary trade imbalances. Were trade-deficit explanations valid, a bundle of various monetary substances would have flowed simultaneously to trade-surplus countries such as China. Yet survey of the four main monetary substances in global history during our time period – silver, gold, copper, and cowry shells – reveals trade patterns that contradict the trade-deficit arguments sketched immediately

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[9] David S. Landes, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are Rich and Some So Poor* (New York & London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), p. 155.

[10] Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: Norton, 1990), p. 129.

[11] Sevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire. Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 132–4.

above.[12] First, geological forces, quite independent of human agency, led to endowments of three natural-resource substances that were infused into coins – silver, gold, and copper – each concentrated at specific locations around the globe. (Humans did select locations for aquaculture-farming of cowries, but locational choices were sharply limited by geography for this fourth monetary substance as well.) In general, concentrations of monetary raw materials were determined by geological forces independent of trade-balance / trade-imbalance issues of any particular time or place.

Second, the proportion of any particular monetary substance destined for relocation to a specific end-market location depended upon the extent to which concentrations of human beings expressed ability and willingness to purchase and maintain that particular monetary substance. There was immense Chinese demand to hold silver for centuries, for instance, but *no* similar demand to hold gold existed in China; in consequence, silver from around the world was sent to China for centuries, whereas gold was simultaneously *exported* from China during considerable time periods. Substantial gold zones existed within Japan and also within India, on the other hand, so gold consequently gravitated to specific heavily populated gold regions within those countries; silver settled in silver regions of Japan and India, however, because dense populations in those specific regions preferred the white metal over gold. Any number of similar examples indicate that nation states (for which trade balances are normally calculated) serve as poor units of analysis in monetary history generally, since monetary preference differed from region to region within nations. In a similar vein, concentrated human demand to hold cowry shells was huge in specific end-markets within Asia as well as within West Africa, while equivalent end-markets for cowry shells did not develop within Europe or the Americas; thus great amounts of shell money gravitated toward specific end-markets within Asia and West Africa because of intense end-demand at these locations. The same logic applies to the prolific seventeenth-century Japanese copper-mine output that mainly fed China, but was also exported in large volume to locations of concentrated demand in Europe and elsewhere. Swedish copper fed European industries (including mints) and population centers that demonstrated robust demand (not because of some presumed trade deficit), and copper exports to Africa followed the same set of rules. Third, and as a consequence

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[12] Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, "Introduction: Monetary Substances in Global Perspective," in D. O. Flynn and A. Giráldez (eds.), *Metals and Monies in an Emerging Global Economy* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1997), pp. xv–xl.

of the foregoing, distinct trade routes connected production-site concentrations to specific concentrations of end-market demand that were distinct for each monetary substance.

In sum, the world's four main monetary substances never traveled worldwide in tandem; indeed, they were often exchanged for each other while traveling in *opposite* directions over time periods that stretched up to a century. Historical facts contradict trade-deficit reasoning as applied to the abstract category "money"; trade-deficit reasoning is powerless to explain movements of each *specific* monetary substance from unique endowment sources to final destination end-markets that exhibited unique characteristics. Monetary items should neither be lumped together into a "money" catch-all category, nor treated as compensating residuals that purportedly derive motion only as counter-balancing flows that respond to non-monetary market imbalances. The fundamental "real" versus "monetary" dichotomy taught in present-day economics textbooks is an obstacle to understanding global monetary history.

As mentioned, worldwide silver production flooded into China for centuries, sometimes as bullion and other times as specific coin types, depending upon conditions during a given time period. Payment for tens of thousands of tons of Chinese silver imported over centuries took the form of equally prodigious exports of Chinese silks, ceramics, tea (later on), and other items. In short, export goods were swapped for import goods. Since the Chinese did not collectively lend in order to finance massive purchase of Chinese exports to the rest of the world up to the nineteenth century – the Chinese accepted payment overwhelmingly in silver instead – there was no "trade imbalance" in need of finance. Silver imports were exchanged for non-silver exports.

This historical setting differs fundamentally from the trade deficit of the United States today, for instance, whereby United States residents collectively borrow from the rest of the world in order to pay for net imports. Huge US net borrowing today does indeed imply an equally huge US trade deficit, since net imports require borrowing outside of the United States. But Europeans (and other areas beyond China) during the 1400–1800 period of this chapter did not borrow to finance massive imports of Asian wares; they therefore could not have experienced trade deficits vis-à-vis China. Global trade during our period was not "balanced" via massive international loans, as is the case today. In sum, systematic modern-style trade imbalances existed neither between hemispheres nor within them during the time period covered in this chapter. Those who invoke trade-deficit reasoning to explain global movements of monies during our period fail to distinguish between

the trade involved in the relocation of physical monies centuries ago, and the actual debt-financed trade imbalances that exist today. Description of the production and relocation of each monetary substance in a global perspective requires *direct* application of supply-and-demand mechanisms to each individual monetary item in its own right. Treatment of monies as imbalance-residuals must be rejected.

The Unified Theory of Prices

Supply and demand mechanisms presented in this essay were constructed in order to analyze monetary and non-monetary products within a single theory that can be described as a Unified Theory of Prices. The theory is "unified" in the sense that the price of each monetary substance is treated in the same fashion as the price of any non-monetary substance; this procedure requires imposition of an abstract Ratio Unit of Account Money (RUAM). Thus, when the market value of a non-monetary item rises, other things equal, its RUAM price increases from, say, 10 RUAMs/unit to 12 RUAMs/unit. Similarly for a monetary item, when the market value of a dollar bill rises, other things equal, then its RUAM price increases from, say, 5 RUAMs/dollar to 6 RUAMs/dollar. In each case, the rise in market value is expressed as more RUAMs per item. In this sense, supply and demand for each individual money is treated the same as supply and demand for any non-monetary good. Integration and unification of monetary theory with non-monetary theory, however, also requires introduction of Inventory Supply and Inventory Demand functions that together determine prices of all goods expressed in terms of abstract RUAMs.[13]

Inventory Supply simply refers to the number of units of a good owned by a party (or group of parties). For example, 2 loaves of bread might currently exist in a family breadbox, in which case family Inventory Supply of bread equals 2 loaves. The family may *wish* to hold 4 loaves of bread at the moment, on the other hand, which means that family Inventory Demand equals 4 loaves of bread. Deficiency of Inventory Supply (= 2 loaves) vis-à-vis Inventory Demand (= 4 loaves) would be easily remedied if the family were

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[13] More complete discussion of conventional conceptions of the "value" of money in conventional microeconomics and macroeconomics, in contrast to this chapter's treatment of the price of each particular physical money, can be found in Dennis O. Flynn and Marie A. Lee, "A Restatement of Price Theory Monies," in G. Depeyrot (ed.), *Three Conferences on International Monetary History* (Wetteren, Belgium: Moneta, 2013), pp. 293–314.

to purchase 2 additional loaves of bread that day (= 2 loaves/day). Purchase Demand (= 2 loaves/day) raises Inventory Supply (units owned) from 2 loaves to 4 loaves by day's end, other things equal. Purchase Demand thus adds to inventory stocks. In addition, the family may elect to consume a loaf of bread that day, thereby reducing inventory holdings (from 2 initial loaves) to 1 loaf by day's end, other things equal. Consumption Demand therefore functions to deplete inventory stocks over time. The family may both purchase and consume bread during the day, of course, in which case Purchase Demand would have to increase to 3 loaves/day (rather than 2 loaves/day) in order to raise Inventory Supply to 4 loaves (net of 1 loaf/day consumption) in conformity with Inventory Demand at 4 loaves in the breadbox. As this example illustrates, Purchase Demand acts to raise inventory holdings, while Consumption Demand acts to lower inventory holdings; Consumption Demand *offsets* Purchase Demand. Such commonsense conclusions contradict the conventional Law of Demand, however, since the Law of Demand conflates Purchase Demand and Consumption Demand into a single function labeled simply "demand." These two demand concepts clearly cannot be synonyms, however, since Purchase Demand enhances inventory holdings while Consumption Demand depletes inventory holdings. In short, the Unified Theory of Prices posits three intuitive and interdependent demand notions – Inventory Demand (which ultimately determines inventory holdings), Purchase Demand (which adds to inventory holdings), and Consumption Demand (which depletes inventory holdings). Inventory holdings – which are components of wealth – occupy center stage at all times.

Intuitive functions also exist for the supply side of the Unified Theory of Prices. Production Supply involves fabrication of new loaves of bread that add to pre-existing bread stocks held by the bakery. Bakery sales to wholesale, retail or end-market customers, on the other hand, deplete bakery inventory holdings of bread. Thus, three interrelated supply notions can be distinguished in relation to inventory holdings. As mentioned previously, Inventory Supply simply refers to inventories held at a given point in time. Production Supply enhances inventory holdings, other things being equal, while Sales Supply depletes inventory holdings of the seller. Again in contrast to the conventional Law of Supply – which conflates production supply and sales supply into a singular supply function – the Unified Theory of Prices posits three interacting and interdependent supply notions: Inventory Supply (i.e. inventory holdings), Production Supply (which adds to inventory holdings), and Sales Supply (which depletes inventory holdings). The conventional

Law of Supply, on the other hand, conflates production supply and sales supply into a singular "supply" function, while ignoring Inventory Supply entirely. In short, the Unified Theory of Prices posits three intuitive, interdependent supply notions – Inventory Supply (inventory holdings at a point in time), Production Supply (which adds to inventory holdings), and Sales Supply (which depletes inventory holdings). Again, inventory holdings, which are components of wealth, occupy center stage at all times for the Unified Theory of Prices.

Hydraulic Metaphor

Three versions of the Unified Theory of Prices exist: (1) a mathematical version; (2) a graphical version; and (3) an intuitive, visual Hydraulic Metaphor version that is easiest to comprehend.[14]

The intuitive "Hydraulic Metaphor" is introduced next in order to visually demonstrate essential features of the Unified Theory of Prices (UTP). Begin with the simplest view: an isolated market not yet permitted trade with the outside world. Three UTP supply concepts – production supply, inventory supply, and sales supply – are visualized in hydraulic terms in Figure 9.1. Production Supply (PS) simply refers to fresh production of additional units. Since the producer must maintain an inventory of its own good in order to have new product on hand for sale into nearby Market A, Producer Inventory refers to producer holdings of its own product. Market A's Inventory Supply (IS_A) refers to the total amount of the product held by all parties within Location A; hence, the volume of liquid within Location A's container represents inventory supply in that location (IS_A) (Figure 9.1).

Figure 9.1 also shows three UTP demand concepts in hydraulic terms – Purchase Demand, Inventory Demand, and Consumption Demand. Volume-capacity of the container represents Inventory Demand (ID_A): ID_A represents quantity of the item people in Location A *are willing and able* to hold at

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[14] The only published exposition of mathematical foundations that underlie the UTP is a bare-bones treatment (Appendix A: Derivation of Stock Demand) in Kerry W. Doherty and Dennis O. Flynn, "A Microeconomic Quantity Theory of Money and the Price Revolution," in E. G. van Cauwenberghe (ed.), *Precious Metals, Coinage and the Changes of Monetary Structures in Latin America, Europe and Asia* (Leuven University Press, 1989), pp. 185–208 (republished in Dennis O. Flynn, *A Price Theory of Monies: Evolving Lessons in Monetary History* (Wetteren, Belgium: Moneta, 2009)). A more complete (unpublished) mathematical version, "Consumer Demand in Comparative-Static and Dynamic Analysis" (July 1986), can be found at website: www.unifiedtheoryofprices.org

Figure 9.1: Steady state for a reproducible and consumable good

prevailing prices. Purchase Demand (PD_A) for individual entities in Location A involves additions to purchaser inventory-stocks. Consumption Demand (CD_A) depletes inventory holdings in Location A. The single stream between the Producer and Area A is labeled sales supply (SS_{PROD}) toward the top of its flow, and is relabeled purchase demand (PD_A) on the Market A side of the price axis. In other words, what appears as sales supply (from the Producer vantage point) appears as purchase demand (from the vantage of those in Area A). For visual simplicity, additions to inventory in any location are depicted as "darkly shaded bubble inflows" of liquid, while subtractions from a location's inventory are depicted as "lightly shaded bubble outflows" of liquid. Also, "lightly shaded bubble outflows" shown rising above the liquid stock (IS) in Figure 9.1 are labeled "evaporation = decay" and represent subtractions from that location's inventory stock (e.g. spoilage, or wear and tear). For visual simplicity, all subtractions from inventories are represented as lightly shaded bubble outflows. Thus, consumption demand (CD_A) is represented as a lightly shaded bubble outflow because units consumed are subtracted from Market A inventory holdings. (Note that "consumption" demand for a good under the UTP is characterized by two simultaneous requirements: (1) the activity must generate utility (i.e. satisfaction); and (2) the activity must also deplete inventory. Requirement (2) employs a

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restriction that does not exist in conventional analysis, since Inventory Supply and Inventory Demand are not acknowledged in standard microeconomics.) According to this scheme, Producer sales supply (SS_{PROD}) is depicted as a lightly shaded bubble outflow in the left upper portion of product flow from Producer Inventory into Market A; lightly shaded bubble outflow sales supply (SS_{PROD}) undergoes metamorphosis into darkly shaded bubble inflow purchase demand (PD_A), however, when viewed from the perspective of Market A buyers. In other words, Sales Supply from the Producer's point of view is identical to Purchase Demand from the point of view of buyers in Market A; ownership of (recently manufactured) items is transferred from producer to Market A customers. Producer Sales Supply is shown as a lightly shaded bubble outflow because sales deplete Producer inventories, while purchase demand is shown as a darkly shaded bubble inflow because items purchased enlarge inventories held in Market A. Any ownership exchange can be viewed from the perspective of inventory-depleting sales supply, or alternatively from the perspective of inventory-enlarging purchase demand. This ($SS_{PROD} = PD_A$) exchange represents the rate at which inventories are transferred (relocated) from producer to Market A residents.

So long as additions to Market A inventory (via purchase from the producer) equal subtractions from Market A inventory due to decay plus consumption, Figure 9.1 depicts a "steady state" situation (assuming normal profits). That is, the system is self-regenerating over time, assuming undisturbed conditions. "Steady state" is the dynamic equivalent of "equilibrium" in comparative-static analysis. (A dynamic version of the Hydraulic Metaphor can be viewed at www.unifiedtheoryofprices.org.)

Applications of the Hydraulic Metaphor to the history of silver

It is often (inaccurately) asserted that China has always acted as a "suction pump" for attracting silver. A decisive step toward a silver-based economy indeed occurred during the early thirteenth century when Mongol conquest of China led to repudiation of (copper-based) coin, which in turn led to eventual domination by silver and silver-backed paper money. Despite this turn toward a silver economy within China, however, silver was actually *exported from China* to Western Asia during the thirteenth century, as mentioned in the opening section of this chapter. Since convertible Chinese paper monies served as substitutes for silver domestically, these paper silver substitutes *pushed* the white metal out of China. Muslim states from Spain

to Persia had meanwhile returned to a silver standard with sufficient force to *pull* silver westward from China; silver was attracted westward because demand-side growth fueled a doubling of silver's market value vis-à-vis its purchasing power within China (100 percent price premium in the West). In sum, the unification of Islamic merchant communities across Eurasia facilitated silver's east-to-west migration in response to arbitrage opportunities. Moreover, elevated market values westward simultaneously encouraged silver mining in Southwest China, particularly in Yunnan.

Fiscal crises within China led to excessive issuance of paper monies later on, however, which in turn generated hyperinflations that destroyed China's silver-exchange-paper-money standard by the 1430s. Private-market participants understandably refused worthless paper monies and demanded payment in physical silver instead. Thus, an enormous fifteenth-century surge in demand for silver within Ming China – simultaneous with a sharp decline in Chinese silver mine production – caused the market value of silver in China to reverse its previous pattern of undervaluation within China during the Mongol era. By the mid-fifteenth century, China had indeed become the world's primary "silver sink" due to *overvaluation* of silver within China vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

Central European silver production quintupled from the middle of the fifteenth century in part because of improved mining technology, but also presumably due to buoyant end-market demand emanating from within China. Rising European silver values no doubt stimulated surges in European mining and mintage; silver's purchasing power nevertheless rose ever higher eastward, with the pinnacle in China:

> In dealing with this Mercantilist "problem," however, we need to find answers to two related questions: why did Europe require so much "treasure" in conducting its trade with the Levant, and more generally with Asia; and why was such a large proportion in the form of silver?... The very marked difference in bimetallic ratios certainly indicates that silver was generally always scarcer and thus relatively more valuable – in terms of both gold and commodities – in eastern Asia than it was in Europe.[15]

After their conquest of Constantinople/Istanbul in 1453, the Ottomans invaded the Balkans and gained control of important Central European silver mines. Central European silver – irrespective of whether under Muslim or Christian governance – stimulated trans-Eurasian trade networks, due to

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[15] Munro, "South German Silver," pp. 924–5.

improvements in European mining technology but also due to lucrative end-markets within Asia (and presumably especially within China).

Silver and the birth of globalization

Long after the initial fifteenth-century collapse of China's silver-exchange-paper-money system, inventory demand for silver within China continued to expand, thereby causing its market value to soar. By the time silver mines of unprecedented abundance were discovered during the first half of the sixteenth century – in Spanish America and in Japan – silver markets within China yielded far higher prices than elsewhere in the world. By the 1590s, bimetallic ratios indicate that silver's purchasing power (relative to gold) within China was double silver's market value in, say, Spain. In other words, the disintegration of China's paper-money system led to a 100 percent price premium for silver within China eventually, as depicted in Figure 9.2. Not only had the private sector moved relentlessly to silver as a monetary medium, but the trend toward "silverization" was bolstered as local and regional governmental units followed suit by insisting upon receipts and payments in the form of silver. Realizing that the silverization of China was unstoppable, the Ming dynasty finally relented and declared key taxes empire-wide payable in silver while implementing "Single Whip" tax reforms in the 1570s through which a complex series of tax, labor, and tribute obligations were converted into a single payment in silver.

Given the escalation in market value of silver within China, small wonder that merchants and governments throughout the world responded to such stark arbitrage possibilities: massive quantities of American and Japanese silver were shipped to China in exchange for Chinese exports. Merchant profits were immense in both directions, since there also existed robust, simultaneous international demand for Chinese exports, especially silks and porcelain. Lucrative end-markets for silver within China were recognized throughout Asia, but also by the Portuguese (first to navigate around the Cape of Good Hope), and later the Dutch, English and other Europeans. Considered as a group, European silver shipments via the Cape Route grew at a remarkably steady rate for centuries.[16]

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[16] Jan de Vries, "Connecting Europe and Asia: A Quantitative Analysis of the Cape Route Trade, 1497–1795," in Dennis O. Flynn, Arturo Giráldez and Richard von Glahn (eds.), *Global Connections and Monetary History, 1450–1800* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 35–106.

Figure 9.2: 100 percent silver-price premium in China vis-à-vis world, 1590s

American silver also flooded eastward through Baltic trade routes, via the Mediterranean, through the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and along numerous overland trade routes, including silk roads. Armenians, Jews, Ottomans, Persians and a multitude of other traders swapped silver in exchange for Indian and Chinese textiles, gold, and of course pepper and spices from South and Southeast Asia.

At 15,000+ feet in the Andes, mines at Potosí in Upper Peru (Bolivia today) may have disgorged half of the total world silver production at times during the Potosí–Japan Cycle of Silver (1540s–1640), and Mexican mines were major sources of silver as well. Perhaps three-quarters of Spanish-American silver flowed across the Atlantic Ocean. The Spanish Crown was remarkably successful at the control and taxation of American silver flows, notwithstanding the existence of huge and unknowable quantities smuggled (including down the so-called "Back Door" of the Andes to Buenos Aires and Sacramento on the Atlantic) in order to avoid the royal *quinto* (20 percent) and other taxes. Most legal flows were shipped up South America's Pacific Coast to Panama, where they crossed overland to the Atlantic Ocean. Peruvian silver then joined Mexican silver (exported through Vera Cruz) in Havana. Heavily guarded Spanish fleets then crossed the Atlantic to southern Spain, the fountainhead for redistribution of American silver, much of which was ultimately destined for China and to a lesser extent for India.

Significant quantities of Andean silver continued up the Pacific Coast past Central America, and on to the excellent port at Acapulco, Mexico. Peruvian

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silver was then loaded aboard arguably the largest ships in the world, the Acapulco–Manila galleons. Such huge ships were not required to transport 50 tons of silver (two million pesos) annually throughout the seventeenth century, but capacious maritime capacity was required to accommodate staggering volumes of Chinese silks that crossed eastward on the return voyage to Mexico via the Pacific Ocean. Japanese foreign trade at this time likewise boiled down to a straightforward swap of Japanese-silver-for-Chinese-silks, but less capacious ships were typically capable of handling intra-Asian trade cargoes.

The Acapulco–Manila galleons provided Spain's only direct access to lucrative Asian markets, since other Europeans had already established trade routes around the Cape of Good Hope. Despite intense efforts by the Spanish Crown to control the Acapulco–Manila trade, however, smuggling became increasingly prevalent as silver prices gradually declined. Spain never did control trade between the Philippines and mainland Asia, on the other hand, since Asian trade networks (in which Europeans participated) dominated this bi-directional trade. Silks were the main Chinese export, while silver of course dominated Chinese end-market imports. Overall, and contrary to claims in the historical literature, trans-Pacific trade generated huge profits for the Spanish Crown, which is why the Acapulco–Manila galleon trade persisted for 250 years.

The transition from Figure 9.2 to Figure 9.3 provides a simplified depiction of worldwide decline in the market value of silver during the sixteenth and

Figure 9.3: End of the Potosí–Japan cycle of silver, end of arbitrage by 1640

part of the seventeenth century. Since monetary systems were widely silver-based, price inflation during this period – the Price Revolution – is attributable to the worldwide decline in value of silver monies. More units of this less-valuable commodity were required to purchase items that did not decline in value. Once the market value of silver declined to the cost of production at the most efficient mines, it could fall no further (in the absence of cost-reducing technology). In sum, the Price Revolution ended around 1640. Unprecedented surge in worldwide silver mining had augmented global silver stocks to a greater extent than growth in silver's inventory demand, which explains silver's loss in purchasing power at about 1 percent per year (roughly the rate of silver-content price inflation). As the price of silver descended slowly toward American and Japanese mining costs, profits were slowly squeezed. Global silver price pressures drove the great Central European silver mines out of business first, since mineral extraction was more expensive in older, deeper mines. Excess profits were eventually eliminated for American and Japanese mines as well by around 1640.

Prodigious silver exports from Japan, in addition to Spanish-American silver exports via the Atlantic and – subsequently via countless Afroeurasian trade networks – Pacific oceans, led to relentless accumulations of silver within China over time. These accumulations eventually drove Chinese silver prices down to the level of rest-of-the-world silver prices by 1640 (Figure 9.3), bringing closure to the Japan–Potosí Cycle of Silver (1540s–1640). Permanent linkage between the New World and Asia across the Pacific Ocean originated truly global *trade* during the Japan–Potosí Cycle of Silver when Manila was established as a Spanish entrepôt in 1571. Yet the sixteenth-century birth of globalization extended far beyond economic considerations alone, since there was simultaneous release of profound biological forces that have shaped – and continue to shape – evolutionary forces worldwide over the past five centuries.

There can be no doubt that profits motivated global maritime and over-land trade routes that were awash in silver destined for end-markets in China. Silver-laden ships and overland vessels also contained American plants and seeds that physically reshaped landmasses worldwide, however, notwithstanding that the economic values of these plants and seeds were negligible at the time of their dissemination worldwide. The introduction of just three previously unknown American crops during the sixteenth century – maize, sweet potato, and peanut – was an essential factor that contributed to the eventual doubling of China's physical landmass, and more than doubling of its population to perhaps 30 percent of the world population by the end of the

eighteenth century. Such explosive physical transformations within the world's largest economy could not help but affect countless internal and external markets, of course, Having previously "silverized" already, demand-side expansion caused the price of silver within China to vault to a 50 percent premium by 1700 vis-à-vis the price in the rest of the world. In response, Mexican silver production during the eighteenth century exceeded the silver output of all of Spanish America during the two previous centuries combined. Naturally, non-silver markets were also heavily impacted throughout the globe, due to economic, ecological, demographic, epidemiological, and cultural forces that became (and remain today) increasingly interlinked at a planetary level as a result of the Columbian Exchange. The salient point emphasized here is simply that silver-market profits unintentionally initiated a five-century series of complex recursive interactions among ecological, epidemiological, botanical, demographic, and cultural – and back again to further economic – forces that are components of global evolution from sixteenth-century origins into the early-twenty-first-century era.

Visualization of global silver markets via Hydraulic Metaphor mechanisms is portrayed in Figure 9.4. (Note that Figures 9.4, 9.5, 9.6, and 9.7 abstract from most productive processes in the interest of simplicity. In addition, silver is assumed to be a non-consumable product that decays slowly.) Elevation of China's container base illustrates the 50 percent price premium within the Chinese silver market by 1700 – due to surging Chinese demand for silver – relative to silver prices elsewhere in the world. Escalating Chinese

Figure 9.4: 50 percent silver-price premium in China vis-à-vis world, 1700

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
Figure 9.5: Global silver-price equilibration, 1750

Figure 9.6: Carolus dollar market, early nineteenth century

demand for silver was driven largely by the burgeoning Chinese population, stimulated, in turn, by the introduction and gradual dissemination of American plants. Silver's 50 percent price premium in China yielded arbitrage potential recognized worldwide, an incentive that contributed mightily to an unprecedented surge in global silver production, mostly in Mexico this time around. Durable and non-consumable, silver stocks accumulated in

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
Figure 9.7: Silver bullion market, early nineteenth century

sufficient volume to eventually force price downward until arbitrage profits were (again) eliminated globally by 1750, as shown in Figure 9.5. Figure 9.4 and Figure 9.5 together summarize the market forces that determined the beginning and end dates of the half-century Mexican Cycle of Silver (1700–50). Inventory Demand (ID_C) ultimately determined the volume of silver that settled within China, at a price that ultimately settled at world price by 1750. Conventional laws of supply and demand are equipped neither to recognize nor to describe equilibrium processes that last 50 years (1700–50) or 100 years (1540s–1640), thus illustrating the need for economic models that explicitly focus upon processes of accumulation through time.

The Hydraulic Metaphor provides a useful model for understanding why American silver continued to pour into China after 1750, even though arbitrage gains depicted in Figure 9.4 had been eliminated. First, keep in mind that the non-arbitrage situation depicted in Figure 9.5 implies that merchants earned "normal profits"; elimination of arbitrage gains simply means that above-normal profits had been squeezed out. Second, silver is assumed to be a durable, non-consumable good, but a small percentage of silver wears out and is lost. For simplicity, assume a modest 1 percent "decay rate/evaporation" for Figure 9.5. Assume further that the stock of silver held within China was 500 million pesos in 1750 (a purely speculative number). One percent annual loss of the silver stock therefore implies shrinkage of the Chinese silver stock from 500 million to 495 million pesos

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after one year, in the absence of replenishment. Thus, importation of 5 million pesos (about 2.5 tons) in silver per year would be required in order to simply maintain the existing stock of 500 million pesos. Yet we know that population growth was robust in eighteenth-century China, so inventory demand for silver must have grown, and not necessarily proportionally. In short, it may have been necessary to import, say, 10 million pesos in silver annually just to maintain a silver price consistent with zero economic profits (i.e. prevalence of normal profits). Unprecedented silver mining in Mexico and Peru throughout the eighteenth century makes sense in view of requirements to adjust global silver stocks to non-arbitrage levels. As stated earlier, invocation of trade-imbalance logic to justify flows of silver (or other substances) is unnecessary and misleading. Chinese trade was *balanced* in the sense that imports of silver, opium, and other items were offset (i.e. paid for) by various Chinese exports, notably tea and numerous *Chinoiserie* items that became the rage in Europe and elsewhere during the eighteenth century.

Distinct forms of silver

Not only is separate theoretical treatment of the intrinsic content of each monetary substance required – i.e. conceptual separation of silver from gold, from copper, and from cowries – it is also essential to conceptually sub-divide each intrinsic substance according to distinct perceptions depicted in historical sources. For instance, nineteenth-century Chinese monetary history furnishes evidence of the need for disaggregation of specific forms of silver, as Richard von Glahn attests:

> ...decline in Chinese silver imports during the second quarter of the nineteenth century must be considered in the context of the demand for particular types of money, both in China and in the global market, not simply the supply of silver in general. In this respect, we must also pay attention to the rapid adoption of the Spanish peso as a new monetary standard... What drove the sharp increase in silver imports during the 1780s–1820s was not the demand for silver in general, but the demand for a stable means of payment.[17]

[17] Richard von Glahn, "Monetary Demand and Silver Supply in 19th-Century China," in *Empires, Systems, and Maritime Networks Reconstructing Supra-Regional Histories in Pre-19th Century Asia* (Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Beppu, Oita, Japan: Working Paper Series 2011), p. 75.

Distinction must be drawn between silver-bullion imports vis-à-vis silver-coin imports, as emphasized previously, but it is also essential to differentiate among markets for specific types of silver coins. Alejandra Irigoin argues convincingly that abrupt change in quality control at early-nineteenth-century Mexican mints created momentous reactions within Chinese end-markets for particular coins.[18] The Chinese central government had not minted silver coins previously, and privately minted coins within China contained diverse weights and fineness. "Tael" referred to an amount of silver, but the Tael was nonetheless ill suited to function as a general monetary substance because at least 67 recognized Tael standards co-existed. Moreover, bullion itself was ineligible as a candidate for general money because hiring a professional shroff was required to assess bullion purity. Reputable foreign coins (even broken ones) did not present equivalent assessment difficulties, on the other hand, which explains why foreign silver coins commanded premiums within Chinese marketplaces. The Carolus dollar from Mexico had already become the most trusted and prestigious coin within early-nineteenth-century China. An unfortunate byproduct of the Mexican war of independence after 1808, however, was the production of fresh Mexican coins of unreliable quality, a development quickly and widely recognized within Chinese markets. Given shattered Chinese confidence in freshly minted Mexican coins, previously minted Carolus dollars commanded a substantial and escalating price-premium in Chinese markets. As a result, arbitrage again assured that massive quantities of Carolus dollars were imported into China. As indicated in Figure 9.6, buoyant Inventory Demand for Carolus dollars within China led to sharply higher values for Carolus dollars in particular (shown by the elevated height of the Carolus container base). Arbitrage gains were realizable by simply buying relatively cheap Carolus dollars outside of China for shipment and sale at substantial price premium within Chinese markets.

Notwithstanding massive Chinese importation of Carolus dollars, substantial volumes of silver bullion (Sycee) were simultaneously *exported* from China during the first half of the nineteenth century. One traditional explanation is that Chinese opium imports caused exports of silver bullion, yet silver and opium had both been huge simultaneous Chinese imports during the second

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[18] Alejandra Irigoin, "A Trojan Horse in Daoguang China? Explaining the Flows of Silver in and out of China," London School of Economics, 2013.

half of the eighteenth century, so how can one argue that Chinese opium imports *caused* Chinese exports of silver during the early nineteenth century, when Chinese opium imports had failed to cause Chinese exports of silver during the preceding time period? Once again, historical facts contradict weak theoretical claims that imports of a "real" non-monetary product (opium) caused exports of a "monetizable" product (silver bullion). Whether monetized or not, silver was and is as "real" as any non-silver product. Moreover, analysts should directly analyze the specific market under investigation, rather than impute reactions in one market based upon alleged imbalances in remaining markets collectively. For various reasons that shall not detain us here, including massive environmental problems within China, the Chinese economy collapsed during the nineteenth century. General shrinkage of the Chinese economy must have implied shrinkage in Inventory Demand for many products within China, presumably including diminution of Inventory Demand to hold silver bullion. Figure 9.7 depicts shrinkage in Inventory Demand for silver bullion; note that volume capacity for Chinese silver bullion markets in Figure 9.7 is intentionally shown with relatively small capacity relative to volume capacity of Chinese silver bullion markets in Figure 9.5. Owing to shrinkage in Inventory Demand for silver bullion, China's silver bullion price in Figure 9.7 is depicted as depressed vis-à-vis silver bullion prices in the rest of the world. As with any trade good, arbitrage gains were realizable through purchase of cheap silver bullion (Sycee) within China this time, in order to relocate and sell the white metal in non-Chinese markets where the silver bullion price was higher (in India, for instance). Under such circumstances, it is unsurprising to encounter evidence of Chinese *imports* of Carolus dollar coins coincident with simultaneous Chinese *exports* of silver Sycee bullion. Moreover, different types of silver coins could be (and sometimes were) both imported and exported at the same time. Explanation for concurrent import and export of items within a category – such as distinct types of silver coins, or distinct types of silver bullion – requires theoretical mechanisms that explicitly acknowledge separate markets for each product, since market participant perceptions themselves lead to divergent market prices that appear in archival records and discussion of prices. The main point of this chapter is that clear depiction of evolving markets in a global context – including specific silver (monetary and non-monetary) objects distributed worldwide between 1400 and 1800 – requires that each product be viewed independently to the maximum extent possible (i.e. disaggregation), and that focus upon inventory analysis (accumulation through time) prevails.

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Summary

Silver has been a uniquely important commodity for thousands of years. Confiscation of pre-existing silver stocks, such as Alexander the Great's capture of Persian silver, involved transfers of wealth. But recipients of transferred wealth in silver form may prefer to diversify new wealth into a mix of assets, which could be accomplished through the exchange of silver for other goods as alternative forms of wealth. Concentrations of wealth, in addition to individual preferences, determine geographical end-market locations for silver items and non-silver goods. This chapter offers an intuitive visual model – the Hydraulic Metaphor – designed to describe where and how specific forms of silver eventually settled.

In global monetary terms, silver was more important than gold up to the late-nineteenth century. The history of silver is therefore inextricably intertwined with monetary history generally. A widespread problem in monetary history – the aggregation of various monetary substances into a catch-all category "money" – is attributable to instructions from modern monetary theory itself. The narrowest definition of "money" in economics textbooks involves the aggregation of monies fashioned out of diverse substances. Yet we have seen that productive concentrations of each of the four most important monetary substances between 1400 and 1800 – silver, gold, copper, and cowry shells – differed for each one, as determined by geological forces. Moreover, while some end-markets certainly contained more than one kind of money at a time, these four substances by and large did not travel together in tandem as "money" anywhere. Rather, each monetary substance was attracted to specific geographical locations that attracted particular items; relocation of monetary items was guided by the same profit motivation that guided trade in non-monetary goods. Theoretical aggregation of these diverse monetary substances renders global monetary history unintelligible, while disaggregation offers clarification.

Aggregation of diverse monetary items at the level of the nation-state also raises the issue of distinct monetary regions within a country. Gold was not an important monetary substance in China, for instance, but there were significant gold-money regions in Japan, India, and many other parts of the world. Silver became the dominant monetary substance in China (along with copper-based monies), notwithstanding the fact that the Chinese did not mint silver coins. On the other hand, silver was heavily minted in Japan, home to major silver mines. Silver was also heavily minted in India, a land without silver mines. Both India and Japan contained regions dominated by silver,

along with regions dominated by gold. Monetary theories need to operate at regional levels. Persian *larin* coins were common in the Maldive Islands, the most prolific source of cowry shells on earth, millions of pounds of which were exported to Asia and West Africa, the latter via European ports. And of course there were countless "lesser" monetary substances such as lead, which were of significance at specific locations around the world.[19]

Seemingly bewildering distributions of monetary substances around planet Earth can be comprehended, however, only when each monetary substance is conceptualized as a distinct entity. Each was produced in specific locations, was destined for particular end-markets, and traveled via trade routes that facilitated relocation from place of production to final end-market destination. This logic applies to all goods, monetary and non-monetary alike. Silver objects were "real" products in their own right, items created through a sequence of processes, beginning with access to working capital and expertise in prospecting, through rock mining, ore extraction, refining, alloying, manufacture (including minting of coins), and eventual distribution of final silver products to dispersed end-markets, often in defiance of political boundaries.

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[19] Akinobu Kuroda, "Concurrent but Non-integrable Currency Circuits: Complementary Relationships Among Monies in Modern China and Other Regions," *Financial History Review*, no. 15.1 (2008): 17–36.

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Dutch and English trade to the East: the Indian Ocean and the Levant, to about 1700

JAMES D. TRACY

By about 1700, the Dutch East India Company (*Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*) and the English East India Company – hereafter the VOC and the EIC – achieved dominant positions in certain sectors of trade in the Indian Ocean region. How they did so has been illuminated by scholars whose works are indicated in the Further Reading. The companies inserted themselves into and subsequently depended on a pre-existing Asian trading world, and here there are difficulties of interpretation, because the extant documentation is so heavily tilted in favor of the European enterprises. In the absence of sources in indigenous languages, it is not easy to reconstruct the business activities of Asian traders from the reports by company agents, written to make a good impression on their superiors in Amsterdam or London. Nonetheless, Clio's disciples have been productive in this field too, especially from about 1980. These two bodies of work are in some tension, as one might expect, but if both are regarded from the standpoint of the companies there are several points of consensus.

First, even if one includes all the other European enterprises in the east – notably Portugal's *Estado da Índia*, and France's *Compagnie des Indes* – shipments back to Europe represented only a small fraction of the overall volume of Asian trade. For example, in 1688, the VOC shipped from its stations in Kerala Malabar pepper and other goods worth about 1,000,000 guilders. But for the same year, R. J. Barendse has estimated Kerala's overland trade to Konkan as worth 4,000,000 guilders, and its seaborne trade to Gujarat as worth 3,500,000. (Conversely, overseas trade, from Asia and elsewhere, is now seen as having played but a minor role in Europe's economic development.)[1]

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[1] See Patrick K. O'Brien, "European Economic Development: The Contribution of the Periphery," *Economic History Review* 35 (1982): 1–18, and the minimal reference to Asian trade in David Ormrod, *The Rise of Commercial Empires: England and the Netherlands in the*

Second, the balance of trade was overwhelmingly in Asia's favor. Since the market for European goods in Asia was minimal, both companies had to make up the difference by shipping specie to the East. Even the VOC, with profits in Asia from an extensive intra-Asian trade, paid for as much as 80 percent of its exports to Europe with silver sent out from home.

Third, and contrary to what was previously thought, Portugal's *Estado da Índia*, based from 1530 in Goa, had relatively little impact on traditional patterns of commerce in Asia. East–West trade across the Central Asian Steppe did fall off in the latter half of the sixteenth century, but this was due to the disruption of the caravan routes by wars between the Safavid Shahs of Iran and the Jochi Khans of Uzbekistan, not to Portuguese caravels rounding the Cape of Good Hope. Even in supplying pepper and what were called fine spices[2] to Europe, Portugal's dominance was short-lived, as C. H. H. Wake has shown: Thanks to shipments to the Red Sea by Portugal's Asian rivals, Venetian merchants resumed their role as Europe's main purveyors of spices, from about 1560.

Finally, the combined operations of the VOC and the EIC did effect fundamental changes in the structure of trade. Southeast Asia's historic free ports were by about 1680 subjected to European control: Melaka fell to the Portuguese and then to the Dutch, who also took Makassar and Banten. The merchants of Gujarat, who had for generations sailed to the Spice Islands, were now compelled to bargain for cloves and fine spices imported to Surat by the VOC. Along the Coromandel coast, a major cotton-weaving region, some two-thirds of the fabrics produced locally were, by about 1700, destined for Europe. In Bengal, important for the export to Europe of cottons, tea, and silk, the EIC and the VOC were described in 1730 as the greatest traders in the province.

How does one explain the success of the companies? And how does one explain the fact that their principal Asian rivals went into decline by around 1700, or soon thereafter? The first part of this chapter deals with the VOC and the EIC; the second part deals with the indigenous trading communities who were sometimes their partners, and more often their rivals.

Age of Mercantilism, 1650–1770 (Cambridge University Press, 2003). Also, Rene J. Barendse, *The Arabian Seas: The Indian Ocean World of the Seventeenth Century* (London: C. M. R. Sharpe, 1998), p. 198.

[2] Nutmeg and mace. Nutmeg comes from the seed of the *myristica fragrans* tree, mace from the seed coating. In 1600, almost all of the world's supply of fine spices came from the Banda island chain in the Moluccas (modern Indonesia) – the so-called Spice Islands.

The VOC and the EIC in the Indian Ocean, 1600–1700

The VOC strategy of "armed trading"

For those who live in the country they call Nederland, Holland is the name not of a country but a province. In 1600 Holland was one of seven northern provinces of the former Habsburg Netherlands that were engaged in a long war for independence, against a Spanish monarchy whose king also ruled Portugal and its overseas empire.[3] With more than half the wealth and population, it was the dynamic center of the Dutch Republic. Its cities, led by Amsterdam, enjoyed a spectacular economic boom, in good part because the Republic had made its border a *cordon sanitaire*, behind which a battle-free zone of prosperity beckoned to enterprising merchants and craftsmen, especially from the provinces loyal to Spain, the war-ravaged southern Netherlands.[4] The war against Spain was the soil in which the VOC took root.

Portugal had built a trading empire in the East by exporting to Asia the medieval European practice of armed trading, that is, the use of naval power to compel commercial traffic to follow certain routes.[5] Prior to its conquest in 1511, Melaka was a great entrepôt where cottons from India and silks from China were traded for cloves and fine spices from the Moluccas. Banten, at the west end of Java, and Makassar, on the southern tip of Sulawesi, played similar roles on a smaller scale. Now, while Banten and Makassar remained free ports, Melaka became one of several fortified "choke-points" by which the *Estado da India*, based in Goa, controlled ocean-going trade along major routes; Portuguese warships patrolled the Straits of Melaka in search of vessels sailing without passes (*cartazes*). With Portugal under Spanish rule, from 1581, Dutch captains who could circumvent the Portuguese system

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[3] Philip II, king of Castile and Aragon (r. 1556–98), was ruler of all the Netherlands provinces until the Revolt gained a foothold in Holland and Zeeland in 1572; from 1581 he was also king of Portugal.

[4] James Tracy, *The Founding of the Dutch Republic: War, Finance, and Politics in Holland, 1572–1578* (Oxford University Press, 2008); Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1815* (Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Clé Lesger, *The Rise of the Amsterdam Market and Information Exchange: Merchants, Commercial Expansion, and Change in the Spatial Economy of the Low Countries, c.1550–1620* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).

[5] Kirti N. Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean* (Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 14, suggests that armed trading had Graeco-Roman precedents; but Chester Starr points out that while the Carthaginians used naval power to support their trade, the Greeks and Romans did not: Chester Starr, *The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

would serve the patriot cause even as they enriched themselves. From 1595, private companies in Holland and Zeeland organized fifteen voyages to the Spice Islands. Most ships went lightly armed, for Holland's ship-owners and their backers were not in the habit of wasting money on weapons and soldiers. But some investors took a different view. In 1602, an Amsterdam company provided Jakob van Heemskerk with heavily armed ships, and instructed him to look for allies against the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. Off Singapore in 1603, he seized the *Santa Catarina*, carrying Chinese silk worth 2,200,000 guilders. Heemskerk justified his action in a report to his principals: seizure of the *Santa Catarina* was due punishment for the mistreatment of Dutch merchants by Spanish authorities in the Moluccas.

In 1602, the States-General compelled rival companies to join in a United East India Company, the VOC. The objective of their High Mightinesses, as deputies were called, was to further the campaign against the Hispano-Portuguese crown by undercutting its lucrative spice monopoly. Governance of the company was entrusted to a college of directors, the Gentlemen Seventeen, chosen by five local "chambers" that were to manage the sale of goods brought back from Asia. The major investors (*bewindhebbers*) who controlled the chambers were also the only authorized issuers of stock to lesser investors who were mere shareholders (*participanten*). Although capital was to be parceled out to major and minor investors after ten years, in 1612, when the States-General decreed that there would be no re-distribution of capital, those wishing to recover their money could sell stock on the secondary market. This decision left the Gentlemen Seventeen with a permanent stock of capital[6] to support their overseas operations, supplemented by money from large loans contracted on the Amsterdam exchange.

The first two fleets sent out by the VOC had orders to attack Portuguese positions, but managed no more than the occupation of a Portuguese fortress on the island of Amboina, the center of clove production. In 1606, the third fleet joined with the sultan of Johor in an unsuccessful assault on Portuguese Melaka. Meanwhile, the Gentlemen Seventeen had engaged a brilliant young jurist, Hugo Grotius, to work Heemskerk's report on the seizure of the *Santa Caterina* into a legal brief, the *De Jure Predae* (*On the Law of Prize and Booty*). In 1606, Grotius petitioned the States-General on behalf of the VOC, asking (in vain) for support of the company's military expenses in Asia, as part of the

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[6] Kirti N. Chaudhuri, *The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company* (Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 412–17. The EIC did not have a permanent stock of capital until 1657/1660.

overall war against Spain; he emphasized that armed trading would have real benefits for the Dutch state and its people.[7] In 1609, the Gentlemen Seventeen established the office of Governor-General. Although major policy decisions had to be ratified by the Gentlemen Seventeen, the Governor-General and his council would subsequently have immediate responsibility for overseas operations. Pieter Both, the first Governor-General, was instructed to strengthen Dutch forts, and to work toward a "monopoly" in the Moluccas. Both took up residence in Banten, and then in Jakarta, a dependency of the sultanate of Banten.

The strategy of armed trading was undercut when Spain and the Dutch Republic agreed to a Twelve Years Truce, beginning in 1609. But while both sides observed the truce, troubling reports came from the Banda Islands, the source of 95 percent of the world's supply of nutmeg and mace: Here, indigenous growers contracted with the VOC and then sold to higher bidders from the EIC. When challenged by the Dutch, the Muslim *orang kaya* or leading men of Banda Neira – the main island – were bold enough to challenge company warships with their *kora-kora* outriggers. Representing the VOC in negotiations with the EIC (1613–15), Grotius insisted that the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* applied to commercial contracts in the Moluccas. But the Governor-General from 1614, Laurens Reael, was a jurist who had qualms about using force against the Honorable Company's business partners. Indirectly, he spoke for shareholders who objected to expenditures for fortresses and soldiers' wages. Then in 1617 EIC ships, supported by local authorities, blockaded the VOC outpost at Jakarta, and Reael's lackluster response was sharply criticized by a subordinate, Jan Pieterszoon Coen. Within a year, Coen was appointed to replace Reael as Governor-General. In 1619 his forces sacked Jakarta; renamed Batavia,[8] the city would henceforth be the VOC's fortified capital in Asia. In 1621, Coen imposed a brutal military solution on the problem of competitive bidding for fine spices: On Banda Neira, the main island of the Banda group, forty leading men were beheaded, and the population was scattered through the archipelago, making way for new and more tractable settlers.[9] This may not have been quite how the Gentlemen Seventeen had envisioned establishing a monopoly in the

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[7] *De Jure Predae* was never published by Grotius. One of its chapters, the famous *Mare Liberum (Freedom of the Seas)*, appeared separately in 1609.

[8] Sixteenth-century humanists had identified the ancient Batavians, a sometime ally of Rome, as the remote ancestors of modern Netherlandish-speakers.

[9] John Villiers, "Trade and Society in the Banda Islands in the Sixteenth Century," *Modern Asian Studies* 15 (1981): 743–9.

Moluccas, but when Coen returned for a home visit in 1623 he received a hero's welcome.

In 1622, the VOC and the EIC collaborated in ousting the Portuguese from their position in Hormuz, a "choke-point" for trade through the Persian Gulf. For Niels Steensgaard, this campaign was a turning point, not merely because the *Estado da Índia* lost a key position, but also because the victors represented a superior business rationality. The EIC and the VOC engaged in armed trading, like the Portuguese, but their structure as business corporations meant that they factored military decisions into an overall commercial plan. Steensgaard's critics rightly point out that he fails to take account of how the *Estado* changed over time, and that he seems at times to contra-pose an essential Dutch character, incarnated in profit-seeking merchants, to an essential Portuguese character, represented by proud and warlike *fidalgos*. But it does seem that the companies represented a more developed business rationality. Unlike the Portuguese, the Dutch in particular "internalized" their protection costs,[10] that is, they included the costs of overheads in Asia (warships, etc.) in the price of goods sold in Europe.

Again according to Steensgaard, Jan Pieterszoon Coen was the first to see how the VOC's monopsony position in the Moluccas could be built out into a trading empire in Asia. From a contemporary merchant's standpoint, capital realized in Asia was an asset that could be called home as needed. Coen envisioned keeping a permanent stock of capital in Asia, an idea the Company gradually accepted. He also sketched a strategy for intra-Asian trade. In the Moluccas, cloves and fine spices were traded for Indian cottons. But in India cottons were sold for specie, and silver was difficult for the Dutch to obtain, since the war between Spain and the Netherlands had resumed in 1622. As Coen understood, this meant obtaining silver from an Asian source, namely Japan,[11] which in turn meant setting up shop on Taiwan to get Chinese silk for trading to Japan. Coen did not live to see the day when warships were used to reinforce the company's trading position in Gujarat,[12] the better to profit from its monopoly of fine spices. But he had created a template that made armed trading profitable, a template

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[10] Fundamental for the notion of protection costs is Frederic C. Lane's work on Venetian trade. See Frederic C. Lane, *Profits from Power: Readings in Protection-Rent and Violence-Controlling Enterprises* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1979).

[11] From 1609, the VOC had a factory on the island of Hirado, off Nagasaki.

[12] In 1647, the VOC banned trading from Gujarat to the sultanate of Aceh; the aim was to force Gujarati merchants to buy their spices only from the VOC, and at prices dictated by the Company: Sinnappah Arasaratnam, *Merchants, Companies, and Commerce on the Coromandel Coast* (Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 123–5. Coen died in 1629.

that would endure well beyond the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, in which Spain recognized the independence of the Dutch Republic.

With backing from the Gentlemen Seventeen, later Governors-General sought to replicate in other trades what Coen had done for nutmeg and mace. In the case of cloves, VOC forts on Amboina did not make for a monopsony, because cloves grown elsewhere in the Moluccas were freely traded in Makassar. It took several military campaigns, over four decades, but by 1669 the company had largely snuffed out its rivals' trade in cloves. Cinnamon, grown exclusively in Sri Lanka, commanded prices almost as high as cloves and fine spices. To gain possession of the main cinnamon-producing regions, the VOC fought two series of wars, first against the *Estado da Índia* (1638–58), and then against the Sinhalese kingdom of Kandy (1658–65). Control of the pepper trade would have been the greatest prize of all, had the European market for pepper continued to grow. In fact, demand was not insatiable; in retrospect, it can be seen that a point of saturation was reached in the 1660s – just as the VOC conquered Portuguese Cochin in 1663, as part of an effort to exclude European rivals from the market for Malabar pepper. But pepper from southern Sumatra and else-where was still on offer at Banten, where the EIC had ties to the local government. Moreover, company balance sheets were now burdened with war debts, especially from Sri Lanka. In the 1670s, the overall strategy of armed trading was called into question; for example, the idea of dropping the system of mandatory *cartazes* (taken over from the Portuguese) was con-sidered if not acted on. When the Gentlemen Seventeen decided in 1682 to attack Banten after all, it was not for the sake of the pepper trade, but because Banten was an adversary in the VOC's war in central Java against the sultan of Mataram. The fall of Banten undercut the EIC's pepper exports to Europe, but low prices for pepper made the idea of a monopoly no longer attractive.[13] In any case, relations between the companies became more relaxed after 1688, when Prince William of Orange ascended England's throne as King William III.

The EIC: "a form of business constitutionalism"

The VOC was founded by a national parliament intent on striking a blow against the Spanish monarchy. By contrast, the EIC, which received its

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[13] Femme Gaastra, "War, Competition, and Collaboration: Relations between the English and Dutch East India Companies in the 17th and 18th Centuries," in H. V. Bowen, Margarette Lincoln, and Nigel Rigby (eds.), *Worlds of the East India Company* (New York: Boydell, 2002), pp. 49–68.

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charter in 1600, was founded by a corporation of merchants and investors who successfully petitioned Elizabeth I's government for exclusive rights to conduct trade to the Spice Islands.[14] Shareholders made up the General Court, which elected each year a Governor and a twenty-four member Court of Committees, known as the Directors. Major policy decisions had to be submitted to the General Court, but the Governor and the Directors had executive responsibility, and they showed "remarkable consistency" in maximizing profits and reducing overhead costs,[15] demonstrating that shareholder interests were paramount. Until 1636, the company sold separate issues of stock for each voyage, and re-distributed the capital once accounts were settled. Private trade by officials and employees of the company was discouraged, although not strictly forbidden, as by the VOC.[16]

EIC captains were not loath to make use of sea power to gain a commercial advantage. But the company lacked the resources for a sustained challenge to the VOC's position in the Moluccas. Between 1613 and 1617, for example, the EIC sent 29 ships east, as against 51 for the VOC. By 1623, the VOC had 90 ships in the East Indies, and 2,000 troops distributed among 20 forts. In 1619 the British and Dutch governments compelled the companies to agree to divide the trade in spices, two-thirds for the VOC, one-third for the EIC. The idea was to boost profits by sparing the companies the expense of fighting a war against each other. But VOC officials in the East saw the treaty as a mere "gift" to their English rivals. In 1621 Coen occupied Banda Neira, as noted above, and in 1623 VOC authorities on Amboina claimed the right to try to execute ten Englishmen and nine Japanese mercenaries on charges of a treasonous plot. At this point the EIC abandoned the Moluccas. From now on, the company would be content to trade for spices in Banten.[17] By default, the focus shifted to India.

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[14] For the phrase "a form of business constitutionalism": Chaudhuri, *Trading World of Asia*, p. 22.

[15] Kirti N. Chaudhuri, *The English East India Company* (London: Frank Cass, 1965), pp. 31–3, and Chaudhuri, *Trading World of Asia*, pp. 25–8.

[16] Peter James Marshall, "Private British Trade in the Indian Ocean before 1800," reprinted as chapter XIII of Peter James Marshall, *Trade and Conquest: Studies on the Rise of British Dominance in India* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1993), pp. 277–8.

[17] Anthony Farrington, *Trading Places: The East India Company and Asia, 1600–1834* (London: British Library, 2002), pp. 41 and 54; M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade in the Indonesian Archipelago Between 1500 and About 1650* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962), p. 193; Jonathan Israel, *Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), pp. 175–6; and Gaastra, "War, Competition, and Collaboration," in Bowen, Lincoln, and Rigby (eds.), *Worlds of the East India Company,* p. 52.

Map 10.1: Indian Ocean in the 1600s

Legend:

	Trade routes and sea lanes
●	Indigenous port towns
○	Other towns
▽	English presidency settlements
◀	Subordinate factories
△	Factories withdrawn
■	Other European settlements

Japan

Hirado

PACIFIC OCEAN

Ningpo

Nanking

Hangchow

Amoy

Canton

Macao

Peking

China

Philippines

Manila

Indo China

Siam

Burma

Pegu

Bangkok

Malacca

Malacca

Jambi

Aceh

Tiku

Bencoolen

Banjarmasin

Batavia

Banten

Amboina

Makassar

Bay of Bengal

Kasimbazar

Dacca

Patna

Hugli

Calcutta

Balasore

Vizagapatam

Masculipatam

Petapoli

Madras

Pondicherry

Cuddalore

Porto Novo

Negapatam

Colombo

INDIAN OCEAN

Delhi

Lahore

Agra

Ahmadabad

Broach

Mughal Empire

Surat

Bombay

Goa

Karwar

Calicut

Tellicherry

Cochin

Anjengo

Kabul

Herat

Mashad

Persia

Kirman

Kandahar

Gombroon

Muscat

Arabian Sea

Erzurum

Baghdad

Isfahan

Basra

Turkish Empire

Damascus

Cairo

Alexandria

Smyrna

Jedda

Yemen

Mokha

Aden

Mombasa

Mozambique

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In 1608 an EIC ship called at Surat, the main port of Gujarat, and a good place to obtain the Gujarati cottons that had an established market in the Moluccas. But the English were not allowed to establish a factory here until 1615, after defeating a Portuguese fleet that sought to exclude them (1612), and after King James I had agreed to send an ambassador to the court of Jahangir, the Mughal emperor. From 1611, the company also had a factory in Masulipatnam, the main port of the sultanate of Golconda, and a major outlet for Coromandel cottons. Then in 1639 the company was invited to establish a presence in the Hindu principality of Madras; the end result was the construction here of Fort St. George, which was to be for some time the EIC's only fortified settlement in Asia.[18] Bengal was another important region for textiles, but opposition from Portuguese private traders – and from pirates based in Arakan in modern Burma – hindered the company's initial efforts there. Whereas the VOC was trading from Hugli as of 1633, the EIC did not establish a factory there until 1651, with a *farman* from Jahangir's successor, Shah Jahan. Troubles with the Mughal government began in 1660, when Mir Jumla, a man of wide commercial interests, was named *subaldar* of the province of Bengal. This led to talk among shareholders about the need for forceful action to protect company trade. Josiah Child, the leading advocate of a "forward policy," became Governor for the first time in 1681. After the company had obtained James II's permission to initiate hostilities, the war that Child had wanted began in 1688, but it ended badly for the company when an English expeditionary force failed to capture Chittagong. Emperor Aurangzeb, Shah Jahan's successor, allowed the company to re-establish itself in Bengal in 1690, when Calcutta was chosen as the headquarters. During a local rebellion in 1696, company officials took the opportunity to begin fortifying its new settlement.[19]

There were separate presidencies for Surat/Bombay,[20] Madras, and, from 1700, Fort William in Calcutta. Each president, responsible for the supervision of several subordinate agencies, reported directly to the Governor and Directors in London. But the lack of a centralized command structure in Asia

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[18] Sinnappah Arasaratnam and Aniruddha Ray, *Masulitpatnam and Cambay: A History of Two Port Towns, 1500–1800* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1994).

[19] Om Prakash, *The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal, 1630–1720* (Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 34–9, and Susil Chaudhury, *Trade and Commercial Organization in Bengal, 1650–1720* (Calcutta: K. L. Mukhopaday, 1975), pp. 21–30 and 36–51.

[20] Bombay came to the English crown in 1661 as part of the dowry of Portugal's Catherine of Braganza, the bride of Charles II. The Surat presidency re-located to Bombay in 1666.

seems not to have prevented company officials from following a common strategy: cottons obtained in India would pay for homebound cargoes of pepper and spices. Like the VOC, the EIC had a plan – although, as things turned out, not a very good plan – for trading silks to Japan to obtain silver for buying cottons in India. The fact that the company had to withdraw from the Moluccas after 1623 did not in itself effect a fundamental change, because EIC agents were still able to procure pepper in Banten and cloves in Makassar. But the VOC captured Melaka in 1641 and thereafter exerted increasing pressure on Makassar. As of 1661 or 1662, the EIC's Directors made a formal decision to withdraw from intra-Asian trade; shipment of Indian cottons to Banten continued, but in the hands of British private traders, who could now apply for licenses from the company. This shift in policy was pregnant with implications for the future, for British private traders, under the protection of EIC warships, would become a dominant presence in the Indian Ocean during the course of the eighteenth century.

Oliver Cromwell's Navigation Act of 1651 may be seen as the beginning of an economic struggle, punctuated by war,[21] which pitted England against the Dutch Republic during most of the second half of the seventeenth century. In India, competition between the two companies focused on a rivalry to supply Europe's seemingly insatiable demand for calicoes. Overall, the VOC shipped more in goods to Europe, by a factor of roughly 3:2. But the EIC had directed its attention to Indian textiles earlier, and cottons continued to be relatively more important in its homebound cargoes. For example, textiles represented 64.5 percent of the invoice value of EIC imports from Asia for the years 1696–1705, while for the VOC the comparable figure was 54.7 percent for the years 1698–1700.[22] Both companies dealt with brokers who passed on their orders to village weavers. The Dutch were more aggressive about trying to bypass the middlemen and deal directly with producers, but they never managed to command the local market. In Gujarat the VOC had an advantage, because the company was able to enforce its monopoly on the import of cloves and fine spices from the Moluccas. Along the Coromandel coast as well, the VOC outdid the EIC in textile exports. But by about 1700 Bengal was the most important source of textiles for both companies, and here the English had an edge, because of a favorable customs agreement

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[21] J. R. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the 17th Century* (London: Longman, 1996).
[22] Niels Steensgaard, "Growth and Composition of the Long-distance Trade of England and the Dutch Republic," in James Tracy, *The Rise of Merchant Empires* (Cambridge University Press, 1991), vol. i, pp. 102–52, specifically p. 110 (table 3.2), pp. 114–15 (table 3.5), and p. 126 (table 3.8).

granted by the Mughal government. Moreover, in the absence of a hierarchical structure of governance like the VOC's, local officials could react more quickly to market opportunities.

Banker–brokers in India

In Gujarat and in Bengal, provinces of the Mughal Empire, both companies faced interference from local officials who did not always respect *farmans* granted by the court in Agra. Timing was an even more serious problem. Prices for commodities to be purchased varied greatly depending on the season, and "supply" from Europe – mainly in the form of specie – seldom arrived soon enough to take advantage of opportunities. Accordingly, the bullion sent out from Europe was used more as collateral for loans than for direct purchase of goods: "The trade of all Companies and of the *Estado* floated on the credit of Indian bankers."[23] Many bankers also acted as brokers, buying from or selling to company agents on behalf of their clients. Surat's Virji Vora was a famous example. On one occasion, having cornered the market in pepper, he forced the Dutch to accept his price (they sent to the Deccan in quest of pepper, but Vora's men had gotten there first). Making accommodations with such men was easier than doing battle with them. In 1666, complaints reached Batavia that the VOC factory in Surat was selling to Vora at artificially low prices. In 1669, the EIC owed him a total of 6,000,000 rupees. In Madras, Beri Timanna and Kasi Veeranna, recognized by the EIC as Chief Merchants, were also major suppliers of textiles for export, and monopoly purchasers of goods imported by the EIC. These "portfolio capitalists," as they have been called, could also be found farming taxes, or lending great sums to princes.[24] Like the Fuggers and the Spinola of sixteenth-century Europe, it may be said of them that they held in their hands the destiny of states.

Partners and rivals of the companies: Asian trading networks

The study of settler trading communities, sharing a common religion and ethnicity, was stimulated by Philip Curtin's *Cross-Cultural Trade in World*

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[23] Barendse, *Arabian Sea*, p. 226.
[24] Balkrishna Govind Gokhale, *Surat in the 17th Century: A Study of Urban History of India* (London: Curzon, 1979), pp. 37–41; Arasaratnam, *Merchants, Companies, and Commerce*, p. 226; and Sanjay Subrahmanyam and Christopher A. Bayly, "Portfolio Capitalists and the Political Economy of Early Modern India," in Sanjay Subrahmanyam (ed.), *Merchants, Markets, and the State in Early Modern India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 242–65.

History (1984). But Curtin's "trade diasporas" included trader-settlements that had behind them a state or a state-like power (like the European companies) as well as those that did not. For Indian trader communities, most of which did not have the direct support of a state or a navy, the term "trading networks"[25] is more appropriate.

Kelings

Owing to a Hindu taboo against ocean-sailing, Indian merchants who settled abroad were usually Muslim. The Tamil-speaking Kelings, mostly Hindu, were an interesting exception, possibly because they represented a region of the Subcontinent whose trade with the Indonesian Archipelago went back more than five centuries. Prior to 1511, Kelings and Muslim Gujaratis made up the largest Indian communities resident in Melaka. As the Portuguese contemplated an attack, they needed an ally in Melaka, and the Gujaratis were an unlikely choice, since the attack on Diu by a Portuguese fleet (1509) had made the sultan of Gujarat an enemy of the *Estado*. The Kelings, seeing a chance to push the Gujaratis aside, aided the Europeans in the conquest of Melaka, and then in the organization of trade with the Moluccas. As for the Gujaratis, they migrated to the sultanate of Aceh, a state in northern Sumatra, which soon became the main foe of Portuguese sea power in this region. Melaka still had a significant community of Keling traders more than a hundred years later, when they offered their services to the VOC after the Portuguese were ousted in 1641. But the Dutch proved more difficult partners. From their perspective, Keling merchants who brought cottons from south India for trade in Aceh were competing directly with the company. Accordingly, they sought to force ships from India to call at Melaka. As these measures took hold, Melaka's Kelings began their exodus to Aceh, where they built a flourishing trade in Indian cloth.[26]

Gujaratis

Surat owed its prosperity as an entrepôt to a fortunate convergence of geo-political circumstances. When Akbar, the third Mughal Emperor

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[25] Sebouh David Aslanian, *From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean: The Global Trade Networks of the Armenians of New Julfa* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011), pp. 7–15; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Persianization and 'Mercantilism' in Bay of Bengal History," in Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Explorations in Connected History: From the Tagus to the Ganges* (Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 45–79.

[26] Subrahmanyam, "Persianization and 'Mercantilism'," in Subrahmanyam, *Explorations in Connected History*, pp. 57–9, and Arasaratnam, *Merchants, Companies, and Commerce*, pp. 113–23.

(1556–1605) captured Gujarat, Surat became the port of choice for overseas luxury goods imported by the court. Moreover, unlike Cambay, which had been more prominent during the fifteenth century, Surat had an insurance trade to hedge the risks of ocean-going traffic; it also boasted one of the few maritime fortresses on the west coast of India that was not in Portuguese hands. Meanwhile, trade from Iran was promoted by Shah Ismail I (r. 1501–24), the first ruler of the Safavid dynasty. Then the Ottoman conquest of Aden (1538) secured the Red Sea against Portuguese incursions, making it safe for *hajj* pilgrims (and merchants) sailing from Gujarat. Increased demand in West Asia for the spices procured by Gujarati merchants at Aceh created a trade circuit that spanned the Indian Ocean, with its mid-point in Surat. More so in Surat than in some urban centers, members of the *bania* castes also had the benefit of mutual-aid societies formed along ethno-religious lines, the *mahajans*. The *mahajans* lacked an umbrella organization, but there was a *nagarseth* who could speak for the whole trading community in time of crisis. Prominent bankers – like Virji Vora – were likely to be found in the Hindu or Jain *mahajans*, while overseas trade was largely in Muslim hands. As subjects (from 1573) of the Mughal emperor, Gujarati Muslims were no friends of the Portuguese, at least not initially. But *Estado* outposts in Melaka and Hormuz did not inhibit their traffic to Aceh in the east or to the Red Sea in the west. When the EIC and the VOC called at Surat, starting around 1610, Gujaratis and Portuguese joined in an unsuccessful effort to keep the newcomers out.[27]

In Surat as in Melaka, it was the Dutch who made life difficult for indigenous traders. With Melaka in company hands, as of 1641, the VOC deployed its naval power to interdict Gujarat's trade to Aceh. At one point the company's factory in Surat was burned in retaliation. The Dutch then detained two rich Gujarati merchantmen en route back from Mocha, extorting promises not to trade to the east, except to Melaka. But the blockage of eastbound traffic could not be made airtight, and in 1651 the company lifted its ban on sailing from Surat to Aceh. Meanwhile, the Gujaratis enhanced their position in the Persian Gulf and in the Red Sea, often at the expense of the EIC and the VOC; for example, they undercut the Dutch at Mocha by offering Gujarati cottons that were cheaper

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[27] Ashin Das Gupta, *Indian Merchants* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1979), pp. 1–14; Chaudhuri, *Trading World of Asia*, p. 51; and André Gunder Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 88.

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than the company's Coromandel fabrics.[28] Mulla Abdul Ghafur (d. 1718), wealthiest of the Red-Sea traders, used his fleet to combat English and Dutch efforts to restrict traffic into and out of Surat. If Surat's westward trade declined in the early eighteenth century, it was due not to competition from the companies, but rather to the break-up of the geo-political configuration on which Surat's prosperity had always depended.[29]

The Persians of Masulipatnam

Among the port cities of the Coromandel coast, Masulipatnam grew in importance during the fifteenth century because of the rise of the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagara (1356–1565). In the sixteenth century, Golconda was one of five sultanates that emerged in the Deccan after the break-up in 1518 of a larger Muslim state that had been ruled by a dynasty of Persian origin. Since Golconda's Qutb Shahi sultans were Shi'ites, they looked to Persia as a "cultural pole," and Persians formed a distinct and important element among their court elite. The powerful Ibrahim Qutb Shah (r. 1550–1580) extended his rule to Masulipatnam, and became fabulously wealthy when tribute was transferred to Golconda after the sack of Vijayanagara in 1565. Masulipatnam's ship-owners, mainly Persian, now developed what the Portuguese saw as a rival trading network round about the Bay of Bengal, with connections to Aceh, Arakan (modern Burma), and Kedah (modern Malaysia). Ibrahim Qutb Shah himself was suspected by the Portuguese of having financed an unsuccessful assault on Melaka by the sultan of Aceh in 1568. He also had ships of his own sailing to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, a route that allowed the Safavid shahs of Persia to send ambassadors to Golconda, without their having to cross the lands of Golconda's enemy, the Mughal emperor.[30]

The VOC and the EIC gained access to Masulipatnam early on, but the companies preferred to center their Coromandel operations in places under their control, the Dutch at a re-built Portuguese fort in Pulicat (1609–12), and the English at Fort St. George in Madras (1639–41). The Persians who continued to dominate Masulipatnam's trade included high officials at the

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[28] Rubi Maloni, "Straddling the Arabian Sea: Gujarati Trade with West Asia during the 17th and 18th Centuries," in S. Jeyaseela Stephen (ed.), *The Indian Trade at the Asian Frontier* (New Delhi: Gyan, 2008), pp. 193–204.

[29] The thesis of Das Gupta, *Asian Merchants.*

[30] Subrahmanyam, "Persianization and 'Mercantilism'," in Subrahmanyam, *Explorations in Connected History,* pp. 61–5; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The Political Economy of Commerce: South India, 1500–60* (Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 149–52 and 193; and Arasaratnam, *Merchants, Companies, and Commerce,* pp. 13–19.

court of Golconda. Before he moved on to the Mughal court, Mir Jumla, who rose to the position of vizier or prime minister in Golconda, is said to have had his own fleet of ten ocean-going vessels. Having conquered Melaka in 1641, the VOC sought to force ships crossing the Bay of Bengal to call at Melaka, but Coromandel's indigenous merchants found ways of evading restrictions; for example, if the VOC would not issue passes for Kedah or Arakan, *cartazes* could be obtained from the Portuguese or the English. Coromandel traders also equipped ships and organized trade for Thailand's rulers, and they used their profits from specialized trades (like bringing elephants to Thailand) to sell Indian cottons at prices the Dutch could not afford to match. Over time, however, continuous Dutch pressure had an effect, and Masulipatnam shippers chose to send their cottons west, to the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf, rather than across the Bay of Bengal. The departure for the Middle East in 1656 of Muhammad Sayyid, a leading overseas merchant, marks an early stage in Masulipatnam's decline. Of the Persians who stayed on, many left in 1687, when Golconda was conquered and absorbed into the Mughal Empire.[31]

The Armenians of New Julfa

Armenia's history as an independent kingdom ended with the Byzantine conquest in 1045, and the Seljuk conquest in 1065. From around 1500, merchants from Julfa, an ancient Armenian city, rose to prominence as dealers in silk; their caravans traveled east to the silk-growing regions of northern Iran, and west to markets in Damascus (later Aleppo) and Bursa.[32] For much of the sixteenth century, Armenia was a battleground in wars between the Ottoman sultans and the Safavid shahs of Iran. Between 1603 and 1605, Shah 'Abbas I (r. 1587–1629) occupied Julfa and deported most of its residents, including the merchants. Whether the shah had a conscious plan for the economic development of his realm is disputed. But he settled his Armenian subjects in what became a separate quarter of his new capital of Isfahan, known as New Julfa, where the skyline was soon dominated by the spires of Armenian churches. In 1615, 'Abbas I made the export of silk a state

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[31] Arasaratnam, *Merchants, Companies, and Commerce*, pp. 123–5, 142–5, 218, and 224–5; Subrahmanyam, *Political Economy*, pp. 216–17; and Chaudhuri, *Trading World of Asia*, pp. 198–9.

[32] For this paragraph and the next: Aslanian, *From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean*; Ina Baghdianz McCabe, *The Shah's Silk for Europe's Silver: The Eurasian Trade of the Julfa Armenians in Safavid Iran (1530–1750)* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1999); and Stephen P. Blake, *Half the World: The Social Architecture of Safavid Isfahan, 1590–1722* (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Press, 1999).

monopoly. In 1619, the community of New Julfan merchants outbid the English East India Company to win the auction; they thus became the exclusive suppliers of Persian silk, by sea from Hormuz to Surat, and by land to Aleppo. Although their caravan route crossed the border of two empires that were often at war, their Christian identity exempted the New Julfans from Ottoman regulations aimed at keeping out Shi'ite merchants. After the royal monopoly was abolished in the 1630s, they controlled the market for silk through negotiations with the Safavid governors of silk-producing provinces, many of whom were ethnic Armenians.

By the end of the seventeenth century there were Armenian settler-communities in Surat, Madras, and, in Bengal, at Chinsura, north of Calcutta. On important matters, merchants living overseas looked for direction to the *Kalantar* of New Julfa. Once established on the Coromandel Coast, they sensed an opportunity in the distant east, where Spanish government regulations excluded British and French shipping from Manila. By 1700, Armenian vessels, with a red-yellow-red flag and a superimposed Lamb of God emblazoned on their sails, had a regular route from Madras to the Philippines, with a stop in Canton. Meanwhile, agents of the EIC noted possibilities for collaboration. In 1675, for example, John Fryer found huge stocks of English broadcloth in Isfahan, brought back by caravans from Aleppo. He recommended an arrangement with the Armenians whereby the company would trade Spanish silver for Persian silk. In 1688, an agreement was signed in London between Josiah Child, representing the EIC, and Khwaja Panos Kalandar, a merchant residing in London who had authorization to act for the New Julfan community. The agreement gave Armenians the same rights as English subjects in all EIC settlements in India, and allowed them to freight their goods on the company. The whole arrangement depended on the continued ability of the New Julfans to supply Persian silk. In fact, their Persian trading network functioned into the eighteenth century, at least until the imposition of heavy taxes under Nadir Shah (r. 1736–47).

State power and stateless trading networks

There were a few Asian states that did deploy naval power to protect their commercial interests.[33] Perhaps the most notable example was the sultanate

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[33] In addition to the sultanate of Aceh, two other such polities were the city-state of Cannanore in Kerala, and the Ya'rubi sultanate of Oman: Geneviève Bouchon, *"Regent of the Sea": Cannanore's Response to Portuguese Expansion, 1507–1528*, Louise Shackley (trans.), (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988), and Tonio Andrade, "Beyond Guns,

of Aceh, which provided a safe harbor for numerous merchant communities, including Kelings, Gujaratis, and Persians. As of about 1500, the power in this region, and the main enemy of the *Estado da Índia*, was the sultanate of Johor. But as Aceh grew stronger, all three governments competed for dominance in the Straits of Melaka, and for extending the pepper plantations they controlled, especially in Sumatra. By 1536, Melaka's Portuguese governor was forced to ally with Johor against Aceh. Sultan Alauddin al-Kahar (r. 1537/9–71) then launched several attacks on Melaka, albeit in vain. For the assault in 1568, he had support from Istanbul: following the arrival of an ambassador from distant Aceh, Sultan Murad III sent a fleet of war galleys from the Red Sea, bringing war material and cannon-founders.[34] Sultan Iskandar Muda (r. 1606–37) made the trade in pepper a state monopoly. Like the Portuguese and the Dutch, he sent out armed outriggers to burn the crops of growers who refused to co-operate. He too attacked Melaka, in 1629, but he suffered a devastating defeat at the hands of the Portuguese governor, Nuno Álvares Botelho. According to Portuguese sources, Aceh lost hundreds of ships, and some 19,000 men. Iskandar Muda then took cognizance of changing power dynamics in the region: in the same year, 1629, he and Álvares Botelho signed an alliance against the Dutch. Under Aceh's forceful sultans, resident foreign merchants were implicit collaborators with Aceh's navy. Merchants boosted the value of imports and thus added to the sultan's revenue base. In turn, they could expect that losses they suffered at the hands of the Portuguese or the Dutch would be taken into account as plans were made for retaliatory strikes. After 1641, however, Aceh's elite "asserted their influence and self-interest and prevented the emergence of another strong ruler" until the nineteenth century. This did not mean an end to profitable business. For example, Keling merchants did very well selling Indian cloth in Aceh under Queen Taj ul-Alam (r. 1641–75).[35] But the fact that the VOC no longer had to fear Aceh's war galleys was surely one reason why traders in Surat and Masulipatnam gradually lost interest in shipping to Aceh.

Except in the case of Aceh, indigenous trading networks in the Indian Ocean rarely had military backing from the governments of their home states.

Germs, and Steel: European Expansion and Maritime Asia, 1400–1750," *Journal of Early Modern History* 14 (2010): 165–86.

[34] M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200* (Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 36–8; Meilink, *Asian Trade and European Influence*, pp. 137–43; and Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration* (Oxford University Press, 2010).

[35] Ricklefs, *History of Modern Indonesia*, pp. 38–40; Denys Lombard, *Le Sultanat d'Atjéh au Temps d'Iskandar Muda, 1607–1636* (Paris: École Française de l'Extrême-Orient, 1967); and Arasaratnam, *Merchants, Companies, and Commerce*, pp. 116–23.

But these stateless communities were nonetheless indirectly supported by state power. Trade over long distances always relied on geo-political configurations that made traffic relatively safe, especially across land routes that might otherwise be tempting targets for bandits. The Mughal emperors did not often deploy their military might in defense of the interests of their merchant subjects, but the trade of Surat – the empire's greatest port – depended on reliable access to inland production centers for export goods, and to markets in Delhi and Agra. After the death of Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707), however, "security of transport disappeared in the regions of Delhi and Agra." There were changes in Iran as well. Shah ʿAbbas I had promoted Persia's trade to India and elsewhere by joining with the VOC and the EIC to expel the Portuguese from Hormuz in 1622. But under the last of his dynasty, Shah Sultan Husayn (r. 1694–1722), non-Shi'ite merchants were discriminated against, and the military power of the state was allowed to waste away. Finally, Ottoman sultans had in the sixteenth century sometimes responded to requests from co-religionists in the east for help against the infidel Portuguese. From Ottoman ports on the Red Sea, there were naval expeditions to Gujarat, and a diplomatic mission to Aceh. But in a recent and authoritative survey of Ottoman history in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Indian Ocean does not merit a mention.[36] Taken together, the waning strength of these three great empires of the Islamic world made life more difficult for largely Muslim sea-going traders in the Indian Ocean.

Conclusion

How does one understand the success attained by the two companies, as of about 1700? Some scholars have emphasized the advantages of that distinctively European form of commercial organization, the joint-stock company, with its capacity to plan for the long term, and to raise funds on the capital markets of Amsterdam and London. Others contend that the companies represented not so much a superior business model, but rather the application of superior force to achieve their objectives. The two perspectives are not mutually exclusive. Both came together in Niels Steensgaard's "internalization of protection costs" thesis: the companies made sure that money

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[36] Ashin Das Gupta, "Trade and Politics in 18th Century India," in Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (eds.), *The Mughal State, 1526–1750* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 361–97, and Suraiya N. Faroqhi (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey* (Cambridge University Press, 2006), vol. III.

spent on deploying naval power to beat down their competitors was duly reckoned into the cost of getting goods to market. Indeed, in the long history of the Indian Ocean trade, what was peculiar about the companies was that, like the Portuguese *Estado da Índia,* they assumed that a proper business enterprise should have military force at its disposal. As K. N. Chaudhuri has said, "The phenomenon that is in need of explanation is not the system of peaceful but of armed trading."[37]

More generally, this assumption was common for Europeans doing business abroad, not just in the Indian Ocean. The point can perhaps be made clear from a brief glance at Europe's trade with the Levant – that is, with the complex of lands under Ottoman rule, from Egypt north and west around the coast of the Mediterranean as far as Dalmatia. In the waning decades of the sixteenth century, the Venetian Republic still controlled the bulk of the trade in Asian spices and silks sent on to Europe, even if the rise of Ottoman naval power had put an end to the control of sea lanes of the eastern Mediterranean by Venetian war galleys. But during the seventeenth century, even as the VOC and the EIC superseded the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean, British and Dutch merchants superseded the Venetians in the Levant. Ships of the Atlantic nations were lighter and more maneuverable than the heavy carracks favored by Venice, and their high walls and heavy armament gave them an edge in naval combat. Dutch and English captains found they could profit from raiding as well as trading, and the increase in piracy that made the Mediterranean unsafe for commercial shipping is usually dated from the coming of the Dutch and especially the English, around 1580. For those looking to go corsairing, or merely to ensure safe passage, English ships, known as *bertoni*, were much sought after for hire or purchase.[38]

The Dutch had an initial advantage, because they led the way in carrying Baltic rye and wheat to a grain-starved Italy.[39] Dutch traders to the Mediterranean never formed a monopoly corporation, like the VOC or the West

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[37] Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilization,* pp. 14, 209–10 and 228, and Martine van Ittersum, *Profit and Principle: Hugo Grotius, Natural Rights Theories and the Rise of Dutch Power in the East Indies, 1595–1615* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. xlvii–xlix.

[38] Alberto Tenenti, *Naufrages, Corsaires et Assurances Maritimes a Venise, 1592–1609* (Paris: Editions de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 1959), pp. 13–22 and 28–39, and Alberto Tenenti, *Piracy and the Decline of Venice, 1580–1615* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1965), pp. 9–16 and 73–9.

[39] For this paragraph, Maartje van Gelder, *Trading Places: Netherlandish Merchants in Early Modern Venice* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 47–53; Israel, *Dutch Primacy in World Trade*, pp. 44–56 and 149–51; Gigliola Pagano De Divitiis, *English Merchants in 17th Century Italy* (Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 166–73; Jaap R. Bruijn, *The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Columbia, SC: South Carolina University Press,

Indies Company, but they had a strong position in Venice, built up from the 1570s; in 1597, twenty-four newly arrived Dutch vessels staged a parade across the lagoon, to honor a newly crowned Dogaressa. Dutch shipping to the Mediterranean expanded during the Twelve Years' Truce with Spain (1609–21), but contracted thereafter, owing to the imposition of new restrictions by Spain. England's Levant Company, chartered in 1581, used Livorno as its base in Italy. The British advantage was that England had in abundance what the Dutch lacked – a store of home-produced light woolens, suitable for crowding out the more expensive Venetian cloth that had an established market in the Levant. By the middle decades of the seventeenth century Levant Company ships controlled traffic between Italy and the eastern Mediterranean, with only minor competition from the Dutch. In light of the continuing menace from Barbary corsairs, both governments intervened to protect their merchants. From 1621, Dutch merchantmen sailing to the Mediterranean were convoyed by warships. In England it was only in 1649 that the House of Commons voted to support convoys for merchantmen, without charge to the traders. The first report of naval vessels on convoy duty in the Mediterranean comes from 1651. The British convoy system was regularized and expanded in 1662; for example, in addition to a squadron that patrolled the Mediterranean, merchantmen bound from Livorno for Izmir or Iskanderun were always to be accompanied by two warships.

Thus while in the Indian Ocean the VOC invested more in armaments and the EIC invested less, in the Mediterranean the Dutch were outgunned by the British. Dutch merchantmen could be quite effective as gun-platforms, but the Levant Company's *bertoni* were even better. Also, the English government proved more willing to recognize the protection of its Mediterranean merchant fleet as a matter of state interest. The salient point of this comparison is that the strategy of armed trading was not peculiar to any single European trading nation. In Asia, some merchant groups competing with the companies showed a fighting spirit, like the Islamicized *orang kaya* of Banda Neira, who paid dearly for their resistance to the VOC. More often, they sought non-violent ways of thwarting the companies. In Europe, by contrast, "merchant warriors" were a dime a dozen. K. N. Chaudhuri rightly sees a precedent for armed trading in the medieval Mediterranean, where Venice battled Genoa for control of traffic to the Levant. One might equally

1993), p. 24; and Sari R. Hornstein, *The Restoration Navy and English Foreign Trade, 1674–1678: A Study in the Peacetime Use of Sea Power* (London: Scolar, 1991), pp. 21–5.

well invoke the Hanseatic League, of towns in Germany and the Low Countries, whose wars with one another often had to do with control of local streams. In sum, armed trading – the phenomenon to which Chaudhuri called attention, and which is still in need of an explanation – was a common inheritance of the European nations.[40]

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[40] An interesting exception is the republic of Dubrovnik (Ragusa), an Ottoman tributary whose merchant ships never offered battle at sea: Barisa Krekic, "Ragusa (Dubrovnik) e Il Mare: Aspetti e Problemi (XIV–XVI Secolo)," in Barisa Krekic, *Dubrovnik: a Mediterranean Urban Society, 1300–1600* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1997), pp. 131–51.

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Plantation societies

TREVOR BURNARD

Few institutions define world history in the early modern era as completely as the plantation complex. Initiated in Europe; realised in the tropical and semi-tropical regions of the Americas; involving both Asia as a source of capital and Asians as labourers; focused strongly on Africa, from where the great majority of plantation labourers came; and extending eventually in the nineteenth century into the Pacific and into Australia – the plantation complex and the social forms it engendered was a global phenomenon.

The development of the plantation system had far-reaching consequences. It was the imperative force behind the growth of the Atlantic slave trade, especially during the mature period of that trade. Through that trade, 12.5 million Africans left Africa, primarily for the Americas, and 10.7 million captives arrived to become chattel slaves in a large geographic region that ultimately stretched from Rio Grande do Sol in southern Brazil to the Mason–Dixon Line of southern Pennsylvania in the United States between 1500 and 1866, 7.3 million of whom arrived before 1800, the great majority disembarking in Brazil or in the Caribbean. There have been larger migrations subsequently, but in the pre-industrial age this was the most significant forced migration of people across a long distance over a relatively short period. At its height, in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, nearly 75,000 Africans arrived each year in the Americas, transforming the demographic make-up of the Americas and making plantation America a cultural offshoot not so much of Europe but of West Africa. Prime plantation regions such as the British and French Caribbean, Bahia and Pernambuco in Brazil, and Virginia and South Carolina in the United States had populations in which a majority or near majority were enslaved people of African descent, making these areas more like what a Swiss newcomer to South Carolina in 1737 termed 'Negroe countries' than European-like societies.

Moreover, the plantation itself was a highly distinctive innovation, especially after its transformation as an economic institution in mid-seventeenth

century Barbados and the subsequent spread of the Barbadian plantation model throughout British and French America. It was the most complex and semi-industrial form invented in the early modern period, with the regime of the sugar mill showing significant resemblances to that classic industrial institution, the cotton mill. Both were dangerous and unhealthy and fiercely patrolled places that consumed their workers. The successful plantation system was a place of finely calibrated coordination internally and externally, involving as it did complex long-distance trade relationships, the careful cultivation of demand for plantation products, and innovative and capitalistic financial instruments that were seldom used in other trades. The result of the development of the plantation system was the creation of highly specialised and differentiated 'factories in the field' that provided enormous wealth to their owners and misery and impoverishment to workers. Once established in places suited to the production of tropical goods for sale in Europe, the plantation proved to be an irresistible force, subsuming all other economic activities in its wake and creating a variety of social, economic and political characteristics that were of long-lasting importance. Quintessentially a feature of early modern colonial life, the plantation did not fade away once modernity arrived but continued to grow, develop and expand into the nineteenth and even into the twentieth century in places as diverse as Natal and Queensland.

The plantation was modern with pre-modern features, most notably a reliance on forced labour. It was marked by a distinctive and generally pernicious set of social and intellectual understandings, predicated upon the relentless exploitation of workers denigrated for their racial origin. Planters did not create racism; but they did provide the ideal setting in which forms of racial denigration could flourish. The plantation was also marked by excessive brutality and by a conspicuous absence of regulation over planter excesses. Its characteristic social types, notably the planter and the slave, became recognisable cultural figures, crucially important in the development of New World identity and culture. The complex relationship between planter and slave was formative in the development of New World societies, as has been represented in a variety of literary and cultural forms, and was also determinative, to a considerable extent, of politics, society and culture in post-plantation societies right up to the present day.

Some historians have pondered whether the plantation system added much to human experience besides the immiseration of large numbers of people. David Eltis, for example, rather derisively claims that the whole history of the plantation can be attributed to Europe's sweet tooth and

added relatively little to European and North American economic well-being except greatly increased and cheaper amounts of addictive luxury products. Walter Rodney thought the major contribution of the plantation system was to contribute to African underdevelopment.[1] Such diminishments of the impact of the plantation complex are unfortunate. The plantation was a vital early modern institution. It contributed hugely, if only sometimes positively, to shaping the contours of social, economic and political existence in the New World.

Definition of plantation

The first plantations – farms devoted to producing sugar, the quintessential plantation crop – started in the Mediterranean in the late Middle Ages and became established in a form later generations would recognise in the fifteenth century in the Canary Islands, then in Madeira, and finally in São Tomé, an island off West Africa. From there it crossed the Atlantic to northeastern Brazil, where sugar began to be produced in sizeable quantities in the 1540s. The term plantation did not exist in its current form for sixteenth-century Iberians. 'Plantation' was an English term initially denoting an overseas colony, notably in Ireland, that only took its modern form in the eighteenth century. The usual definition of a plantation is a large agricultural enterprise in a tropical country, managed for profit, that produced an export crop for sale in Europe and elsewhere, and which had a labour force that was hierarchically stratified.

Philip Curtin outlines six features that define the mature plantation complex. The most important feature was the labour force, which from the middle of the seventeenth century was normally an enslaved population of people of African descent. That population was generally not self-sustaining and thus relied on fresh importations of people from the Atlantic slave trade to keep population constant. Not all plantation systems had non-self-sustaining populations – the American South managed to achieve natural demographic increase from the 1740s in the Chesapeake and from the 1760s in South Carolina. But sugar plantations in particular were so destructive of health that these plantation systems depended on the Atlantic slave trade for their labour needs. Plantations, moreover, were capitalist enterprises, even if

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[1] David Eltis, *The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), and Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Books, 1972).

they retained some aspects of feudalism, especially in Brazil where plantations were oriented around *engenhos*, or sugar mills, where *lavradores de canha*, small farmers who grew cane, took their canes to mills where it was milled by *senhores de engenhos*. These capitalist enterprises produced for distant markets in Europe and thus were dependent on the vagaries of long-distance trade for their success or failure. Only American tropical societies were so intensely export-oriented – no sections of Europe, Africa or Asia relied as heavily on long-distance trade as did plantation societies. Finally, plantation societies were colonial societies, with political control lying in European imperial systems. Plantation societies thus did not grow autonomously. Each was linked to a particular European country and through that country to the European state system.

The Brazilian model

The plantation is not exclusively for the production of sugar. Planters produced other luxury tropical crops, notably tobacco, cotton, indigo, coffee and rice. But sugar was the most important plantation crop. Its cultivation was the most connected to the development of the plantation complex before the nineteenth century. The Iberians led the way in its cultivation and in its integration into emerging mercantile capitalism, which is ironic because in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Spain and Portugal could hardly be called capitalistic. They also lagged behind other Western European nations in the subsequent development of capitalism.

Iberia's relative lack of involvement in the growth of mercantile capitalism influenced the development of the plantation system. Brazil's plantation system – the most significant early form – retained elements of feudalism, principally the usurpation by private subjects of jurisdictional rights over workers that were usually the province of the state. The most notable consequence of feudal remnants in the plantation was planters' insistence that the great majority of workers had to be owned – fixed costs, in economic terms – rather than hired – variable costs, in capitalist parlance. Coerced labour was integral to the plantation system from the start. Planters always feared the bargaining power that free labourers might have, especially in the critical harvest period where time was always of the essence.

Brazil was ideally suited to sugar production. Northeast Brazil contained large areas of flat land, with good soil and excellent rainfall, fine forests for the supply of firewood and other supplies, and was close to the Atlantic Ocean and transatlantic shipping channels. Sugar cane was first introduced in

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the 1530s by colonists with experience in Madeira and the Canary Islands. These first planters used their contacts in Antwerp, where a market for the sale of sugar that catered to increased demand for sugar in northwest Europe was developing, to get necessary capital to construct *engenhos*. By 1612, Brazil had 192 *engenhos* capable of producing 75 tons of sugar each per annum and total annual production of over 10,000 tons.

The early seventeenth-century Brazilian sugar economy was determined by three factors – the structure of ownership, the supply of labour and access to credit. All of these factors were related to an absence of capital. The lack of large amounts of capital eventually meant that it was difficult for Brazil to compete against more efficient forms of sugar production developed in Barbados in the mid-seventeenth century. The structure of ownership was unusual in that there was a separation between the owners of sugar mills and the farmers producing sugar cane. Such separation put limits on productivity and on profits from economies of scale and was evidence of the diffusion of investment and risk in the Brazilian sugar industry.

Brazilian sugar production depended heavily on bound labour. At first Brazilians used indigenous labour, but demographic decline and growing levels of resistance encouraged them to replace Native Americans with Africans by the end of the sixteenth century. Turning to African slave labour made sense, as the Portuguese had the best access to African slave markets of any European nation. Portugal's well-established connections to Angola allowed Portuguese traders to obtain easily captives who could be taken to northeastern Brazil on voyages that were much shorter than elsewhere in the Atlantic slave trade. The result was dramatically lower mortality rates and a relatively low cost of transhipment, especially compared with voyages to the Caribbean or British North America.

The move from Indian to African labour was of momentous import. African slave labour had many advantages, both over Native American coerced labour and also over European indentured labour, which was the initial form of labour used in British and French America. Africans, adrift from home and without the protection of law or custom, could be worked hard in ways that were impossible for Indians and especially for Europeans. Slaves, for example, generally provided much of their own food needs through being forced to work on their own provision grounds, while indentured servants had to be provided with room and board as part of their terms of indenture. The differences in treatment were especially obvious for women. European women did not work in the fields, but African women were forced to do so, becoming the majority of field

workers in sugar cultivation with many men taking on supervisory or tradesman roles. Moreover, because Africans were owned in perpetuity, they had the time in service to learn the often difficult processes of cultivation and processing tropical crops. Unlike indentured servants, who came to the Americas as young people and seldom worked for planters for more than a few years before going on to other activities, often while aged under 20, African slaves who survived three or four years of 'seasoning' became experienced and productive plantation operatives. The typical slave force was concentrated around men and women in their twenties and thirties. The older age of slaves when compared with servants made sugar plantations more productive and profitable. It also made natural population growth difficult for enslaved people. Women of childbearing years were worked relentlessly and without consideration of their reproductive needs. The result was poor health and low female fertility.

Brazilians, especially in the initial flush of plantation growth, made good money from sugar planting. They were handicapped, however, by lack of access to credit and capital, leading them into considerable indebtedness. Debt was a continual problem everywhere for planters even at the peak of the plantation system. Planters got into debt both because they adopted lavish and unsustainable modes of living and also because the plantation was a voracious consumer of up-front costs that could only be paid through borrowing from local and especially European merchants. Conflict between merchants and planters was endemic in any plantation system. When prices for sugar slumped in the 1620s and as slave resistance increased planter vulnerability and reduced profits, Brazilian prosperity declined. From rapid growth, the mid-seventeenth-century Brazilian sugar industry moved into a long period of stability and low profits. Their place as leaders in the plantation world was taken by English and French planters, who were better integrated than the Portuguese into North Atlantic commercial networks. The Dutch played a vital role in Brazilian decline. They did not become planters themselves – the Dutch proved reluctant to live in slave societies – but they lusted after Brazilian wealth and tried to gain it through attacking Bahia in 1624 and seizing Pernambuco in 1630, which they held until Portugal retook it in 1644. The Dutch learned the techniques of sugar cultivation and played a possibly important role (historians debate the matter) in passing on knowledge about sugar making to English and French planters in the eastern Caribbean and in providing the necessary capital to invest in sugar mills. War between the Dutch and the Portuguese in the 1640s also disrupted Atlantic commerce, leading

to a rise in sugar prices at a very propitious time for Barbadians making the shift to plantation production.

Thus, Brazil's golden age ended just as that of Barbados began. Sugar became less important in Brazil as other activities, notably gold in Minas Gerais, became significant. But Brazil remained the third largest producer of sugar into the nineteenth century and a major producer of other tropical crops such as coffee. While *fazendas*, or sugar estates, did not employ modern management models, they had low costs rooted in an efficient slave trade. Brazil was both the first place to develop the modern plantation complex and the last country, in 1888, to abolish slavery, the system that allowed all plantation systems to flourish. Their model of slave-based plantation labour was long lasting and was copied throughout all sectors of Brazilian society.

The Barbados model

By the early seventeenth century, the potential for profit from the production of sugar was clear. Demand for sugar was high, as it was for other crops produced by plantation methods, such as tobacco, which was grown in quantity and in high quality in the tidewater area of Virginia. The relative roles of supply and demand in the growth of plantation models are much debated. It is clear that supply was important – plantations were the result of an agricultural revolution and a revolution in human capital evaluation with planters finding ever more effective ways of exploiting labour. But demand played a part, too. Sugar moved from being an elite form of consumption to a product that ordinary people could afford. Moreover, plantation products became highly desirable objects. The rise of capitalist farming and manufacture fed into a new culture of consumption symbolised by the fierce appetites of men like Rabelais' Gargantua and Shakespeare's Falstaff. The early seventeenth century saw changes in consumer demand that led people to want to smoke tobacco, drink sweetened coffee and wear clothes made from new textiles especially, as E. A. Wrigley notes, in countries like England where 'steadily growing productivity per head in agriculture had permitted a shift of the structure of demand for necessities and comforts and even luxuries'.[2]

A small, uninhabited West Indian colony first settled by English adventurers in 1627 provided a new model of plantation development. Barbados

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[2] E. A. Wrigley, 'The Transition to an Advanced Organic Economy: Half a Millennium of English Agriculture', *Economic History Review* 59 (2006): 435–80.

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was the crucible in which the mature plantation system was incubated. What Barbadian planters did most crucially was to move away from the dispersed system common in Brazil to a system in which they integrated the growing and processing of sugar cane. Some historians think of this, grandiloquently, as a 'sugar revolution', but, as Russell Menard insists, the process was more evolutionary than revolutionary, with Barbadians moving by trial and error to a new system over a period of nearly thirty years. The main impetus behind the creation of the integrated plantation was falling sugar prices after 1660, which forced planters to innovate in order to improve productivity. The large integrated plantation in which hundreds of slaves worked in gangs producing and processing sugar happened haphazardly and coexisted with the dispersed system. Significantly, this integrated system emerged in Barbados and everywhere else in British America after, not before, the introduction of slavery on a large scale. By the 1650s Barbados was a majority-black population slave society, but it did not have large integrated plantations for at least another twenty years. The key was not so much the adoption of slavery but instead the development of a form of labour organisation that could produce large enough quantities of sugar to bring wealth sufficient for substantial reinvestment. That organisation was the development of ganged labour, with its lockstep discipline and its liberal use of the whip to force slaves to work as hard as possible. With ganged labour, slave forces could dramatically increase until typical slave forces were well over a hundred slaves in the Caribbean and over fifty slaves in British North America.

Barbadians drew on Brazilian experience in creating their version of the plantation, but they had one key advantage denied to their predecessors. They had access to the vast resources of the London capital market and had a number of well-placed merchant friends willing and able to invest in their activities. These merchants saw in ganged sugar plantations ways of making lots of money. Large integrated plantations had major economies of scale when compared with small farms. Those economies of scale worked best when slaves worked in gangs in rhythmic unison. The first mention of gang labour came relatively late in Barbadian history, in 1679 in a tract written by a pioneering planter, Henry Drax. To an extent, forcing slaves to work in gangs was an obvious thing to do, given that most of the work required for growing and processing sugar made sense done in gangs. It was also an obvious path to follow for many Barbadians because the rhythms of ganged labour were akin to rhythms in the military. The bell calling slaves to work was like that used at sea, while the methodical routines of working in gangs

were similar to repetitive marching in step and loading and firing guns in standardised movement common in the new and larger armies of Europe that resulted from the military revolutions of the seventeenth century. Like all French and English plantation societies, Barbados fashioned its social hierarchy around military honorifics. Many of its white residents had experienced being in the English Civil War or had served aboard slave ships. Gang labour was not only similar to drilling. It also involved slaves being subject to ferocious discipline that was not found elsewhere other than in the brutal treatment meted out to common soldiers in late seventeenth-century armed forces.

Gang labour changed African labour patterns in the New World irrevocably. It also made plantation agriculture more profitable than it had been previously. Slave labour was more efficient than other forms of pre-industrial labour less because slaves were worked excessively hard in terms of hours worked but because when they worked, they worked very intensively. Slaves on sugar plantations worked the longest hours, labouring 3,288 hours per year in late eighteenth-century Jamaica. Slaves in rice and tobacco in British North America worked considerably fewer hours but their labours remained very difficult. Planters were relentless in the demands they placed upon enslaved people, willing, while the slave trade operated successfully, to sacrifice slaves' health in order to make a crop. The result was that slaves suffered chronic bad health caused by stress, poor childhood nutrition and onerous and dangerous work, even in advanced pregnancy. The main sufferers were those slaves who worked in the fields, who tended to be women of childbearing age, and children, whose welfare was generally for planters a matter of great indifference. A project comparing 12,000 skeletons from 1000 BC with examples from the early twentieth century ranked slaves who had been field hands in eighteenth-century South Carolina near the bottom of all historical populations, in the same range as pre-Columbian populations facing extinction or demographic disaster.[3]

The switch to the integrated plantation and to gang labour was not uncontested. Africans hated working in gangs and detested the regimentation that gang labour forced upon them. A slave rebel in seventeenth-century Barbados declared that 'The Devel was in the English-man, that he makes everything work, he makes the Negro work, the Horse work, the wood

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[3] Ted A. Rathbon and Richard H. Steckel, 'The Health of Slaves and Free Blacks in the East', in Richard H. Steckel and Jerome C. Rose (eds.), *The Backbone of History: Health and Nutrition in the Western Hemisphere* (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 208–25.

work, the Water work, and the winde work.' Slaves resisted: Barbados went through one of its periodic bursts of slave rebellion, with plots, actual and imagined, uncovered by planters in 1675, 1683, 1686 and 1692. These rebellions were put down with maximum ferocity, with rebel slaves tortured and executed in barbarous fashion in order to cow slaves into obedience.

To a large degree, such repression worked. The shift to ganged plantation labour throughout British and French America marked the nadir of black life in the Americas. As Ira Berlin notes for the Chesapeake, the plantation regime needed raw power to sustain it. Planters mobilised the apparatus of coercion, private and state, in the service of this new regime. Slavery had always been brutal in the Americas, but the level of violence exercised against Africans dramatically increased as the size of slave labour forces grew. After 1700, Chesapeake slaves faced the pillory, whipping post and gallows more frequently and in larger numbers than before. Moreover, the punishments meted out to slaves were not only cruel, they were intended to humiliate and demoralise, such as when William Byrd II of Virginia forced a bedwetting slave to drink a 'pint of piss'. Yet after the initial period of transition to the large integrated plantation, when slave opposition to new demands was considerable, slave rebellions declined in frequency. In British America, the only slave rebellions of real seriousness that occurred before the nineteenth century came in Antigua in 1736 and Jamaica in 1760. Otherwise slaves were forced into quiescence. Planters used strategies of divide and rule as well as ingenious applications of spiritual terror against slave communities, which had lost much of their social bearings in the transit across the Atlantic. This was accompanied by appalling levels of violence and harsh work regimes to keep enslaved people demoralised, traumatised and obedient. Such strategies were largely successful. In Barbados and Virginia, for example, there was no slave revolt in the eighteenth century, despite material conditions for enslaved people markedly deteriorating. Similarly, there was no slave rebellion in Saint Domingue prior to the Haitian Revolution, despite the plantation regime being more onerous (and more profitable to owners) there than anywhere else in the eighteenth-century Americas.

The frequency of slave resistance to new working arrangements helps explain one of the mysteries about the switch to the integrated plantation system. Other slave societies were very slow to emulate the Barbadian example, even though as early as 1680, when a census revealed Barbados to be the wealthiest place in the British Empire, the advantages that the integrated plantation system brought to fortunate owners were evident. Yet it took at least another generation for the integrated plantation to

become dominant in the Leeward Islands and Martinique. Big plantations with 200 or more slaves did not become common in Jamaica until the 1710s or 1720s and it took until the 1720s and 1730s for the integrated plantation to become common in Saint Domingue. The switch to integrated plantation agriculture took longer in the Chesapeake, only really occurring in the 1730s.

The reasons for the slowness of the move seem to lie less in the difficulty of mastering new techniques of production than in the problems planters had in retaining control over large numbers of hostile African men. Managing a gang of traumatised, hostile and potentially violent African slaves was a different proposition from controlling a smaller group of enslaved people. The shift from small-scale to large-scale slave plantations only came about when planters solved the problem of disciplining enslaved people. They solved this problem through the application of terror. To make slaves terrified, planters needed people willing to inflict terror. These people were ordinary white men, acting as overseers on slave plantations. This new subaltern class emerged as a result of three simultaneous developments: the decline in opportunities outside the plantation economy for ordinary white men; the increased presence in plantation America of men who had considerable experience of being brutalised and meting out brutality as soldiers and non-commissioned officers in the large armies of the Nine Years' War (1688–97) and the War of Spanish Succession (1700–13) or as sailors in the increasingly numerous English or British slave ships plying Atlantic waters; and the increasingly racialised disposition of labour on large plantations, where white men were promoted out of indentured servitude into managerial positions as overseers while the vast majority of black slaves were consigned to difficult work as field hands. What planters needed were tough men prepared to do whatever it took to control enslaved men and women working in dreadful conditions. They found such tough men from the ranks of poorer whites, men accustomed to violence and prepared to put up with the hardships of supervising recalcitrant slaves and growing perishable crops in return for good wages and the rewards of white privilege in societies turning from class-conflicted societies into ones with a significant racial caste dimension.

The Atlantic slave trade

The large integrated plantation ate up its workers. In the most complete plantation societies, especially those devoted to sugar, the wastage of human

life in plantation labour was enormous. The migration of nearly 700,000 Africans to Jamaica before 1788 resulted in a slave population of just 211,000. Nearly 800,000 Africans were transported to Saint Domingue between 1680 and 1777 for a population of enslaved people of 290,000. Before the nineteenth century, plantation societies everywhere outside mid-eighteenth-century British North America depended on fresh inputs of labour from the Atlantic slave trade. Without it functioning effectively, plantation life would have been very different.

The Atlantic slave trade was an important means whereby Africa became included in world history. From the perspective of societies in West Africa, the slave trade was not an unalloyed bad thing. It allowed Africans to rid themselves of surplus outsiders. It provided West Africans with European commodities they would have found difficult getting otherwise. It was also only part of a developing trade between Africa and other continents. Slaves only become the dominant export trade in Africa in the late seventeenth century, although by the 1780s when the slave trade was at its peak slaves accounted for over 90 percent of all African exports. It was only after 1700 that the French and English became major players in the trade. And it was only around this time that the slave trade began to play a decisive role in shaping coastal African communities and politics.

Europeans were able to buy captives from Africa because Africans were willing participants in the trade. Indeed, Africans controlled it. They had long experience with slavery, especially in the Islamic north where the enslavement of non-Muslims was customary. They welcomed European traders, but made sure that they were in charge of how slaves were obtained and exchanged. European traders could only succeed if they worked within African norms.

The trade was very complicated and risky, although it offered large potential profits. It involved long stays in Africa, intricate commercial relationships and multiple decisions in order to coordinate supply and demand cycles. The plantation system imposed considerable constraints on what traders did. What they wanted to do was to provide planters with slaves either before or during the harvest season. That meant planning the purchase and passage of slaves with great care. It was very easy to get things wrong and to end up with a voyage that lost money. Planters wanted slaves from some regions rather than others, but generally demand was more pressing than supply and planters had to take whatever slaves they were offered. As planters tended to buy slaves in small numbers either directly from a ship or from an urban slave merchant, and as shipments in British and French

America tended to come from a range of African places, the result was that plantations were usually stocked with slaves from a variety of ethnic origins.

It was a grisly business. The Middle Passage was especially horrible. Hundreds of terrified and naked Africans were sent to the Americas in tightly packed, foul-smelling ships on a 4–6-week journey. The violence was one problem; but dehumanisation was a much bigger issue. It was on these ships that captives became commodities, preparing them for the enslavement that awaited them on arrival. The slave ship was a distinctive social place, a combination of war machine, mobile prison and factory. The Africans who survived the passage – 2 million did not – suffered both emotional trauma and also an ontological crisis of identity. When they entered the ship they became 'socially dead', people who were no longer people but things and cut adrift from all the social ties that had sustained them in their homelands. Slave ships were distinguished by their many 'lacks'. Slaves suffered material and social misery along with cognitive dissonance and were defenceless in the face of the supernatural and in respect of sailors, who were quickly shown to be their enemies. What were left of their truncated psyches were violence, terror and personal self-disintegration.

Sale in America enhanced these feelings of social alienation and psychological distress. Slaves felt like and were treated like livestock and, sent to work on plantations, were made to feel isolated and desolate. Some plantation slaves tried to ease the plight of new slaves, especially if new slaves came from their own African countries, but in general slaves were left to adapt to slavery on their own. The alienation they felt was overwhelming. Even though as they adjusted to slavery, slaves tried to recreate the African cultural patterns they had left behind, it was difficult to overcome the sense of loss that Africans felt in being ripped from their homeland. In such circumstances, the creation of vibrant slave communities was difficult. Nevertheless, the continued addition of people fresh from Africa into societies where memories of Africa remained strong did allow slave communities to retain African cultural practices, notably in family arrangements and in religious practice. It was not until the end of the eighteenth century, for example, that slaves started to convert to Christianity in serious numbers. Until then, slave societies were imbued with a large degree of African cultural forms and remained essentially African in character and aspiration. That Africanness can be seen in periodic slave rebellions, which until the nineteenth century were fashioned according to African values and which aimed for African solutions, such as the creation of African kingdoms, to New World problems.

The mid-eighteenth-century plantation: economic performance

In the 1770s, the plantation system was at its pre-industrial peak. Its economic performance was extraordinary. Produce from plantations amounted to around 40 percent of the trade of the leading European Atlantic states. It was slavery and slave-produced goods that integrated the Atlantic system and which made it so dynamic in the eighteenth century. Even those places that had neither slaves nor plantations were involved in providing goods and services that supported plantation economies. Plantations themselves contributed mightily to imperial coffers. The annual value of colonial exports, the great majority of which came from plantations, just before the American Revolution, was £5.6 million for British America, £5.2 million for French America and £1.8 million for Brazil.

Individual colonies and individuals within colonies were very rich. The wealth of Jamaica increased from under £500,000 in 1680 to over £28 million in 1780, making this small island with just 15,000 free settlers as valuable to Britain as a large county such as Lancashire or Sussex. Whites in the island were fifty times as wealthy as the average person in Britain, and the richest planters, men with 1,000 or more slaves and several plantations, had wealth that only men in the highest reaches of the aristocracy in Britain had. Saint Domingue, the wealthiest plantation colony of them all, accounted for nearly two-thirds of French overseas commerce immediately before the French Revolution. The French plantations were especially valuable. The French outperformed the British in the West Indies as the eighteenth century progressed, despite relatively weak demand for plantation produce in France. One reason for their success was the extent to which state support complemented private initiative. The French government was much more willing than the British to provide considerable help in irrigation and infrastructure works. Good roads and the best modern irrigation systems greatly raised productivity and encouraged Saint Dominguean planters to import huge numbers of Africans into the colony each year in the decade before the Haitian Revolution.

The economic performance of plantation societies has attracted considerable historical attention. One question has been whether plantation slavery provided the momentum for European industrialisation. Slave trade profits and accumulated wealth by planters and merchants reinvested back in the metropolis no doubt provided a stimulus to growth, although it is true that few plantation profits went directly into industrial development. But recent

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work in world history suggests that American land and products gave Western Europe a vital extra edge through 'ghost acres'; Britain in particular was able to pioneer the transition to industrialisation while having available to it the output of acres of highly fertile land in the New World. Having these 'ghost acres' obviated the British needing to devote resources to getting what it gained from overseas produce. Moreover, industrialisation benefited not just from export markets but also from technical innovations in finance and insurance that resulted from long experience with the difficulties of long-distance trade in slaves and slave-produced goods.

A related question has been whether the plantation system was in decline even as it seemed to be at its height in the late eighteenth century. Was the plantation system profitable in itself or, more to the point, was it making the sorts of profit that detracted attention from the growing dynamism of the temperate regions of North America and Europe? A general consensus has emerged that slave owners were not congenitally conservative, backward looking and opposed to any form of innovation. Rather they were active, aggressive and generally successful managers who achieved rising productivity returns from their workers and made usually rising profits. In 1800 the plantation system was not in irreversible decline but on the verge of a new burst of activity. It was profitable, productive and capable of both diversification and also technological and managerial improvement. Perhaps the most remarkable innovation was in planters' approach to developing human capital. Slave men, in particular, were trained as tradesmen or placed in junior supervisory positions as drivers, partly to make the plantation work more efficiently but also in order to increase their value on the market. The result of paying attention to developing capital was not only improved productivity and enhanced profits but also an increase in the capital value of the planter's human capital. The increasing value of slave property – accounting for over 40 percent of non-landed wealth in Jamaica in the 1770s – made investing in slavery an economically logical decision. By the time of the abolition of the slave trade in British America in 1807, when slaves were overpriced by planters paying handsome prices for new slaves and thus stockpiling slaves against future hardship, slaves in the British Caribbean were worth nearly three times what they had been worth thirty years before. Planters' investment in this property made them among the wealthiest businessmen in the world. The abolition of the slave trade put a stop to this expansion of wealth in the British West Indies. The Haitian Revolution destroyed the value of French American plantations overnight, with dramatic consequences for the French metropolitan economy. But as the continued

growth of plantation agriculture in the nineteenth century in the southern United States and in Cuba showed, and as was demonstrated by the spread of the plantation system to places such as Mauritius, the economic potential of plantation agriculture was still strong in 1800.

Planters and slaves

The plantation system created two enduring social types: the planter and the slave. Neither social type was synonymous with the plantation. Slaves especially had existed throughout history and worked in a variety of capacities outside the plantation complex. But in the early modern period the typical slave was a plantation slave, probably an African or a person of African descent, working in sugar cultivation. Planters tended to be white; slaves were overwhelmingly black. Planters were rich; slaves were overwhelmingly poor and indeed constituted easily the largest group of very poor people in the western hemisphere. Planters relied on their slaves for their wealth and slaves were a means of upholding their vaunted independence. They expected slaves to be obedient and devised a variety of means, alongside the state-sponsored violence that at bottom upheld their authority, to impress upon slaves that they were helpless, worthless and dependent upon the planter's goodwill. The plantation system was a complex social order, but in the end it was very reliant upon personal interactions – slavery was a negotiated relationship between one group, planters, who had most of the power but who could not always get their own way, and slaves, who faced large handicaps in trying to establish lives for themselves independent of their master's control but who had a few weapons of their own that they deployed to weaken planters' control over their bodies and their thoughts. It was in the working out of that negotiated relationship that the theory of the plantation – masters ordered and slaves obeyed – was contradicted by complex practice. Masters were, in fact, more reliant on slaves than vice versa and thus had to cajole unwilling slaves to work for them rather than have slaves do willingly what they were required to do.

As a distinctive social type, planters everywhere shared similar social and cultural characteristics. They saw themselves, and were seen by others, as being genteel New World aristocrats whose role was to be the upholder of rural social and economic relations, the person at the top of a harmonious social hierarchy. The planter saw himself as providing leadership and protection to inferiors in return for their respect and obedience. Even more than Old World aristocrats, however, planters' practices belied their beliefs.

Slaves were not European peasants with established if unequal relationships with landowners. Planters refused to recognise slaves either as fully human or as having rights to land or custom that they were obliged to respect. The planter self-image as a hospitable, public-spirited gentleman was not always accepted. European elites thought them irreligious, philistine and barbaric and resented their nouveau riche intrusions into European society – 'overpaid, oversexed and over here' might be a fair summary of how planters were thought of in Europe. And they were considered hypocrites. How, Samuel Johnson quipped, could we take seriously planters' loud protestations about their 'rights' during the American Revolution when they were so intent on depriving Africans of every liberty? Moreover, their proclaimed distaste for black people and justification of racial slavery as an institution that inferior black people were inherently suited for was belied by their compulsive obsession with sampling the sexual charms of black women. If they thought black people so inferior, why were they so willing to have sex with them and produce a new class of mixed-race people?

They were especially considered hypocrites because of their indulgence in brutal methods of slave management. Punishments inflicted on slaves went well beyond humiliation into sadism. Such brutality showed the extent of planter fear about what their slaves might do to them if given the chance. Planters did, of course, sometimes establish ties with slaves that involved a degree of personal intimacy. But, in the main, planters treated slaves with contempt. Outside of the American South, where paternalism had considerable purchase, planters seldom tried to destroy the autonomy of the slave community, although they punished harshly manifestations of slave culture, such as vodou or obeah, which they thought involved dangerous social practices that might compromise planter power. The psychological pressure to obey that planters placed on slaves was not negligible, but the messages they tried to implant about their innate superiority were always undermined by planters' ethical failings.

Slave culture was influenced by their twin identities: coerced workers and unwilling migrants. Like all migrants, African slaves tried to recreate in the Americas what they had left behind in Africa. They congregated where they could with fellow countrymen; they practised African religions; they spoke African languages, although they also had to learn European languages in order to deal with their owners; they performed songs and dances similar to those in Africa; and struggled, surprisingly effectively given the conditions they faced, to establish kin and family relationships that could provide them with some personal stability within functioning communities. Scholars are

divided about how successful these attempts to establish viable cultures of their own were. In some places, such as Bahia, where almost all slaves came from one ethnic region, African customs were very effectively recreated. In other places, such as British North America, where blacks were outnumbered by whites, the cultures established tended to have relatively little African influences and instead were creative adaptations of European and American cultural forms. Everywhere, slaves struggled against alienation, uncertainty and continuing flux in living and working arrangements. They faced much greater difficulties than other migrant groups in controlling their religious, family and cultural lives. Nevertheless, the sheer number of African slaves and their long persistence in American plantation societies made their cultural influences upon all aspects of plantation society in the Americas deep rooted and long lasting.

Reactions against the plantation system

For most of the early modern period the occasional complaint about the horrors of plantation slavery had no discernible effect on metropolitan European opinion. The economic performance of the plantation system was sufficiently strong as to overcome doubts about its morality. Around 1750, however, a small group of evangelical Christians in Britain started to question the ethics of slavery and the slave trade, drawing in part upon a developing ideology of sympathetic humanitarianism in which humans were expected to have some obligations to outsiders, even outsiders of a different racial and ethnic complexion to themselves.

By 1800 the abolitionist movement still had some years to go before slavery came fully under attack. But the signs were there that planters would no longer get their way without opposition. The image of the planter began to change after the American Revolution, an event which not only raised afresh questions of freedom and the extent to which imperial formations should be based upon slavery, but also encouraged Britons to conceive of the planter not as a fellow countryman but as an exotic and disturbing outsider. Alongside abolitionist sentiment, the rise of scientific racism played a role in the demonisation of the planter class as a group overly connected sexually and culturally to Africans, although this did little to improve the ideological position of the African in European discourse. The Haitian Revolution showed graphically that planter assertions that enslaved people were happy under bondage had no basis in fact.

The revolutionary age had mixed implications for slavery. In America, the creation of the United States encouraged abolition in the northern states,

where the plantation system did not exist, but shored up slavery and the plantation system in the southern states, where the great majority of slaves lived. Overall, the American Revolution was a positive event for planters and a negative one for slaves. Its major effect, ironically, was in the British Empire, where conservative evangelicals argued for an empire that had neither slavery nor freedom-loving planters. The French Revolution's impact was even more mixed. It led directly to the Haitian Revolution and the implosion of the greatest plantation system in the Americas. It stopped the French from developing a large tropical empire. But it provided a fillip to the British and the Spanish in the Caribbean and to Americans in Louisiana. These nations quickly filled the void left by the destruction of Haiti by expanding their own plantation systems.

Thus, in 1800 the plantation system and the institution of African chattel slavery that sustained it were far from dead. Even those British abolitionists clamouring to end the slave trade did not foresee an end to the plantation system. Rather they portrayed abolition as a path to amelioration and as a way of reconciling humanitarianism with the national interest while retaining plantation production. But plantations and slavery were not as strong, as institutions, as they had been. The advent of industrialisation provided a different model of economic enterprise to plantation slavery that was soon to exceed the plantation system in economic and social importance. The morality of slavery was no longer in doubt: few people seriously considered it a good thing. And slaves had shown by their own resistance to slavery, notably in Haiti, that they had a different, and compelling, interpretation of human rights than that which had been invented during the cataclysms of the French Revolution. The plantation system was not dead. But it was wounded.

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Industrious revolutions in early modern world history

KAORU SUGIHARA AND R. BIN WONG

Half a century ago the economic history of the early modern world was largely the history of Europeans' economic activities within Europe and their adventures into other world regions. More recently Western scholars have become more aware of the scholarship on the economic histories of other world regions, in particular those with traditions of scholarship that include analysis of economic history. As a result scholars have been able to develop an economic history of the early modern world that compares economic activities across world regions and looks at the connections among them. Connections have proven reasonably straightforward to understand when the data confirming their existence can be assembled. Typically, there is a causal sequence involving some set of actors initiating connections with an array of particular consequences for the different participants. Thus, when European traders went to Asia to buy spices, teas, and textiles and in exchange offer silver, consumers in European markets were able to purchase what were initially exotic goods; Asian consumers, in contrast, did not gain any new products directly, since the silver received by Asian merchants became a key component of Asian money supplies. Comparisons are more difficult to assess than connections because they entail making judgments about similarities and differences. Similarities identify shared properties of a phenomenon and differences relate either to varying particulars of the contexts within which the common phenomenon takes place or to traits found in only one of the two cases. These moves allow the same term to be applied to phenomena recognized to be different in some ways by stressing what is common to both of them – we use "merchant groups," "pirates," and "free trade" to refer to people or practices in different early modern world regions because the terms identify features of distinct situations we want to recognize as similar, but at the same time we realize merchants can be organized differently in some respects, pirates work in very different environments, and free trade was bounded by different constraints. Given this

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historiographical situation, what are we to make of the term "industrious revolution," which has been used by scholars of Europe and East Asia to refer to important features of early modern economies in these two world regions that appear at first glance to be distinct and separate phenomena?

For early modern Europe, Jan de Vries has introduced the term "industrious revolution" to refer to the expansion of consumption despite an apparently constant real wage. In order for people in such circumstances to buy more goods they must choose to work longer hours, to be, in other words, more industrious. Their newly formed tastes for commercially produced goods lead them to sacrifice leisure for more work. De Vries sees these activities as basic preparation for the modern economy typically characterized by the supply-side transformation of production possibilities ushered in by England's late eighteenth-century industrial revolution.[1] The term "industrious revolution" has a very different genealogy in East Asia where it was first used and which de Vries subsequently borrowed and deployed in a distinct manner. In Japan, beginning with Hayami Akira, a number of economic historians have focused on the skills and hard work of common Japanese, which were important both to Japanese commercial growth during the early modern era and to the subsequent path of industrialization taken by the Japanese a century or so after the English began their industrial transformation.[2] This Japanese industrious revolution considers the manner in which Japanese labor in agriculture and craft industry was organized in the early modern era and suggests that these characteristics influenced the subsequent development of skills by Japanese workers during industrialization.[3] For the European usage of the term, the industrious revolution is deemed a demand-driven set of changes in labor efforts tied to a consumer revolution. For the Japanese use of the term, the industrious revolution focuses especially on supply-side changes in the quality and quantities of

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[1] The original article is J. de Vries, "The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution," *Journal of Economic History* 54 (1994): 249–70; his most comprehensive exposition to date is J. de Vries, *The Industrious Revolution: Consumer Behavior and the Household Economy, 1650 to the Present* (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

[2] A. Hayami, *Population, Family and Society in Pre-Modern Japan* (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2009).

[3] A. Hayami, *Population, Family and Society in Pre-Modern Japan*, pp. 64–72 gives a summary of Hayami's original article in 1979. The subsequent Japanese-language writings are summarized in Oshima 2009, especially in the editor's chapters. O. Saito, "Kinben Kakumeiron no Jisshoteki Saikento (The industrious revolution re-examined: a survey of evidence)," *Mita Gakkai Zasshi* 97 (2004): 151–61 refutes Hayami's treatment of the use of animals in Japan, while the first explicit assertion that the industrious revolution existed in China was Sugihara 2004.

labor effort in the agrarian household that created a skilled labor force making subsequent late nineteenth-century labor-intensive industrialization distinct from European patterns of combining capital and labor. There is a clear contrast in the foci of the "industrious revolution" concept for early modern Europe and early modern East Asia – in one, the focus is on demand-related factors and in the other on supply-side features. This could simply mean, of course, that the concept has two distinct meanings and is at best a misleading false cognate. For his part, de Vries has argued that the Japanese did not have the kind of industrious revolution he sees in Europe because they lacked a labor market and thus worked harder on their farms because they had no other choices. But unless we in fact look more closely at both the supply and demand-side features of early modern East Asian and European economies to compare similarities and differences, we cannot establish the existence or confirm the absence of overlap in the ways in which the term "industrious revolution" has been deployed to describe features deemed distinctive to each. Discoveries of difference are a staple of historical scholarship that world history seeks to temper through its attention to both similarities and differences as well as to connections among world regions. If we can find places that share features of the industrious revolutions stressed in the European and Japanese cases, we will be able to delineate a connected landscape of cases that span European and Japanese situations at either extreme. Industrious revolution then becomes a term we can apply across a larger number of cases according to criteria that allow us to consider the presence or absence of an early modern industrious revolution in other world regions.

One obvious area to turn to in order to look for both European and Japanese industrious revolutions is China. Like Europe, China is a big spatial unit with a large commercial economy. Like Japan, early modern China is populated by a predominantly peasant population working small plots of land, many of which are planted in rice. The first section of this chapter considers the global social and political context that a common climate-induced general crisis in the seventeenth century set for economic activities. The second section of the chapter considers the parallel and distinct dimensions of the expansions of early modern commerce in Europe and East Asia, elements of which are central to the changes in the consumption behavior of Europeans that is a basic trait of the European industrious revolution. The third section moves from commodity markets to the markets for factors of production, most importantly for labor but also those for land. This leads us to consider the different ways craft production was organized in Europe and

East Asia and how such differences are key elements in a larger set of contrasts between urban and rural settings of economic activities in early modern Europe and East Asia. Arguments can be made that both European wageworkers and East Asian peasants worked harder and relied increasingly on markets for consumption. In terms of working more and making market purchases, Europe and East Asia shared an industrious revolution that was situated in contrasting social structures. Some important craft activities located in urban Europe were found instead in rural East Asia. The urban locations of European crafts had unintended consequences for the likelihoods of technological change taking place in the two world regions. We look more closely at how people in East Asia took on additional kinds of work in early modern agrarian settings in ways that contrast with the more limited possibilities present in European settings. This would influence the manner in which late nineteenth-century industrialization unfolded in East Asia, and make it different from Europe. By looking at the industrious revolution from the vantage points of what scholars initially argued was distinctive to both Europe and Japan, with the addition of material on China, we will put ourselves in a position to generate a taxonomy of meanings for an early modern industrious revolution in world history, the subject of the fifth and final section of the chapter.

Two kinds of comparison are crucial to our goal of identifying an industrious revolution common to both Europe and East Asia. First and most obviously we are interested in the similarities and differences we can identify between East Asia and Europe. But to be sure we have correctly identified these traits, we have to distinguish the constellation of similarities and differences between world regions from the range of similarities and differences that we encounter within each world region. In other words, the traits of the European world region industrious revolution are not equally present through all of Europe or even all of what we conventionally label as Western Europe. Similarly, the traits highlighted in a Japanese industrious revolution are not equally present in all of Japan, let alone all of East Asia, despite our ability to find many traits of the Japanese industrious revolution in economically dynamic parts of early modern China. When we consider differences thought to be significant to what accounts for different paths of economic change in Europe and East Asia, we also have to consider that these paths share certain features even when differences, such as those of economic institutions, could lead us to assume that different economic results necessarily follow. This will become readily apparent when we examine commercial expansion according to the principles of supply and demand

and a division of labor that allows people to specialize and produce and exchange over larger spatial scales, a phenomenon labeled in some of the early modern economic history literature as Smithian growth, after Adam Smith and his arguments in *The Wealth of Nations*. Finally, we need to distinguish the efforts of scholars who coined the term "industrious revolution" for Europe and for Japan to identify features of their respective economic histories that preceded the industrial revolution from the exercise of explaining the industrial revolution itself, a complex event well beyond the capacity of the industrious revolution to explain adequately, however much authors seek to claim the industrious revolution as contributing to modern economic growth in both East and West. We seek to avoid conflating the industrious and industrial revolutions since the linkages suggested from each world region in the literature are different enough to lead us back to our initial concern that the term is simply being applied to different and possibly incommensurate subjects for early modern Europe and early modern Japan. By including China in our analysis, we will find the term "industrious revolution" does indeed apply to related but distinct phenomena in at least two early modern world regions. The similarities encourage us to consider carefully how important demand-side changes in the early modern era were to subsequent industrialization. The differences, on the other hand, alert us to variations in the ways labor was deployed during industrialization processes in Europe and East Asia. The application of the term "industrious revolution" to diverse places where labor and consumption were reorganized in the early modern era was made in 1994, but to date there has been little effort to connect comparisons of the phenomena covered by the term in different world regions.[4]

A world of economic crisis and political competition

Before the second half of the nineteenth century there were few places where urban populations engaged in industrial production came close to the numbers of people living in rural areas pursuing agricultural production as their main economic activity. Between 1500 and 1800 in most parts of the world some 80 to 90 percent of the population lived in agrarian settings and the material quality of their daily lives depended on the quality of each year's

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[4] C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 52–6.

harvests. The frequency of climate-induced harvest troubles during the Little Ice Age that afflicted much of the world between the 1640s and 1690s exceeded the food supply insecurities before or after this half century of difficulties. Nature's havoc was signaled by portents of trouble connecting the natural and supernatural worlds of human imagination. Human actions themselves also contributed to the chronic insecurities of the age with the widespread use of violence as a means to compete for resources and territory in Europe and to challenge authorities to manage the social and natural worlds of East Asia more effectively.[5]

Faced with difficult economic circumstances, common people actively expressed their displeasure over scarce food supplies, targeting both the merchants who exacerbated locally short supplies by buying for sale in other locales with yet higher prices and officials who failed to protect their subsistence. Worse yet, European governments continued to tax people and at times even raised additional taxes through the Little Ice Age to pay for the armies battling each other for territory. War making was the most violent form of inter-state competition for wealth and power that pitted European rulers against each other. Their competition extended to a maritime competition for wealth. In the Americas, the Spanish mined silver that was a major source of their wealth and power, while the English and other Europeans sent greater numbers of white settlers to temperate climates of North America, and black slaves worked the lands in the hotter, more humid south of North America and in South America and the Caribbean. In Asia, European merchants organized by their governments to compete with each other and to supply their respective governments with revenue as they made their profits epitomized the intimate connection drawn between wealth and power by European rulers and their merchant elites. The political economy of mercantilism focused more on competition between European states both within Europe and in American and Asian world regions than it addressed issues of domestic welfare during the Little Ice Age.

In East Asia there was not any inter-state competition comparable to Europe's. Japan was unified in 1600 under the Tokugawa Shogunate; military conflicts were ended and the central government was not competing with other states to produce goods for sale abroad in order to amass more money. China was the size of Europe, but what in Europe were competitive political relations among states were in China relations among provinces framed by

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[5] G. Parker, *Global Crisis: War, Climate Change & Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013).

their common subordination to central authority. Central, provincial, and county levels of government all promoted principles of expanding agricultural and craft production. Sustaining domestic social order led the government to pursue a mix of policies to promote material prosperity, persuade people to follow common cultural practices, and register households in order to tax them and keep track of their activities. Issues of domestic order on an empire-wide scale in China were inter-state relations in Europe, relations marked by competition and conflict.

The general crisis set in motion by the Little Ice Age undermined the environmental basis of agriculture across Eurasia, which in turn fostered social unrest that was met in differing ways by governments. European political competition and its spread to other world regions created opportunities to generate wealth and power that did not place additional hardships on already hard-pressed subject populations. Chinese imperial commitments to social order meant more deliberate investments to respond to disasters, while the Japanese, for their part, were less affected by the climate changes. Given an environmentally driven crisis with major economic consequences and political impacts, the facts that people were working harder and relying more on markets were likely not very noteworthy to many people of the era, who for the most part were probably quite pleased to have survived the challenges and dangers of the seventeenth century. As environmental conditions improved in the eighteenth century, the industrious revolution's demand-side features in Europe and supply-side features in East Asia became increasingly visible. We turn next to the demand side of economic changes and the expansion of commercial consumption.

Changing consumption: European transformations in East Asian perspectives

The concept of a European industrious revolution helps us conceive of how an expansion of commercial consumption could have taken place through a period of economic hardship, social turmoil, and political conflict, all of which were either set in motion or exacerbated by the environmental difficulties of the Little Ice Age. Despite the frequently harsh and often difficult circumstances of the early modern era, at least some people in both Europe and East Asia were able to satisfy their desires for an expanding set of commercial goods made possible by increased production reaching larger numbers of people engaged in market exchanges. The changing consumption patterns in Europe and in East Asia, especially China, suggest similarities

that depend on parallel developments of commercial exchange and differences that include how the circuits of exchange within East Asia and Europe became connected.

Within Europe, the expansion of early modern commerce was facilitated by changes in perceptions of economic activity. In contrast to medieval injunctions against avarice and excessive consumption, seventeenth- and especially eighteenth-century writers began to speak of consumption in more positive terms. Luxury was still frowned upon, but the aspiration to sustain a stable and healthy growth of consumption absent violent oscillations of dearth and excess is basic to Adam Smith's economic logic and moral vision in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, a text that complements the more famous arguments in *The Wealth of Nations*. Without being certain that similar sensibilities emerged elsewhere, it is easy to imagine that these changes in European attitudes enabled changes not possible in other world regions. To be sure, we would want to learn what kinds of arguments were made in favor of commerce in other world regions. We would need to parse the similarities and differences in such arguments since some may be context-specific; for instance, the great concern Europeans had about markets being a venue through which to channel man's passions and bellicose nature was prompted by the widespread negative impacts of war making on people's lives. Across China, a similarly sized space in which far more people lived, such concerns would have been far less likely, because there was a single government rather than a group of often hostile states.[6]

Merchant-organized private commerce was several centuries old in some parts of the Chinese Empire when a sixteenth-century spread of merchant networks and increase in market towns across many parts of the empire created an economy that was simultaneously agrarian and commercial. Most production across the empire took place in rural settings and towns closely connected to their hinterlands economically, politically, and culturally. Government policies deliberately promoted commercial exchange in several ways.[7] First, transit taxes were generally low; when some area experienced severe food shortages, these taxes were lifted in order to give merchants even greater incentive to ship in grain. Second, the government, especially in the eighteenth century, made multiple adjustments to commercial policies in

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[6] A. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism* (Princeton University Press, 1977).

[7] R. B. Wong, *China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 127–51.

order to promote effective complementary relations between merchants transporting goods and resident brokers to whom they sold their cargo. Third, and especially obvious in contrast to Europe, the imperial Chinese state promoted peace across an area the size of Europe where the pursuit of wealth and power included war making.

The realities of war in Europe did not mean, of course, that merchants were not socially seen in a positive light. Indeed, much has been made of the high esteem in which the bourgeoisie was held as key to the triumph of capitalism.[8] Signs of cultural approval for merchants in Europe can be contrasted with the cultural stereotype of merchants being socially despised in East Asia because they did not directly create wealth like peasants or craftsmen, nor did they contribute to ruling society like the educated literati who became officials did. But beneath this veneer of social disapproval, merchants in both China and Japan proved able to fashion culturally credible arguments for their virtues grounded in Confucian understandings of the economic benefits of commerce.[9] In China, the absence of corporate elite identities found in both Europe and Japan meant that the passage of merchant wealth into literati elite status faced fewer institutional barriers. The easier institutional integration of merchants into a broader elite defined by education and landholding meant that the cultural sensibilities of Chinese elites were more easily shared. Issues of taste and techniques for the acquiring, safe keeping and display of desirable cultural objects, including paintings, calligraphy, bronzes, and pottery, were settled by literati elites, some of whom published books designed to educate wealthy early modern Chinese merchants on the proper means of consumption.[10]

From household division records, we know that families in the wealthier parts of the empire or families who accumulated some measure of wealth from commerce had consumer durables in the form of furniture. Indeed, while their possessions differed somewhat from those in European probate inventories, it is possible and perhaps even likely that furniture was more common in Chinese property divisions than in European probate

[8] D. McCloskey, *The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce* (University of Chicago Press, 2006).

[9] T. Najita, *Visions of Virtue in Tokugawa Japan: The Kaitokudo Merchant Academy of Osaka* (University of Chicago Press, 1987); R. Lufrano, *Honorable Merchants: Commerce and Self-Cultivation in Late Imperial China* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997); T. Brook, *The Confusions of Pleasure: Commerce and Culture in Ming China* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 215–16.

[10] C. Clunas, *Superfluous Things: Material Culture and Social Status in Early Modern China* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991).

inventories.[11] Certainly Chinese commentators began to recognize the importance of promoting consumer demand in order to give skilled artisans employment some two centuries before Mandeville's better known eighteenth-century statements calling on all people to pursue their desire for goods as a way to create a greater common good.[12] While some other Chinese commentators continued to counsel frugality in order to assure reserves for years of hardship, the principle of consumer demand to keep artisans employed was also understood. The two principles addressed two features of the pre-industrial economy common to both East Asia and Europe, as well as the rest of the world. First, annual incomes fluctuated with the harvests as the supply of food drove economic activity more generally; the logic of frugality made sense globally given these conditions. Second, in societies with skilled artisans producing goods for the market, it was important that demand for such goods be kept up in order to keep the craft labor force employed. While the extent of market-based consumption in China and Europe is difficult to estimate, they may well have differed in ways that made European consumption appear relatively greater for two reasons. First, the relative importance of urban-based consumption was higher in Europe and urban consumption appears better documented. Second, early modern Europe's consumer revolution depended upon the influx of new and exotic goods from overseas, which increases their visibility in the historical record.

The literature on Europe's consumer revolution focuses on urban consumers and most especially on the wealthier among them. Retail markets were concentrated in urban centers. In China, however, marketing networks extended well into the countryside so that agrarian households routinely purchased goods on the market. China likely had more people who consumed goods purchased on the market than did Europe, even if, as is also likely, more Chinese consumed a combination of goods they produced themselves and those they purchased commercially than was the case in Europe. A second reason for Europe's consumer revolution being more visible concerns the geographic origins of new goods. The introduction of Chinese porcelains, silks, and teas, as well as Indian cotton textiles and spices, sugar, and coffee from other world regions, into Europe all depended on

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[11] R. Wu, *Wan Ming de xiaofei shehui yu shidafu* (Late Ming Consumption Society and the Gentry) (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lianjing chubanshe, 2007), pp. 215–57.

[12] J. Huang, *Minsheng yu jiaji: qingchu zhi minguo shiqi Jiangnan jumin de xiaofei* (People's Livelihoods and Family Livelihoods: Consumption in Jiangnan from the Early Qing to Republican Era) (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2009), pp. 336–8.

Europeans purchasing Asian goods and making claims on territories and people in the New World where coerced labor yielded products European consumers could afford more cheaply than if they had been produced with wage labor. A third reason is historiographical; we simply have more scholarship on early modern European consumption than we do on Chinese and Japanese consumption. For China, Zheng Yangwen has made clear the growing fascination with "yanghuo" (foreign goods) beginning by the late fifteenth century and continuing thereafter.[13] Opium was the foreign good consumed increasingly by elites in the eighteenth century and by the 1820s and 1830s had spread to the common people, who provided the demand satisfied by British merchants importing Indian opium.[14]

Replacing silver exports to China with Indian opium sales was one important change the British made around the turn of the nineteenth century regarding their trade with Asia. A second was finding a way to reduce their imports of Indian cotton textiles. They were spurred to develop the technologies making it possible for them to substitute for the imported Indian cotton textiles with domestic production, the first stage of European industrialization. Within a seventeenth- and eighteenth-century context, international trade relations and the European political economy making such relations possible were both crucial to enabling Europeans to enjoy a consumer revolution associated with the European industrious revolution. Chinese commercial consumption did not depend on European kinds of political economy. Both China and Europe developed new cultures of taste and fashion that were met by craftspeople able to create fine craft goods. Urban wealth in both societies made possible some of the most visible consumption, but Europeans more than Chinese depended upon extractive relations with people in other world regions to open their access to new goods.

Different kinds of political economy in East Asia and Europe provided contexts for the consumer revolutions found within each. But the expansion of consumption in Asia does not mean necessarily that there was a European-like industrious revolution in Asia, for the "industrious" nature of the consumption changes depended on people working harder in order to buy more goods on the market. Consumption may have increased because the incomes of certain strata of society increased. But increases in income were

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[13] Y. Zheng, *China on the Sea: How the Maritime World Shaped Modern China* (Boston, MA: Brill, 2012), pp. 207–42.
[14] Y. Zheng, *The Social Life of Opium in China* (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

more important as a source of increased consumption in Asia since consumers there did not benefit as did European consumers from overseas extraction. Given the better than market terms from which Europeans benefited for some of their consumption, Chinese were therefore more likely to need to work harder to increase their commercial consumption than were Europeans. This situation makes it difficult to understand the plausibility of Europe experiencing an industrious revolution that was absent in East Asia. When we shift from issues of consumer demand to the nature of labor supplies, we discover how East Asia did indeed have an industrious revolution, even if it differed in important ways from that identified in Europe.

Working harder in the early modern world: labor, markets, and consumption

Jan de Vries distinguishes the greater efforts European workers made compared with those made by either Chinese or Japanese in two ways. First, he notes Philip Huang's argument for Chinese farming households: that they had no choice but to self-exploit in order to avoid falling into more extreme poverty. Second, de Vries suggests that Japanese farming households working more was not a matter of choice since the Japanese lacked labor markets.[15] Taken together, the two observations point to constraints rather than choices as determining the greater amounts of Chinese and Japanese peasant labor efforts. There are both empirical and conceptual issues at stake in these contrasts of how and why people became more industrious. The Chinese case of peasants being driven by Malthusian pressures creates a link between motivations and results – blindly driven by the needs of biological survival, poor peasants could hardly create a consumer revolution. If the premise of Malthusian pressures proves false, we need to consider further both the motivations for Chinese peasants working harder and the impact of their efforts on consumer demand. If the Japanese case of peasants condemned to work within the family because their economy lacked labor markets is not true in either Japan or China, yet we still find peasants working within the household rather than entering the labor market, the

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[15] J. de Vries, "Industrious Peasants in East and West: Markets, Technology and Family Structure in Japanese and Western European Agriculture," *Australian Economic History Review* 51 (2011): 142.

issue of labor choices in East Asia needs to be placed in the context of how labor is allocated within the household as a firm and on labor markets.

Huang's view of the early modern Chinese peasant household exploiting female labor engaged in textile production turns out to depend upon an arithmetic error that deflated female earnings to only 10 percent of what they in fact were in the example he presented.[16] Other scholarship based on more data has compared the productivity of Jiangnan agrarian households with households in the Netherlands and England. Li and van Zanden find that Dutch GDP per capita was roughly twice the Chinese GDP per capita in an area roughly corresponding to modern Songjiang County in 1820. The difference was due to the even larger gap in productivity in the industrial and service sectors. In contrast, agricultural productivity was very similar.[17] Bob Allen has compared Li's data with English data through a careful farm accounting model to conclude that labor productivity in the Yangzi Delta was some 90 percent of that in England in 1800.[18] Together these comparisons of parts of Jiangnan with Europe's most economically advanced early modern economies suggest that agricultural productivity in Jiangnan was not the problem that Philip Huang posited in his dire involution scenario. If Jiangnan peasants were not driven by poverty far greater than that confronted by English and Dutch farmers, their working harder was likely fueled by a desire for additional commercial products.

The basic economic difference between Jiangnan and the English and Dutch cases resided in the European cases being high wage economies and Jiangnan, like the rest of China and Europe, being lower wage economies. For England, being a high wage economy provided the economic rationale to develop labor-saving machinery. Bob Allen has demonstrated how the development of technological innovations in cotton textile production was pioneered in England because it was a high wage economy.[19] But just being a high wage economy was not enough, as Jan Luiten van Zanden observes of the Netherlands:

> The slow development of the economy in the period between 1800 and 1850 is seen as the continuation of the relative stagnation of national economy

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[16] K. Pomeranz, "Facts are Stubborn Things: A Response to Philip Huang," *Journal of Asian Studies* 62 (2003b): 167–81.

[17] B. Li and J. L. van Zanden, "Before the Great Divergence? Comparing the Yangzi Delta and the Netherlands at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of Economic History* 72 (2012): 956–89.

[18] R. C. Allen, "Agricultural Productivity and Rural Incomes in England and the Yangzi Delta, *c.*1620–*c.*1820," *The Economic History Review* 62 (2009): 525–50.

[19] Allen, "Agricultural Productivity and Rural Incomes": 525–50.

during the eighteenth century. The factors which hindered industrialization, such as high wages in the coastal provinces, were closely linked to the socio-economic structure which emerged in the seventeenth century.[20]

In early modern Europe, high wages were an indicator of successful commercial capitalism. In both the Dutch and English cases, early modern commercial capitalism involved a combination of domestic market development and the reaping of large profits from maritime exchanges on Asian markets. The British Industrial Revolution was, in part at least, a story of import substitution.[21] But the Dutch did not make the same kind of move as the British. At a minimum, we can suggest that the kinds of changes leading to industrialization would emerge in a high wage economy, even as other contextual factors either improved or diminished the likelihood of this occurring. High wages affected commercial economies in seemingly opposite ways. On the one hand, high wages could stimulate labor-saving technological changes; on the other hand, high wages could reduce the abilities of entrepreneurs to use technologies that could be used elsewhere with lower labor costs.

The shift from commercial capitalism to industrial capitalism is also the moment when data for workers adding hours to their daily routine become available. It is difficult to find much evidence that European workers chose to work more during the early modern era before the onset of factory industry. The direct evidence for workers extending their work hours comes from Britain and from a longer working day coming as industrialization begins between 1760 and 1820. De Vries recognizes that increased work intensity could be attributed to the need that workers felt to work harder in order to fend off poverty, but counters that a main cause of eighteenth-century European economic growth was the increased amounts of market-oriented labor.[22] The two assertions are not in fact necessarily incompatible. One of the results of England's early modern high wage economy beginning industrialization was that numerous craft workers who enjoyed high wages lost

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[20] J. L. van Zanden, "Industrialization in the Netherlands," in M. Teich and R. Porter (eds.), *The Industrial Revolution in National Context: Europe and the USA* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 80.

[21] S. Broadberry and B. Gupta, "Lancashire, India, and Shifting Competitive Advantage in Cotton Textiles, 1700–1850: The Neglected Role of Factor Prices," *Economic History Review* 62 (2009): 279–305.

[22] J. de Vries, *The Industrious Revolution: Consumer Behavior and the Household Economy, 1650 to the Present* (Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 114–21.

their employment – they were replaced by machines. As Bob Allen expressed the issue in a recent paper:

> As industry was mechanized, there was technological unemployment and falling wages for those who remained in the handicraft sector. The "standard of living question" was the result of the liquidation of the traditional sectors that were responsible for the prosperity of the eighteenth century. The standard of living problem was big because these sectors were large.[23]

Part of the visible concern over standards of living and the related phenomenon of people working longer days during the era of initial industrialization therefore is related to the gap in wages for skilled craft workers and factory workers, even as these factory workers had wages higher than those in other countries. Ironically, we have better direct pre-factory evidence of Chinese and Japanese working harder than we have for European workers because in the East Asian cases the changes take place in rural households in which people are adding work through a diversification of activities requiring more labor. Examples from Jiangnan typically involve textile craft production. Women in some households begin to weave cotton cloth, often buying their thread at a local market and then weaving cloth to be sold on the market. Silk production involved even more opportunities for adding work hours to the household's labor efforts. Planting mulberry trees from which the leaves to feed silk worms were gathered made it possible for a single household to integrate the different steps of silk production from the creation of the thread to the weaving of the cloth. The silk worm excrement dropped into ponds in which fish were raised. This diversity of craft and crop activities added work hours for the purpose of producing goods for sale.[24] The incomes gained from such activities made it possible for these same people to purchase goods as consumers. The case of cotton textile production is especially important because it became an increasingly common craft activity between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, not only in Jiangnan, but in other parts of China as well.

Only if East Asia had no labor markets whatsoever should we suspect that the absence of labor markets was a constraint on the efficient allocation of labor. As long as some labor markets existed, the issue is how labor was allocated within the firm and on the market, recognizing that the division

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[23] R. C. Allen, "The High Wage Economy and the Industrial Revolution: A Restatement," *University of Oxford Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History* (2013): 115.
[24] M. Elvin, *The Pattern of the Chinese Past* (Stanford University Press, 1973); B. Li, *Agricultural Development in Jiangnan, 1620–1850* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).

between firm and market varies. In China there certainly were labor markets for male agricultural labor, both short-term and long-term.[25] In Japan, as we discuss further below, some young women went into domestic service in other households. The fact that labor markets were not used more extensively suggests that there were other ways to combine factors of production efficiently. For China, in addition to a factor market for labor, there was one for agricultural land. Land could be bought and sold as well as rented in or out. If Chinese women produced cotton textiles at home rather than in some off-farm workshop, the absence of labor markets does not appear to be the likely reason. Chinese women were not condemned to remain in the family and thus suffer dramatically lower incomes than they would have achieved entering the labor market. The one carefully formulated and empirically rich comparison of female incomes from textile production in Britain and Jiangnan finds that the Chinese incomes are higher in the seventeenth century, but only two-thirds the level of British female incomes in the early nineteenth century. When the Jiangnan agrarian family's income is compared with a Midlands family where the man is in agriculture and the woman is employed in textiles, but they work separately, mediated by market relations, the difference in the family incomes is only 5 percent, not a level of difference to suggest that Chinese and British people chose to work harder for fundamentally different reasons or with significantly different results.[26]

East Asians and Europeans appear to have worked harder for similar reasons in their early modern situations. In general, when given opportunities to work more, East Asian rural households did so. Increased commercial exchange with people working more hours is also more readily visible in Jiangnan than in England or the Netherlands. We can see how agrarian households in Jiangnan actually increased the amount of labor they performed. The European industrious revolution, by contrast, implies longer working hours from the combination of increased commercial consumption and largely flat real wages. We do not observe European workers directly working additional hours until the shift from craft production to factory production. The dynamics of the demand-side stimulus for the industrious revolution is more similar in Europe and East Asia than de Vries has

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[25] Y. Liu, *Qingdai qianqi nongye zibenzhuyi mengya chutan* (A Preliminary Discussion of Early Qing Dynasty Sprouts of Agricultural Capitalism) (Fujian Renmin Chubanshe, 1992).

[26] Allen, "Agricultural Productivity and Rural Incomes": 525–50.

suggested. One major difference is the political economy of European commercial capitalism that brought in new goods that were part of the consumer revolution at prices below those that would have obtained were these goods produced by wage labor. The absence of any similar change in East Asia meant they had to be more industrious to achieve the same increment in commercial consumption, so even if we suppose that they did not increase commercial consumption to quite the degree achieved by Europeans, they may have been at least as industrious. When we turn to supply-side differences in the characteristics of the labor that began to work harder, we observe a situation that supports the conclusion that an industrious revolution also took place in East Asia.

Industriousness and the typology of work in early modern East Asia and Europe

In order to discuss more carefully the notion of *industriousness*, we need to address the question of how work was perceived in the early modern world with reference to agricultural work, the mainstay of economic activities. It is crucial to do this, because we want to avoid projecting the perception of the industrial society back to this period and assessing the industriousness of pre-industrial work in that light. Focus on guilds and artisans is also problematic, as this considers only a minority of the population. Early modern notions of work in rural settings vary region by region, and we can only get a general idea through the reconstruction of perceptions taken from different regions. In this section we attempt to establish the general notions that would accommodate similarities and differences between East Asia and Europe.

It is easier to compare regional experiences of modern, industrial notions of work than pre-industrial ones, because there have been much greater technological and institutional interactions, indeed a degree of convergence, between world regions in the modern era. But we should not assume that the European lead in the history of the industrial revolution implies that earlier regional notions of work did or should have converged. It is much more likely that each world region took on the challenge of industrialization differently, by utilizing specific attributes, industriousness for example, engrained in predominantly agrarian settings. As there were regional varieties of Smithian growth, so there were also variations in notions and qualities of work in East Asia and Europe. The most obvious literature that addressed this issue is the work of Thomas

C. Smith on Japan,[27] which was inspired by a provocative work of E. P. Thompson on England.[28] While Thompson depicted artisanal workers' resistance to the introduction of machinery and the factory system in late eighteenth- to early nineteenth-century England, and described the nature of common customs and prevailing work habits that induced it, Smith noted that there was no such resistance in Meiji Japan, and discussed how differently industrial workers emerged there.

Smith's Japanese peasant farmer managed his time as carefully as any English factory worker did, but in a very different manner. The whole process was based on the dawn to dusk pattern of agricultural time. Temple bells rang in accordance with ecological time, rather than mechanical clock time. The intensity of work was not measured according to physical strength and punctuality necessary to carry out manual labor within the machine-dominated factory environment or the modern transport system operated by the timetable. The quality of work was related more to an ability to adjust to weather patterns, respond to ecological disasters (water shortages or insect attacks), and cooperate with others to address these problems. Useful and reliable knowledge, and general and inter-personal skills, were central to the execution of good or *careful* work.

The peasant farmer typically managed a plot of land, either of his own or as a tenant; in Japan, as well as China, the number of agricultural laborers was negligible. This meant that almost all farmers had a degree of managerial experience, such as securing seeds for the next season, determining the timing of transplanting, and organizing harvest labor by collaborating with villagers. A major element of this managerial task was to absorb and allocate family labor. The household unit was normally multi-occupational, centering on rice farming, but including the production of other commercial crops and proto-industrial work. To cite Smith on a relatively commercialized village in Southwestern Japan around 1840:

> Every able-bodied person works at salt making and other employments insofar as farming permits... In time free from farming, men make rope and rush mats and other articles by hand; and women work in the salt fields from the third to the eighth month and during the rest of the year devote themselves exclusively to weaving cotton cloth, ... (quoted in Smith, 1988: 83).

[27] T. C. Smith, *Native Sources of Japanese Industrialization, 1750–1920* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988).

[28] E. P. Thompson, "Time, Work-discipline, and Industrial Capitalism," in E. P. Thompson, *Customs in Common* (New York: New Press, 1991).

The unit could also include sending daughters to a nearby village for domestic work, confirming the existence of a labor market and the choices the household had to make regarding market trends (e.g. price of rice, salt or cotton cloth, and wages) and economic geography (e.g. distance, availability of transport, risks), as well as ecological and micro-managerial knowledge.

The perception of work was crucially related to the perception of livelihood, as the household as a unit of production was simultaneously a unit of reproduction. Changes in the composition of the availability of family labor as a result of a marriage or the birth of a child were to be predicted and responded to carefully, and the allocation of labor was to be planned accordingly well ahead of time. This involved an assessment of the burden of domestic work (cooking, washing, and cleaning) and the need for care (for children and the old), in addition to the organization of the "productive" part of the workload. Similar concerns in China were framed by the same cultural stress upon filial piety and loyalty in a Neo-Confucian vocabulary; in practical terms this led to notions of duty, discipline, and commitment to developing a labor-intensive technology as labor was allocated according to needs determined by the family life cycle. Labor-intensive technology and labor-absorbing institutions were developed in China by the seventeenth century, and they in fact influenced the development of the Japanese path, in spite of the fact that the family system was very different in the two countries. Although the scarcity of land was perhaps not as acute in China as in Japan, small land holdings centered on rice farming remained a lasting feature of the East Asian path.

China and Japan did differ in the size of their market economies. The Lower Yangzi delta, with a population size similar to Japan's, was part of a larger international division of labor in Asia. Water buffalo were imported from Southeast Asia for agricultural work, while bean cake was imported from north China to enrich the soil: rice and commercial crops such as sugar and proto-industrial goods such as cotton and silk textiles were exchanged with less developed parts of the empire, so that the Lower Yangzi delta was much more a center of the early modern East Asian regional economy than Japan ever was. The result was the growth of an internationally dynamic commercial exchange with diverse consumption patterns, active land and land lease markets, and migration to and from other parts of the empire. In these respects the Chinese case should be recognized as the typical East Asian pattern in which early modern notions of work came to be cultivated. On the other hand, there are good reasons why the perception of work in Tokugawa Japan is particularly worthy of note, and indeed was picked up for a contrast

with the West in the literature. One feature that did not exist in China to the same extent as in Japan was a stable social environment in which to concentrate on a small but gradual rise in land productivity. The highly regulatory state offered peace and stability for more than two centuries, with relatively limited impact from abroad (threats of epidemics and foreign invasion were extremely limited). For example, the prospect of buying a silk kimono for a dowry gave a good incentive for cultivating the sense of industriousness within the family. Under such circumstances it was easier in Japan than in China to focus on labor absorption and raise the quality of labor, instead of pursuing the gains from trade and economies of scale. Yet markets certainly mattered in Japan. Osamu Saito suggests that not only the commodity market but both labor and land markets were at work in Tokugawa Japan to a degree significant enough to qualify for Smithian growth.[29] Market forces were crucial for the cultivation of early modern notions of industriousness in Japan. In particular, the growth of rural industries in the second half of the eighteenth century not only undermined the industries in urban areas and nearby districts where wages rose, but also contributed to the growth of the population, female employment, and the correction of the biased sex ratio (partly arising from the practice of female infanticide). In this respect the Japanese case is similar to China's, and differs in character from Western Europe where the dichotomy between cities and countryside played an important role in the context of proto-industrialization.

In the East Asian case, household labor allocation and coordination became an integral part of industriousness, as a result of great diffusion of the (predominantly cotton) textile industry, involving a very large amount of female labor.[30] Proto-industrialization under the East Asian peasant economy offered a much richer ground for the absorption and coordination of family labor across the population, at a low cost with a possibility of the improvement of the quality of labor, than did its European counterpart. Thus, industriousness prevailed among the majority of the population in China, but with greater emphasis on the exploitation of market opportunities, compared with Japan. The combination of labor absorption and market

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[29] O. Saito, "An Industrious Revolution in an East Asian Market Economy? Tokugawa, Japan and Implications for the Great Divergence," *Australian Economic History Review* 50 (2010): 240–61.

[30] K. Pomeranz, "Women's Work, Family, and Economic Development in Europe and East Asia: Long-term Trajectories and Contemporary Comparisons," in G. Arrighi, T. Hamashita, and M. Selden (eds.), *The Resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150 and 50 Year Perspectives* (London, New York: Routledge, 2003a), pp. 78–123.

incentives constituted a driving force behind working harder. This took place in agrarian settings fundamentally different from those found in Europe. While in East Asia the basic pattern of agricultural development was towards labor-intensive technology such as double cropping, in Europe it was towards mixed farming, a combination of crop production and cattle raising. Mixed farming is inherently more capital-intensive and land-using (its usage was extensive rather than intensive) than the typical East Asian rice farming. Thus, the basis for institutional development was different. From the perspective of the East Asian path, the European path was biased towards the capital-intensive method of production. Workers competed with animals for resources (mainly but not exclusively land resources), and were sometimes evicted, if the landlord or the capitalist manager wished to pursue a more efficient method of agriculture, and capital became more important than labor for this reason. This could happen either because pasture became economically or ecologically more important in the rotation, or because cultivation units were consolidated and tenant farmers were replaced by agricultural laborers. This hardly encouraged long-term planning and the search for a small but steady increase of land productivity on the part of the peasant farmer.

In Europe generally, there was a trend of capital accumulation, as the development of the capital market lowered interest rates, and facilitated investment in the manufacturing and service sectors as well as in infrastructure and war efforts. Frequent wars destabilized the countryside, which gave the urban manufacturing sector a chance to develop capital- and skill-intensive industries.[31] Meanwhile, wages in certain cities went up relative to capital, as the integration of the labor market took longer. Real wages in English and Dutch cities were significantly higher than those in other parts of Western Europe. As already noted, this, coupled with cheap energy supply, encouraged the development of labor-saving technology. It also put pressure on rural proto-industry, which had to compete with urban, skill-intensive industries.

In England, Allen argued, labor-intensive technology developed in small farms was important in the seventeenth century, while consolidation of land became more prominent in the eighteenth.[32] Enclosure certainly helped

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[31] J.-L. Rosenthal and R. B. Wong, *Before and Beyond Divergence: The Politics of Economic Change in China and Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).

[32] R. C. Allen, *Enclosure and the Yeoman: The Agricultural Development of the South Midlands, 1450–1850* (Oxford University Press, 1992).

release land and labor from the peasant pattern of production, even if this was exaggerated in the earlier literature. The rise in land and labor productivity after 1750 (partly as a result of parliamentary enclosure) was accompanied by structural changes, including the emergence of agricultural laborers as a major section of the rural population in England.[33] For industry, new machinery operated by unskilled workers competed with artisanal production. The fate of the proletariat and that of artisans were both consequences of capitalism, which divided technical, managerial, and coordination skills into different classes of people.

A different sequence emerged in East Asia. With less of a capital market and the agrarian economy's greater capacity to absorb labor, a more labor-intensive path of development occurred in East Asia compared with Europe. At the same time, the nature of industriousness of European peasant farmers was different from that in East Asia. Their macro-political conditions were less stable than those of their Japanese and probably Chinese counterparts. They were more mobile, as there were widespread practices of seasonal migration across Europe,[34] and were more able to engage in long-distance and regional trade, as region-wide urbanization was more rapid and regional specialization between agricultural and proto-industrial areas was more marked. This is different from the effects of efficient land and lease markets in China, since it was capital (cattle) and labor, not land and labor, which were being compared in the production bundle. In East Asia, the use of labor against land scarcity remained the main organizing principle of all factors of production.

In summary, different perceptions of work existed in Japan, China, and Europe, as a result of different path dependencies of environment, technology, and institutions, but all regions contained elements of the growth of industriousness as a result of greater labor absorption. Some were easier to transfer to the factory floor than others. In East Asia peasants were not used to the idea of separation of management and labor, nor did they understand that labor can be treated as unskilled with no expectation of managerial skills. This discouraged labor market integration. In Japan, labor management in textile factories accommodated peasant-worker expectations and utilized their sense of duty, discipline, and commitment on the factory

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[33] For the gradual increase of their proportion in the agrarian population, see M. Overton, *Agricultural Revolution in England: The Transformation of the Agrarian Economy, 1500–1850* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 36–45, 168–82.

[34] J. Luccasen, *Migrant Labour in Europe, 1600–1900: The Drift to the North Sea* (London: Croom Helm, 1987).

floor.[35] In England, as well as Europe more generally, displaced labor constituted a large part of the workforce, and laborers were deprived of their participation in managerial aspects of work. In spite of these variations in motivation, intensity, and reinforcing institutions, in all cases early modern perceptions of work were shifting towards industriousness. It was eventually brought onto the factory floor, and influenced the process of industrialization. Industriousness was at once an important part of the "initial conditions" of, and a major constraint to, an industrial revolution.

A common framework for European and East Asian industrious revolutions: paths from industrious to industrial revolutions

In classical political economy, the relationship between food and population (Malthus) or between land and labor (Ricardo) prevailed. In 1969, John Hicks characterized the industrial revolution by differentiating fixed capital (machinery) from circulating capital (raw materials and labor) and by arguing for the vital importance of the former.[36] In fact these characterizations fit East Asian history much better than they do European history.

In Europe, much of the problem this relationship had caused, whether it was recognized as a population question or a resource question, was solved through institutional development, which enabled the growth of the market, deployment of capital, and development of technology. A combination of (1) inter-state competition with its overseas expansion and long-distance trade; (2) the growth of capital-intensive methods of production (mixed farming and urban, skill-intensive industries) and international capital market institutions; and eventually (3) the use of coal and the vast resources of North America helped ease the pressure on land.[37] The technological breakthrough of the industrial revolution was a result of full deployments of war making, external expansion, and associated market forces.

None of these occurred in Japan. The pressure on land was responded to by the explicit denial of war making and the seclusion policy, and by the

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[35] K. Sugihara, "Labour-intensive Industrialization in Global History: An Interpretation of East Asian Experiences," in G. Austin and K. Sugihara (eds.), *Labour-Intensive Industrialization in Global History* (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 38–43.

[36] J. Hicks, *A Theory of Economic History* (Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 142.

[37] K. Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton University Press, 2000) emphasized a large element of contingency.

development of labor-intensive technology and labor-absorbing institutions. In China, there was more room for exploiting the scale of the market and ecological and cultural diversities than in Japan, but the government attempted to sustain an agrarian empire by avoiding inter-provincial conflicts and by holding a very large population in the countryside. Thus, in East Asia the classical political economy's concern for the land–labor ratio underpinned institutional development, even though the patterns of state formation in China and Japan were quite different from each other.

We suggest that the typology of Smithian growth and industriousness should begin with East Asia, not just because it had a larger population than Europe, but because the East Asian case points to the most fundamental issue of economic development, the relationship between resources and population, more clearly. It was technological and institutional adaptations to factor endowment constraints, rather than market forces per se, which made the economy sustainable and underpinned Smithian growth. The East Asian path, especially the Chinese path, took the most "natural" course of economic development, in the sense that market forces were more or less left to work, rather than were worked by the state, and also because the regional economy depended less on resources outside of the region. We agree with Jan de Vries on the central importance of the household as an agent of change. But the range of functions the East Asian household took on included the careful and economical use of natural and human resources and thus was much broader than Gary Becker and de Vries have considered.[38] The East Asian reply to the issue of how to feed an ever larger population with the expectation of a slow but steady rise in the standard of living was not a full entry into the market by losing some of these functions engrained in the household, but the development of a "peasant path" of pursuing the rise of land productivity through a combination of commercialization and proto-industrial bi-employment.

From this perspective, we wish to distance ourselves from some of the prevailing assumptions behind the literature, especially European literature. First, Smithian growth is not about any market growth, but about local and regional market growth in particular. Likewise, industriousness is not about any hard-working spirit, but about the absorption of labor with a sense of duty, discipline, and commitment. We argue that the industrious revolution

[38] G. S. Becker, *Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis: With Special Reference to Education*, 3rd edn. (University of Chicago Press, 1993); de Vries, *The Industrious Revolution*.

occurred both in East Asia and Europe, with or without long-distance trade and changes in tastes induced by it. Europe's industrious revolution is simply more visible because of the consumption possibilities created by maritime expansion.

Second, institutions that are conducive to the growth of industriousness are not necessarily formal institutions, but also include informal institutions that help to recruit and incentivize labor. Market institutions are powerful agents for creating and training labor, but they work with non-market institutions in absorbing and incentivizing it. Coercion tends to discourage incentives to work, but concerns for the welfare of the family could work, both positively and as a constraint, on individual aspirations. The peasant household economy used these ambivalent tendencies, and became the main actor in the growth of the market with labor absorption in the core region of China in the eighteenth century. The degree of formalization of market institutions is not a good indicator for defining the extent of an industrious revolution.

Third, the industrial revolution altered the modern world, not because the emergence of an industrial workforce in England was repeated in most other countries, but because different regions provided a variety of institutional mechanisms for creating a modern workforce. In this chapter we argue for the relevance of the industrious revolution to this transformation with reference to East Asia and Europe. Study of other world regions would help deepen our understanding of how the early modern world prepared for the global diffusion of industrialization and modern economic growth.

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RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS CHANGE

The scholarly discovery of religion
in early modern times

GUY STROUMSA

Early modernity brought many deep changes to the status of religion in Western European countries. The Reformation constitutes obviously the major parting line for the transformation of religious attitudes in Europe. In the following pages, I shall not seek to analyze the transformations of Christian ritual and theology. Rather, I shall focus on the very conception of religion, and on the new vistas for a comparative study of the religions of the world, vistas opened up by a number of early modern scholars, both Catholics and Protestants. These scholars took as the subject of their studies many different religious phenomena, past and present, from societies close and afar. Often deciphering texts, or communicating with natives, in difficult languages, these early modern scholars, who were usually working alone, without the comfort of an academic institution, succeeded in establishing the grounds for the modern, comparative study of religion. In order to fully understand this complex phenomenon, we must start, before the Reformation, with the great discoveries of the late fifteenth and of the early sixteenth century. These offer an obvious *terminus a quo*, while the French Revolution provides a convenient *terminus ad quem*.

Traditionally, the modern, comparative, and historical study of religion is perceived as having started with the establishment of specialized chairs in a number of European universities. To my mind, this new discipline started much earlier, long before institutional frameworks were established – and therefore, long before comparative religion, or the "science of religion," could be taught to a body of students. In a sense, the defining moment for the modern, non-theological study of religions starts with its intellectual conception rather than with its academic birth.

In his big book on the conditions and the nature of religion in the modern world, *A Secular Age*, the philosopher Charles Taylor insists on the fact that the very idea of religion in 1500 (in Western Europe) was strikingly different

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from what it is in the twenty-first century.[1] My focus here is on a much more limited period. I intend to highlight some of the main vectors of the early modern scholarly discovery of religion, hoping to show that they reflect nothing less than an intellectual revolution. This revolution offered a new understanding of religion that had no real precedent in the Middle Ages or during the Renaissance. Metaphorically, the birth of the modern comparative history of religions can be called the *discovery* of religion.

Comparative religion is still too often perceived as having been born, like other comparative sciences, in the second half of the nineteenth century, under the influence of biology, in particular of Cuvier's comparative anatomy and Darwin's evolutionary theory.[2] Such a perception, probably stemming from the fact that the late nineteenth century saw the establishment of chairs devoted to the study of religion in a number of universities, must be strongly qualified. The real breakthrough in comparing cultures and religions, the most significant passage from the medieval world-view to modern approaches, stems from the seventeenth-century transformation of *discourse* on religion. In this context, Richard Popkin speaks of the "budding development of comparative religion" in the second half of the seventeenth century.[3] While it is true that the latter part of the seventeenth century would see a plethora of works on "comparative religion," it seems to me that the real watershed separating the Renaissance from the modern world happened in the early part of the century. A small number of scholars then learned to recognize, although in different ways and from different perspectives, the multiplicity of observable religions, past and present. Eventually, comparison, no longer mainly perceived as a polemical tool, would rather be used to recognize the irreducibility of differences, as well as the similarities between cults and beliefs, ancient and modern, from all around the globe.

A paradigm shift

The early modern transformation of the late medieval conception of religion was due, first of all, to the dramatic change of scale in the contacts between

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[1] Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). The following pages seek to summarize, in part, the main argument of my *A New Science: The Discovery of Religion in the Age of Reason* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

[2] For a recent study of the discipline of the modern study of religion and its development in the late nineteenth century, see Hans Georg Kippenberg, *Die Entdeckung der Religionsgeschichte: Religionswissenschaft und Moderne* (Munich: Beck, 1997). English translation: Hans Georg Kippenberg, *Discovering Religious History in the Modern Age* (Princeton University Press, 2002).

[3] See James E. Force and Richard H. Popkin (eds.), *Essays on the Context, Nature, and Influence of Isaac Newton's Theology* (Boston, MA: Kluwer, 1990), p. 9.

cultures and civilizations – which to a great extent had had until then very limited relations, if at all. The great discoveries were of course the main cause for this new situation and their sequels had a major impact on inter-cultural contacts. To use a fashionable term, one can speak, for the first time, of a globalized world. Thousands of European men (as well as some European women) were now constantly on the move, between the New World and the old one. These were, in particular, soldiers, missionaries, and merchants. A few among them observed the mores and rituals of the natives in the newly discovered lands, often out of sheer curiosity, but sometimes also because they thought some understanding of the natives' ways might be useful for their primary purpose (these causes were not exclusive of one another). A small number among them also took the trouble to learn their languages and to report on the mores and rituals they had observed. The meeting between European Christians and newly encountered peoples instigated a reflection upon their religions, and eventually led to some deep changes in the very concept of religion.

The great discoveries were of course of a geographical nature. But with the new lands in the Americas, peoples that were so far unheard of were revealed to Christian Europe, together with their languages and their cultures, and in particular their religious rituals and beliefs. At the same time, travelers to the Ottoman Near East, to Persia, India, China, and Japan were encountering no less fascinating cultures. In contradistinction to the cultures of the New World, those of the Old World were perceived as stemming from long traditions and rooted in fundamentally literate societies. In Asia, as in America, one of the most puzzling problems encountered in the new communities was the nature of their religion. For Early Modern European Christians, such traditions did not belong to any of the known ways of revering the divinity. The question was, rather, whether one could at all call religion a set of beliefs and actions that were so strikingly different from both Christian rituals and beliefs and traditional forms of paganism. For the European observers some of these practices reflected, as we shall see, "political religion": such rituals, meant to serve the state, could not be categorized as idolatry.

Hence, the discovery of a whole spectrum of previously unknown religious attitudes permitted the development of a new sensitivity as well as a broadening of traditional Christian religious sensitivity. From now on, one knew that living religion, even when it appeared to shock Christian consciousness, could nonetheless reflect deep religious feelings. This new sensitivity, I wish to insist, brought nothing less than a paradigm shift in the

understanding of religion. The social transformations of early modernity, then, entailed new intellectual vistas and religious mutations.

In its turn, the paradigm shift entailed the passage from a subjective to an objective approach to religion. This passage, which has mainly been presented as one of the causes for the growing distance from religion, also permitted the establishment of a new, comparative approach to religions, past and present. To be sure, the modern study of religion was not born only thanks to the explosion of data that followed the great discoveries. Other major historical and cultural phenomena, such as colonialism and the birth of the modern research universities, were necessary in order for these new data to become integrated into a new overall picture.

Yet, it would be deeply misleading, as has become fashionable, to speak about the "invention" of religion. Religion had always been there, in highly different societies, since antiquity. As we know from Herodotus as well as from the Hebrew Bible, the ancients clearly knew how to recognize a religion when they saw one. On his side, Cicero had offered theoretical discussions of religion in his *On the Nature of the Gods* and in the *Tusculan Disputations*. The new insights about religion from the sixteenth century were now developed as new categories, permitting the understanding of different religions as aspects of a universal phenomenon. They would eventually find their full expression in the encyclopedic approach of the eighteenth century: religions that were all different expressions of an "Ur phenomenon" were now to be analyzed synoptically.

What are the epistemological foundations of the new cognitive structures invented for the understanding of religious phenomena, at the dawn of the modern times?[4] Intellectual revolutions, however, are not born from a Big Bang. At least three major historical events were necessary for the emergence of the modern approach to religious phenomena. The first, already mentioned, is the Great Discoveries: the Americas then South and East Asia were the first laboratories where the new categories meant to describe and analyze hitherto unknown phenomena were invented by Spanish and Italian missionaries. Without the Discoveries, there would have been

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[4] For an excellent study of the birth of modern psychology in the same period, see Fernando Vidal, *The Sciences of the Soul: the Early Modern Origins of Psychology* (University of Chicago Press, 2011). I should like to thank Saskia Brown, the translator of this book from the original French, for calling my attention to this work. Vidal insists from the start, as I shall do here, that the birth of a scientific or scholarly discipline can predate the establishment of university chairs and departments in the last third of the nineteenth century.

no encounter with the peoples and religions of the New and of the Old Worlds, and hence no emergence of a new approach to religion. The second is the Renaissance itself, or rather some of its direct consequences, such as the new interest in Antiquity and the growth of modern philology, which permitted the study of classical and oriental languages and brought the publication of major texts from different cultures, in a number of alphabets. The wars of religion, which devastated significant parts of Western Europe in the wake of the Reformation, provided the third impetus for the new science. For the best minds among scholars, both Catholics and Protestants, the claim of their own faith to express divine truth had lost much of its persuasive force. The violent, painful divisions of Christendom cast a doubt upon the absolute validity of Christianity itself. As anyone could see, the Turks, those followers of "the false prophet Mahomet," showed a much more tolerant attitude both to outsiders such as Christians and Jews and to their own sectarians than the Christian authorities throughout Europe. This questioning of one's own Christian faith, with its universal pretensions, was a major incentive toward the new understanding of religions as reflecting, rather than perennial truth, the values of the specific society in which they blossomed. And this questioning created a real crisis among European intellectuals.

The first to correctly identify this *crisis* was the French intellectual historian Paul Hazard, who published in 1935 his seminal *La crise de la conscience européenne, 1680–1715* – a complex title overly simplified in its English rendering: *The European Mind*.[5] In this work, Hazard identified the last two decades of the seventeenth century and the first of the eighteenth as the period of "crisis," i.e., of the breaking of the old conceptions, which engendered the emergence of the new ones, through the Enlightenment. Jonathan Israel has recently argued that one should date the start of the "crisis" earlier, around the mid-seventeenth century.[6] The difference between the views of Hazard and Israel should not really concern us here, as it may be, to some extent, a matter of definition, depending on how broadly one defines the crisis in question. Let us only note that Hazard's identification of a major

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[5] Paul Hazard, *La crise de la conscience européenne, 1680–1715* (Paris: Boivin, 1935). English edn.: Paul Hazard, *The European Mind, 1680–1715* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1952).

[6] See Jonathan I. Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–1750* (Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 14–20, where the author argues that Hazard "starts the crisis, unacceptably late, around 1680," and that one should go back to at least the 1650s in order to encompass its full scope. For Israel, the crisis started with Cartesianism and its deep impact upon radical thinkers. It had been prepared by the "libertinisme érudit" since the start of the century, and with the decline of belief in hell.

crisis in European culture was made at a time when various radical movements were sweeping European countries, paving the way to the Second World War. Indeed, that very same year, Edmund Husserl was delivering in Vienna the lectures which formed the basis of his *Krisis in den europäischen Wissenschaften und die transcendentale phänomenologische Philosophie*. A crisis in culture reflects the collapse of old paradigms, and permits the establishment of new ones. The comparative approach to religious phenomena, born with the crisis in European consciousness, created what one can call the first modern phenomenological approach to religious phenomena – a method which would become best known in the thirties of the twentieth century, embodied in the work of the Dutch scholar Gerardus van der Leeuw.

Hazard provided in his great book a magisterial analysis of the intellectual changes, which led to the formation of the "Republic of Letters" at the passage from the classical age to the Enlightenment. At the time when modern science was born, religious ideas were undergoing deep transformations, as was, in a different register, the intellectual approach to religious questions. This was the case almost all over Europe, among both Catholics and Protestants, but in particular in the Netherlands, in Switzerland, in France, and in England. The blurb on the back cover of the Penguin edition (dating from 1964) of *The European Mind* reads:

> Paul Hazard conveyed all the excitement – and much of the detail – of what he saw as the most significant single revolution in human thought: the birth of Newtonian science and of comparative religion: the impact of Descartes and Bayle, Newton and Locke, Spinoza and Leibniz; the creation of *our* world.

A whole generation before Michel Foucault's *Les mots et les choses* (first published in 1966), Hazard was able to identify in that period the birth of the human sciences. He also recognized that among the new sciences and disciplines emerging out of the crisis of European consciousness, one should include a new approach to religion. Together with the discovery of the New World, that of chronology, of the parallel histories of ancient civilizations, permitted the emergence of a hitherto unknown conception of the unity of humankind. Beyond the multiple forms of religion, including the most barbarian forms of idolatry, such as the human sacrifices practiced by some American peoples, all religions reflected the unity of humankind: the Jesuit Joseph Acosta noted that the Indians "possess some knowledge of God," ("que en los Indios ay algun conoscimiento de Dios"), while the Dominican friar Bartolomé de las Casas – a man whose encyclopedic vision of the

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world's religions remains stunning – would say: "Idolas colere humanum est" (idol worship is human).[7] The idea of idolatry was one of the major preoccupations, if not obsessions, of the early modern students of religion, starting with the Spanish missionaries in America.[8] In this sense, too, one can legitimately speak of "the discovery of religion," as it is beyond the multiplicity of its historical and cultural forms, and upon the essence of religion that scholars would now start to focus. In earlier times, religion had always remained a binary concept, centered upon the Augustinian opposition between *vera* and *falsa religio*. Together with the devaluation of Christianity, both implicit and explicit, the discovery of so many and so different forms of religion permitted, paradoxically, the development of a single concept of religion. From then on, religion would be perceived, primarily, as a central aspect of any society, endowed with a different function in each one of them. Religion had become part of collective identity, and the study of religions would see, gradually, intellectual curiosity take over polemical animus – although this remains, alas, a never-ending process.

In a seminal book, *The Meaning and End of Religion*, Wilfred Cantwell Smith noted, more than a generation ago, the major changes undergone by the concept of religion in the aftermath of the Reformation, as religion became increasingly identified with a system of beliefs and practices.[9] It is a pity that Smith's insights were not quite carried through, and that they seem to have had relatively little impact on scholarship. *Vera religio*, since Augustine's days, was indeed represented through a series of correct actions, both personal and public. It was, however, essentially a personal attitude, the right belief, the correct understanding of the Christian *mysterium*. Whereas heresies were perceived as a multiplicity of ugly movements, or medusa heads, to use Irenaeus' metaphor, orthodoxy was characterized not only by

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[7] See Serge Gruzinski, *Les quatre parties du monde: histoire d'une mondialisation* (Paris: La Martinière, 2004), p. 255.

[8] See Carmen Bernand and Serge Gruzinski, *De l'idolâtrie: une archéologie des sciences religieuses* (Paris: Seuil, 1988). See further the recent issue of the *Journal of the History of Ideas* 67 (2006) devoted to the topic, introduced by Jonathan Sheehan, "Thinking about Idols in Early Modern Europe," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 67 (2006): 561–9, and with articles by Joan-Pau Rubiés, Carina L. Johnson, Sabine MacCormack, and Peter N. Miller. To a striking extent, Maimonides offered for seventeenth-century Christian scholars and thinkers the best intellectual frame in which to understand the phenomenon of idolatry.

[9] Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion: A New Approach* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), pp. 37–44. On the history of the term itself, see Ernst Feil, *Religio, die Geschichte eines neuzeitlichen Grundbegriffs* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986–2001).

its unity, but also by its interiority. The Reformation was to break this deeply ingrained perception. Polemics between Protestants and Catholics raged more over rituals and exterior forms of piety than over religious belief itself. The polemics on Christian rituals must be seen also in the context of the puzzlement created by the discovery of so many odd forms of ritual, observed throughout the world, before one could read the texts and understand the etiological myths that permitted the contextualization of these rituals, or "cults." In the constant pendulum between what one says and what one does in religion, the seventeenth century gave preference to acts, *dromena*, while the following century would witness the turn to the underlying words, *legomena*.

In *The End of Sacrifice: Religious Transformations in Late Antiquity*, I argued that a series of major transformations of the very concept of religion could be discerned in late antiquity: from the suppression of blood sacrifices to the new central role of books in religious identity and ritual. The victory of Christianity did not only represent the passage from polytheism to monotheism; it also entailed a radical transformation of the very concept of religion, which included its internalization.[10] In modern times, the medieval concept of religion, with its late antique roots, would be ushered out. It is thanks to this transformation that the modern, comparative study of religions was made possible.

Although secularization is a striking and obvious characteristic of modernity, its implications for the study of religion are not commonly understood. We readily acknowledge the role played by biblical criticism, as first undertaken by Richard Simon and Spinoza, in the fast erosion of revealed religion in Western European countries. Much less well known, however, are the contemporary efforts by a long list of scholars to describe and analyze, as adequately as possible, religious phenomena across the world and throughout history. The secularization of modern times is usually seen as having permitted, or imposed, a privatization of religion, together with its progressive disappearance from the public space. Religion now became more and more the affair of the individual, whose choices need no longer be shared by the whole community. This is certainly true, but it is as true, although less commonly recognized, that secularization also transformed religion into a

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[10] Guy G. Stroumsa, *The End of Sacrifice: The Religious Transformations of Late Antiquity* (University of Chicago Press, 2009). This book was originally published as Guy G. Stroumsa, *La fin du sacrifice: les mutations religieuses de l'antiquité tardive* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2005).

major facet of any society. In that sense, ethnology would now replace theology at the forefront of the study of religion. From the individual's viewpoint, religion was now privatized, meaning that one was free to choose among different possibilities of religious – or, for that matter, of non-religious – behavior. The development of religious toleration, thanks to its great advocates from Locke to Lessing, would become one of the main benefits of this privatization. For religious scholarship, however, the progressive weakening of Christian revelation as the only form of truth meant the opposite: religion, in all cases, should be studied, rather, as an individual endeavor, but within its social context.

Throughout history, since the great figures of Karl Jaspers' "axial age," (a concept of dubious heuristic value),[11] Zarathustra, the prophets of Israel, the Buddha and the Greek philosophers, any reflection on religion has also been a *Kulturkritik*.[12] Reflecting on religion, even on the part of theologians, who in principle write on their tradition as insiders, entails a certain distancing from current religious beliefs and religious practice. The early modern study of religion is no exception to this rule. Its close connection to the critique of Christianity, by both Catholic and Protestant practitioners, is too obvious to need elaboration. What is less obvious, however, is the fact that this new science was born from the relationship between Catholic and Protestant intellectuals. Neither the Catholic missionaries playing ethnologists, nor the Protestant theologians turned philologists, would have been able, alone, to assert the premises upon which the modern, comparative study of religion is established. This became possible only thanks to the dialectical process between them.

In fact, this dialectical process took place not only between Catholic and Protestant intellectuals, but also between two kinds of scholarship. On the one hand, there were ethnologists, or, more precisely, missionaries groping to understand the language and mores of those they were seeking to convert, and discovering, unintentionally, "sans le savoir," the principles of ethnology. On the other hand, there were philologists working on various oriental languages and learning to appreciate, sometimes despite themselves, the

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[11] See G. G. Stroumsa, "Robert Bellah on the Origins of Religion – A Critical Review," *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* 229 (2012): 467–77.

[12] For recent reinterpretations of Jaspers' concept, see Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt (ed.), *The Origins and Diversity of the Axial Age Civilizations* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986), and Robert N. Bellah, *Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).

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content of the texts they were trying to edit and translate. From the Dominican Bartolomé de Las Casas to the Jesuit François Lafitau, the Catholic missionaries to the New World were establishing, at least implicitly, some of the principles of social anthropology. One can also say, moreover, that the modern study of religion, comparative by nature, involves by necessity a complex mixture of philology and ethnology, in the analysis of both sacred acts and sacred words. If the religious world of contemporary savages is similar to that of ancient pagans then comparison is not only possible, legitimate, and necessary between similar or comparable texts, such as the Bible and the Koran, but also between what ancient texts and contemporary mores teach us, when studied together.

The Christian crucible of comparative religion

I have referred above to a new paradigm of religion, and to cultural criticism. While freethinkers, such as François de la Mothe le Vayer (1588–1672), showed a great interest in the comparison of pagan and Christian myths and rituals, with the aim of demoting the latter, early modern scholarship on religion remained, by and large, an enterprise of Christian believers.[13] It is important to insist upon the fact that these intellectuals and scholars were no freethinkers, but rather "enlightened" Christians. Intellectual curiosity for religious traditions different from their own (including Christian heresies) permitted them to overcome, to some extent, religious and theological prejudice, and to mute down polemical instincts. As enlightened Christians, they were all critical of various forms of religion, past and present, and able to recognize similarities, both in structure and content, between rituals and beliefs from different religious traditions, including their own. In that sense, Vico, who draws a hermetically sealed border between the tradition of Israel and its Christian sequel on the one hand, and all other traditions on the other, is strikingly out of tune with the attitude of the best among contemporary intellectuals and scholars.

The fact that the modern, comparative study of religion was born in Christian milieus is not only due to the fact that the dawn of modernity occurred in Western Europe. As Max Müller saw so well, Christianity itself was particularly fit to become the humus of such a development:

> In no religion was there a soil so well prepared for the cultivation of Comparative Theology as our own. The position which Christianity from

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[13] As far as I can see, the arguments used by freethinkers had been first submitted by less radically oriented scholars.

the very beginning took up with regard to Judaism, served as the first lesson in comparative theology, and directed the attention even of the unlearned to a comparison of two religions. . .[14]

Meanwhile, some form of unity was provided through all this diversity, mainly thanks to the traditional concept of natural religion – a concept inherited from medieval, and ultimately from ancient, philosophy. It was natural religion, permeating the multiplicity of rituals and beliefs, which retained the unity of humankind. As we shall see, however, the appeal to natural religion would eventually become a powerful instrument in the hands of those who sought to undermine adherence to Christian supremacy, as it presupposed an identical approach to all observed religious rituals, irrespective of their beliefs. Even in its strangest, or most objectionable, forms, such as human sacrifices, religion could now be perceived as reflecting natural religion, and even a powerful religious faith. That clearly dealt a serious blow to the idea of revelation.

One should seek, then, to understand more precisely the conditions under which the modern study of religion first appeared and grew. The main question lies in identifying the kind of discourse that made its birth possible.[15] As we have seen, the deep transformation of scholarly approaches to the religions of humankind, and to the phenomenon of religion itself, between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, must be seen in the context of the three major phenomena referred to above. The Great Discoveries, the birth of modern philology, and the wars of religion profoundly transformed intellectual and religious attitudes alike. It is only the joint effects of these three distinct phenomena which would permit the formation of a new kind of intellectual *curiositas* and the birth of comparative religion. This last point is essential. As Edward Said has shown in his famous book, the birth of

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[14] F. Max Müller, *Lectures on the Science of Religion* (London: Longmans, Green, 1893), p. 29. The lectures were delivered in 1870 and first printed in 1873. I owe this reference to Simon Cook. Lourens P. van den Bosch, *Friedrich Max Müller: A Life Devoted to the Humanities* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), ch. 3, pp. 243–92. To be sure, a parallel case could be made for Islam, and indeed, medieval Islamicate civilizations showed some extremely impressive intellectual efforts to understand the history of religions from a comparative perspective. It is in this context that Maimonides should be understood. See Sarah Stroumsa, *Maimonides in His World: Portrait of a Mediterranean Thinker* (Princeton University Press, 2009), ch. 4.

[15] Martin Mulsow has insisted upon the dramatic intellectual changes which made the modern history of religions possible. See in particular Martin Mulsow, "Antiquarianism and Idolatry: The *Historia* of Religions in the Seventeenth Century," in Gianna Pomata and Nancy G. Siraisi (eds.), *Historia: Empiricism and Erudition in Early Modern Europe* (London: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 181–209.

Orientalism, for instance, is certainly related to imperialist designs and attitudes in France and in England.[16] But this is true only to a certain extent. What Said did not see, and what too many forget, or fail to notice, is that in order for scholars to invest so much energy, throughout their lives, in the study of difficult languages, abstruse mythologies and odd literatures, they must be imbued with great doses of intellectual curiosity. Such intellectual curiosity goes a long way in transforming traditional perceptions and patterns of thought. Crossing all traditional boundaries, ethnic, cultural, religious or ideological, intellectual curiosity provides a necessary condition for the blooming of "la science pour la science."

The early modern scholars who launched the modern, non-theological study of religion, all had personal stakes in their research. And yet, it would be misleading to think that their lack of disengaged objectivity entailed a deeply flawed method, and to deny their work real scholarly value. Thanks to their deep personal involvement with the subject of their inquiry, they developed some sympathy for those whose beliefs they were studying. Their intellectual curiosity, therefore, permitted them to overcome, at least to some extent, their personal attitudes and prejudices. To be sure, the idea of scientific objectivity, which is always problematic in the humanities, is all the more so in a field as complex or as fraught with deeply engrained personal attitudes and beliefs as the study of religion. Whether scholars of religion are ever able to develop a completely *wertfrei* approach to the phenomena they study, either within or without their own tradition, remains a moot point. But we deal here with the very beginnings of the secularization process, at the time of the discovery of American and Asian civilizations. In the study of all cultures and religions involved, from those of the native Americans to those of the Jews, of the Muslim world, of India, China and Japan, European Christians could not be devoid of old and engrained prejudices and were often moved by the temptations of imperialism – the snares of colonialism would only come later.

In 1614, the year of his death, the great philologist Isaac Casaubon published, in London, where he was living at the time, *De rebus sacris et ecclesiasticis exercitationes XVI*. In this work, Casaubon demonstrated, using rigorous philological arguments, the late date and the pseudepigraphical nature of the *Corpus Hermeticum*. Dame Frances Yates has famously called the publication of this work a watershed, separating the modern age from the

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[16] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon, 1978). One should note that Said discusses a period later than the one dealt with here.

Renaissance.[17] According to her, it definitively tore down the earlier, holistic conception, to make way for the historical and critical approach to ancient texts, and hence to the early history of religious and philosophical ideas. Hence, the new paradigm for studying religious phenomena, past and present, was born from the scholarly endeavors of the early seventeenth century. To be sure, very important work on religious traditions was done both before and after our period. But a new discipline is constituted by a series of individuals, acting in a particular context. And this context must be over-determined, and has to offer a set of reasons, which, combined, transform individual oddities into a collective activity.

Among the bolder harbingers of modernity, Jean Bodin (1530–96), retaining the medieval taxonomy of religions, referred (under the name of Fridericus, one of the characters of his *Heptaplomeres*) to "the four kinds of religions, namely, those of the Jews, Christians, Ismaelites, and pagans..."[18] At the time, Spanish missionaries as well as various travelers had started to circulate reports on the religious customs of the people they met, from the Indians of New Spain and Peru to those of India, as well as the Chinese, the Turks, and the Persians. Such works, however, had yet to have their full impact on the transformation of categories through which European intellectuals, both Catholics and Protestants, perceived the religions of humankind. While the multiplicity of *mores* throughout the continents had already started to be registered – a case in point is Montaigne's famous *Essay on Cannibals* – the new categories that could deal effectively with this recently discovered complexity were still to be formulated.

Indeed, the late sixteenth century had seen a series of daring publications, which opened new vistas on the religions of humankind, past and present. Already in 1571, Vincenzo Cartari had published in Venice his iconogaphic study of Greek and Roman deities, *Le imagini degli dei degli antichi, nelle quali si contengono gl'idoli, riti, ceremonie, e altre cose appartenenti alla religione de gli antichi*. Cartari also published a work called, in the Renaissance fashion, *Theatrum*, a synoptic presentation, as it were, of all

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[17] See Frances Yates, *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Traditions* (University of Chicago Press, 1964). See further Anthony Grafton, "Protestant versus Prophet: Isaac Casaubon on Hermes Trismegistus," in Anthony Grafton, *Defenders of the Text: The Traditions of Scholarship in an Age of Science, 1450–1800* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 145–61.

[18] *Heptaplomeres* v. I quote the translation of Jean Bodin, *Colloquium of the Seven about the Secrets of the Sublime,* Marion Leathers Kuntz (trans.) (Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 266.

"idolatrous cults" of antiquity, including a description of their temples, sacrifices, idols, rituals, and "ceremonies."[19]

Another milestone in the early days of the modern study of religion, Iohannes Boemus' *Mores, leges et ritus omnium gentium*, was first published in Augsburg in 1520. This book, which would go through forty-seven editions in a century, and would soon be translated into Italian, French, English, Spanish, and German, dealt with the cultures of the various parts of the old worlds, from Ethiopia and Egypt to Persia and India, tackling also Northern countries such as Poland, Russia, Lithuania, Bohemia, and Germany.[20] It showed no arrogance vis-à-vis exotic cultures, but rather approached them with sheer intellectual curiosity. Such works, however, were still rare.

Attempts to legitimize the newly discovered cults had already started, with the works of some of the Catholic missionaries to the American Indians, such as the Dominican Bartolomé de Las Casas (1474–1566), and somewhat later the Jesuit José de Acosta (1540–1600).[21] In order to better understand odd practices and beliefs, the missionaries often compared these rituals and myths to those they knew, in particular from ancient Israel and the religions of Greece and Rome.[22] One should stress that in the works of the Spanish *frailes*, comparisons between Greek and Roman paganism and that of America usually turned to the disadvantage of ancient paganism.

Such studies, which started to appear in the sixteenth century, were published in more significant numbers throughout the seventeenth century. A real revolution in knowledge and in attitudes had taken place, which had permitted a radical transformation in the perception of religious phenomena. The dramatic events of the sixteenth century were only now having their full impact. The newly discovered continents and cultures were slowly becoming part of the "cultural landscape," or what the French call the *imaginaire*, of

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[19] See Caterina Volpi, *Le immagini degli dei di Vincenzo Cartari* (Rome: De Luca, 1996).

[20] See Klaus A. Vogel, "Cultural Variety in a Renaissance Perspective: Johannes Boemus on 'The Manners, Laws and Customs of all People' (1520)," in Henriette Bugge and Joan Pau Rubiés (eds.), *Shifting Cultures: Interaction and Discourse in the Expansion of Europe* (Münster: LIT, 1995), pp. 17–34. Vogel deals with the reasons for Boemus' omission of reports on culture and religion in the New World.

[21] Las Casas' *Brevissima relación de la destrucción de las Indias* was published in 1552, while D'Acosta's *De procuranda Indorum salute* appeared in 1596. See in particular Louis Hanke, *All Mankind is One: A Study of the Disputation between Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda in 1550 on the Intellectual and Religious Capacity of the American Indians* (De Kalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974); Anthony Pagden, *Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology* (Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Bernand and Gruzinski, *De l'idolâtrie*.

[22] See Sabine MacCormack, *Religion in the Andes* (Princeton University Press, 1991).

European intellectuals. Besides, books were now being printed in classical or "exotic" languages, such as Hebrew or Arabic, and the world of European Christendom had been torn asunder. A major diversification of the religions being practiced around the world entailed the urgent need to re-define religion, as a universal phenomenon, with a strong emphasis on ritual, rather than on beliefs.

Thomas Hobbes offers in his *Leviathan*, published in 1651, one of the very first discussions devoted to religion as a generic term for an essential element found in all societies.[23] In his discussion, Hobbes mentions Numa Pompilius, "the first king of Peru" (he means Pachacuti), and Mahomet as three "founders and legislators of commonwealths among the Gentiles," who created a religion as the basis of their political covenant. The reference to Pachacuti, side by side with that of Numa, clearly points to the direct influence of Las Casas. In his *Apologetica historia*, Las Casas "made Numa the Old World model for Pachacuti, the Inca leader responsible for reconstituting ancient Andean religion."[24] The early modern construction of civil religion, indeed, would be based to a great extent upon the missionaries' ethnographic discussions. Actually, the missionaries themselves often described the rituals they were observing as belonging to "civil religion," in order to salvage them from being considered pagan. If Confucian rituals, for instance those centered on the Zoroastrian fire cult, are to be understood as rituals invented in order to maintain the society, they are *ipso facto* exempt from the accusation of paganism. The argument about the Confucian rituals was made by the Jesuits to counter the accusation of the Dominicans, in what came to be known as *La querelle des rites*, that by behaving like Chinese mandarins, they were taking part in pagan rituals. The Jesuits would eventually be condemned by the Sorbonne in 1700. Similarly, Thomas Hyde, the author of the first scholarly work on Zoroastrian religion, *Historia religionis veterum Persarum eorumque Magorum*, published in 1700, argued that the Zoroastrian fire cult should be understood as a ritual of their civil religion, just as the adoration of the sun by the Peruvians was. This permitted him to include ancient Iranian religion in the religions issued of Abraham, of whom Zoroaster had been a disciple.[25]

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[23] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Oxford University Press, 1998), ch. 1, p. 12.
[24] See Mark Silk, "Numa Pompilius and the Development of the Idea of Civil Religion," in Giovanni Filoramo (ed.), *Teologie politiche: Modelli a confronto* (Brescia: Morcelliana, 2005), pp. 335–56, esp. 345.
[25] See Guy Stroumsa, *A New Science*, pp. 101–13, esp. 104.

A new science

In the early eighteenth century, things would have changed in some radical ways. Giambattista Vico's *magnum opus*, *La scienza nuova*, was first published in 1724. It is a central witness to the birth of comparative religion, a science of which Vico thought he had discovered the essential principles. Many of the early modern scholars working on religion belong to those whom Paolo Rossi has called "Vico's great interlocutors."[26] They played an essential role in the formation of his ideas, and are referred to at the start of *La scienza nuova*. To my mind, the common failure to see the direct relationship between *La scienza nuova* and the early modern explorers of religion reflects a category mistake. When Vico, like others during the Enlightenment, speaks of *mitologia*, he does not refer to what we call today mythology but rather, more broadly, to the comparative study of religion in general. We should not underestimate the differences in intellectual climate and freedom between Naples and Europe north of the Alps in the first half of the eighteenth century. These differences go a long way in explaining Vico's odd decision to exclude from his world-wide inquiry the tradition of Israel, together with Christianity. Vico was a man of his time when he was searching for principles explaining the history of religion in ancient societies. The publication year of *La scienza nuova* was an *annus mirabilis* of sorts, as it also saw the publication of both *Les moeurs des sauvages ameriquains comparées aux moeurs des premiers temps*, of the Jesuit Joseph-François Lafitau, a book which has been acclaimed (at least in the French-speaking world) as the founding study of modern social anthropology, as well as *De l'origine des fables*, Bernard Fontenelle's seminal book.[27]

Cérémonies et coutumes religieuses de tous les peuples, the first modern multi-volume encyclopedia of the world's religions, with the famous engravings of Bernard Picard, was published (both in French and in English) from 1723

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[26] Paolo Rossi, *The Dark Abyss of Time: The History of the Earth and the History of Nations from Hooke to Vico* (University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. x, and Giambattista Vico, *La scienza nuova* (Milan: Rizzoli, 1977), vol. I, ch. I, p. 128.

[27] I quote *La scienza nuova* in the edition of 1744 (Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli), with an introduction by Paolo Rossi. See Giambattista Vico, *La scienza nuova* (Milan: Rizzoli, 1977). *De l'origine des fables* had been written before the end of the seventeenth century, but was not published until 1724. For Fontenelle's significance for the modern study of religion, see James S. Preus, *Explaining Religion: Criticism and Theory from Bodin to Freud* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), ch. 3, pp. 40–55. Despite its importance and fame, Joseph-François Lafitau's masterpiece has not been recently fully reprinted. A new edition, by Edna Hindie Lemay (Paris: Maspero, 1983), oddly omits precisely the whole part on religion. See, however, a full English translation of Joseph-François Lafitau's *Customs of the American Indians compared with the Customs of Primitive Times*, William N. Fenton and Elizabeth L. Moore (trans.) (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1974–7).

to 1743.[28] This remarkable achievement was only made possible thanks to a whole library of monographs and synthetic studies. In its turn, *Cérémonies et coutumes* has recently been the object of a series of important studies, which have emphasized its crucial role in the early stages of comparative religion as an intellectual enterprise.[29]

This direct relationship between the work done by antiquarians and missionaries and the concept of civil religion, which would grow in importance up to Rousseau's *Contrat social*, shows how central the comparative reflection on religions had become in early modern discourse. A common perception sees the early comparative studies of religion as stemming from freethinkers. This view of things is mistaken. In their great majority, the early antiquarians and scholars were good yet enlightened Christians, both Catholics and Protestants, and sought to accommodate their religion to their research. It is only in the eighteenth century that freethinkers and Deists realized the subversive power of the new discipline. If religious legislators could be shown to have used the same methods in order to establish their religions, and if these methods, like in the case of Numa Pompilius, were notoriously fraudulent (according to Livy [I. 19], he had concocted the story about his nightly meetings with the nymph Egeria), there was no reason not to compare also Jesus to Moses and Muhammad. Indeed, this is what would be done in the most famous *samiszdat* of the eighteenth century, the anonymous *De tribus impostoribus*, which circulated first in Latin, then in French as *Le traité des trois imposteurs*.[30] From now on, religion *in bonam partem* would more and more be natural religion, entailing disdain, or worse, for revealed religions in general, and Christianity in particular.

This turn of affairs was perhaps inevitable. Comparative patterns themselves evolved in our period. From the sixteenth to the seventeenth century,

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[28] See Silvia Berti, "Bernard Picart e Jean-Frédéric Bernard dalla religione riformata al deismo: Un incontro con il mondo ebraico nell'Amsterdam del primo settecento," *Rivista Storica Italiana* 117 (2005): 974–1001. Berti offers there a detailed picture of the publication and of its context.

[29] See Lynn Hunt, Margaret C. Jacob, and Wijnand Mijnhardt, *The Book that Changed Europe: Picart and Bernard's Religious Ceremonies of the World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), as well as Lynn Hunt, Margaret C. Jacob, and Wijnand Mijnhardt (eds.), *Bernard Picart and the First Global Vision of Religion* (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2010). Picart's engravings have been recently studied in Paola von Wyss-Giacosa's splendid monograph: Paola von Wyss-Giacosa, *Religionsbilder der frühen Aufklärung: Bernard Picarts Tafeln für die Cérémonies et coutumes religieuses de tous les peuples du monde* (Wabern, Bern: Benteli Verlag, 2006).

[30] On this book, see Georges Minois, *Le traité des trois imposteurs: histoire d'un livre blasphématoire qui n'existait pas* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2009).

there had been a passage from an inclusive to an exclusive mode of mental functioning.[31] In the early seventeenth century, the comparison of religious concepts and systems started from the discovery of cultures as ancient as the Bible. With the limited tools available, scholars such as John Marsham built synoptic chronologies, and learned to compare Homer and the Bible, as the two canonical texts of European culture. One was then interested in structural more than in genetic arguments. For some time, there seems to have been a delicate, precarious equilibrium between Homer and the Bible. It is only later, with the discovery of other sources, that this equilibrium was broken. In particular, the legendary figure of Sankhuniaton, the Phoenician author from the ninth century BCE, whose quotations by Philo of Byblos had been preserved by Eusebius, caught the fancy of many in the eighteenth century. The die was cast: from now on, the antiquity of the Bible was not absolute anymore; other texts and figures were now known to have been older. The Bible had now definitively fallen from its pedestal, and the aura of utmost antiquity and cultural primacy would move to China in the eighteenth century, and then to India, in the early nineteenth century, once the travails of Sir William Jones (1746–94), a.k.a. "Orientalist Jones," had introduced the knowledge of Sanskrit to Europe. Together with the rise of India, and then of Indo-European linguistics, the nineteenth century would see, with the demise of the biblical tradition, the opposition between the Indo-European and Semitic "mythologies," and the hierarchic classification of cultures, with their well-known dramatic consequences.[32]

The creation, *ex nihilo*, of a new, short-lived religion, *le culte de l'Etre suprême*, in the aftermath of the French Revolution may be seen as a convenient symbolic end to our period. In the same last decade of the eighteenth century appeared Charles Dupuis's multi-volume *Origine de tous les cultes*, a mammoth work, which sought to interpret the religious traditions of all peoples as so many transformations of an original cult of the sun.[33] Soon afterwards, Friedrich Schlegel's *Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier* (1807) would usher in a strikingly different era for the study of religions, well anchored in a new philological *rigueur*.

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[31] See John Bossy, "Some Elementary Forms of Durkheim," *Past and Present* 95 (1982): 3–18.
[32] See Maurice Olender, *Les langues du paradis* (Paris: Gallimard, Le Seuil, 1989), and Suzanne L. Marchand, *German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and Scholarship* (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
[33] Charles François Dupuis, *Origine de tous les cultes, ou religion universelle* (Paris: Chez H. Agasse, L'an III de la République, 1794), and Frank E. Manuel, *The Eighteenth Century Confronts the Gods* (New York: Athenaeum, 1967), pp. 259–70.

As is well known, Edward Said stressed the fact that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Orientalism was tainted by its belonging to the age and culture of imperialism. While there is no denying that fact, Said clearly overplayed his hand by failing to recognize that the early Orientalists were not only puppets in the great game of the European courts, but could also have been moved by intellectual curiosity in their persistent endeavors.[34] This is certainly true of many early Arabists and Islamicists, who learned to respect Islam even though their starting point had been the instinctual Christian opposition to the prophet Muhammad and his religion. This is also true of the Christian Hebraists who, since Johannes Buxtorf (1564–1629) and his *Synagoga Judaica* (1604; German edition 1603), had learned to observe the Jewish rituals. Although their first instinct may well have been an attempt to convert the Jews, they soon learned to respect the texts of the vast rabbinic tradition. But the Jews were a special case: for European Christians, they were at once insiders and outsiders, tolerated but not easily integrated into society. Hebrew was both a sacred tongue and an Oriental language. The modern study of Judaism soon learned to appreciate Jewish post-biblical literature, traditions, and customs, in particular thanks to Richard Simon's *Comparaison des cérémonies des juifs et de la discipline de l'eglise*, a text first published in 1681, and which would have a long and impressive career.[35] More and more, however, as the Oriental character of Judaism grew in prominence, the blatant genetic and structural connections between Judaism and Christianity would be perceived as less significant. Judaism was now seen as a religion in its own right, rather than as only the fossilized remnant of early Israel. A curious book published by the marquis de la Créquinière in 1704, *Conformités des coutumes des Indiens orientaux avec celles des Juifs et des autres peuples de l'antiquité*, and immediately translated by John Toland, offers an interesting testimony to this fact.[36] Side by side with this "Orientalizing" of the Jews came the new racial anti-Semitism of the late nineteenth and twentieth century. But this is another story.

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[34] Said's extremely influential book has generated a huge polemical literature. The best scholarly response to Orientalism is probably Robert Irwin, *For Lust of Knowing: The Orientalists and their Enemies* (London: Allen Lane, 2006). See also Ibn Warraq, *Defending the West: A Critique of Edward Said's Orientalism* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007). Said's and Irwin's Orientalists are almost exclusively Arabists and Islamicists. For an excellent study of early Orientalism dealing with the religions of India, China, and Japan, see Urs App, *The Birth of Orientalism* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).

[35] See Stroumsa, *A New Science*, pp. 68–76 and notes.

[36] See Stroumsa, *A New Science*, p. 159 and note 6.

All in all, the trajectory of the early modern comparative studies of religion reflects a passage from ritual, in the seventeenth century, to myth in the eighteenth. As mentioned above, "mythology" was then equivalent to "religious system," a fact underlined by the entry "Mythology" (an entry perhaps written by Diderot himself) in the *Grande Encyclopédie*. The results of the major intellectual efforts to decipher and understand the religious traditions of humankind, past and present, soon to be used by Schelling and Hegel, would then become the basis for the chairs of Oriental studies and science of religion established from the seventies of the nineteenth century.

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Christianity in Europe and overseas

R. PO-CHIA HSIA

During the 1710s, the two French Jesuits Jean-Baptiste Régis (1663–1738) and Pierre Jartoux (1668–1720) traveled in a large entourage of Manchu officials and soldiers, busy surveying and mapping the areas around a stretch of the Great Wall that separated the Qing Empire and the Mongol steppes. Cartographic experts in the service of the Kangxi Emperor, who deployed his western Jesuit servants to carry out the first systematic and comprehensive survey of his vast empire, Régis and Jartoux had an unexpected encounter. Somewhere on the steppes, the Jesuits' party came upon a Mongol prince. Some Lamaist monks in the entourage showed the astounded Jesuits an icon of the Virgin Mary inscribed with Greek letters, a gift from Russian orthodox clerics. We too may be equally astounded at this encounter between two branches of Christianity – Roman Catholicism and Russian Orthodoxy – that occurred in the Mongol borderlands between two expanding empires, the Russian and the Chinese, in a cultural region of Tibetan Buddhism, far from the heartland of Christianity. What follows in this chapter may explain the background to this remarkable event.

Christianity in 1400

Nothing about the history of Christianity at the beginning of our period would prepare us for its dynamic expansion and world domination in 1800. In 1400, Christianity was divided into three main groups. Latin Christianity, which extended to almost all of Europe and at whose head stood the pope, was mired in a crisis of authority, with rival popes at Rome and Avignon hurling excommunications at one another in the Great Schism (1378–1415). Meanwhile, religious dissent grew into a full-blown national revolt in Bohemia against the Roman Church, before the Bohemians found a compromise with a papacy restored in authority.

A second branch of Christianity dominated the southeastern and eastern margins of Europe: Eastern Orthodoxy. With Constantinople as its center and Greek its liturgical language, the Eastern Orthodox Church had formally split with the Roman Latin Church in 1054. Besides the differences in language, the two churches disagreed fundamentally on ecclesiology, with the Eastern Orthodox emphatically rejecting Rome's claim to episcopal primacy. From its Byzantine heartland, Greek Orthodox Christianity had spread to Bulgaria, Romania, and Kiev, eventually becoming the official religion of the Muscovites. In the early fifteenth century, Eastern Orthodoxy was under siege as the Byzantine Empire was reduced to a small rump of its former self by the advancing Muslim Ottoman Turks. An attempt at reunion with Rome, negotiated at the Council of Florence in 1439, was rejected by the Orthodox faithful. After the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453, Greek Orthodoxy became the tolerated church of a political minority in the Ottoman Empire and the mantle of apostolic succession would pass to the Muscovites in the sixteenth century.

The third branch of Christianity, Oriental Orthodoxy or the group of Eastern Christian churches, was to be found in Africa and Asia. Doctrinally, Oriental Orthodoxy differed from Latin Christianity in that it rejected the dogma of the Council of Chalcedon (451) that defined Christ as having two complete natures, fully human and fully divine. Instead, these churches held that the divine and the human are united in one nature in Christ. Also called monophysite for this reason, Oriental Orthodoxy divided further along geographic and ethnic lines. One of these branches, the remnant of Egyptian Christianity known as the Coptic Church, became a minority church after the Islamic conquest of North Africa. Representing the highest authority of Coptic Christianity, the Patriarch in Alexandria also exerted considerable influence over the affiliated but ethnically and linguistically separate Ethiopian Church. Armenian Christianity represented another member of the Eastern Christian churches. As the most ancient Christian national Church, Armenian Christianity claimed a strong presence in Jerusalem, although an independent Armenia had fallen to Mongol attacks and was divided between the Ottoman and Safavid empires during the early modern era. Syrian Christianity represented yet another branch in the Eastern churches, with centers in Antioch, Aleppo, and Baghdad, from where it spread eastwards to the west coast of India and China via the Silk Routes and maritime trade. With the sole exception of the Ethiopian Church, Oriental Orthodoxy represented a minority Christianity under the relatively tolerant rule of Islam, a status it shared with Greek Orthodoxy. Although

without political power, the Eastern Christian churches were coherent and strong ethno-religious communities and succeeded in preserving their identity under Islamic rule throughout the early modern period. The main aggression experienced by the Eastern Christian churches came, in fact, from Roman Catholicism, as members of these churches became the main targets for conversion by Catholic missionaries in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Just as political power made Christianity into a world religion with the conversion of Constantine in the fourth century, the history of Christianity in the early modern era cannot be understood without knowing the deep connections of the Christian religion to Christian polities. The minority and stable conditions of the Eastern Christian churches and the decline of Greek Orthodoxy presented a sharp contrast to the global expansion of Latin Christianity and the Russian Orthodox Church. To these developments we will now turn.

From crisis to crisis: Latin Christianity

Latin Christianity was and is today the most significant expression of global Christianity; the story of its repeated recoveries from deep crises, its global expansion, and its relationship with other religions and Christian churches will form the heart of this chapter. It is a story all the more remarkable in that Latin Christianity survived two profound crises in this era: the Great Schism (1378–1415), mentioned above, and the Protestant Reformation and religious wars (1517–1648).

The restoration of papal authority represented the crucial development in the century between 1417 and 1517. Meeting at the Council of Constance (1414–17), representatives of the Latin Church secured the abdication of the three reigning rival popes and ended the Great Schism, the first step in restoring papal authority. Between the Council of Basel, called by Pope Martin v in 1431, and the Council of Lausanne in 1449, papal supremacy was asserted against claims by other constituents, such as church councils and bishops, as the best guarantee for the strength of the Latin Church. These were the first steps in a long process of centralization, which would be characterized by a strong Romanization and Italianization of Latin Christianity. Having quashed the rival claim of Avignon (and the intervention of the French monarchy) in papal elections, the papacy, as the center of Latin Christianity, was henceforth firmly rooted in Rome. Despite strong Spanish and French national representations in the College of Cardinals, the election

of popes became an almost exclusively Italian affair, as elite families from central and northern Italy came to dominate the upper echelons of the papal curia. The last non-Italian pope elected before 1800 (indeed before 1978) was the Dutchman Adrian of Utrecht (1459–1523), who obtained the papal throne thanks to the strong patronage of his former pupil, the Habsburg Emperor Charles v, but who wore the tiara for only one year.

While in centralizing its power the papacy became overwhelmingly Italian in character, parallel national developments in Western Europe diminished the universal claims of the popes. In the mid-fifteenth century, with Portuguese maritime voyages, the papacy had granted to the Portuguese monarchy *padroado* (patronage) over all churches in its expanding jurisdiction. Later, the same rights were granted to the Spanish monarchs, with the papacy taking a leading role in demarcating the boundary of explorations and new Christian evangelization between the Iberian monarchies in the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas. In 1514, Pope Leo x confirmed the rights of royal patronage for the Portuguese and Spanish monarchies.

In 1516 the same pope granted to King Francis i of France in the Concordat of Bologna extensive rights over the Gallican Church. In exchange for the royal affirmation of papal supremacy over church councils and for allowing the collection of ecclesiastical incomes in France, Leo conceded to Francis the right to tithe the clergy and restrict their right of appeal to Rome. Most significantly, the French kings gained the right of nomination to all benefices in their kingdom, thus effectively controlling all appointments to the Gallican Church as a vast source of royal patronage. The many territories of the Holy Roman Empire and England were left out of these diplomatic arrangements, a fact that would have important implications for the new crisis that would follow.

A restored papacy provided patronage for artistic creation and urbanization in Rome between the 1470s and 1700, and its vast wealth and bureaucracy provided high ecclesiastical offices and income for the Italian elites, who endowed Rome with churches and palaces. Once again, Rome felt it was the *caput mundi*, the head of the world, a beacon to Latin Christianity. Many looked to Rome as the sacred center. With the declaration of the Papal Jubilee, special years in which sins would be remitted for those who visited certain churches in Rome, Rome became a major pilgrimage destination. There were, however, many who looked askance at the new splendor and power of Rome. Within the church, some criticized the new opulence and power of the papacy; others denounced the worldliness and ambition of popes; and a few would come to question the fundamental legitimacy of papal rule.

Opposition arose in Bohemia. A professor at the University of Prague, Jan Hus (1369–1415) preached against the secular power of the clergy and the political rule of the papacy. Deeply influenced by the Oxford theologian John Wycliffe (1320–84), Hus argued that all Christians, not just the clergy, constituted the Church; that the Bible and preaching represented the true Christian ways; and that power had corrupted the clergy. After Hus was burned at the stake by the Council of Constance in 1415, Bohemia rose in revolt. Opposition to Rome spanned a wide spectrum, from radicals who envisioned the imminent end of the world to conservatives who demanded communion in both kinds (both bread and wine) for the laity at Mass. Eventually contained after decades of warfare and ultimate liturgical concessions, the Hussite Revolution was the precursor of a more serious crisis.

Dissatisfaction with the status quo within Latin Christianity did not necessarily target the papacy. For the mendicant orders – the Franciscans, Dominicans, and Augustinians – the spirit of reform led to the Observant movement, a return to the rules and asceticism of the original foundation. However, for some friars, the impulse toward greater asceticism and monastic discipline led inexorably to millenarian fervor. Such was the case of the Florentine Dominican, Girolamo Savonarola (1452–98), whose fervent sermons calling for moral reform led to sharp criticisms of Pope Alexander VI and ultimately to his own condemnation at the stake.

The Protestant Reformation

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Latin Christianity presented a highly complex picture. At its apex, a strong papacy played an important role in the politics of the Italian states, while the papal curia assumed the character of an Italian Renaissance court. Elsewhere, high ecclesiastical offices were in the hands of the nobility. This was particularly the case in the Holy Roman Empire, where the nobility and urban elites controlled nominations to the many benefices of the imperial church. Meanwhile, the universities, many founded in the fifteenth century, were graduating a new class of clergy, heavily recruited from the urban middle classes and theologically well trained. Keenly aware of abuses within the ecclesiastical hierarchy, this well-educated middle clerical stratum stood between a church leadership encumbered by political interests and the common people devoted to traditional forms of piety – pilgrimage, saints, and the sacraments. Most leaders of the anti-Roman movement that came to be called the Protestant Reformation stemmed from this clerical stratum – Martin Luther,

Ulrich Zwingli, Philip Melanchthon, and many others. Their voices of critique within the church, inspired initially by theological considerations, found a deafening echo outside the ranks of the clergy in society at large, especially among urban merchants and artisans and among peasants.

At issue were clerical privileges. The Latin Church consisted of two classes of people: the economically privileged clergy, subject only to canon law and tried in separate courts, who looked upon themselves as the true church; and the vast majority of laity, who resented the sacerdotalism of the clergy and their privileges, and whose strong anti-clericalism would provide the force behind the Reformation.

At its origins was the critique of indulgences. Sanctioned by the church, these were certificates sold by the church to the faithful in lieu of penance; one issuing of these was authorized by Pope Leo x to help pay for building the new Basilica of St. Peter's in Rome and in Saxony by the Archbishop of Mainz to pay for the expenses involved in his election to ecclesiastical dignity. Professor of theology at the University of Wittenberg, Martin Luther wrote a paper in 1517 that criticized the sale of indulgences and other practices. His voice found an echo, initially among sympathetic like-minded clerics and quickly among broad segments of society. By the time Leo x reacted, the "Luther Affair" had gotten out of control. In three short inflammatory treatises, written in German not for his fellow clergy but for the laity, Luther attacked the pope as Antichrist, decried Catholic teachings and doctrines as erroneous and man-made, in contrast to the godly commands found in the Bible, argued that faith in God, not good works, was the key to redemption, and appealed to the nobility of the German nation to take up the godly cause. The evangelical movement, as it was first called, spread rapidly in the towns of the Holy Roman Empire, often with the support of urban elites. Prominent German princes, in the first place Frederick, Elector of Saxony, offered Luther protection against Rome. In 1525 rural unrests broke out in large parts of southern and central Germany, with peasants targeting monasteries but also the nobility. Coming to the side of public order, Luther condemned the revolts and stated that religious reforms must respect the god-given social order. After the suppression of rural revolts, radical social and political unrest continued in the form of the Anabaptist movement. This too was crushed in 1535 when the millenarian kingdom the Anabaptists established in the city of Münster was militarily suppressed.

Impasse was reached by the 1550s. Although Luther himself had died in 1546, his party had gained a name, the Protestants, from the 1529 act of protest lodged by princes against Emperor Charles v, who declared against

Luther. In most cities and many territories in the Holy Roman Empire, the mass had been abolished, replaced by German-language services; monasteries were closed; the clergy, allowed to marry, swore allegiance to their political masters instead of to their ecclesiastical superiors; and Protestant Germany was lost to Rome. A military attempt to compel obedience by Charles v ended eventually in stalemate. In 1555, Charles reluctantly recognized the Protestant Reformation in the Religious Peace of Augsburg.

From its heartland, the Reformation spread to other countries. In Scandinavia, with close cultural ties to Germany, the churches became Lutheran. In Poland, Bohemia, Hungary, and Transylvania, German-speakers in the cities quickly adopted the Reformation. In the Holy Roman Empire, only Austria, Bavaria, and part of the Rhineland and Westphalia remained Catholic.

Switzerland became a second center for the reform movement. The first wave was embodied by Ulrich Zwingli (1481–1531), a preacher in Zurich, who fell in battle in the warfare between Protestant and Catholic cantons. A second and more influential wave emanated from the Frenchman John Calvin (1509–64), a refugee from religious persecutions in France, whose indefatigable leadership in Geneva made it into a Protestant bulwark and the center of a second Protestant movement. A more systematic theologian, Calvin built upon Luther's teachings on redemption "by faith alone" and "by Bible alone" and worked out an intellectually cogent and powerful theological system to explain divine and human nature, and the meaning of existence and redemption. In ecclesiology and Eucharistic theology, Calvin broke more completely with the Catholic Church than Luther. For him, the true Christian community was invisible, but its earthly manifestation took the form of a community governed by presbyters or elders elected to the office, who supervised and admonished their members to godly behavior, similar to the workings of the first apostolic churches. Calvin's theology, highly abstract and less dependent on his mother tongue, in strong contrast to Luther's profoundly German character, allowed for a wider circulation of his ideas. More effective in eliciting moral conduct with the use of church discipline, Calvin's ecclesiology also appealed to those who wished to create a more godly society by means of church discipline and moral fiber. In addition to Geneva and his native France, the Calvinist reform spread to Scotland, England, the Netherlands, Hungary, Poland, Italy, Transylvania, and parts of Germany.

The Calvinist Reformation expanded at precisely the time when the Roman Catholic Church had awakened to the grave crisis it faced and was

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resolved to face the challenges. In a series of general Church Councils at Trent (1545–61), the Catholic Church drew a sharp boundary with the Protestants. Under the skillful leadership of the popes, who diverted potential anti-papal feelings into doctrinal and moral reforms, the Council of Trent clarified the doctrines of the Catholic Church, rejected compromise with the Protestants, and planned for "the reform of the head and branches of the Church." Poised for combat, the Catholic and Protestant camps became centers not only of religious dispute but also military confrontation, as the ambitions and convictions of kings and princes fueled the maelstrom of religious violence.

Patterns of religious violence

The period between 1517 and 1648 was the most bloody in the history of Christianity. Religious disagreements and a profound fear unleashed by the collapse of authority fed long years of religious violence, which took four major forms. First, there was state violence against religious dissenters. Second, there was violence between different sectors of society or between social groups and the state. Third, religious warfare engulfed most states in Europe in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. And finally, there was social violence against marginal religious groups.

The first victims of state repression of religious dissent were the two Augustinian friars Henry Voes and Johan Esch, followers of Luther, who were burned at the stake in 1523 in Brussels. If the Catholics were the first to use state violence to repress religious dissent, the Protestants were not far behind. During the early Reformation years in Zurich, dissenters criticized Zwingli for not going far enough in breaking with the Catholic Church and in espousing wholeheartedly the Bible as the sole basis for reformed Christianity. Arguing from examples from the first apostolic church, these dissenters refused to baptize their infants and argued that only voluntary adult baptisms constituted the true Christian community. The first Anabaptist community was thus born. Refusing civic oaths and military service, the Anabaptists threatened civic cohesion. Under Zwingli, the Protestants executed the first Anabaptist dissenter, Felix Mantz, in 1527.

Religious violence from the state was particularly marked during the first forty years of the Reformation. While Catholic authorities in the Low Countries, France, Italy, England, and Spain persecuted religious dissenters of all stripes, in general Protestant authorities focused their repression on the Anabaptists. The one notable exception – the 1553 burning of the Spanish

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physician Michael Servetus, who denied the doctrine of the Trinity – damaged the otherwise impeccable reputation of Calvin, as he was criticized for intolerance by Sebastian Castellio, a fellow reformer. The far larger number of Protestant victims of state violence inspired the creation of Protestant martyrologies, of which the English work by John Foxe was the best known. In the blood of their own martyrs, the Lutherans, Calvinists, and Anabaptists (and later the Catholics) wrote new histories that forged an unbroken link between themselves and the first Christian martyrs, establishing proof of true apostolic succession.

It was the state that carried out religious repression in most countries: the Parlements in France; the bailiffs and local authorities in the Spanish Netherlands; the councils in Venice; the city councils in the Holy Roman Empire. The scale and intensity of repression depended on the zeal of individual authorities and the perception of crisis. The execution of Anabaptists, for example, peaked in the years between the first execution in Zurich in 1527 and the 1540s, a decade after the violent Anabaptist revolution in the city of Münster; thereafter, with the pacifist turn of the Anabaptist movement, both Catholic and Protestant authorities stopped executing Anabaptists, with the notable exception of the Swiss.

In England, where official religion vacillated, the executions of Protestants ceased in 1534, when Henry VIII was declared the head of the Anglican Church, only to be renewed with greater intensity under the reign of his daughter, Queen Mary (r. 1553–8), who tried in vain to destroy Protestantism. State violence did not cease, however, in Protestant England. During the 1580s, the war with Spain and fear of Catholic rebellion created a siege mentality in Elizabethan England, which became a relentless repressor of Catholic missionaries and leading dissenters.

In sixteenth-century England state repression proved successful because the state could muster sufficient resources to contain religious dissent. This was not possible in France and the Spanish Netherlands. In France religious disagreements boiled over to ignite social resentment and political competition, and effectively turned state violence into full-scale religious civil wars. Localized conflicts in the 1560s built up to the wholesale massacre of Protestants in 1572, an act conceived initially as a limited action by the Queen Regent Catherine de Medici to remove leading Protestant political leaders, but which degenerated into indiscriminate killings of Protestants throughout France. Between 1572 and 1598, the French state lost control as the monarchy became one player in a generalized religious civil war, fought by rival noble factions and fueled by fierce religious hatred and class antagonism. In 1593,

Henri de Bourbon, leader of the Protestants, converted to Catholicism in order to claim the throne. Five years later, in the Edict of Nantes, Henri IV granted freedom of worship to his former co-religionists and extensive political rights to the Protestant party. Despite lingering ultra-Catholic opposition, royal power was restored to a bi-confessional French state. Nonetheless, religious toleration did not last. Catholics considered the existence of two religious confessions a weakening of royal authority. In 1685, at the height of his power, Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes and subjected French Protestants to a campaign of harassment and forced conversions.

Still another model of state violence was represented by the Spanish Netherlands. Having failed to retard the growth of Protestantism despite the use of state violence between the 1520s and 1540s, the elites in the Low Countries arrived at a consensus for religious toleration. De facto religious diversity was undermined in 1566 by the iconoclastic riots instigated by radical members of the expanding Calvinist movement. It resulted in the dispatch of troops from Spain by Philip II, who rejected the call for religious compromise from the leading noblemen in the Low Countries. Not only did Spanish violence fail to repress religious dissent, but instead it led to a full-scale uprising, the declaration of independence by the Protestant dominated northern provinces, a long period of futile war (1568–1648), and the final separation between a Protestant United Provinces of the Netherlands and a Catholic south under Habsburg rule.

The Spanish Netherlands showed how a social and religious conflict could turn into a religious war between confessional states. This pattern of religious violence, the third in our list, dominated the history of Central Europe. After the Peasants War of 1525 and the Münster Anabaptist Kingdom of 1534–5, there was a decrease in religious conflicts at the social level. The war between the Protestant Schmalkaldic League and the Catholic emperor Charles V (1547–52) was as much about imperial politics as religion. The 1555 Religious Peace of Augsburg established a stable and peaceful co-existence for more than sixty years, albeit the rise of Calvinism after the 1570s and a more aggressive Catholic Counter-Reformation in the 1580s intensified tensions. Renewed religious conflict broke out over the election to the Bohemian Crown in 1618 that touched on the balance of power between Protestants and Catholics in the multi-territorial Holy Roman Empire. The conflict that came to be called the Thirty Years' War (1618–48) began with a strong religious character, with Protestant Denmark and Sweden fighting on the side of German Protestants against the Austrian Habsburgs and the German Catholic powers. With the entry of France on

the side of the Protestants, the war assumed the character of a dynastic conflict between Bourbon and Habsburg. The conclusion of the peace treaties at Westphalia in 1648 included the Calvinists as well in the general religious settlement and largely resolved religious state violence in Christian Europe.

The fourth and final pattern of religious violence was directed at religious scapegoats. It reflected deep social reflexes that viewed social minorities as motivated by anti-Christian intentions, embodying the evil that threatened the body politic. Christian Europe targeted two social groups: Jews and witches. Persecution of Jews in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was part of the long history of antagonism toward the synagogue by the Church, and culminated in a series of accusations by Christians that Jews were engaging in desecration of the host (the bread of the Communion ritual) and ritual murder. While anti-Jewish violence diminished with the escalation of intra-Christian violence after the Reformation, sporadic persecutions persisted in seventeenth-century France and Poland.

The other persecuted group, witches, represented a constructed social category. Out of diverse marginal social elements – folk-healers, vagrants, the poor, the old, particularly women – popular fantasy and learned discourse created the image of the malevolent witch, minion of the Devil and the instigator of hail, storm, disease, poison, and death. The first persecutions against witches occurred in the Swiss Jura during the 1440s; the first demono-logical discourse, the *Malleus Maleficarum* (Hammer of Witches), was com-posed in 1487 by two German Dominicans; and large-scale witch hunts began to occur after the mid-sixteenth century. Many thousands died during two centuries of witch trials, with the most intense persecutions occurring between the 1580s and 1650s, overlapping with the period of the most intense religious conflicts. Interestingly, the witch hunt was especially acute in regions faced with the greatest confessional conflicts – the Catholic territories of South and Central Germany, Protestant Scotland and England – and relatively moderate to almost non-existent in regions with strong confessional identity, notably Spain. Unlike state repression of religious dissent, the origins of many witch trials began with the popular search for scapegoats. These were rural, small-town phenomena of social control; but when political authorities inter-vened, interjecting a Manichean ideology of the struggle between good and evil, witch trials turned into full-scale witch hunts that threatened to destabilize society. The resolution of religious conflict after 1648 removed the state from the mechanism of witchcraft accusation, but popular demands for the punishment of scapegoats persisted well into the eighteenth century.

Protestant Christianity

A century after the Reformation, Christian Europe was permanently divided between Catholics and Protestants. Scandinavia, England, Scotland, the Netherlands, Hungary, Transylvania, and most of Germany and Switzerland, had forsworn allegiance to Rome. In addition, there were large Protestant minorities in France and Poland. Catholicism held firm in Bohemia and Austria with the triumph of Habsburg arms, and crushed pockets of religious dissent early on in Spain and Italy with the help of the Inquisition. Even after the cessation of violence, a strong cultural frontier emerged between Protestantism and Catholicism, characterized by ecclesiology, soteriology, and liturgy.

A marked distinction in Protestantism was its ecclesiology. Born out of a deep anti-clericalism, the Reformation forswore allegiance to the papacy and created a laicized Protestant Christianity that wrested control of religion from clerical to political authority. This took different forms. In England, the monarch became the head of the Anglican Church; in Germany, the prince appointed clerical officials and determined ecclesiastical affairs; in Switzerland, officials in the Protestant cantons selected pastors and paid their wages. Whether at the national, territorial, or local level, the principle of lay control in religious matters operated, as best summed up in the formula devised in the 1555 Religious Peace of Augsburg: *cuius regio, eius religio*, "whose realm, his religion," with "his" here meaning the effective ruler of the territory. While Calvinist ecclesiology provided a blueprint for a more "democratic" church government, membership in the presbytery (the controlling institution) overlapped to a large extent with local social and political elites, as studies of the Reformed churches in Northwestern Germany and the Netherlands have shown. Whether church discipline was exercised through the Clerical Council and superintendents of a territorial state or by the magistrates in a Swiss canton, a more rigorous moral regime was created with techniques of external surveillance and internal examination of conscience. In translating church discipline into social control, Calvinism proved more effective than the Lutheran Church, which relied on periodic parish visitations and long-term catechism to bring the faithful in line with the heightened expectations of a more professional clergy.

In rejecting celibacy and monasticism, the Reformation created a clergy markedly different from the Catholic priesthood. Legally and connubially indistinguishable from the citizenry, Protestant pastors, better educated than their medieval counterparts, became just another group in the middle class

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by virtue of their professionalism. They were paid officials in the Protestant states, defenders of the new religious and political order, and censors of theological dissent and unorthodoxy among the laity and in its own ranks.

The triumph of laicization was manifest in religious practices. Latin no longer divided the laity from the clergy, as it continued to do in Roman Catholicism. Everywhere in Protestant Europe, religion was practiced in vernacular languages – divine services, Bible-reading, psalm-singing, Sunday sermons, confessional creeds, and ecclesiastical ordinances. The idea of "the priesthood of all believers" promoted lay Bible reading; it led to a strong emphasis on education and greater literacy in Protestant Christianity than in Catholic lands.

After the fervor of the Reformation, Protestant Christianity settled into a doctrinal stability. After the turmoil of the mid-seventeenth century – the Thirty Years' War in Germany and the Civil War in England – eschatology, prophecy, and religious "enthusiasm'"went out of fashion, as Protestant Europe radiated self-confidence in asserting its differences from Catholic Christianity.

Post-Tridentine Catholicism

The Council of Trent defined early modern Catholicism. It clarified the dogmatic boundary between the Roman Church and the Protestant innovators, and affirmed the supremacy of papacy and validity of tradition. In so doing, Tridentine Catholicism not only returned to its medieval roots, but assumed new characteristics with an energy found in a regained self-confidence.

First and foremost was safeguarding sacerdotal authority, with defending the papacy a top priority. An obvious response to the Protestants, this was also directed at Catholic states, the Venetian Interdict (1605–7) being a good example. Disputes over how the Venetian state controlled the clergy escalated an ecclesiastical quarrel into a full diplomatic confrontation. Venice expelled all clergy who refused to submit to secular authority; Pope Paul v retaliated by placing the entire republic under the ban of excommunication. A war of pamphlets broke out, with the Servite monk Paolo Sarpi taking the pen on behalf of Venetian republicanism and the Jesuits for the pope. This diplomatic *contretemps*, with France drawn to Venice and Spain supporting the papacy, even boiled over to talks of war before a final settlement, but the most vocal pro-papal religious order, the Society of Jesus, did not return to the Venetian Republic until 1655.

The affirmation of papal supremacy came with a price. Against Protestant Europe, Counter-Reformation popes depended on Spain and France; but wars and competition between the two major Catholic powers narrowed the maneuverable space for the supreme pontiff. To enhance his powers, the pope centralized power, increased revenues, and tightened control in the Papal States, but reasons of state sometimes contradicted the goals of church reforms spelled out by the Council of Trent. Reform decrees stipulated better clerical training, stricter adherence to canon law, and enhanced episcopal authority. In practice, few diocesan seminaries were established, nepotism and pluralism persisted, and bishops were beholden to princes for appointments and found their pastoral duties sometimes hindered by political imperatives (including in the Papal States).

Tridentine decrees were implemented at two different speeds. While Counter-Reformation measures were quickly implemented, church reforms proceeded slowly and unevenly. In the first category, the Holy Office (the Inquisition) and the Index of Prohibited Books increased frontier vigilance against Protestantism: dissidents died, books were burned, and heretics condemned, as the Catholic Church tried to control the bodies and minds of the faithful. The seven sacraments were affirmed; episcopal visitations checked for baptisms, confessions, and communion; diocesan courts investigated illegal marriages; and church authorities exercised greater control over clerical admission and promotion. Still, clerical celibacy remained a problem into the late seventeenth century, and insufficient funding meant that the goal of a better-educated parish clergy did not begin to be achieved until a century after Trent.

Despite these shortcomings and limitations, post-Tridentine Catholicism expressed a new religious energy, manifest in increased religious vocations, revival of popular devotions, and a new wave of sanctity. The founding of new religious orders expressed the activism manifest in a Catholic revival; two of them, the Jesuits and the Capuchins, would play important roles in the early modern period. After 1600, signs of Catholic recovery could be seen in pilgrimages, new liturgies, and new saint cults, with the early seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries representing the two waves of canonization. The defense of papal authority extended to the centralization of liturgical practices: the Roman Missal, the Vulgate Bible, and new papal institutions reinforced the central position of Rome as the capital of Catholicism. Its positions consolidated, Roman Catholicism went on the offensive, both in terms of winning over Protestants and converting non-Christian populations. The many papal institutions founded between the mid-sixteenth and late

eighteenth centuries testified to this catholic/imperialist energy: the German, English, Hungarian, and Greek colleges for the training of clergy from those nations, and a new congregation for the Propagation of Faith (1622) to coordinate the expanding Catholic missions to lands beyond Europe. This last development will be discussed in greater detail and compared with Protestant overseas missions below, but not before following developments in Orthodox Christianity, which was also affected by a reinvigorated Latin Christianity.

Greek Orthodoxy: surviving conquest

After the fall of Constantinople, the Greek Orthodox Church rallied around two poles: the patriarchate and the monastery of Athos. Important institutions in the Byzantine Empire, monasteries were often constructed on holy mountains. The site of Athos, perched on top of an inaccessible mountain at the end of a peninsula, helped to enhance its significance, as many other monasteries in Asia Minor fell to the advancing Turks. Inspired by the ideal of piety and protection of religious figures, and eager to win over the local populations, the Ottomans left Athos untouched. As the leading monastery of the movement for internal prayer and quiet meditation, the religiosity of Athos did not pose a threat to the Ottomans. The privileged monastery became a refuge from war, attracting large donations and developing into a major credit institution in the Ottoman Empire. The 1568 confiscation of all monastic lands by Sultan Selim II represented a blow, but Athos retained its buildings, flocks, and other properties. A major center for icon production, Athos developed close financial and cultural ties to the Orthodox communities in Walachia, Moldavia, and Russia in the early modern period.

Continuing Byzantine traditions, the Ottoman sultans allowed the Orthodox Church to be governed by the patriarch. The re-establishment of the patriarchate after 1453 was an attempt to attract Greeks to the empty city, and immigrants from across Greece were forcibly resettled there. Appointed by the Ottoman, the patriarchate represented an extension of the state. The patriarch was invested with authority over the Greek Christian community, or *millet*, and administered the Orthodox Church in this capacity, collecting taxes among the faithful for the Ottoman state, and overseeing the administration of Roman family law among the Orthodox.

Many problems faced Greek Orthodox Christianity under Ottoman rule: a declining Greek population exacerbated by conversions to Islam, prohibition

of proselytizing among Muslims, fiscal exactions from the Ottoman state, and highly fractious relationships within the Greek community. Occupying an important political office, the patriarch often had to contend with influential Greek officeholders, the *archontes*, and was sometimes enmeshed in treacherous Ottoman politics.

Accommodating to Ottoman rule, the Greek Orthodox Church maintained its hostility to Roman Catholicism, while making overtures to Protestants and strengthening ties with the Orthodox populations of northeastern Europe. In 1559, Patriarch Joasaph II established contact with the German Lutherans, and Philip Melanchthon sent him a Greek copy of the Augsburg Confession of Faith. In the 1570s, Stephen Gerlach and other German Lutherans sent theological works to Patriarch Jeremias II, but the two sides disagreed on the role of the church fathers and councils in Christian authority. Turning from Protestants to Russia, Jeremias II established closer ties with the Slavs and established the Moscow patriarchate in 1589, bringing the large Russian population under the banner of Greek Orthodoxy.

A new attempt to forge ties with Protestant Europe was made by Patriarch Cyril Loukaris (r. 1620–38). Born in Venetian Crete and educated at the University of Padua, Cyril became an envoy for the Orthodox Church in Eastern Europe. An opponent of Catholicism, and especially of the Jesuits, Cyril envisioned a grand Orthodox–Protestant coalition against Rome. He developed close ties to English and Dutch Protestants, reformed Orthodox education, commissioned a modern Greek Bible, and introduced the printing press to Istanbul. His reforms fell victim to politics, however. Embroiled in a conflict with Pope Urban VIII, Cyril became increasingly vulnerable to papal diplomatic pressure and internal dissent within the Greek Church. In 1638 he was executed by the Ottomans for treason. Cyril's enthusiasm for Protestantism led to a negative reaction among the Orthodox faithful, which led the Greek Church to open contact with Catholicism in the late seventeenth century, although the aggressive policies of Catholic missionaries soon soured this rapprochement.

Russian Orthodoxy: the Third Rome

Beginning in the late fourteenth century, Russian Christianity began its long drift away from the Byzantine center and towards autocephalous consolidation. While Kiev and Novgorod had served as spiritual centers in the Middle Ages, the rise of the Muscovite state would make its capital a new center of religious power. The fall of Constantinople in 1453 contributed

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to the mythology of Moscow as the Third Rome / New Jerusalem. Orthodoxy was also a way for the tsars to assert their sovereignty over newly conquered western regions such as Kiev and Novgorod. Just as the tsars used the Orthodox Church to centralize power, the church sought to consolidate itself, producing unified lists of holidays, saints, orthodox spiritual practices, and texts.

A fierce devotion to tradition and relative isolation from Latin Christianity characterized the history of the Russian Church. The development of an autocephalous tradition was marked by a series of cultural productions, such as the Slavonic Bible (1499) and the chronicles and hagiographies produced by Russian monks, who constituted the church's intellectual elite. The significance of monasticism was enhanced by its strong growth in the early fifteenth century, which exhibited a distinctive pattern of religious–social dynamics: seeking spiritual solitude, a hermit or holy fool (important figures in Russian Christianity) sought out the wilderness, only to be joined by expanding groups of devotees, who became the nucleus of new monastic communities and the expansion of the Muscovite northern frontier. By the sixteenth century, the growth in properties and power led to close ties between ecclesiastical and secular authorities. Despite its cultural conservatism, the Russian Church witnessed a distinctive flowering of ecclesiastical architecture and a new sense of its grandeur as the Third Rome.

As the Russian Church expanded with the rising Muscovite state, events in western and central Europe made a deep impact on the history of Russian Orthodoxy after the late sixteenth century in two ways. First, the doctrinal, liturgical, and ecclesiological reforms, initially emanating from Protestantism and then from Tridentine Catholicism, stimulated similar movements in the Russian Orthodox Church. The key themes were centralization and standardization: enhancing episcopal authority, improving clerical education, eradicating folk "superstitions," standardizing liturgy, and generally strengthening church discipline and moral behavior. Second, it is clear that these ideals for reform were inspired by developments in the Western churches and, for that very reason, they also provoked strong internal resistance from a Christian community fiercely attached to tradition, averse to innovations, and violently hostile to Roman Catholicism.

The age of the Counter-Reformation was a time of bitter conflict in the Eastern Orthodox Church in Ukraine, which at this point was part of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. In this multi-ethnic state, there was a great deal of religious diversity, stemming from the strength of the nobility and the weakness of the central government, resulting in a sort of *cuius regio*

policy. However, the Catholic Sigismund III (r. 1587–1632) began to change this de facto policy, applying the Counter-Reformation to his territories and sending missions to both Protestants and Orthodox.

The relationship between the Orthodox and Catholic reforms in Poland–Lithuania was complex. They shared the same goals of purifying and strengthening the practice of the faith. This meant increased power of the church hierarchy over the lower clergy and laity, improved clerical education, the standardization and revision of liturgical texts, and the discipline of devotional practices. However, the orthodox, imbued with anti-papal sentiment, reacted negatively to Catholic missionary incursions.

Reforms in the Orthodox Church begun in the 1580s often underlay sponsorship. Achievements included the publication of Orthodox biblical and liturgical texts and the foundation of Orthodox confraternities in Lviv. Some leaders of the Orthodox Church in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth thought unification with Catholicism the best possible means for reform. However, the laity would only accept a complete reconciliation between all of Orthodoxy and the Catholic Church, something that the Russian Church would not agree to. In 1596, church leaders accepted union with the Roman Catholic Church at the Union of Brest, but the orthodox laity organized strong opposition. The partition of Ukraine in 1654 determined the fate of the Uniate and Orthodox churches, giving each exclusive control on their side of the divide, although confessional tensions would remain for a long time.

In Russia, the Orthodox Church was the state religion, and conserved the local Slavonic traditions without much influence from the outside world. The status of the Orthodox Church was elevated by the creation of the Moscow patriarchate in 1589. Invasions by Catholic Poles and Lutheran Swedes in the seventeenth century intensified the identification of Orthodoxy with Russianness. In defending Russia against foreign invaders, Orthodoxy and Tsardom became synonymous with Mother Russia.

While rejecting Western Christianity, Russian Orthodoxy borrowed from it lessons for religious and church reforms. One such reformer was Peter Mohyla, a noble and a high-ranking cleric, who used the Jesuit model to create an Orthodox seminary, meant to provide highly trained defenders of the faith educated along Western lines. This florescence of learning was followed by a systematic program of publication and editions, making Kiev the intellectual heart of the Orthodox world by the 1650s.

The example of Kiev inspired reforms in Muscovy. Under Tsar Alexis I (1645–76), reformers in the Russian Church saw many of their proposals

adopted, including strict enforcement of liturgy and moral teachings, an emphasis on effective preaching, and a ban on pagan folk practices. Changes in the tax code threatened these gains, subordinating church property and clergy to secular control. These tensions erupted under the patriarchate of Nikon, who increasingly asserted his authority. His adoption of Greek liturgical practices angered many traditional believers and members of the clergy, who focused their opposition on his increasing assertions of absolute patriarchal power. Alexis was forced to remove him from office by creating an ecumenical panel from across Orthodoxy, deposing him for dereliction of duty. Although it deposed Nikon, the council came down firmly on the side of the new liturgical practices he had introduced, exiling the opposition despite calls for reconciliation between devotees of the old traditions and the new. This event marked the rise of tsarist authority in the church and of Greek and Ukrainian leadership in the Russian Church. Though dramatic and controversial, these decisions largely settled the debate in 1666–7. Millions separated from the official church. They came to be called Old Believers. Savage repression by the state drove some to rebellion and many more into voluntary exile, especially to the expanding Russian frontier to the east, across the steppes of Central Asia and to Siberia.

The subordination of the Orthodox Church to the Russian state was completed under Peter the Great, who appointed Western-educated Ukrainians to major church positions. One of these was Feofan Prokopovich, a Ukrainian cleric educated by the Jesuits, who espoused tsarist control of the church. Having observed the Anglican Church while abroad, Peter concurred in this vision of a Russian national church. In 1718, Feofan released the *Spiritual Regulation*, which advocated the abolition of the patriarchate in favor of a synod. This was quickly enacted, although the synod was ineffective in implementing reforms until the 1740s. These reforms focused on curtailing folk religious practices, instructing the laity in Christian doctrines, and training a better-educated parish clergy. While the intellectual level of the parish clergy had been raised by 1800, the success in expanding Russian Orthodoxy to the newly conquered Asian peoples on the eastern frontier was more limited. Early massive, coerced conversions obtained by state-sponsored missions in the Volga brought in large numbers of converts, but the vast majority retained at most a nominal adherence to Christianity. A shift of policy was initiated under Catherine II, whose *raison d'etat* and enlightened conviction resulted in a gentler approach to missions. A more tolerant religious regime allowed Old Believers to return from exile, and removed punitive laws against them.

Monasticism in the eighteenth century was in decline, with the total number of monks decreasing by half between 1724 and 1738. Prompted by this decline and by fiscal need, Catherine II confiscated much monastic property for the state. Currents within the church discouraged priests from becoming monks. On the other hand, internal prayer in the tradition of Mount Athos brought a new sense of purpose to monks alienated by the scholastic turn in church teachings. This newly vibrant tradition inspired many intellectuals, as well as many women, who joined female religious institutions with increasing frequency after Catherine II made it easier to found nunneries.

The period of Enlightenment was followed by a conservative reaction. In the early nineteenth century, conservative church leaders asserted their authority and expressed deep hostility to reforms and foreign innovations, as well as to mysticism. The Jesuits were expelled from St. Petersburg and Moscow in 1815, and the empire in 1820; freemasonry and secret societies were abolished in 1822; British missions in Siberia were expelled in the 1830s. The Orthodox Church was once again the guardian of Russian identity.

The global expansion of Christianity

Just as Russian Orthodoxy expanded in tandem with the Russian Empire eastward to Central and Northern Asia, Catholic and Protestant missions spread globally due to the rise of Western European maritime empires (Figure 14.1). There were three models of Christian expansion: conquest, as represented by Spain in the Americas; trade, as represented by Portugal in Asia; and colonial settlement, as represented by France and Britain in North America. While these models were not mutually exclusive, the patterns shaped the nature of the encounter between Christian and non-Christian peoples.

In Spanish America and Portuguese Brazil, colonial conquest and rule imposed Christianity from above through repression of indigenous cults, enforced catechism, translation programs, and subjugation of indigenous communities to missionary authority. Catholicism and colonialism were synonymous, as soldiers protected missionaries on the frontiers in Mexico and Chile, and as conversions pacified resistance to Spanish rule. Beginning in 1500, this process terminated only in the late eighteenth century with the pacification of Chile.

Without the ambition and means to create an extensive territorial empire, except around the Indian city of Goa, Portugal created a network of trading posts in Africa and Asia, stretching from West Africa to Japan.

Figure 14.1: Pasquale Cati, *The Council of Trent*, 1588–9. In this fresco, painted for a chapel in Rome, the artist shows the assembled churchmen in the back, with allegorical figures, including the Catholic Church wearing a papal tiara, surrounding a globe in the front, symbolizing the global reach of the Church.

In Mozambique, Goa, Malacca, Macao, and Nagasaki, the Portuguese clergy attended first to their compatriots. After the founding of the Society of Jesus and thanks to the exemplar of Francis Xavier, the first Jesuit missionary, Jesuits from all Catholic countries volunteered to work under Portuguese *padroado*. In India, non-Portuguese Jesuits comprised some 10 percent of the clergy between 1500 and 1750; in the China Mission, also under Portuguese patronage, the proportion was over 60 percent. Where Christianity could not

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be implanted by arms, conversion took the form of persuasion. Through translated texts, rituals, healing, and other cultural practices, missionaries propagated Christianity in a larger network of exchanges that was sustained by trade, not unlike the earlier spread of Islam in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. Christianity met with various levels of success and resistance, depending on politics, culture, economy, and the ability of individual missionaries. In South Asia, Catholicism achieved limited success among Hindus; encounter with Syriac Christianity caused an intense conflict within that community between supporters and opponents of Roman reunion. In Southeast Asia, Catholicism scored some success in Sri Lanka, Malacca, and Vietnam, but it suffered a catastrophe in the seventeenth century, when Japanese Christianity was brutally suppressed by the newly unified Tokugawa regime. Only in the Philippines, the only Spanish Asian colony, did Catholicism become the major religion.

Following the Spaniards and Portuguese, Protestant England and the Netherlands also became global maritime powers in the seventeenth century. Focused on trade and colonial settlement, the Dutch and English private companies that sponsored the overseas enterprises invested little in propagating Christianity. Where colonial interests were involved, however, greater resources became available for evangelization. Such was the case in mid-seventeenth-century Taiwan, when the Dutch supported missions among the aborigines, hoping to develop the island into their East Asian base just like Batavia in Southeast Asia. Similarly, Christian missions on the frontier of English settlements in North America took on the nature of civilizing missions and pacification, similar to Jesuit missions in the Mexican and Chilean borderlands of the Spanish state. The establishment in 1769 of Dartmouth College in New Hampshire for the Christian education of native boys may well represent the apex of this missionary impulse.

Christian missions stimulated religious rivalry in the way European states competed in the mercantilist world. In the late seventeenth century Danish and German Pietists sent missionaries to India, where many European countries were developing a strong commercial interest. The Calvinist Dutch founded the Cape colony to compete with Portuguese Mozambique and attracted French Calvinist and German Protestant immigrants. At times, religious resistance lasted longer than the military: Catholicism survived in Malacca after the Dutch snatched it from Portugal in 1641, thanks to 130 years of Catholic missions.

Resistance was equally stubborn to Catholic missions in Eastern Christianity. In Ethiopia, Portuguese Jesuits scored little success in the late sixteenth

century, but two emperors, ZaDangel and Susenyos, converted in the early seventeenth century and agreed to a reunion with Rome. This provoked widespread and fierce resistance among many adherents of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church; in 1632 Susenyos was deposed and the Jesuits expelled.

The Armenians were also largely immune to Catholic missions. Under the leadership of their *catholicos*, who, as the recognized leader of his religious community, played a similar role to that of the Greek Patriarch in the Ottoman Empire, the Armenian diaspora was sustained by a commercial network and a strong adherence to tradition. Armenian merchants in New Julfa near Isfahan in the Safavid Empire met Catholic missionaries with hostility; whether in the Russian or in the Ottoman empires, Armenian Christianity remained a strong ethnic marker.

Subordinated to the Armenian Church by Ottoman authorities in the seventeenth century, Syrian Christianity was in a more difficult position. With the penetration of French diplomacy and trade in the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth century, Catholic missionaries achieved some success in persuading Syrian converts to imitate the example of the Maronites and accept full union with Rome.

The global expansion of Christianity raised (and continues to raise) many religious and cultural questions: the translation of theological terms; the use of language; and whether conversion was or should be seen as synthesis, accommodation, hybridization, or spiritual conquest. While peoples around the world absorbed, rejected, or remained indifferent to the message of the Christianities propagated in the early modern period, a Christian ethnography was being founded and elaborated in Catholic and Protestant Europe. The study of non-European languages, culture, politics, and religion would eventually lay the foundation for a global knowledge, of which we are both the inheritors and deconstructors.

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Islam in the early modern world

NILE GREEN

Islam has often been described as a religion of the mosque and the book, and the early modern period saw the construction of many of the largest and most enduring mosques in history. In contrast to the major mosque-building projects of previous centuries, these new prayer buildings were not located in such old Muslim centres as Damascus and Cairo, but often in the further reaches of Asia and Africa that saw new Muslim-ruled polities appear in this period. The Bibi-Khanum mosque (1404) in Samarkand, the ʿIdgah mosque in Kashgar (1442), the Sidi Yahya mosque in Timbuktu (1440) and the Shait-gumbaj mosque (1459) in Bagerhat are some of the most important. After the conquests of Chinggis Khan (d. 1227) and Timur (d. 1405), new religious and intellectual centres developed beyond the formerly core regions of Islamic religious productivity. Given that the locations of many of the great fifteenth-century mosques had themselves only been recently claimed for the *dar al-islam* ('house of Islam'), they in part served to publicly claim new spaces for Islam. As the post-Timurid sultanates gave way to the larger imperial states of the Ottomans, Safavids and Mughals, there began what was arguably history's greatest period of mosque construction. This age of an imperial Islam saw the completion of the Ottoman Selimiye mosque (1575) in Edirne, the Ketchaoua mosque (1612) in Algiers and the Sultan Ahmet mosque (1616) in Istanbul, the Safavid Shah's mosque (1629) in Isfahan, the Mughal Jahan-Numa mosque (1656) in Delhi and the Badshahi mosque (1673) in Lahore, and the Mecca mosque (1694) in Hyderabad that was begun by the Qutb Shahs but completed by the Mughals. Funded from the coffers of empire, these were arresting concrete symbols of imperial and Islamic might (Figure 15.1).

Yet as feats of patronage, these official projects tell us more about the religion of the state than of its peoples. For with their artful precocity and precious materials, these mosques distract our attention from the more widespread proliferation of an Islam of the shrine as much as an Islam of the mosque. While the wealth of rival empires was being channelled into

Figure 15.1: Mosque of Sokollu Mehmet Pasha, Istanbul, 1572

these prestige projects, in villages and towns right across the *dar al-islam* shrines appeared to the Muslim saints and their families, which served as the bridgeheads of an expanding and adapting world religion. For in comparative terms, the relative absence of durable village mosques to parallel the rural churches of Europe is not to be explained by an absence of piety or funds,

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but rather by the focus of Muslim devotion on graves as much as prayer niches. Unlike mosques, such tomb shrines accommodated both women's and men's religiosity, the needs of both sedentary and pastoral peoples, as well as the hybridized Islams of the many rural communities acculturating to Islam from West Africa to Java. The point here is not to draw dichotomies between a mosque and a shrine Islam, between Islam as a religion of the book and the body, between a transcendent God and immanent saints. Rather it is to recognize from the outset the spectrum of religiosity behind the imposing imperial mosques built to capture the eye of posterity.

If mosques, great or small, must be recognized as the partners (if for many early modern Muslims, the less visited partners) of the shrines to the holy families of Shiʿi *imams* and Sunni *awliya* (saints), then the place of the Quran, and of written Islam in general, needs to be similarly contextualized. Since it is often casually claimed that Islam is a religion of the book, then in an historical appraisal this truism needs to be evaluated in relation to the parameters of textual receptivity. The Quran served as a symbolic touch-stone for all Muslim communities in the early modern period, but for many it was more a venerated idea than a textual object. Although excerpts might be recited in formal worship, inscribed in public buildings or cited in non-Arabic books, the majority of early modern Muslims never owned a Quran. The reach of such a scriptural Islam faced multiple barriers as the demographic shift was made into Islam being practised by a majority of non-Arabic speakers. Except for occasional interlinear glosses, the Quran remained untranslated till the last decades of this period. Moreover, with the exception of the brief printing career of Ibrahim Müteferrika (1674–1745) in Istanbul, who was in any case expressly banned from printing the Quran, the early modern centuries remained for Muslims an age without printing. We must therefore be cautious in automatically looking to the Quran as a sourcebook on religious practice. The socio-religious dynamics of the period preclude the spread of anything comparable to a Lutheran *sola scriptura* model of religious practice, even if we will see proponents of the Prophet's *sunna* ('way, example') becoming increasingly vocal in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Written languages form points of connection and disconnection. In towns throughout the *dar al-islam*, Arabic remained the learned language of the religious sciences. In many regions, Arabic was a sociolect or caste language that served as the cultural capital of self-replicating clerical families, though in certain regions the teaching of Arabic through *madrasa* schools offered the possibility of social mobility through Arabic. In either case, it served as

a minority language of prestige and power. Supported by the early modern empires, the prestige of Persian and Turkish opened alternative literary avenues for writers of religious works (including women) who had not learned Arabic. But with the rise of baroque styles at court, these too became learned and coded languages, leaving the true vernaculars (whether Malay, Hindi or the so-called African 'Ajami languages) in the hands of vernacular-izing literati and peasant troubadours. While there is no reliable data on literacy rates in this period, in all regions a minority of the population was literate, with men being far more likely to be literate than women and town-dwellers than agrarian or pastoral peoples. Literacy did probably expand through the demands of increasingly bureaucratic empires and in some cities, such as Cairo, we know that artisans and craftsmen possessed sufficient literacy to read basic texts. Nonetheless, however much we can surmise a trickle-down effect of scriptural awareness, for the majority of Muslims literacy remained a restricted and minority cultural asset, with literacy in Arabic being rarer still. Whole Muslim communities (pastoralists not least) found their only links to literate Islam through the Sufi patrons who served as cultural mediators on the many social, ethnic and linguistic borderlands of the *dar al-islam*.

This brings us to the important point that the *'ulama*, the 'men of learning' who were the representatives of learned and literate Islam, were not categorically distinct from the Sufis, whose authority rested on the combined claims of mystical experience and the genealogical inheritance of Prophetic charisma. Both *'ulama* and Sufis relied on textual learning for their legitimacy and activity, using writing to exchange letters and treatises across wide distances; to prove their learning through *ijaza* certificates; to disseminate their teachings through vernacular literatures in Arabic script. Their sources of legitimacy having converged in previous centuries, Sufis and *'ulama* were frequently the same persons; as such, in the following pages they are referred to as Sufi-*'ulama*. Albeit constituting a small section of any given community, these men of learning extended an Arabic and, to a lesser extent, a Persian ecumene across Eurasia and Africa, at the same time that they developed Islamic vernaculars and translated Perso-Arabic works into existing literary languages such as Chinese. But such literate religion was not free-flowing and in each of its locales, it had to pass through the master–disciple networks that were the institutional fabric of Islamic learning. These networks were substantially provided by the Sufi *tariqas* ('brotherhoods') that served as social channels for the further distribution of ideas and activities. In writing Islam into world history, the networks created by such brotherhoods are

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essential for understanding the expanding reach of Islam in this period. For these lineage-based networks bridged not only geographical but also social distance, connecting the learned heirs of the Prophet to tribespeople, women and non-literate townsmen.

The following pages explore the latitude and limits of these attempts to bring an Islam of the mosque and book to so wide a portion of the planet between around 1400 and 1800. The first section turns to the connection of different regions through the Sufi lineages that offered both the conceptual-genealogical ties and organizational-institutional networks that forged a cohesive if by no means unitary *dar al-islam*. The second section moves from geographical to social frontiers by examining the widespread conversions to Islam of this period as a process of collective acculturation and private strategy. The third section traces the impact of the early modern empires on religious conformity and confessionalization as states furthered this conversion process by playing an increasing role in the organization and system-atization of their subjects' religious and thereby public lives. Finally, the chapter follows the spread of renewal movements in the late eighteenth century before turning to the first signs of the impact of colonization on Islam. In attempting to conceive Islam as a set of processes in world history, the focus lies particularly on processes that emerged through interconnection between different regions or peoples and patterns that can be observed comparatively (if not always connectively) in different regions around the same time. Since the repositioning of Islamic history within world history cannot be accomplished by generating models from a notional Middle Eastern 'centre' or 'norm', equal attention is given to developments in all Muslim regions.

Connection: genealogies and networks

As mechanisms for the controlled transfer of charisma, authority and doc-trine to selected followers and successors, the *tariqa* brotherhoods had already emerged in the medieval period. These vehicles of Sufi and wider Muslim tradition were originally more conceptual entities than concrete social organizations. But between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries they developed initiation rituals, dress codes, curricula and, most crucially, the pilgrimage, residential and teaching institutions that allowed for the accumu-lation of capital. While the *tariqas* can broadly be understood as Muslim counterparts to the Christian monastic orders, their leaders bore the crucial difference that they could marry (and marry multiply) to produce heirs and

successors. Through their links to the many upstart dynasties of the fifteenth century, the Sufis won patronage that saw them acquire properties that were inheritable through Muslim endowment law (*waqf*). One channel of royal patronage created grand mosques in the major cities, but this more diffuse and enduring pattern of investing in Sufi families saw ruling elites build channels of benefaction to their villages and provinces. Whether markets or farmlands, when granted in perpetuity to the Sufis and Sufi-*ʿulama* who maintained them, such endowments allowed these holy families to become independently wealthy economic as well as religious players. An example can be seen under the Timurid rulers of eastern Persia and Central Asia, particularly Sultan Husayn Bayqara (r. 1469–1506), who used *waqf* endowments to grant under-used arable land to saintly families. While the polity benefited in the short term by an increase in agricultural productivity, in the longer term, when the Timurid state itself collapsed, it was the Sufi families who emerged strongest by holding onto the rich agrarian resources granted them in perpetuity. Rightly described as 'little cities of God', the shrines that were constructed through this wealth generated further revenue in turn from the pilgrims who visited the deceased Sufis buried in the grand mausoleums at the centre of these complexes of mosques, schools and hospices. Through rituals of pilgrimage no less than popular legend and formal theology, these Sufi-*ʿulama* were rendered saints whose families inherited their symbolic and material capital through conflating the genealogical mechanisms of the brotherhood with the legal principles of the endowment. Brotherhood (*tariqa*) and endowment (*waqf*) were crucial tools in the construction and reproduction of religious power.

What this all meant was that by the fifteenth century, such Sufi families were emerging as local religious establishments in regions as far removed as Morocco, Anatolia, India and Southeast Asia. In many cases, the brotherhoods and their shrines provided services that states were either unable or not expected to provide. Through the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, for example, the Naqshbandi brotherhood in Central Asia provided the peasants and townsmen who pledged their allegiance to its leaders with services ranging from protection from raiding nomads to immunity from taxation. By the seventeenth century, the expansion of Sufi brotherhoods through China saw the descendants of their local founders establish *menhuan* (from *menhu*, 'great family'), corporate lineages that blended claims of prophetic descent with Chinese family structures and mercantile dexterity. The very fact that Sufis were able to embed themselves into so many societies, economies and polities is testament to their effective apparatus of tradition.

For what was essential to their success was the transportability and transfer-ability of their claims to authority: the genealogies, doctrines and rituals that supported their claims to be the heirs of the Prophet were all intrinsically mobile symbolic assets. And so there developed a general pattern in which the son or disciple of a notable Sufi from one region would travel to a new town, settle there, and gain followers through the prestige of a lineage that in leading directly to the Prophet served as a channel for Muhammad's miracu-lous and salvific blessing power or *baraka*. There was undoubtedly a touch of the frontiersman about these migrants as they sought followers – and opportunities – on the expanding horizons of the *dar al-islam*, and their hundreds of hagiographies preserved popular tales of their travels and adventures.

Settling in new regions, these migrants created local holy families, off-shoots of the sacred lineages they imported from their homelands. Whether in India, Africa or Central Asia, such holy families usually exercised local monopolies over specialist services (legal arbitration, medicine, magic, edu-cation) and, through the patronage of ruling elites, consolidated their cultural power with land-grants or tax-exemptions. There was also often an ethnic dimension to this process. For these migrants were not only men of learning and lineage: in many (and in some regions a majority of) cases, they also claimed to be *sayyids*, that is, blood-descendants of the Prophet's family. In this way, claims to biological descent allowed notionally Arab *sayyids* to position themselves prominently in the local religious establishments that emerged among the ethnically pluralistic societies of the early modern world.

In the southern Philippine islands of Mindanao and Sulu, claims of Arab descent were bolstered by the adoption of the Arabic script for local lan-guages, creating the powerfully hybrid genre of the *tarsila* (from the Arabic *silsila*, 'lineage') that demonstrated the prophetic genealogy of both royal and religious elites. Even as such notionally *sayyid* families acquired varied physical appearances through local intermarriage, in regions where such bloodlines were most rare (such as Africa and South Asia) genealogical paradigms served to maintain ethnic hierarchies and privileges. Islam, then, was no democracy of souls. Rather, what we see is a context in which the genealogical paradigms of Sufi tradition and even older veneration for the *sayyids* proved to be highly effective resources for the reproduction of social hierarchy. While both education and initiation formed entry mechanisms into the intersecting religious establishments of Sufis and *'ulama*, such opportunities for social mobility were always constrained by the effective boundary maintenance of these holy families, whether through their

deployment of genealogy, learning or wealth. The friction between establishment and upstart claimants to religious authority served as one of the central dynamics behind religious change in many early modern Muslim contexts. But for much of the early modern period, until the religious upheavals that began with the political and economic catastrophes of the early eighteenth century, these regional religious establishments remained stable, especially outside the Safavid and Ottoman domains that saw the state most effectively contest the autonomy of these holy families and brotherhoods (Figure 15.2).

Yet amid this picture of hierarchies and establishments, there remained much room for solace. Pilgrims travelled to the shrines constructed as one generation of these ancestral lineages passed to the next. And from these pilgrimage sites sprang the miraculous cures and benevolent intercessions that rendered these saintly families beloved, necessary and thereby lasting members of their communities. As stories spread of such miracles, and techniques developed to better solicit them, the graves of the holy dead became fonts of religious creativity by way of poems and praise songs in local languages that were often set to music as the media of vernacular theologies. In gratitude to the miraculous powers of the holy dead, whether Sufi saints or Shi'i imams, their birth (*mawlid*) or death ('*urs*) anniversaries became the holy days of a shrine-based religious culture that was connected through the mobile rituals, loanwords and doctrines that the brotherhoods spread across the whole *dar al-islam*. Throughout the early modern period, major shrines in Ajmer in India, Shah-i Zinda in Central Asia and al-Qarafa in Egypt hosted grand festivals enlivened by banquets, musicians, fairgrounds and lighting. Here was a culture of the carnivalesque that echoed the merry Catholic world celebrated by the French author François Rabelais during this period.

Yet the influence of the Sufi *tariqas* and their local leaders came precisely from the fact that they did not merely form the focus for a carnivalesque Islam of the masses. They were also the representatives of learned and legalistic Islam. They were, then, points of connection between different classes, ethnicities and communities. Although there were Sufis who were not learned and '*ulama* who were not Sufis, the family and initiatic lineages that most successfully reproduced the *tariqas* typically were lineages of learning. After all, literacy is the most effective tool for the transmission and reproduction of culture (and cultural capital) through time. Through the format of the regulated study 'circle' (*halqa*) around Sufi-'*ulama*, book learning was transferred not only between generations but also between places. Whether convened in shrines or mosques, in homes or gardens, such teaching circles formed the social mechanisms of a textual tradition that

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Figure 15.2: Tomb Tower Shrine of Safi al-Din, a leader of a Safavid Sufi order, Ardabil, Iran, *c.*1500

was not separated from the popular practices that also clustered round the Sufis. And what was *traditio* – 'handed down' – was often books, in many cases medieval classics such as the Arabic prayer manual of al-Jazuli (d. 1465) or the Persian poetry of Rumi (d. 1273), works that travelled far into Africa, India and China. Once again, the Sufi *tariqas* that linked one study circle to another served as the mechanisms for these transmissions of texts. Through the discipline of the inner self and the regulation of the outer self, the study of mystical and legal works was combined to pursue a self-restraint of which the Prophet and his Companion Abu Bakr were epitomes. Education was inseparable, then, from the maintenance of social order, an order theoretic- ally embodied in the austere *adab* (etiquette) of the Sufi-*'ulama* themselves.

From Gujarat and Yemen, learned Sufis followed the monsoon winds to transmit both their lineages and learning into maritime Southeast Asia, whence they turned north towards Thailand, Sulu and Mindanao, only to be halted by the Spanish conquest of the Philippines and the expansion of the Buddhist kingdom of Ayutthaya. Far from Arabia, the Arabic language was not only studied in its own right, but also used to create a script and technical vocabulary for such languages as Malay, Javanese and Maguindanao. What little evidence survives of the early transmission of Islam across the Atlantic even suggests that it was enslaved members of Sufi brotherhoods who acted as the first Muslim community leaders in Brazil and the Caribbean. Muhammad Kaba was a descendant of an old Sufi family, who had been educated by Shaykh Babu al-Fakiru in what is now Côte d'Ivoire; in 1777 he was shipped as a slave to Jamaica. There he wrote his *Kitab al-Salat*, a treatise on prayer in simple Arabic, to spread Islam's basic principles among the island's slaves. Muhammad Kaba thus ensured that, even in their enslave- ment, Africans in Jamaica received the knowledge he remembered from writings passed down by the Qadiri brotherhood in West Africa.

The Sufi brotherhood, the study circle and the written text were therefore the combined components of intercontinental transfers of knowledge. Tracing the transmission of North African learning in another direction, we can turn to the Nilotic Sudan, where in introducing the Shadhili brotherhood to the region, the migrant Hamad Abu Dunana (*fl.* 1450) brought with him books that taught the legalistic Sufism being promoted by al-Jazuli in the cities of Morocco. Through the networks created as mobile Sufi-*'ulama* moved from attending study circles to create their own elsewhere, ideas could travel quickly. In evolving societies with few alternative mechanisms for dispute resolution, legal expertise helped cement the prominence of – and demand for – Sufi-*'ulama*, who also found positions as judges and arbitrators.

In early modern contexts where the state was distant and arbitration sorely needed, Sufi-*'ulama* helped in the small-asset disputes that tormented populations living on the brink of subsistence. Across much of Saharan Africa, such legal functions loomed so large in people's minds that the Sufis were popularly termed *faqihs* ('jurists'). When disputes arose on a larger scale, as *sayyids* inheriting the Prophet's blood and blessing power, the special status of some Sufis saw them serve as mediators between different ethnic or political groups, as in the negotiations between the Mughal and Afghan confederacies as they struggled for control of India in the sixteenth century.

Whether as solvers of disputes or transmitters of learning, as purveyors of miracles or causers of carnivals, in each of their innumerable locales the representatives of the Sufi brotherhoods were entwined in complex webs of interdependency with their surrounding societies. They supported, and were in turn supported by, ruling elites and common pilgrims, not to mention the large extended families and servants who depended on the shrines for hearth and home. This issue of income and interdependence also points us to the role of the *tariqas* in enabling commerce, as seen in the dominant role that the Nasiriyya brotherhood came to play over trade in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Morocco or the ascent of Kunta merchants affiliated with the Qadiri brotherhood in Saharan Africa. The brotherhoods not only supplied the social capital of trust that was so crucial to early modern trade. They also often provided the more practical commercial wherewithal of loans, labour, access to political elites and accommodation in hospices whose sanctity few thieves dared violate.

Sufis have often been theorized as agents of religious localization, carrying teachings and practices from homelands in such venerated regions as the Hadhramawt and Khurasan that, when replanted in the distant soil of Sumatra or Sudan, grew into the variegated foliage of 'local Islams'. In a sense this is exactly what happened. But it is only half of the process. For in as much as the *tariqa* brotherhoods were agents of the localization of Islam, they were also agents of inter-connection between Muslims. We have already noted that the *tariqas* were conceptual as well as concrete entities: for early modern Muslims they were conceived as the branches of genealogical trees that all had their trunks in Persia, Iraq and ultimately Mecca, but whose branches reached out across the whole *dar al-islam*. As such, the *tariqas* were conceptual tools that allowed Muslims from distant regions to conceive of themselves as parts of a larger connected unit, as with the *Jawi* Sufis from Southeast Asia incorporated into hagiographies written by Arabs in Yemen. In this way, through the remembered genealogies of generations

of masters and disciples, the *tariqas* formed the conceptual cords that bound the *dar al-islam* into an overlapping web of inter-relations. If the many Muslim societies of the period were separated by states and geography, languages and ethnicity, then the far-reaching genealogical branches of the brotherhoods allow us to make sense of the notion of Islam as a world religion in a way that early modern Muslims may themselves have recognized.

All in all, perhaps the most important collective process undertaken by the manifold personnel, doctrines, rituals and places associated with the brotherhoods was rendering Islam *recognizable* as it adapted to its many host societies that by the early modern period stretched from the Niger delta to Siberia. If we have said that the *tariqas* were agents of both the localization and interconnection of Islam, then what this implies is that local religious practices could develop while still being recognizably Islamic to visitors from other regions. As a processual outcome rather than an inevitable given, this 'recognizability' occurred through the transmission of specific cultural markers, whether the shape of shrines based on cuboid domes, the adoption of the same Arabic lexicon to label rituals and persons in many local languages or the recurrence of familiar key texts across vast spatial distances. The transmission of the Persian poetry of Rumi and Jami between circles of learning from Persia to Anatolia, India, Central Asia and even China is only one example. Without the level of coherence and intelligibility offered by these transmitted cultural markers, it would make no sense to think of early modern Muslim societies as being part of a larger shared system within which people, practices and ideas could circulate without facing insurmountable cultural barriers. Yet such coherence and intelligibility did exist, enabling a figure such as Nur al-Din Raniri (d. 1658) to enjoy a career that linked India, Egypt, Arabia and Southeast Asia. And as Raniri's example makes clear, in order to function, such recognizability had to be mutual: the Indian-born Raniri had to be recognizable as a Muslim to his teachers in Arabia just as he would in turn need to recognize his Malay students as Muslims when he settled in Sumatra.

The conceptual and institutional roles of the *tariqas* in enabling the transmissions that underlay this recognizability were all the more important given that early modern Islam inherited no centralizing institution comparable to the Catholic Church and developed nothing comparable to the Inquisition that sought to standardize a recognizable Christianity across the vastly distant societies of Europe, Latin America and the Philippines. In providing local religious leaders and holy families, places of worship and pilgrimage, schools and teaching circles, legal arbitration and popular celebration, what

the *tariqas* of Sufi-*'ulama* transmitted to their various places of settlement was Islam in its workable social terms. And through their genealogies, brotherhoods and networks, the *tariqas* were able to ensure that, in conceptual terms likewise, this was a legitimately recognizable Islam that had spread across the immense geographies that their networks connected.

Conversion: acculturation and agency

Another large-scale religious process that expanded during the early modern period was conversion. While conversion to Islam had been taking place since the seventh century, its means and motivations were by no means stable through different periods. Even between 1400 and 1800, different forms of conversion emerged that varied according to context. Since in principle to become a Muslim requires only the utterance of the profession of faith (*shahada*) in the company of adult witnesses, with circumcision adding the more enduring testament of the flesh for men, so brisk a procedure meant that many converts' cultural attitudes could be transferred into their (and their descendants') lives as Muslims. For this reason, historians have used the concept of 'acculturation' alongside 'conversion' to recognize that, whether for individuals or entire communities, relatively rapid moments of formal or nominal conversion are often followed by a slower period of acculturation by which the converts acquire the wider cultural trappings of Islam, from naming practices to patterns of diet, clothing and sociability. Since acculturation was typically a process of cultural negotiation, some of the former customs of any convert community would usually survive in parallel with the adoption of Islamic practices. Few if any early modern Muslim communities followed the *sharia* wholesale and a quavering balance between Islamic and customary law (*'urf*) typified many if not most communities. Indeed, the diversity of religious and cultural practices displayed by the many Muslim communities of this period was itself the outcome of these varied paths of acculturation.

Amid this variety, certain larger patterns can be discerned. We have already seen Sufi-*'ulama* establish themselves so successfully that they were the most prominent human representatives of Islam. Unsurprisingly, this afforded them central roles in the conversion and acculturation process. There is certainly room here to reckon with the role of unlettered wandering Sufis as cultural mediators, preaching Islam in colourful local idioms and, as wonder workers, making miracles as startling as the circumcising of kings as they slept. This is certainly how conversion was

remembered in the ethnohistories of the 'nine saints' (*wali sanga*) of Java, and similar conversion narratives abound from Siberia to West Africa. To make sense of the processes behind such stories, it is worth making a distinction at the conceptual level between the conversion of places and the conversion of peoples. Looking first at places, one of the most effective conversion methods was the establishing of institutional bridgeheads of Islam in new regions. When Sufi-'ulama served as frontiersmen on the edges of the *dar al-Islam*, they were in many cases not operating as pioneering lone stars, but as representatives of larger systems by way of the polities that lent them patronage and the brotherhoods that lent them legitimacy. What this often amounted to was a prince or governor granting frontier land on the edge of his nominal dominions that was at once his most under-used and abundant asset. Since the Sufi recipients of such endowments were in many cases also 'ulama trained in Islamic law, these land grants were often exchanged for the promise of service. By using their legal skills for dispute resolution and the maintenance of social order, such pious frontiersmen became the representatives of Muslim-ruled states on the limits of their power. In other cases, Sufi-'ulama were associated with soldiers, farmers or merchants whose power and wealth incentivized conversion.

The process of agrarian conversion has been most fully explored with regard to Bengal, the vast forested frontier of the Mughal Empire that saw perhaps the period's most demographically significant conversion. The fact that Bengal was more thoroughly converted in these few hundred years than the rest of South Asia was in a millennium is certainly a pointer to significant developments. Plots in Bengal were granted to Sufi-'ulama by Mughal governors with a generosity that was only matched by the land's relative worthlessness as uncultivated forest. Whether by bringing in kinsmen or employing local jungle-clearers, the trees were felled to create deep forest outposts of Islamic civilization by way of built settlements with mosques, shrines, farms, markets and occasionally even schools. Over time, these bridgeheads were connected by road or river communications to the larger imperial society they represented. On one level, then, this was a conversion of the land (and its resources) into Muslim territory through a pattern of migrant settlement and annexation by a neighbouring polity. But in the Bengal case, the forests were already populated (albeit by followers of indigenous religions rather than Sanskritic or caste Hinduism), and the wealth, prestige and practical advantages offered by entry into this society of Muslims attracted these forest dwellers to convert and gradually acculturate to regional Muslim norms. This was, then, a conversion of people as well

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as of place. In this multi-generational undertaking, it was often the institutional rather than the human representatives of Islam that were the more effective motors of acculturation as convert communities attached themselves to shrine complexes that offered legal mediation, agrarian marts and miraculous protection from the forest's many menaces.

Another example of converting the land comes from the newly conquered provinces of the Ottoman Empire in the Levant and southeastern Europe. Here trusted Sufis with ties to the state were used to re-settle formerly or partially Christian regions, which were either strategically vulnerable or under-populated through previous wars. The same process occurred in the expanding African Muslim states of the period, such as the Funj sultanate, which attracted Arab Sufi-*'ulama* southward through the Sahara with the promise of patronage. Arriving on this new African frontier of Islam, these holy men were given lands on which they established the *qasr* villages that formed the focus of what were at once confessional, agricultural and legal outposts. As in the Ottoman and Mughal contexts, in return for the Funj rulers' patronage, they acted as pillars of social order for an emergent state with minimal direct influence over its population. By creating the infrastructural networks to support travelling merchants, these 'market and hostel' shrines not only stimulated regional economies but also privileged the role in them of merchants who were Muslims. This process led in turn to demographic changes, not only through the arrival of such traders and their marriage to local women, but also through their greater access to local resources that created further economic incentives for non-Muslims to convert. The role of multi-purpose shrine complexes rather than mosques can be seen in regions as far apart as the Balkans, Central Asia, Sudan, India and Palestine, where both peasant and pastoral communities found such complexes the most effective (and in many cases the only) sedentary or state-affiliated service institutions to which they had access.

Shrines were not only effective in the conversion of places, but also the conversion of peoples, particularly the pastoral-nomadic peoples who occupied the vast plains between the Volga and far Siberia. In contrast to the 'conversion by the plough' model, where acculturation appears as a gradual bottom-up procedure of forest peoples being incrementally attracted to the benefits of a larger Muslim society, in the many cases of tribal conversion on the steppes we see a more immediate top-down process initiated by the conversion of a tribal headman which his kinsmen were bound to follow. In the abundant ethnohistories of these tribal peoples, such sudden conversions are presented as the work of charismatic wandering Sufis who, amid the

competitive struggles for pasture and tribute that typified the nomadic life, pledged to act as the protectors of particular clans or tribes. Thus it was with the Mongol-descended Golden Horde, who considered a certain Baba Tükles as their collective convertor or even ancestor. Further east into Central Asia, the conversion of the Turkic peoples known today as Uyghurs was locally remembered as collectively occurring through the conversion of the Qar-akhanid sultan, Satuq Bughra Khan (d. 955), whose shrine at Artush near Kashgar became a key memory space for the region's Muslims.

In other regions of Central Asia, as well as China and even Tibet, it was Sufis rather than sultans who took on the role of anchoring collective identities to local geographies through the building of shrines to convertors or ancestors of entire communities. While the Chinese Hui, who cherish self-histories of descent from Middle Eastern migrants, call these shrines *gongbei* (from the Arabic *qubba*, 'dome'), they more often resemble Confucian than Muslim buildings. This commemoration of ancestors or convertors in turn points to the role of Sufis as not merely the patrons of existing communities but as the primogenitors of new ones. In some cases, this phenomenon was a genuine occurrence; in other cases, it was part of invented aetiologies that lent Muslim respectability to pastoral groups beneath the sway of urban mores. The ethnohistories of many tribal groups thus recount the marriage and offspring of a Sufi with the daughter of the tribal headman. One example comes from the Timuri branch of the Chahar 'Aymaq people of Afghanistan, who considered themselves descendants of the union of the Naqshbandi Sayyid Amir Kulal and a daughter of the great conqueror Timur (d. 1405). If in the aetiological narratives that recorded these conversions, agency was given to the individual holy man, in seeing conversion as only one moment in a longer process of acculturation, we must again recognize the role of shrines as the enduring institutional agents of this slower procedure. For each of these tribal groups venerated the shrines of their convertors by making pilgrimages to holy burial places that, in some cases, allowed pastoralists to articulate ancestral claims to the surrounding land. Islam, then, also served the practical function of sanctifying claims to pasture and water. Such functionality helps us recognize the way in which conversion and acculturation were reciprocal processes in which the convert's agreement to be drawn into a larger moral community based on the acceptance of Islamic norms was exchanged for a series of fringe benefits. These might include sanctifying customary rights, arbitrating disputes, curing animals, providing talismans, writing documents needed for mercantile or state interactions, or any of the other services that the shrines and their religious professionals could provide.

Such exchanges bring us to the conjunction between conversion to Islam and interaction with the state, and in turn to the role of shrine complexes and their personnel in mediating these interactions, particularly with regard to the tribal (pastoral–nomadic) groups which early modern states increasingly sought to control. Once again, religion formed a useful instrument of social action. We have already seen how, as acculturation, conversion to Islam was a multi-tiered process in which there existed many points of negotiation along a spectrum between former custom and wholesale *sharia*. In some cases, what this meant in practice was that states tried to intervene in the acculturation process by pushing tribal groups in directions that better suited state policy. Typically, this meant binding tribal peoples more closely to urban legal personnel or rural Sufi-*'ulama* outposts and thence to the common rules of *sharia* rather than fissiparous custom as a strategy of rendering tribes more governable. In being promoted by force of state, such religious projects can accurately be considered ventures in the creation of 'orthodoxy', that is, a historically generated religious norm produced by the exercise of power. An example is seen in the Ottoman patronage of outposts for the Bektashi brotherhood as a means of exerting control over areas of Anatolia with unstable tribal populations. In other cases, the Ottomans encouraged immigrant legalistic Naqshbandi Sufis to found stations among rural Turkomans in order to direct their acculturation towards a more legally codified and thence predictable set of Islamic norms. Such policies did not only involve the Sufi brotherhoods and, in developing the legal-administrative system known as the *'ilmiyye*, the Ottomans were assiduous in employing law to better control their bewildering variety of Muslim subjects. For once a community was classified as Muslim, whether they understood their own Islam in legalistic terms or not, such classification allowed the state to use the regulated and relatively predictable mechanisms of *sharia* to shape their behaviour. For even though recent scholarship has shown the practical implementation of *sharia* to have varied by general context and jurispruden-tial decision, the Ottoman bureaucratization of law sought to delimit the executive fiat of *'ulama* as much as the nonconformity of tribesmen.

So far we have focused on more collective and in some cases state-sponsored forms of conversion. But conversion was also the outcome of private decision-making, and so we can detect larger-scale patterns emerging from the sum of individual acts. Two important and distinctive patterns of individual motivation can be seen with regard to the avoidance of slavery and the sometimes-related phenomenon of social mobility. With regard to the intersection between conversion and slavery, the best-known example is

again related to the agency of the state by way of the Ottoman *devshirme* system. Until its effective end in 1648, the *devshirme* (a term first cited in 1438) used a flesh-and-blood tax to enlist the sons of Balkan Christians, raise them as Muslims, and then employ these adoptive sons of the state as Ottoman bureaucrats and soldiers. The opportunities that this brought paradoxically encouraged some parents to bribe officials into taking their children. The extent to which conversion emerged from less formal mechanisms of military recruitment elsewhere is unclear if nonetheless likely.

We see a quite different pattern in Africa, where being kidnapped into the Atlantic slave trade offered no options for social advancement comparable to the relative meritocracy of the *devshirme*. On the basis of Islamic legal regulations forbidding the enslaving of Muslims, many individual Africans chose to convert to Islam in the (often vain) hope of avoiding enslavement. However, conversion was not only one-way, and whether in the plantations of Brazil or the Carolinas, African Muslims later found themselves being converted – and acculturated – to Christianity, even if their Islam did survive longer in the Americas than was once thought. Lest African religious lives appear solely as responding to external hegemonies, whether Muslim or Christian, it is also important to recognize the role of the slave trade in disseminating African religious practices. This can be seen most clearly through the dissemination of African Muslim practices of spirit possession, whether by the rise of the Gnawa (Berber: *aguinaw*, 'black') brotherhoods in North Africa, the spread of the *Zar*, *Bori* and *Ahl-i Hava* cults in the Middle East, or the diffusion of Sidi possession rites in India. In each case, this involved a form of acculturation-in-reverse through which non-African Muslims adopted religious techniques that had evolved from the pre-Islamic customs of converted African slaves.

Conversions also took place further north in the Mediterranean, where we find the early modern phenomenon of the *renegado*. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, many Christian sailors from northern Europe made the private decision to better their social and economic prospects by becoming Muslims. The collective outcome of these individual acts of conscience added up to a considerable number, with estimates varying from the lower thousands to the tens of thousands. As captured Christians enslaved in the ports of North Africa sought a confessional path to freedom, in some cases these private decisions may be compared with the conversions chosen by Africans. In other cases, we are dealing with strategic acts of religious careerism as impoverished Christian sailors chose Islam not merely as a path to freedom but as a road to social ascendance and riches. Once again, such individual

decisions added up to larger collective and comparable processes, not least since the conversions of European *renegados* were echoed by the decisions of many Ottoman Christians and Jews who similarly converted in pursuit of social mobility. Whether in Istanbul or London, the demographic impact of these conversions was visible enough to attract the attention of seventeenth-century storytellers and playwrights who chided their fellow Jews and Christians for having alternatively 'turned Rumi' or 'turned Turk'.

The process was by no means one-way, though, and the gradual Spanish conquest of Iberia saw both enforced and voluntary conversions to Christianity as the Muslim ethnic and professional groups of al-Andalus negotiated new relations with the crowns of Castile and Aragon. In the case of professional cavalrymen, conversion to Christianity allowed them to replicate their high social standing under the new dispensation. But for Iberia's many lower-class Muslims, unable to afford the luxury of pious emigration (*hijra*) to North Africa, their forced conversion led them to secretly preserve remnants of their old faith in Arabic-script Spanish (*aljamiado*).

Whether with the Ottoman Dönme, or the Iberian *conversos*, the confessional states of early modernity spun a concealed pattern of crypto-communities. Similarly enforced conversions and assimilations of many different Muslims took place after the Russian conquests of Kazan and Astrakhan in the sixteenth century and Siberia and the Crimea in the eighteenth century. From a Muslim viewpoint at least, here again was acculturation in reverse as these Iberian and Eurasian Muslims incrementally lost sight of their former faith and practice. If conversion could sometimes be the outcome of private choice, it was therefore also increasingly a question of state enforcement.

The state: confessionalization and conformity

The religious interventions of the state came not only through conquest, conversions, transactions with Sufi-*'ulama* and the patronage of grand mosques. They also came through a more systematic change by which the larger early modern polities transformed themselves into confessional and thereby persecuting states. This offered a contrast with the later medieval period when legitimacy-weak and relatively short-lived tribal dynasties had cultivated the support of a Sufi establishment that their own insecurities helped create. This pattern had reached its apogee in the sixteenth century when the Safavi Sufi brotherhood transformed itself into the 'Safavid' empire by conquering Persia in 1501. From this point, to make a pilgrimage to the

shrine of Safi al-Din at Ardabil was at once to pay homage to the ancestor of a Sufi and an imperial dynasty. Similar state (or better, court) attempts to co-opt Sufi authority were seen elsewhere in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In India, the Mughal emperor Akbar (r. 1556–1605) synthesized elements of Muslim and Hindu religiosity in a new 'divine religion' (*din-i ilahi*) in which Sufi forms of authority were appropriated for the emperor himself, who was designated the 'perfect man' (*insan al-kamil*) who ruled as rightful master (*murshid*) over courtiers configured as his disciples (*murids*). A parallel practice emerged in the Malay courts of Southeast Asia, where in Aceh the sultan Iskandar Muda (r. 1607–36) was likewise presented as the *insan al-kamil* in whom all authority rested.

As personalized forms of religiosity based on the coalescence of imperial and religious charisma in the person of the emperor, these ventures were mainly aimed at controlling the court and ensuring its members' loyalty. Such attempts to instrumentalize religion at court were clearly different from attempts to use religion to regulate a far more numerous and diffuse society of imperial subjects. This brings us to the question of confessionalization, which has been identified as a state-led (if not entirely state-controlled) demarking of religious boundaries for the purposes of state expansion and governance. What this involved was not only the increasing role of the state as a sponsor of conversion, but also a more general attempt to enforce uniform standards of 'orthodoxy'. While the case has been made most fully with regard to the Ottoman Empire, the process of confessionalization has been theorized as inherently interactive: an outcome of inter-state relations by which the Ottoman, Safavid and Habsburg empires shaped their religious identities in distinction to one other. In the Ottoman and Safavid cases, this process manifested itself not only in increasing attempts to police religiosity but also to actively transform it, whether by the large-scale promotion or similarly large-scale suppression of particular forms of Islam. The most vivid example of such state-initiated transformation was the conversion of Safavid Persia from Sunni to Shi'i Islam, a process which, though initiated in 1501, only took full effect a century later. In practical terms, this involved the deployment of state resources towards the importing of Shi'i *'ulama* from Lebanon and the establishment of the *madrasa* colleges to produce a home-grown cadre of legal expertise in Persia. Since such a top-down policy would hardly reach the grass roots of popular religiosity, the Safavid state also patronized a new Shi'i sacred geography of pilgrimage sites. Based on the tombs of descendants from the twelve Shi'i *imams*, these *imamzada* sites articulated Shi'i blood lineages to counter the *tariqa* lineages

of Persia's great Sufi families. Here we see the role of the state in not only promoting religion through importing new legal specialists and establishing new pilgrimage centres, but also in persecuting those it regarded as rivals for religious authority. For the most part, this meant the Sufis, who were massacred, exiled or at best rusticated.

The turning of the Muslim millennium in 1591 sent chiliastic tremors through the surrounding decades. State authorities looked gravely on the revolutionary potential of such millennial expectations. In India, Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624) – the self-proclaimed 'renewer of the second millennium' (*mujaddid al-alf al-sani*) – was imprisoned by the emperor Jahangir and his writings subsequently banned by the emperor Aurangzeb. As in the Ottoman and Safavid polities, other forms of charismatic Islam (such as the Rawshani movement among the Afghans) were also increasingly regulated under Mughal rule. The execution of the fifth Sikh *guru* Arjan in 1606 and the ninth *guru* Tegh Bahadur in 1675 can also perhaps be fitted into this policy that saw both Muslim and non-Muslim charismatic movements as a danger to political stability, echoing in India the Ottoman suppression of the messianic Jewish movement led by Sabbatai Sevi (d. 1676). What we see, then, is the state policing not only of Islam, but of religion more generally.

By the seventeenth century, the increasing confidence of the by now well-established imperial states led them to act as religious authorities in their own right, particularly through the use of *sharia* and its clerical executors. A point of transition between the gathering of Sufi charisma around the emperor and the absorption of religious law by the state can be seen with the Ottoman emperor Suleiman (r. 1520–66), who tapped into the expectations surrounding the turn of the Islamic millennium to present himself as the supreme 'lawgiver' (*kanuni*) whose personal justice permeated, and legitimated, the entire imperial structure. What emerged more slowly was a shifting in the relations of the state and the other *ulama* lawmakers operating in its lands as the Ottoman Empire sought both to centralize the patronage (indeed, the salarization) of legal experts and to organize the implementation of their knowledge. Whether messianic or Sufi, the problem with charisma as a basis for state authority had been that it was inherently unstable and uncontrollable, a dilemma confronted most starkly by the Safavids. For every charismatic emperor there were rebellious charismatic subjects. In principle at least, Islamic law provided a more stable and predictable means not only of articulating a ruler's and state's legitimacy, but also of shaping the behaviour of its people. But the problem remained with *sharia* that it consisted of non-standard and at times conflicting sets

of legal opinions and practices that emerged from diffuse bodies of legal practice and quasi-independent groups of legal practitioners who operated in different cities. While it was not achievable overnight, the solution was to bring legal scholarship and implementation into the ambit of the state and its own preferred norms. This might be achieved by the construction of state-sponsored *madrasa* colleges in the imperial centre (as with the six colleges established in Istanbul by the emperor Suleiman between 1550 and 1559) or by the implementation of a hierarchical religio-legal bureaucracy (as emerged with the Ottoman *'ilmiyye* system). In the period's most remarkable fusion of imperial state norms with Islamic law, culturally Chinese Hui Muslims such as Wang Daiyu (d. *c.*1660) began to write Muslim works in Chinese (later known as the *Han Kitab*) that blended *sharia* with the terminology and principles of state Confucianism.

Clearly, such policies involved long-term transformations, and as such were subject to any number of contingencies, whether from adjustments in policy at the imperial apex or opposition at the bottom of the system as among Arab *'ulama* in the imperial province of Egypt. If throughout the early modern centuries there would always remain a variety of 'antagonistic *sharias*', it is nonetheless accurate to see an increasing role for state-sponsored religious law. Even so, the process was two way: if the *'ulama* were bureaucratized, then the state in turn was clericalized. A comparable trade-off to that seen in the Ottoman Empire occurred in Persia. For while under the Safavids the state sponsorship of legal clerics and their institutions clearly helped to create a more uniformly 'orthodox' society, there remained clerical objectors to the expansion of imperial influence into the propriety realms of the *'ulama*. But if the Safavids and Ottomans appear to cohere with this picture of increasing state promotion of a 'confessional' identity through recourse to legal definitions of Muslim behaviour for their subjects, the case is less clear for the other great Muslim imperial polity of the period. Despite what we have seen of persecutions in Mughal India, as yet we know too little about state–*'ulama* relations there to paint the Mughal Empire as another confessional state. Arguably, the demographic position of a ruling Muslim minority may have rendered such policies unthinkable: Mughal elite translations of Hindu scriptures clearly point to a complicated picture of religious engagement. Even so, the reign of Aurangzeb between 1658 and 1707 does seem to point to increasing attempts to draw *sharia* into state policy and to use legal rulings to articulate a more 'orthodox' Sunni identity for the Mughals, not least with regard to their Shi'ite neighbours – and enemies – in the Deccan and Persia.

We can also detect the increasing influence of Mecca- and Medina-trained legalistic 'ulama in Southeast Asia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, some of whom found employment in the Malay sultanates. Africa's eighteenth century also saw increasingly close ties between state and 'ulama, with the latter becoming increasingly dependent on state stipends and employment. When the Qing Empire in China began its westwards conquests into Central Asia between the 1690s and 1750s, in oasis towns such as Hami, Turfan and Wushi, Sufi-'ulama emerged as middlemen who used *sharia* as the basis of negotiated rights for the Qing's new Muslim subjects. The policy had multiple beneficiaries: the Qing state gained local agents and legitimacy; the Muslim populace gained customary rights and protection from Zunghar nomads; and the middlemen gained authority and wealth at the expense of other Sufi families unwilling to work with the non-Muslim Manchus.

What we see in these various forms of interplay between ruling elites and religious professionals was not so much a straightforward pattern of state domination and hegemony, but rather a picture of compromise and negotiation. The increasing need of various states (including non-Muslim empires like the Qing and Romanovs) for the services of Muslim religious experts created increased opportunities for such figures. Like the genealogies and miracles examined earlier, legal expertise and ethical credibility formed a source of cultural capital with which religious professionals could exert agency over state representatives. The financial rewards that came with administrative employment or favoured trading access may also have increased competition among 'ulama seeking these positions, which in turn found expression in doctrinal polemics and personal denunciations.

Yet legal expertise and moral authority did not only afford Sufi-'ulama the opportunities of incorporation into existing state systems. In some cases, they also afforded them the possibility of founding their own states through the legal and just war of *jihad* against infidels. The most striking case is seen in the foundation in 1679 of theocratic rule over eighteen oasis towns centred on the Central Asian city of Kashgar. Established by Afaq Khwaja (d. 1694) after violent campaigns against non-Muslim nomads and surviving until around 1760, this Sufi state endowed hundreds of schools, Sufi lodges and pilgrimage sites that promoted the *sharia*-derived rules of the Naqshbandi brotherhood as a source of social order. In a pattern that would continue into the nineteenth century, in West and Saharan Africa the eighteenth century saw militant Sufi-'ulama succeed in founding a sequence of *jihad* states, such as Bundu, as well as fail to establish others. Anti-Sufi figures were also part of

this pattern of state formation, as with the obscure Najdi scholar Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab (d. 1792) who entered a marital alliance with the family of Muhammad ibn Saʿud (d. 1765), the founder of the first Saʿudi emirate in Arabia. While Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab's influence would spread widely in the modern era, in his own time he was only one of many ascendant ʿulama – more often than not affiliated with the Sufi brotherhoods – who channelled the political turmoil of the eighteenth century towards the founding of godly polities.

Renewal: from cumulative accretion to colonial crisis

The activities of such activist ʿulama have lent the eighteenth century the moniker of an 'age of reform' when a crisis of conscience spread among Muslims as far apart as West Africa and Southeast Asia. As mechanisms for organizing and disseminating the ideas of such ʿulama, the Sufi tariqas were crucial to these developments in almost every region. To state that there was little intrinsically new in the teachings of the many Prophet-centred ʿulama of the eighteenth century is less to denigrate their lack of originality than to recognize what they were trying to achieve. In this respect, it is more effective to consider these figures as 'renewers' (mujaddid) who were self-conscious participants in a deliberate process of 'renewal' (tajdid) which they regarded as both a general feature of Islamic history and a particular duty of Sufis and ʿulama as the rightful heirs of the Prophet. Correspondingly, it seems best to set aside the term 'reformist' for later colonial Muslim intellectuals whose contacts with European ideas pushed them into quite distinct intellectual ventures with little or no antecedent in Islamic tradition.

To recognize the discursive continuities between the eighteenth-century renewers and their predecessors in the sixteenth and particularly the seventeenth century is not to suggest that little had changed. The fact that eighteenth-century calls for renewal found much greater traction among various segments of society than their predecessors is itself a pointer to significant changes in intellectual context if not necessarily content. As perhaps the most widely influential institution of renewal, the Naqshbandi–Mujaddidi brotherhood is a case in point. For while the early seventeenth century saw the imprisonment of its founder, the 'renewer of the second millennium' Ahmad Sirhindi, the eighteenth century saw his followers successfully expand into Central Asia and the Ottoman Empire. In addition to the trans-regional networks of renewal fostered by these Naqshbandis or

the Qadiris in Africa and Southeast Asia, there were also more regional movements, as with the Kadizadeli preachers of Istanbul and its provinces. In each of these calls for renewal, the central idea was for a return to the practices sanctioned by the Prophet's example. In terms of undermining the religious status quo, the key discursive weapon in the renewers' arsenal was the concept of *bid'a* ('innovation'), which they used to discredit the vast range of religious practices they regarded as having no precedent in Prophetic *sunna*.

In conceiving the call for renewal's expansive spread as part of a larger process, it is helpful to think through the internal logic of these charges of 'innovation' in the contexts where they emerged. As we saw earlier, the elevated status of the Sufis had led to the development of grand mausoleums, pilgrimages and a carnival culture of popular religiosity. Such practices were as common in Cairo as in Delhi. As historians, it is important to recognize the cumulative nature of these developments, which had expanded over time as various local accretions were incrementally added to these common practices of saint veneration. Such cumulative accretion – the addition of increasing layers of ritual and theological superstructure – was the outcome of a process of localization through which the teachings and practices associated with trans-regional Sufi networks took on increasingly local characteristics as holy families at every node along these networks accommodated to local cultural demands. In many settings, such accommodation was the outcome of the conversion process we have seen as an ongoing acculturation from former non-Muslim practices towards some ideal Islamic end point.

As the processes of accretion and accommodation worked together over a period of centuries, there evolved a tremendous variety of popular customs. This diversifying trajectory of religious development emerged from the cultural negotiations in any given setting between the Islamic practices imported by the immigrant and often learned representatives of the *tariqas* and the demands of local audiences for intelligible forms of religion. With regard to the emergence of renewal, what is important is that the outcome of these innumerable local negotiations meant that, in practice, Islam looked different wherever one found it. For while the brotherhoods had transmitted enough cultural markers to render such practices 'recognizable' as Islam, the diversifying effects of acculturation and accretion meant that they were inevitably not all the same Islam. Clearly, if local representatives claimed that each of these Islams was true Islam, then the visitor faced the logical problem that not all of them could be the single true Islam of the Prophet.

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Faced wherever they travelled with such varieties in actual practice, *'ulama* drew two concepts from their discursive toolbox: first, the Prophet's *sunna* ('way') as a benchmark against which to measure what was and was not truly 'Islamic'; and second, the category of *bid'a* with which to castigate whatever seemed to fall beyond the *sunna*'s pale.

In the intellectual framework of the *'ulama*, the call for renewal was often therefore the outcome of an experience of dissonance that occurred in social or geographic settings where Islam was no longer sufficiently 'recognizable', where the transmission of universal cultural markers had either been weak to begin with or diluted by acculturation. Paradoxically, as over time the holy lineages that the Sufis claimed connected their followers to the Prophet had become embedded in local environments, in the eyes of later generations of Sufi-*'ulama* the old lineages had become vehicles for leading their charges astray. It is the internal logic of this process as it moved from observation to rumination and action by these latter day *'ulama* that helps us understand the venture of 'renewal' (*tajdid*) in which they saw themselves participating.

The connections between the teaching circles of renewers emerging in different regions help us explain in turn why what was not in itself a new call for renewal was able to spread so widely and so quickly in the eighteenth century. For we are dealing with a question of, on the one hand, the increasing exposure of Sufi-*'ulama* to popular religious practices and, on the other hand, the increasing ability of such learned men to compare divergences between religious practices across different regions. This process of comparison occurred through several means: *'ulama* service in bureaucratic positions that required them to move between different cities or administer to rural populations; the migration of former country people and their religious practices into the towns; increasingly lavish carnival and pilgrimage celebrations in late imperial cities; and perhaps most importantly, the accelerated movement of Sufi-*'ulama* between different regions. At present, it remains unclear whether we can also link the increasingly widespread calls for renewal to a demographic expansion in the number of *'ulama*. But whether or not such a clerical super-abundance did emerge from the new *madrasas* sponsored by the state and brotherhoods, it is clear that renewal was the outcome of greater interaction between trans-regional and literate forms of Islam and localized and non-literate religious practices.

The spread of trans-regional Sufi brotherhoods and scholarly networks dedicated to the cause of renewal was therefore a crucial component in these developments as the increasing interaction of the *tariqa* networks connected Sufi-*'ulama* across vast distances and allowed them to transfer their ideas.

Two cases in point are ʿAbdullah Nidai (d. 1760), who after leaving his home city of Kashgar in East Turkestan resided in towns across Central Asia and Persia before settling in Istanbul, and Murtada al-Zabidi (d. 1791), who after leaving his North Indian home resided among scholars of Yemen, the Hijaz and Egypt. The eighteenth century also saw more African and Southeast Asian Sufi-ʿulama visit Mecca and other centres of learning in Yemen, Egypt, Morocco and India. Even the Hui Muslims of inland China, for centuries probably the least connected of all Muslim communities, responded to the call for renewal carried from Arabia by the Chinese Naqshbandi Sufi, ʿAziz Ma Mingxin (1719?–81). For after years of study in Yemen and the Hijaz, in 1761 Ma Mingxin returned to China determined to free its Muslims from the errors of 'innovation'.

By moving from far-flung homelands to major centres of learning then returning home, journeys that often involved long passages through many lands, such Sufi-ʿulama were more easily able to compare the Islams of different regions. The circulation of scholars thus initiated the sequences of comparison, dissonance and criticism that fed the many renewal movements of the eighteenth century. Increased scholarly mobility and interaction between different regions created an unprecedented degree of awareness among learned Muslims of the varieties of Islam that had emerged in the previous centuries. In their own eyes at least, the renewers were active agents in an Islamic reading of history that saw the conversions of earlier periods as incomplete and the negotiated Islams of acculturation as needing replacement by a more thoroughgoing commitment to sharia. Connecting religious renewal to the formation of states, such calls fed the ʿulama-led jihads that founded many new African polities in the decades either side of 1800.

If this chapter has emphasized the processual integrity of religious developments, then there was also of course a political context. For as the eighteenth century wore on, calls for renewal in some regions drew strength from the sense of moral crisis that accompanied the contraction or collapse of the Ottoman, Mughal and Safavid empires and the alarmingly novel experience of being conquered by former Muslim subject peoples (whether Afghans or Arab Bedouin) or non-Muslims (whether Christians or Hindus). The loss of state employment opportunities, and the closing of frontier settlement zones, may have rendered these imperial contractions especially painful to a scholarly class that had increasingly come to rely on the expansive Muslim states of early modernity. Yet the fall of the Safavids and Mughals did not mean the end of Islamic renewal, and by the late eighteenth

century, renewal – and, in time, outright reform – was accelerated through interaction with the European empires. In some cases, colonial policies helped to further empower 'ulama who took on the role of middlemen between new colonial states and their communities. Both the Russian Empire in the Volga–Ural region and the Company Empire in Bengal cultivated links to Muslim scholars through their need to understand existing laws and create standardized codes with which to govern their Muslim charges. In 1797, the influence of these cooperative 'ulama was enhanced by the Russian opening of a Muslim printing house in Kazan under Abu'l Ghazi Buraš-uglï, though the Muslims of India, Iran and Egypt would have to wait another twenty years for a similar technology transfer. If Prophet-centred renewal made much headway in the eighteenth century, the fuller and more truly 'reformist' transformation of Islam would not take place until the Muslim modernists and missionaries made their impact in the colonial nineteenth century.

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Religious change in East Asia

EUGENIO MENEGON AND GINA COGAN

Until recently, general accounts of East Asian religions still tended to offer a rather static image of the traditions of Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, and other forms of religious belief and activities in late medieval and early modern times (1400–1850). The close relationship of state power to religious ritual and institutions in China, Korea, and Japan has led scholars to see change occurring only when regimes changed, and to equate political stability with religious stagnation. Continuities between early modern and modern religions have been overlooked, and genuinely momentous change, it appeared, came only with modernity, and the "opening up" of China, Japan, Korea, and other countries in the Sinitic sphere at the hands of Western powers and Christian missionaries. In fact, this historical period witnessed important new developments and changes, both in terms of domestic developments, and of global religious contacts. We are only now starting to understand better the contours of these changes, and scholars are still delineating a new, more convincing general picture, taking into account important local variations. This chapter can only cover some aspects of the diverse religious landscape of East Asia, and is divided into two parts, the first dedicated to China (E. Menegon), the second to Korea and Japan (G. Cogan).

China, 1368–1850

The Chinese late imperial state and religions: regulation, patronage, and prohibition

The establishment of the Ming dynasty in 1368 brought about an unprecedented increase of imperial control over religious activities. While the Chinese government assumed for a millennium that religion had to be under state regulation in order to harness cosmic forces for the public good, the Ming

created the first true "regulatory state" in religious matters.[1] The dynastic founder, the Hongwu Emperor (r. 1368–98), had been a Buddhist acolyte and member of rebel armies inspired by millenarian ideas during the final chaotic period of the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1271–1368). In spite of his personal religious experience and distrust for officials and elites, Hongwu rejected millenarianism as heterodox, forbade "sectarian" practices, and proscribed magic, shamanic possession, and unauthorized religious gatherings. He endorsed Confucian ideology, moral codes, and rituals as the basis for both the imperial and local cults. Although the imperial government's control of the populace was limited, Hongwu still attempted to dictate a new religious program for all his subjects, issuing moral edicts with unprecedented intensity. He prescribed community rituals at the village level, had monuments and altars built, and ordered the printing of moral texts espousing Confucian values.[2] The structure of this official state religion remained in place until the end of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) and its officiants ranged from the emperor and his bureaucrats down to county magistrates and village elders. At the village level, official cults tended to overlap with cults of local gods and tutelary gods of powerful lineages, blurring the lines between official and popular religions.[3]

The Hongwu Emperor combined patronage of Buddhist institutions with control of the Buddhist and Daoist clergy, although some of his regulations amounted to outright prohibition of new monastic ordinations. He also openly opposed Tibetan Buddhism, which had been tainted by collaboration with the regime of the defeated Mongol Yuan dynasty. Hongwu's draconian laws and measures may have had some effect during his reign, but in the long run could not work. Already during the reign of his successor, the Yongle Emperor (r. 1403–25), some of the prohibitions against established religions were relaxed. Occasionally, later Ming emperors extended their patronage to Buddhism and Daoism, but this patronage depended on their capacity as heads of the imperial household rather than as heads of state.

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[1] Timothy Brook, "The Politics of Religion: Late-Imperial Origins of the Regulatory State," in Ashiwa Yoshiko and David L. Wank (eds.), *Making Religion, Making the State: The Politics of Religion in Modern China* 22–42 (Stanford University Press, 2009).

[2] Thomas David DuBois, *Religion and the Making of Modern East Asia* (Cambridge University Press, 2011); Hubert Seiwert and Ma Xisha (in collaboration with), *Popular Religious Movements and Heterodox Sects in Chinese History* (Leiden: Brill, 2003).

[3] Romeyn Taylor, "Official Religion in the Ming," in Denis C. Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China, The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644*, vol. VIII, Part 2, 840–92 (Cambridge University Press, 1998).

The Ming regulatory project developed in interaction with local elites and in local contexts. Hongwu, for example, found ready allies in his legal assault on unauthorized religion among the more fundamentalist members of the Confucian gentry, who staffed the bureaucracy and ruled over local society. Yet, attitudes to Buddhism, Daoism, and other religious traditions were not uniform among the gentry. For example, in Jiangnan, the prosperous eastern coastal region, until the 1680s local elites extended generous patronage to Buddhist monasteries thanks to a growing commercial landlord economy that sustained gentry prosperity. Other local contexts displayed yet more variations: along the southeastern coast, for example, large lineage organizations occupied a central role in funding territorial cults of their own divinized ancestors as local tutelary gods.[4]

Buddhism in the Ming period

Buddhism was an early target of Hongwu's policy of religious control, bringing about momentous changes in the status of Buddhist institutions. The emperor completely restructured the hierarchical organizations of monasteries, disrupting networks that had flourished since the Song dynasties (tenth–thirteenth centuries). Most importantly, in 1394 the imperial government issued regulations prohibiting monks from traveling freely and associating with officials and commoners, measures tantamount to suppression. These regulations were reiterated by three successive monarchs between 1412 and 1441. The Ming government forbade the unauthorized construction of temples, and taxed monasteries as ordinary institutions, obliging them to resort to the sale of ordination certificates to cope with the fiscal pressure. A dearth of sources about Buddhist activities from the mid-fifteenth to the mid-sixteenth century indicates that for a century Buddhist monasticism was in a serious crisis, and that both imperial and gentry patronage dwindled to a trickle. The reign of the Jiajing Emperor (1522–66), a patron of Daoism, led to the physical destruction of Buddhist establishments, in particular those of the Tibetan tradition, culminating in 1544 in an edict disrobing all monks and

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[4] Timothy Brook, *Praying for Power. Buddhism and the Formation of Gentry Society in Late Ming China* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies – Harvard–Yenching Institute, Harvard University Press, 1993); Zheng Zhenman (translated and with an introduction by Michael Szonyi), *Family, Lineage Organization and Social Change in Ming-Qing Fujian* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001); Michael Szonyi, *Practicing Kinship: Strategies of Descent and Lineage in Late Imperial China* (Stanford University Press, 2002); David Faure, *Emperor and Ancestor: State and Lineage in South China* (Stanford University Press, 2007).

nuns. Coastal Buddhist centers also suffered massive destruction at the hands of Sino-Japanese pirates in the 1550s, during a period of government inability to curb such maritime incursions. It was not until the reign of the Wanli Emperor (r. 1572–1620) that Buddhist scriptures were reprinted, doctrinal studies flourished, and monasteries were lavishly reconstructed. The pious Empress Dowager Cisheng (1546–1614) received eminent monks at the palace, and the imperial house sponsored the reprinting of the Buddhist canon, distributing sets to monastic centers across the country.[5] By the mid-sixteenth century, Beijing attracted the most renowned masters in doctrinal studies, who would spend their time lecturing court eunuchs and Confucian scholars attracted to Buddhism, and who revived research about the scriptures of several medieval schools.[6] This was a time of fluid and shifting boundaries between different Buddhist schools, with much synthetizing of philosophical ideas and meditational practices, accompanied by a revitalization of male and female monastic discipline.[7] It was also a time of increasing lay activism and literati involvement with Buddhism, and of diffusion of practices and ideas into the public sphere and popular consciousness. The Confucian School of the Mind inspired by the philosopher Wang Yangming (1472–1529) offered unprecedented openness to the Buddhist ideal of self-realization, and local gentry provided support through land donations, financial supervision, and literary propaganda to monasteries of different Buddhist traditions.[8] The explosion of printing encouraged the diffusion of new religious syncretic moral texts informed by Buddhist principles, known as "precious scrolls" and "ledgers of merits and demerit."

Thus, revived monastic activities combined with the rise of a healthy lay movement helped Buddhism to penetrate all levels of society, to influence the calendar of public festivals, and to create new literature, including the celebrated vernacular novels *Jin ping mei* (*The Golden Lotus*) and *Xi you ji* (*Journey to the West*). The Wanli period in particular saw the rebirth of Chan Buddhism (Zen in Japanese), a medieval meditational school that had dwindled almost to disappearance by then, partly due to opposition by mainstream monastic institutions, and partly for economic reasons. Lay

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[5] Wu Jiang, *Enlightenment in Dispute: The Reinvention of Chan Buddhism in Seventeenth-Century China* (Oxford University Press, 2008).
[6] Susan Naquin, *Peking: Temples and City Life, 1400–1900* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001).
[7] Yü Chün-fang, "Ming Buddhism," in Twitchett and Mote (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China*, pp. 899–952; Beata Grant, *Eminent Nuns: Women Chan Masters of Seventeenth-Century China* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009).
[8] Brook, *Praying for Power*.

support allowed a series of prominent masters to emerge as Chan leaders, and to spread their lineages empire-wide in the late Ming and early Qing, bridging the difficult moment of the Manchu conquest in 1644, characterized by widespread loss of life and destruction of religious centers.[9]

Buddhism in the Qing period

The Qing emperors continued to patronize Buddhism, but also changed the terms of the state's relationship with it. By maintaining a carefully balanced equilibrium among Confucianism, Tibetan Buddhism, Chan Buddhism, Daoism, and their native shamanism, they projected an image of ethno-religious diversity, pivoting as enlightened rulers over Chinese, Mongols, Manchus, and Tibetans. Buddhism played a crucial role in building this image.

The first Qing emperor, Shunzhi (r. 1644–61), summoned Chan masters at court and promoted their lineages, while his successor Kangxi (r. 1661–1722) visited Chan monasteries during his southern tours in the 1680s, favored eminent Chan monks at court, and patronized Tibetan Buddhism. Yongzheng (r. 1723–35) and his son Qianlong (r. 1735–99) went further, organizing Chan training sessions at court, befriending and supporting important Tibetan lamas, engaging in religious debates, financing a new edition of the Buddhist canon, and issuing imperial edicts to promote or attack the masters they liked or disliked. In spite of their personal engagement, however, their policies weakened the official ordination system, and hastened the decline of Chan Buddhism. By controlling Chan circles in the 1730s, Yongzheng tried to limit literati influence in monastic matters and forestall the formation of a united front against the crown, a constant preoccupation of the Manchu monarchs, whose legitimacy remained dubious among Han elites. Later on, in 1754, Qianlong took the unprecedented step of abolishing the official ordination system altogether, a decision based on new fiscal policies, and on the realization that ordinations were happening even without central permission. In spite of these measures, Buddhism continued to offer to the Qing significant ideological legitimization, since the Qing emperor adroitly employed the Buddhist notion and imagery of *cakravartin* ("the king of kings" or "the wheel-ruler") to gain religious stature as monarch, especially among Mongols and Tibetans. Buddhism, moreover, continued to thrive locally. Besides the large monastic communities with a nationwide appeal (especially in Jiangsu and Zhejiang), most members of

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[9] Wu, *Enlightenment in Dispute*.

the clergy lived in temples or in small communities supported by local patronage, and fulfilled local cultic, magic, and liturgical needs for a large number of people (Figure 16.1).[10]

Daoism in the Ming period

Rather than being a religion in decline, as depicted by most past scholarship, Daoism in the Ming period flourished, receiving imperial patronage and reaching large segments of the population. The Ming was also a period of great change for Daoism, as political control over certain schools offered Daoists resources to develop new liturgies and scriptures. The Hongwu Emperor set the tone in the early Ming by attempting to limit the influence of organized Daoism through the imposition of a unified liturgy. He privileged the "Orthodox Unity" School (*Zhengyi*) of the Celestial Masters, while he criticized the monastic order of "Complete Perfection" (*Quanzhen*). The former school had its origins in the eighth century and was dominated by a lineage of masters traditionally approved by the state, who supplied liturgical service to the court, including cosmic rituals of propitiation and prayers for the personal well-being of the imperial family. Complete Perfection was instead modeled on the Buddhist monastic organization, privileged personal spiritual and ascetic practices, and as a consequence was more popular than Orthodox Unity, and thus potentially too subversive for the Ming founder's taste. Through the institution of a central office of registration for Daoists in all counties and a special office for Daoist music and liturgy at court, measures that limited both the numbers of priests and the kinds of rituals they could perform, the first emperor attempted to harness the spiritual forces of the religion in the service of the imperial establishment throughout the realm while controlling undesirable elements. During the reign of the second Ming emperor, Yongle (r. 1403–25), Daoism received direct state sponsorship: the emperor ordered a new version of the Daoist canon to be compiled; he approved Mount Wudang as a new major Daoist center of worship (Figure 16.2); and several deities associated with Daoism were enshrined as official gods, bringing power to a handful of Daoist masters who had been supportive of Yongle during his struggle to capture the imperial throne. Several mid-Ming emperors became even more favorably

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[10] Patricia Berger, *Empire of Emptiness. Buddhist Art and Political Authority in Qing China* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003); Vincent Goossaert, "Counting the Monks: The 1736–1739 Census of the Chinese Clergy," *Late Imperial China* 21.2 (2000): 40–85.

第十三位巴納塔嘎尊者
了一切流恭如是經水
流石泠風過花馨示圓
圓地示光明藏立意掃
除是謂理障

Figure 16.1: Leaf from an eighteenth-century book illustrating and describing the eighteen luohans, the original followers of the Buddha, venerated by the Qianlong emperor and a popular subject in Chinese Buddhist art

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Figure 16.2: A Daoist temple at the Mount Wudang temple complex, Hubei Province

disposed to Daoism, and Daoist masters and practitioners allied with court eunuchs to exert control over Ming rule. The new canon, still the main resource for scholars today, was finally printed in 1445 under imperial auspices; and Daoist priests catered to the desires of the court, culminating in the reign of the "Daoist Emperor" Jiajing (1521–66). Some Daoist masters rose to prominence in the latter part of his reign, and the emperor became so engrossed in Daoist practices that he neglected state affairs, letting his Daoist ministers rule. In reaction to these excesses, the last few Ming emperors curtailed Daoist influence at court, although they continued to employ practitioners for court rituals and alchemical processes.

Doctrinally, Ming Daoism embraced meditational practices connected to "inner alchemy" (internal transformations of the body), and important masters of the Orthodox Unity School advocated meditational methods also found in Chan Buddhism. Parallel to the rise of prominent masters at court was the popularization of Daoism and the diffusion of large-scale rituals to exorcize spiritual forces and gods threatening local communities. Some regional deities, such as Mazu, goddess of fishermen along the southern coast, were adopted into the Daoist pantheon with the state's blessing, and various schools were integrated into the two major state-recognized traditions, Orthodox Unity and Complete Perfection. By the end of the dynasty

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this popularization had become so advanced that Jesuit missionaries who reached China could not identify major traditions, and were unable to distinguish Daoist practices from those of popular cults. Indeed, popular festivals organized by lay associations adopted Daoist ritual frameworks, and Daoist specialists animated such festivals, contributing to a merging of Daoist doctrine and rituals with localized practices. Daoism also contributed to the most important religious development in the latter part of the dynasty, i.e. the emergence of the "Lord of the Three-in-One" popular syncretic movement founded by Lin Zhao'en, combining elements of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism.[11]

Daoism in the Qing period

The end of the Ming dynasty and the advent of the Qing did not bring about abrupt changes in state policies. The new Manchu dynasty adopted most of the religious regulations issued by the Ming founder and contained in the law codes, and classified Daoism as a clerical religion bound by the scriptural authority of the canon. The court did not support Daoist schools with the same energy as its Ming predecessor (except for a brief interlude of favor under Yongzheng). This freed Daoism from excessive political interference, and inaugurated an attitude of bureaucratic indifference, and of increasing "cleansing" of Daoist elements from state liturgies. Daoist musicians, for example, traditionally employed in imperial official sacrifices, were expelled in 1742 by the Qianlong Emperor, who thoroughly Confucianized the liturgy. Daoist ritual officials shrank in numbers, and by 1850 there were only twenty left at court. However, when it came to the well-being of the imperial household itself, Qing emperors continued to employ Daoist practitioners, recruited from temples in the capital region and elsewhere, or specially trained liturgists within the palace supervised by the Imperial Household Department.

Although state-supported Daoism languished, popular Daoism continued to flourish. While campaigns against heterodox groups abounded, as local officials were supposed to curb all unauthorized religious gatherings,

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[11] Judith Berling, "Taoism in Ming Culture," in Twitchett and Mote (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China*, pp. 953–86; Pierre-Henry De Bruyn, "Daoism in the Ming, 1368–1644," in Livia Kohn (ed.), *Daoism Handbook* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 594–622; Kenneth Dean, *Taoist Ritual and Popular Cults of Southeast China* (Princeton University Press, 1993); Judith Berling, *The Syncretic Religion of Lin Chao-en* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); Kenneth Dean, *Lord of the Three-in-One: The Spread of a Cult in Southeast China* (Princeton University Press, 1998).

Buddhism and Daoism were left alone for the most part, and magistrates engaged in continuous negotiation between approving legitimate liturgies, and curbing "immoral cults" with the help of local Daoist masters. Officials also relied on Daoist ritual specialists for exorcistic ceremonies and rain prayers, and used Daoist temples as public spaces for gentry assemblies and charitable activities. Local officials kept a census of both Buddhist and Daoist clergy, licensing them though ordination certificates, and empire-wide surveys in 1667 and 1736–9 attempted without great success to count all clergy and limit their numbers. In spite of official pressure, Daoist symbols and rituals permeated daily life at all levels, from art to ritual opera, and common people cared little for the divisions among clerical elites in the two main schools of Orthodox Unity and Complete Perfection.[12]

Popular religious cults and movements

While Buddhist and Daoist symbolism and rituality tinged every form of daily religious practice, most religious activities in China still happened beyond the institutional organizations of Buddhism and Daoism. Local temples and shrines often had no direct association with institutionalized religious traditions, but represented instead the diffuse forms of Chinese religion at the communal level. These temples were the focus both of large-scale sacrificial festivals and of individual worship. A local god ruled over a territorial community, and was served by religious specialists and spirit mediums who borrowed from Daoist and Buddhist ritual and textual repertoires, but also continued ancient shamanistic practices. In the Ming and Qing periods, powerful lineages headed by the gentry often sponsored the festivals of these territorial cults, creating alliances among local elites, village religious specialists, and the common people, and buttressing local power structures. In fact, temples were the loci of local communal organization below the level of the county, and offered many of the social and charitable services that the late imperial state could not supply. While official rhetoric excoriated such festivals as wasteful and potentially subversive, in fact many local magistrates allowed local elites to run temple organizations to keep their locales in peace and under control, and even participated as sponsors. On rare occasions certain regional gods (such as

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[12] Naquin, *Peking: Temples and City Life*; Goossaert, "Counting the Monks"; Monica Esposito, "Daoism in the Qing, 1644–1911," in Livia Kohn (ed). *Daoism Handbook*, pp. 623–58; Vincent Goossaert, "Taoism, 1644–1850," in *The Cambridge History of China, The Ch'ing Empire to 1800*, vol. IX, Part 2 (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

Mazu) received imperial canonization, in an attempt to co-opt local religious structures within a nationally approved pantheon.[13]

Beyond organized and state-approved monastic communities and territorial cults variously tolerated by the state, a plethora of "heterodox" religious specialists and groups catered to the spiritual needs of the Chinese masses, and often were the target of imperial suppression campaigns and attacks by local elites. However, the opposite was also true at certain times and in certain locales. Especially in the late Ming, some of these movements had enormous success and garnered strong local patronage. The great wave of new religious movements began in the second half of the Ming dynasty, and was accompanied by an explosion in the printing of sectarian literature from the sixteenth to the early eighteenth century, a truly epochal change in the previous tradition of oral and manuscript transmission within similar heterodox groups active since the beginning of the common era. The new movements, with clear boundaries of membership, independent organizations, and their own literary scriptural genres, represented a novel and distinct religious tradition. Luo Qing, a soldier and religious seeker in the late fifteenth century, was one of the most successful innovators, and the movement he established challenged orthodox monastic Buddhism and attracted hundreds of thousands of followers across the empire in the late Ming and early Qing, proclaiming the importance of the laity over the clergy, and combining Confucian and Buddhist symbols and attitudes. The movement started near Beijing, and then spread south along the Grand Canal, finding fertile ground in Zhejiang and Fujian, and receiving regional elite support. It soon became the target of state attacks, as did many other groups, in a galaxy of traditions that scholars have variously called "folk Buddhist," "lay Buddhist," or more generically "sectarian." In fact, these voluntary associations freely borrowed from Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism, other popular religious traditions, and integrated soteriological myths of ancient origin, such as that of the Unborn Venerable Mother, to produce eclectic scriptures known as "precious scrolls." Most of these groups were pacific and did not promote eschatological theologies undermining the constituted order, and thus have left few traces of their passage in history. They dominated entire villages and even regions at times, under the leadership of a charismatic leader and his anointed

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[13] Szonyi, *Practicing Kinship*; Faure, *Emperor and Ancestor*; Kenneth Dean and Zheng Zhenman, *Ritual Alliances of the Putian Plain* (Leiden: Brill, 2010); Mark Meulenbeld, "Chinese Religion in the Ming and Qing Dynasties," in Randall Laird Nadeau (ed.), *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Chinese Religion* (Chichester, West Sussex, and Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pp. 125–44.

successors; in some cases appealed to literate middle classes (merchants, low officials, monks, and nuns), although in general the rank-and-file was made up of commoners; and combined charitable and religious functions. Fearful of rebellion and social unrest, central authorities again and again ordered provincial and county officials to prosecute many of these pacific groups in the late Ming and Qing periods under suspicion of subversion, and created labels to categorize them, often distorting the picture we have of their teachings and practices. Some went underground and survived state persecution, and still flourish today in certain parts of China and Taiwan.[14]

The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were roiled by a series of millenarian rebellions, loosely inspired by Buddhist cosmology, and by Islamic movements in the northwest. The most extensive and successful religious movement of the nineteenth century was the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace (*Taiping Tianguo*, 1851–64). The Taiping emerged partly out of the socio-religious tradition of earlier millenarian movements, but also incorporated new theological elements derived from Protestant Christianity, absorbed through contacts with Anglo-American missionaries in the region of Canton. The Taiping conquered most of central China, but were finally defeated by the imperial armies, at the cost of probably 25 million lives. This uprising signaled the end of an epoch, and even though popular religious cults and practices continued to follow time-honored traditions into the twentieth century (and even today), internal change and Western aggression accelerated the emergence of a new state attitude to religion, culminating in new taxonomies of religions and a wave of anti-superstition campaigns from 1898 on. Those campaigns deeply affected organized religions in China, and eroded the communal structure of village and temple religion.[15]

Islam and Christianity

Islam and Christianity represented religious bridges connecting China to Central Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Middle East, as well as Southeast Asia, Europe, and its colonies. The two religions both had a long history in China, dating back to the eighth century, but each took quite different paths

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[14] Daniel Overmyer, *Folk Buddhist Religion: Dissenting Sects in Late Traditional China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976); Daniel Overmyer, *Precious Volumes: An Introduction to Chinese Sectarian Scriptures from the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center and Harvard University Press, 1999); Seiwert and Ma, *Popular Religious Movements*.

[15] Vincent Goossaert and David Palmer, *The Religious Question in Modern China* (University of Chicago Press, 2011).

of diffusion, confronting some of the same challenges in adaptation that medieval Buddhism had faced in its slow penetration into East Asia from Central Asia and India.

By the Ming–Qing period, Islamic communities already had a long history in China proper, and were augmented by the new populations in borderland regions that were incorporated into the Qing Empire during the eighteenth century. The Muslim population within China itself was the product of waves of immigration going back to the Tang dynasty, when the first contacts with Central Asia and the Indian Ocean world facilitated the settlement of Muslim merchants both in the northwest and along the southern coast. These small communities remained foreign entities in China, in spite of intermarriage, as in the case of the Arabs settled in the southern port of Quanzhou, who could elect their own religious and civic leaders. The influx of foreign Muslims continued into the Song dynasties (960–1279), mostly via the maritime route, but became much more significant during the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), when Muslim officials and technicians from Central Asia and the Middle East were given important government positions. Under Mongol protection, new communities of Muslim settlers also sprang up in remote parts of the empire, such as the southwestern province of Yunnan. After defeating the Mongols, the Ming founder and his successors welcomed the contribution of Muslims to empire-building, enlisting them as military officers, architects, astronomers, and engineers. The famous eunuch Admiral Zheng He, who led large imperial fleets to the Indian Ocean and Africa in the early fifteenth century, was himself a Yunnan Muslim. These populations became known as Hui, and concurrently cultivated their Chinese and Muslim identities in education and customs, participating in literati culture and the examination system. The use of Persian and Arabic dwindled, except for liturgical use, and Chinese became the spoken and literary language of the Hui elites. Hui intellectuals produced translations of religious texts, and went on to write original works in Chinese blending Confucian and Islamic ideas (Figure 16.3).[16]

By contrast, in the Central Asian dominions conquered by the Qianlong Emperor in the mid-eighteenth century (Xinjiang), the indigenous Uyghurs, a Turkic population, which had been a formidable power since the middle

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[16] Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, *The Dao of Muhammad: A Cultural History of Muslims in Late Imperial China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center and Harvard University Press, 2005); James Frankel, "Chinese Islam," in Randall Laird Nadeau (ed.), *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Chinese Religions,* pp. 237–60.

Figure 16.3: The Xing Xin Lou or "Tower of Introspection" inside the Great Mosque at Xian, founded in the eighth century and largely built in the Ming dynasty

period of Chinese history, chafed under Chinese sovereignty and maintained their cultural difference, resisting assimilation. They were divided between the more Islamicized Eastern Uyghurs (looking to Samarkand, Bukhara, and Istanbul as their religious–cultural beacons), and the more secular Western

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Uyghurs, influenced by Chinese material culture. In spite of attempts to create autonomous Uyghur khanates under Qing military supervision, the dynasty was never able to fully control this region, which has remained restless to the present day. One of the factors contributing to Muslim discontent with Chinese military control, both in Xinjiang and elsewhere, was a re-Islamicization of the Muslim populations starting in the late eighteenth century. Some sectors of the Hui, in particular, adhered to Sufi orders popular in Central and South Asia, which had been established by Chinese leaders who had traveled to Mecca for the Hajj. This provoked splits within the Hui communities, with some leaders supporting the Qing policies, and others opposing them in violent rebellions in the 1780s in Gansu and Yunnan. Rebellions continued into the nineteenth century, largely due to local economic disputes within the Muslim community and between Muslims and non-Muslims, as well as against the exactions of imperial officials. This pattern of unrest has continued in Xinjiang to this day, while the Hui living in China proper, for the most part, have accommodated to Han customs.[17]

In terms of Christianity, by the early Ming, the earlier Nestorian and Catholic presence dating to the Tang and Yuan Mongol periods had all but vanished. With the arrival in the 1540s of Jesuit missionaries on Portuguese vessels in southern China, a new wave of missionizing started in earnest, connecting China with the globalizing Catholic missionary movement allied to the Iberian imperial enterprises. In spite of government prohibitions on foreigners residing in the empire, the intellectual openness of late Ming China favored the introduction of new ideas and missionary penetration. After a pioneering phase led by the Italian Jesuits Michele Ruggieri and Matteo Ricci, characterized by a shift from the imitation of Buddhist scriptures and monastic lifestyle toward accommodation with the Confucian literati identity, Christianity spread in core administrative areas thanks to the support of sympathizing officials. The missionaries and their converts introduced an organic mélange of European cosmological, scientific, artistic, and religious elements they called "Heavenly Teachings" (*Tianxue*). While the teachings appealed to a broad public, including non-Christian elites curious about new Western knowledge and exotica, the Christian ritual and spiritual elements mainly attracted a handful of higher-degree holders, many lower-level literati, and commoners.[18]

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[17] Donald Leslie, *Islam in Traditional China: A Short History to 1800* (Canberra: National Australian University, 1986).

[18] Willard Peterson, "Learning from Heaven: the Introduction of Christianity and Other Western Ideas into Late Ming China," in Twitchett and Mote (eds.), *The Cambridge*

By the end of the Ming dynasty, several Jesuits with technical skills in astronomy, sciences, and technology had settled in the imperial capital Beijing, collaborating in the reform of the imperial calendar, while small Christian communities were scattered in key areas of the empire. Missionaries and elite Christians embraced the main tenets of the moral system of Confucianism and supported the political order of China, proclaiming the orthodoxy of Christianity while still distinguishing themselves from other "heterodox" religious traditions. Behind this strategy lurked the hope that Christianity would eventually change those elements of the Confucian worldview deemed incompatible with Christian theology and moral practice. What Christianity became in the late Ming, however, did not necessarily conform to the master plan of the missionaries. Chinese Christians transformed the teachings and practices they received from Europeans into an indigenized religious movement, with a special theological understanding informed by neo-Confucian thought. The historical experience of Christian communities in different parts of the empire, moreover, varied according to localized norms and social practices. In rural contexts and among commoners, the "Confucian Christianity" and the textual world of prominent literati converts did not occupy the place of honor. Daily rituals and personal devotions, inspired by European models heavily inflected by Chinese understandings of ritual and ethics, did. In these contexts, Christians would also challenge society over some of the central issues of social organization, including ancestral rituals, gender norms, and local religious cults.[19]

The Qing dynastic transition further institutionalized the presence of the missionaries in the capital, as the early Manchu monarchs Shunzhi and Kangxi formally integrated them within the Directorate of Astronomy, and informally employed them in the Imperial Household Department. While getting closer to the imperial throne, the Jesuits increasingly lost intellectual contacts with Han high elites, who turned more hostile to Christianity. The Kangxi reign saw the peak of missionary influence at court, and by 1700 there were probably around 250,000 Catholics in China (out of a population of 150 million; a minuscule Russian Orthodox mission was established in Beijing, but mainly served the Russian envoys). The Jesuits also introduced to Europe the first translation of the Confucian *Four Books* (1687), praising Confucianism

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History of China, pp. 789–839; Nicolas Standaert (ed.), *Handbook of Christianity in China. Volume One: 635–1800* (Leiden: Brill, 2001).

[19] Eugenio Menegon, *Ancestors, Virgins, & Friars: Christianity as a Local Religion in Late Imperial China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center and Harvard University Press, 2009).

as compatible with Christian morality, and damning instead Daoism and Buddhism as devilish sects. In response to these pro-Confucian Jesuit accommodationist attempts, the Church became embroiled in the notorious Chinese Rites Controversy, pitting the Jesuits and the emperor against the papacy over the issue of permissibility of ancestral cults and worship of Confucius for Chinese Christians. Two failed papal embassies in 1705–6 and 1720–1 precipitated the mission into a crisis, and missionary activities were restricted.[20] Finally, in 1724, the Yongzheng Emperor formally forbade Christianity in the empire as heterodox, while allowing the Beijing missionaries to stay on in the imperial service. The provincial communities went underground, forcing priests and Christians to live in close quarters to hide from authorities. While growth was stunted for a generation, suppression also fostered a sense of tighter religious identity and nurtured the formation of native clergy who could more easily conduct a local ministry. Over long stretches of time, interrupted by episodic outbursts of state repression during the eighteenth century, Christians continued their religious activities, gathering for prayer and for the ministration of sacraments and carrying on their traditions. They also remained in touch, albeit with great difficulty, with the outside world, until a more robust, but also at times oppressive, transnational and imperialist Church in the wake of the Opium Wars (1840s–60s) integrated Chinese converts into the global institutions and practices of post-Napoleonic Catholicism, while unsuccessfully trying to contain the growth of newly arrived Protestant groups.[21]

Korea, 1400–1800

Early Neo-Confucian ideology and rituals

In pre-modern East Asia, it was generally taken for granted that rulers would provide not only for the physical and economic welfare of the state but also for its cosmic well-being. Whatever the individual inclinations of particular sovereigns, they were obliged to sponsor or conduct public, official rituals of

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[20] Thierry Meynard, *Confucius Sinarum Philosophus (1687): The First Translation of the Confucian Classics* (Rome: Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu, 2011); Eugenio Menegon, "European and Chinese Controversies over Rituals: A Seventeenth-century Genealogy of Chinese Religion," in Bruno Boute and Thomas Smålberg (eds.), *Devising Order: Socio-religious Models, Rituals, and the Performativity of Practice* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 193–222.

[21] R. G. Tiedemann (ed.), *Handbook of Christianity in China. Volume Two: 1800 to the Present* (Leiden: Brill, 2010); Henrietta Harrison, *The Missionary's Curse and Other Tales from a Chinese Catholic Village* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2013).

all stripes as well as to patronize and support religious institutions. This was, in part, because the pre-modern state was not one in which a fundamentally secular order could be separated out from a complex of practices and behaviors deemed "religious." As a result, state patronage of bureaucratic exams, for example, can be seen as religious because the principles under- lying the exams and the bureaucracy, which were laid out in the materials on which candidates were tested, were applicable to the heavenly realm as well as the human one.

From the time of its introduction to Korea in the fourth century CE, Buddhism had received the enthusiastic patronage of Korean rulers. Kings founded and funded Buddhist temples, sponsored rituals, initiated large-scale printing projects, commissioned Buddhist art and, in the sixth century, even brought Buddhist texts and statues to Japan as part of their diplomatic program. Their devotion to Buddhism did not prevent these rulers from supporting Confucian and Neo-Confucian scholars and sponsoring shamanic rituals. The Koryŏ dynasty (918–1392) marked the height of state patronage of Buddhism, but, even then, rulers continued to devote resources to promot- ing Confucianism and worshiping local deities.[22] Consequently, the fact that from its inception in 1392 the Chosŏn, or Yi, dynasty abandoned this centuries-old practice of broad patronage of a variety of religious traditions in favor of supporting Neo-Confucianism almost exclusively marks perhaps the most drastic change in religious practice in East Asia between 1400 and 1800.

Chosŏn Korea has been characterized as a Neo-Confucian state, but the hegemony of Neo-Confucianism as an ideology took decades to develop and its penetration into the daily lives of elite aristocrats, called *yangban*, not to mention those of commoners, took even longer. Efforts to replace previous Buddhist and shamanic methods of ensuring the posthumous welfare of the deceased with Confucian-style ancestor worship were accompanied by the wholesale restructuring of Korean kinship. The previous system – in which marriage was often uxorilocal; male and female children shared in the patrimony; and daughters as well as sons were able to conduct ancestral rituals – had to be transformed into a patrilineal, patrilocal kin structure in which primogeniture was practiced in order to conform to Confucian ideals. Even so, among the *yangban*, widows of the primary son in a family could take responsibility for continuing ancestor worship until the mid-sixteenth

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[22] Sem Vermeersch, *The Power of the Buddhas: The Politics of Buddhism During the Koryŏ Dynasty* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008).

century, and grandsons through the daughter's line could also serve as the ritual heir through the eighteenth century. A sharp distinction was drawn between primary and secondary wives, and sons of secondary wives occupied a lower place in the family hierarchy than primary sons.[23]

In addition to mediating the relationship between this world and the realm of the dead, ancestor worship, as the continuation of the parent–child relationship after death, was seen as the filial act par excellence and as the Chosŏn period progressed, it became the exclusive domain of sons, bestowing upon them moral agency and social power. Neo-Confucian scholar–officials acknowledged that women were capable of moral behavior, but they had to redirect this activity into the domestic sphere. In order to bring women in line with what they saw as Confucian values, they reconceptualized women's activity as directed exclusively towards the family into which she married. To this end, didactic texts for women were published and promulgated throughout the Chosŏn period.[24]

The Chosŏn capital was conceptualized as the residence of the sovereign and by extension the chief site of the harmonization of the relationship between heaven, earth, and humanity. This necessitated not only the expulsion of Buddhist temples and clerics from the capital (discussed below), but the construction of Confucian altars to the gods of land and grain, or *sajik*. Similar altars were constructed in local administrative centers throughout the realm, underscoring the importance of state rituals as well as individual rituals, such as mourning or ancestor worship, to the construction of an ideal Confucian realm.[25]

Mid- to late Chosŏn Neo-Confucianism

The late sixteenth through the mid-seventeenth century was a time of transition within Korea. The Japanese warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536/7–98) invaded in 1592 and conflict did not cease until 1598, with Hideyoshi's death. A few decades later, the Manchus invaded Korea in 1627 and then in 1636. Only a few years later, in 1644, the Ming fell and the Manchu Qing dynasty was established on the continent. These events

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[23] Martina Deuchler, *The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Ideology* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies Harvard University, 1992); Martina Deuchler, "Propagating Female Virtues in Chŏson Korea," in Dorothy Ko, JaHyun Kim Haboush, and Joan R. Piggott (eds.), *Women and Confucian Cultures in Premodern China, Korea, and Japan* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), pp. 142–69.
[24] Deuchler, "Propagating Female Virtues."
[25] Boudewijn Walraven, "Religion and the City: Seoul in the Nineteenth Century," *The Review of Korean Studies* 3 (2000): 178–206.

precipitated a crisis for Neo-Confucian thinkers; to have the Ming rulers supplanted by the Manchus, whom they saw as barbarians, upset not only the political but also the cosmic order. In the eyes of Korean Neo-Confucians, Manchu rulers could never maintain Confucian ideals, leaving Korea as the last bastion of civilization and mediator of the relationship between heaven and earth.

How precisely to carry this out was debated through a controversy over the appropriate mourning rituals for King Hyojong (1619–59) and, by extension, over his legitimacy as a ruler. Some Neo-Confucians felt that the fall of the Ming left the Korean king with no external source of legitimation other than adherence to Confucian norms, norms that were not determined by political expediency of the sort that conferred legitimacy on the Qing but were absolute and transcendent. Others argued that a ruler enthroned without violence or controversy was by definition legitimate and able to rule Korea according to universal norms.[26]

At about the same time, the places of rituals and ancestor veneration were a source of conflict in the relationship between private academies and the state. Private academies (sŏwŏn) began to be founded during the mid-sixteenth century as better alternatives to state-run academies. Their founding was accompanied by the inauguration of shrines dedicated to the worship of a sage or worthy, as a patron of the academy. Students were obliged to pay homage to these enshrined sages every morning, and sacrificial rituals were conducted in their honor every spring and autumn. These shrines to eminent scholars not only elevated a moral exemplar as a model for the students, but also served to establish a lineage for the school in much the same way that the veneration of ancestors maintained family relationships after death. They also reinforced the link between heaven and earth, as well as between the ideal, embodied in the enshrined scholar, and the actual, embodied in the students.[27]

Early Chosŏn Buddhism

As the fortunes of Neo-Confucianism rose in the early fifteenth century, those of Buddhism fell; by the late Chosŏn period, Buddhism had become a

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[26] JaHyun Kim Haboush, "Constructing the Center: The Ritual Controversy and the Search for a New Identity in Seventeenth-Century Korea," in JaHyun Kim Haboush and Martina Deuchler (eds.), *Culture and the State in Late Chosŏn Korea* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), pp. 46–90.

[27] Yŏng-ho Ch'oe, "Private Academies and the State in Late Chosŏn Korea," in Haboush and Deuchler (eds.), *Culture and the State in Late Chosŏn Korea*, pp. 134–59.

religion of the provinces and of the common people, although some elites still patronized it privately. The campaign against Buddhism was both ideological and practical. Anti-Buddhist polemicists charged the monastic institution with corruption and laxity and maintained that Buddhism had no program for active engagement in public affairs; later in the period, some even charged that it was a pernicious influence on the populace.[28] Although it took decades to disestablish Buddhism completely, this development made Korea unique among East Asian nations between 1400 and 1800. The sovereigns of China and Japan continued to assume that the cosmos was multiple and that, while some rituals might be more effective than others for particular aspects of state protection, to neglect one tradition, whether it be Buddhist, Daoist, Confucian, or "folk," would be to fail in their duty to their subjects. In contrast, Korean kings during the Chosŏn period distanced themselves from Buddhism, a move Confucian advocates saw as guarding the purity of the king's role as mediator between heaven and earth.

Early Chosŏn kings, however, did not agree wholeheartedly with the charges against Buddhism. Although the second king, T'aejong (r. 1400–18), decreed that all but 242 Buddhist temples be closed, and confiscated land, property, and slaves from these remaining Buddhist temples, he and his successors recognized that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to eliminate all Buddhist practice from the realm.[29] Moreover, it is clear that early anti-Buddhist legislation was prompted as much by economic necessity as by agreement with the polemicists; the new regime needed land and funds urgently and the land and slaves they took from Buddhist monasteries went a long way towards filling their coffers.

Although it took at least a century, the rulers and officials succeeded in ending public and official support of Buddhism. In the interest of making the capital a pure center of Confucian government, all the Buddhist temples within the city walls of the capital were closed by 1512, and monks and nuns were not permitted to enter the city. In spite of this, rulers continued to patronize Buddhism as individuals, as did members of the *yangban* class, and

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[28] U-Gǔn Han, "Policies Toward Buddhism in Late Kŏryo and Early Chǒson," in Lewis R. Lancaster and Chai-shin Yu (eds.), *Buddhism in the Early Chǒson: Suppression and Transformation* (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies University of California at Berkeley, 1996), pp. 1–58; Sǒngmu Yi, "The Influence of Neo-Confucianism on Education and the Civil Service Examination System in Fourteenth- and Fifteenth-Century Korea," in William Theodore de Bary and JaHyun Kim Haboush (eds.), *The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 125–60.

[29] U-Gǔn Han, "Policies Toward Buddhism."

the government ran an office to supervise the publication of Buddhist texts between the mid-fifteenth and mid-sixteenth centuries.[30]

Mid- to late Chosŏn Buddhism

The disestablishment of Buddhism enabled two groups, women and commoners, to participate in Buddhism more actively. Many of the individual patrons from the elites were women, who, as the Chosŏn period progressed, were gradually excluded from ancestor worship systems. These women, seen now as belonging exclusively to the domestic sphere, found Buddhist monks and nuns, themselves excluded from state religion, willing recipients and ritualists. Legislation was issued prohibiting lay women from visiting monasteries, but *yangban* women ignored this and continued to participate in monastery events. Many elite women also took the tonsure during this period, most frequently after they were widowed. Confucian prescriptions against remarriage made it not only permissible but respectable for women to demonstrate their chastity and allegiance to their deceased husbands by becoming nuns.[31]

Lay people enabled Buddhist monasteries and convents outside the capital to survive the loss of state patronage by forming temple fraternities called *sach'algye*. These groups raised funds for monks and monasteries and encouraged each other in practices such as the recitation of the Buddha's name. Other lay groups sponsored the publication of popular Buddhist texts. Buddhist monks never gave up the fight to be accepted by the Neo-Confucian elite, and continued to produce texts arguing for the compatibility of Buddhism and Confucianism throughout the Chosŏn period.[32]

Popular religion and Christianity

The changes to family structure necessitated by the implementation of Neo-Confucian patterns of marriage and inheritance meant that ancestral rituals became part of the popular religious landscape by the sixteenth century.

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[30] Hee-sook Nam, "Publication of Buddhist Literary Texts: The Publication and Popularization of Mantra Collections and Buddhist Ritual Texts in the Late Chosŏn Dynasty," trans. Inga Diederich, *Journal of Korean Religions* 3.1 (2012): 9–27.

[31] Ji-Young Jung, "Buddhist Nuns and Alternative Space in Confucian Chosŏn Society," in Eun-Su Cho and Robert Buswell (eds.), *Korean Buddhist Nuns and Laywomen: Hidden Histories, Enduring Vitality* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2011), pp. 147–64.

[32] Robert Buswell, "Buddhism Under Confucian Domination: The Synthetic Vision of Sŏsan Hyujŏng," in Haboush and Deuchler (eds.), *Culture and the State in Late Chosŏn Korea*, pp. 134–59; Sangkil Han, "The Activities and Significance of Temple Fraternities in Late Chŏson Buddhism," trans. Matty Wegehaupt, *Journal of Korean Religions* 3.1 (2012): 29–63; Nam, "Publication of Buddhist Literary Texts."

Although contemporary Korean shamanism has been thoroughly studied, very little is known of how it was practiced during the Chosŏn period, or indeed in pre-modern Korea as a whole. Shamanic rituals, in which *mudang*, or female mediums, were possessed by deities who spoke through them, had been sponsored by the state in the Koryŏ era, but they fell out of favor as Neo-Confucianism took hold. Female mediums continued to practice throughout the Chosŏn period, but their clientele changed from members of the elite to members of the commoner class and they became associated with popular religion. Other popular religious specialists included *p'ansu*, blind men who worked as diviners and exorcists, and *pŏpsa*, rituals specialists who conducted ceremonies in their homes.[33] Undoubtedly similar sorts of religious specialists flourished in smaller cities, towns, and rural communities throughout the Chosŏn period.

Although Christianity was not practiced by many people, in comparison with shamanism, which was popular with commoners throughout the Chosŏn era, both forms of religion were marginal to the Neo-Confucian mainstream, and Christianity suffered from state persecution after its introduction. The late-sixteenth century success of Jesuit missionaries in Japan led some Jesuits to plan a mission to Korea. This did not come to fruition and early seventeenth-century attempts by Catholics in China to enter Korea to spread the gospel were also unsuccessful. It was not until the last quarter of the seventeenth century that Koreans began to practice Christianity. At that time a Confucian scholar who had previously read Christian tracts returned from a diplomatic mission to Beijing, where he had met Jesuit priests, and began to spread the teaching to his friends and colleagues. This prompted a strong negative reaction from the state, which banned Christian teachings and imprisoned and persecuted Christian believers. After an intense period of persecution in 1871, when approximately 8,000 lay believers were executed, the state backed off, in part because it was trying to establish diplomatic relations with the West. Because most Korean Christians were lay people and did not have access to priests, and also due to the persecution believers faced, much of the Christianity of the nineteenth century was practiced at home, and was disseminated among households. This gave women a strong leadership role in the community, as the home was their main sphere of activity.[34]

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[33] Boudewijn Walraven, "Popular Religion in a Confucianized Society," in Haboush and Deuchler (eds.), *Culture and the State in Late Chosŏn Korea*, pp. 160–98.

[34] James Huntley Grayson, "A Quarter-Millennium of Christianity in Korea," in Robert E. Buswell, Jr. and Timothy S. Lee (eds.), *Christianity in Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), pp. 7–25; Gari Ledyard, "Kollumba Kang Wansuk, an Early

Japan, 1400–1800

During the medieval and early modern periods, religion in Japan underwent a number of significant changes. The late medieval period began in 1336, when the general Ashikaga Takauji (1305–58) seized power as shogun, or military ruler, in the wake of a revolt against the previous shogunal regime led by the emperor Go-Daigo (1288–1339). It ended in the late sixteenth century, as a series of warlords reunified the realm after a century of civil war. The last of the reunifying warlords, Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542–1616), founded a new shogunate in 1603, ushering in what is called the early modern period, which lasted until 1868, when the Tokugawa regime collapsed. During these centuries, devotion to the many Buddhas and bodhisattvas (enlightened beings) of the Mahayana Buddhist tradition spread throughout the populace, while at the same time great monastic complexes became independent political entities, competing with the shogunate and regional warlords, called daimyo, for control of the realm. Ieyasu and his immediate predecessors, however, subdued them by force and in the early modern period the relationship between religion and the state changed drastically. The medieval model of the mutual support of Buddhism and the secular realm was replaced by one in which the state was clearly superior and religious institutions existed to serve the regime. They did so in large part by acting as the institutions that guaranteed the non-Christian status of their lay parishioners, a result of the mid-seventeenth-century suppression of Christianity, which had been brought by missionaries in the mid-1500s.

Buddhism

The third Ashikaga shogun, Yoshimitsu (1358–1408), not only managed to cow the fractious regional lords, or daimyo, and maintain strong central rule, perhaps the last Ashikaga to do so, but also patronized Buddhism in an effort both to protect the realm and to legitimize his own rule. He was a devotee of Zen Buddhism, called Chan in China, which had been brought to Japan in the thirteenth century. In particular, he patronized monks of the Rinzai school of Zen, which used koans, or stories of old masters, to test the accomplishments of its members. In imitation of a system used in Song China, during the early medieval period, Rinzai monasteries were grouped into a group called the *gozan*, or five mountains, and received official

Catholic Activist and Martyr," in Robert E. Buswell, Jr. and Timothy S. Lee (eds.), *Christianity in Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), pp. 38–71.

recognition from the shogunate. Yoshimitsu and successive Ashikaga shoguns maintained close relationships with these five-mountain monasteries in order to bolster their own authority and exert an indirect influence on lesser Rinzai monasteries with connections to the daimyo. Under Ashikaga patronage, five-mountain monasteries were centers of learning and the arts. Their monks were indispensable to Ashikaga relations with China, due to their expertise in Chinese language and literature, as well as their financial experience in their capacity as moneylenders. The Ashikaga shogunate also patronized the corresponding group of five-mountain nunneries, but these institutions, in spite of housing accomplished nuns, never attained the prominence of those staffed by men.[35]

Five-mountain monasteries, however wealthy and powerful they were, did not have economic resources comparable to those of the older schools of Shingon, which was primarily esoteric, and Tendai, which focused on the recitation and study of the *Lotus Sutra*. Both of these schools had been established in the eighth century and had longstanding ties to the emperor and the aristocracy. The Tendai monastic complex of Enryakuji, for example, had many subtemples whose abbots were members of the imperial family. Enryakuji and other Tendai and Shingon monasteries had grown rich due to their proprietary rights to the income produced by estates throughout the realm. They also filled their coffers by lending money and licensing trade guilds, placing them in the center of the growing commercial economy. Consequently, even when it was difficult for their representatives to collect the income due from their lands, these large temples could rely on their other businesses to support them, rendering them independent of the central shogunate as well as the regional daimyo.[36]

The outward spread of Buddhist practices, ideas, and institutions from their traditional strongholds in the ancient capitals of Kyoto and Nara that had begun during the early medieval period continued in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Monks of the Sōtō school of Zen, which emphasized seated meditation, spread their teachings to towns and agricultural villages as a way of gaining patronage without competing with the influential Rinzai

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[35] Martin Collcutt, "Zen and the *Gozan*," in Kozo Yamamura (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Japan*, vol. III: *Medieval Japan* (Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 583–652; Yoshiyuki Ushiyama, "Buddhist Convents in Medieval Japan," trans. Anne Dutton, in Barbara Ruch (ed.), *Engendering Faith: Women and Buddhism in Premodern Japan* (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Japanese Studies the University of Michigan, 2002), pp. 131–64.

[36] Neil McMullin, *Buddhism and the State in Sixteenth-Century Japan* (Princeton University Press, 1984).

temples of the capital. Early Sōtō monks encouraged women to practice, leading to the establishment of Sōtō nunneries that remained active through the late medieval and early modern periods.[37] Many monks and nuns associated with branches of the Pure Land School, which advocated praying for rebirth in a realm in which it was easy to become enlightened, and it became one of the most popular forms of Buddhism in Japan. This school was disseminated largely through the efforts of itinerant monks and nuns. Wandering priests of the Ji school of Pure Land, which practiced continuous chanting, developed close relationships with lower-level provincial warriors. Other itinerant Pure Land preachers, both male and female, used picture scrolls to deliver sermons to an audience that included the literate and the non-literate.[38] Another devotional school that focused on the *Lotus Sutra*, the Nichiren School, put down roots not only in the provinces, but also in the cities; by the mid-fifteenth century its adherents included most of the merchants in the cities of Kyoto and Sakai (Figure 16.4).

The Ōnin civil war of 1467–77 undermined Ashikaga authority even further and daimyo became even bolder in seizing land, impoverishing the traditional elites. Only the most powerful monastic complexes were able to marshal the military forces necessary to compete with the daimyo and protect the landholdings that bordered their grounds. At the same time, leaders of the Honganji school of Pure Land Buddhism joined the conflict, commanding their followers to fight on their behalf throughout the realm. Honganji's followers were so strong that they were able to seize control of Kaga province in 1488 and hold it for almost a century.[39] The independent economic and military power of Buddhist institutions in the sixteenth century made them bitter foes of the daimyo attempting to unify Japan. The warlord Oda Nobunaga had to battle for ten years from 1570 to 1580 in order to defeat Honganji and in 1571 razed Enryakuji, once the most powerful monastic complex in the realm. Lesser monastic institutions fared better in the late sixteenth century; Nobunaga restored the land orights of many Buddhist institutions, including those of two convents affiliated with the imperial family.[40]

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[37] William M. Bodiford, *Sōtō Zen in Medieval Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993).

[38] Sybil Thornton, *Charisma and Community Formation in Medieval Japan: The Case of the Yugyō-ha (1300–1700)* (Ithaca, NY: East Asia Program Cornell University, 1999); Ikumi Kaminishi, *Explaining Pictures: Buddhist Propaganda and Etoki Storytelling in Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006).

[39] Carol Richmond Tsang, *War and Faith: Ikkō Ikki in Muromachi Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007).

[40] McMullin, *Buddhism and the State*.

Figure 16.4: Seventeenth-century Japanese devotional image of Amitabha, the principal Buddha in Pure Land Buddhism

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After Ieyasu reunified Japan, he and his successors were faced with a problem similar to that of the early rulers of the Korean Chosŏn dynasty, namely how to provide for the cosmic welfare of the realm and put their own stamp on religious patronage and policy. The early shoguns also had to integrate Buddhist monastic institutions into the new state as supporters rather than as the political rivals they had been in the preceding era. In doing so, they broke with the centuries-old model of the mutual dependence of the Buddhist dharma and the sovereign's law, instead making them subordinate to the shogunate and responsible for enforcing its policies.

Early shoguns took advantage of existing networks of Buddhist temples to police the populace, ostensibly to make sure Christianity had been eradicated. The development of the parishioner, or *danka*, system, in which households had to declare an affiliation with a Buddhist institution, went hand in hand with the temple registration system, in which a temple guaranteed the non-Christian status of its parishioners, a system which lasted until the end of the Tokugawa period. Once a lay household was affiliated with a Buddhist temple, that temple had the exclusive right to conduct the funeral rituals needed by that household. This relationship made temples central to village life and enabled monks to develop close ties to their parishioners.[41] Although it is not clear how many convents were active during the early modern period, the two shogunally sponsored convents that brokered divorces for wealthy commoner women were well known due to the many poems written on the theme of women fleeing a bad marriage. Convents associated with women of the imperial family were also influential, as they provided the lower-status women who worked in the kitchens with Buddhist training that enabled them to return home as accomplished religious practitioners. These institutions provided women with a model of celibate ascetic practice that stood in sharp contrast to the expectation of the time that women fulfill their religious inclinations in the lay world, without giving up their domestic roles. Itinerant nuns affiliated with the sacred site of Kumano collected funds for their home

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[41] Nam-Lin Hur, *Death and Social Order in Tokugawa Japan: Buddhism, Anti-Christianity and the Danka System* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007); Kiri Paramore, *Ideology and Christianity in Japan* (London: Routledge, 2009); Alexander Marshall Vesey, "The Buddhist Clergy and Village Society in Early Modern Japan," PhD diss., Princeton University, 2003; Duncan Ryūken Williams, *The Other Side of Zen: A Social History of Sōtō Zen Buddhism in Tokugawa Japan* (Princeton University Press, 2005).

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institution by preaching using picture scrolls, in a manner similar to that of the earlier Pure Land picture preachers.[42]

Christianity

Christianity was the first significant religion to take root in Japan since the introduction of Buddhism, and was openly practiced in Japan from the mid-sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century. It also became the catalyst for much of the Tokugawa shogunate's religious policy. The first Portuguese traders arrived in Japan in 1543, bringing muskets and other trade goods and six years later the Jesuit missionary Francis Xavier (1506–52) started his religious mission, working in the western part of the main island as well as on the smaller island of Kyushu. He succeeded in attracting powerful daimyo, many of whom saw conversion to Christianity as a means to forge trade relations with Portugal and Spain. Other daimyo and their retainers, however, developed faith in the new religion and converted without regard for pragmatic considerations. As a result, the number of Christians in Japan increased fivefold between 1559 and 1601 to around 300,000, out of a population of possibly 15 to 20 million.[43]

The status of Christianity in Japan changed drastically after Ieyasu took power. Once English and Dutch traders arrived, he could afford to alienate the Spanish and Portuguese by proscribing Christianity, which he saw as inappropriate for his retainers and potentially subversive. Ieyasu issued orders to expel all foreign priests and banish Christian domain lords and their retinues by 1614. The shogunate quickly extended its anti-Christian measures to the general populace. These measures became more severe after the Shimabara rebellion of 1639, a peasant uprising that came about due both to harsh taxation and to millenarian Christian beliefs, and by the 1640s Christianity had either disappeared or gone underground. In the course of this suppression, Christian priests and lay followers were persecuted, tortured, and killed and tests were devised such as the *fumie*, in which one trod

[42] Sachiko Kaneko Morrell and Robert E. Morrell, *Zen Sanctuary of Purple Robes: Japan's Tōkeiji Convent Since 1285* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006); Gina Cogan, *The Princess Nun: Bunchi, Buddhist Reform, and Gender in Early Edo Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2014); Kaminishi, *Explaining Pictures*; Barbara Ruch, "Woman to Woman: *Kumano bikuni* Proselytizers in Medieval and Early Modern Japan," in Barbara Ruch (ed.), *Engendering Faith: Women and Buddhism in Premodern Japan* (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Japanese Studies the University of Michigan, 2002), pp. 537–86.
[43] Kentaro Miyazaki, "Roman Catholic Mission in Pre-Modern Japan," in Mark R. Mullins (ed.), *Handbook of Christianity in Japan* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp. 1–18.

on a cross or a Christian image to demonstrate one's status as a non-Christian. Those who escaped detection and practiced in secret, called Kakure Kirishitan (hidden Christians), maintained their traditions through the Tokugawa period.[44]

Shinto

During the medieval period, there was no such thing as an independent Shinto of the sort familiar today. Rather, *kami*, the gods of Japan, were understood as local manifestations of Buddhas and bodhisattvas, whose power and influence were universal. Most shrines to *kami* were part of Buddhist temples, and Buddhist priests performed most rituals to *kami*. This began to change in the fifteenth century, when the shrine priest Yoshida Kanetomo (1434–1511) claimed that the *kami* had priority over Buddhas and bodhisattvas and invented a purely Japanese, pre-Buddhist origin for his particular lineage.[45]

This kind of understanding of the *kami* was limited to specialists, however, until the early Tokugawa period, when the term "Shinto" came to mean a way of worshiping *kami* not necessarily related to Buddhism. This trend accelerated when the shogunate gave the Yoshida family control over ranking shrine priests in 1665, drastically increasing the influence and visibility of Yoshida Shinto. The shogunate also used ideas of the *kami* taken from Shinto to elevate Ieyasu, the founder, to the status of a deity. Yoshida Shinto was also responsible for the dissemination of popular scrolls that combined images of *kami* with passages advocating purity, honesty, and compassion.[46] In spite of this, popular practice continued to combine the worship of *kami*

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[44] Hur, *Death and Social Order*; Ikuo Higashibaba, *Christianity in Early Modern Japan: Kirishitan Belief and Practice* (Leiden: Brill, 2001); Christal Whelan, *The Beginning of Heaven and Earth: The Sacred Book of Japan's Hidden Christians* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996).

[45] Alan G. Grapard, "The Shinto of Yoshida Kanetomo," *Monumenta Nipponica* 47, no. 1 (1992): 27–58.

[46] Bernhard Scheid, "'Both Parts' or 'Only One'? Challenges to the *Honji Suijaku* Paradigm in the Edo Period," in Fabio Rambelli and Mark Teeuwen (eds.), *Buddhas and Kami in Japan: Honji Suijaku as a Combinatory Paradigm* (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 204–21; W. J. Boot, "The Death of a Shogun: Deification in Early Modern Japan," in John Breen and Mark Teeuwen (eds.), *Shinto in History: Ways of the Kami* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000), pp. 144–66; Herman Ooms, *Tokugawa Ideology: Early Constructs, 1570–1680* (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Japanese Studies the University of Michigan, 1985); Brian Bocking, "Changing Images of Shinto: *Sanja Takusen* or the Three Oracles," in John Breen and Mark Teeuwen (eds.), *Shinto in History: Ways of the Kami* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000), pp. 167–85.

and Buddhas, and most Buddhist institutions had at least one shrine on their grounds until a more nationalistic and institutionally independent form of Shinto took shape after the Meiji restoration of 1868.

Neo-Confucianism and nativism

During the late medieval period, Rinzai monks studied and commented on Neo-Confucian teachings as part of their scholarly endeavors, but this did not affect larger debates on ethics, self-cultivation, or the relationship of the individual to the state and cosmos. The Tokugawa period, however, saw Neo-Confucian scholars with no particular Buddhist affiliation develop influential political philosophies and serve as important advisors to the shogunate. Neo-Confucian teachings were also conveyed to a wide audience through figures such as Ishida Baigan, founder of the Sekimon lineage of "Shingaku" (Study of the Mind-and-Heart). Baigan and his successors did not rely exclusively on Neo-Confucian teachings, but drew on Buddhism and the newly emergent Shinto to set out a program for self-cultivation.[47]

Nativism, as the idea that Japan's ancient past could be discovered through new readings of early historical chronicles that distinguished Japanese material from later Chinese accretions, developed during the seventeenth century, when its proponents saw it as compatible with Neo-Confucian studies. Eighteenth-century advocates of the new National Learning School, in contrast, rejected Neo-Confucian teachings as too Chinese, and thus too foreign to be compatible with what they saw as the Japanese spirit. Both nativists and National Learning scholars identified the newly emerging Shinto as an original, purely Japanese form of worship that had been adulterated by Buddhism, whose foreign origin was now seen as suspect.[48] Although the anti-Buddhist stance of these figures was not influential during the Tokugawa period, it did plant the seeds for the movement to separate Buddhism from Shinto that gained popularity during the Meiji period (1868–1912).

Popular religion

In spite of the great changes that took place between 1400 and 1800, the eclectic and trans-sectarian character of popular religion remained consistent throughout the late medieval and the early modern periods. The emergence

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[47] Ooms, *Tokugawa Ideology*; Janine Anderson Sawada, *Confucian Values and Popular Zen: Sekimon Shingaku in Eighteenth-Century Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993).

[48] Peter Nosco, *Remembering Paradise: Nostalgia and Nativism in Eighteenth-Century Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies Harvard University, 1990).

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of an independent Shinto in the late Tokugawa period did not prevent people from considering the *kami* and Buddhas to be related and to be jointly available to hear people's prayers. Specifically Buddhist beliefs in karmic cause and effect and the value of renouncing lay life for making progress on the Buddhist path were widespread, encouraging people to take seriously didactic stories such as those told by itinerant preachers and recounted in popular tales. Concern with the afterlife was also consistent, although it was not until the Tokugawa period that peasants and other commoners engaged in elaborate funerary rituals; funerals became a mainstay of the temples that were part of the parishioner system, providing much of their economic support.[49]

Pilgrimage was one of the most popular religious activities of pre-modern Japan, attracting everyone from peasants to courtiers. The most famous pilgrimage destination was the great shrine of Ise, associated with the imperial family. Large-scale mass movements in which people left their jobs and families to go to Ise occurred several times during the early modern period, in 1705, 1771, and 1830, disrupting social order. In addition, many other sacred mountains, temples, and shrines saw a steady stream of men and women come to petition the gods and Buddhas or express thanks for answered prayers. These practices encouraged people high and low to consider themselves part of a realm that had a sacred geography as well as a secular one, providing a sense of community that was not dependent on state interests, and was occasionally in conflict with them.[50] Similarly, the touristic aspect of religious travel and of local visits to sacred sites subverted conventional Tokugawa notions of social hierarchy as people of different social statuses mingled for leisure and religious edification.

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[49] Margaret Helen Childs, *Rethinking Sorrow: Revelatory Tales of Late Medieval Japan* (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Japanese Studies University of Michigan, 1991); Kaminishi, *Explaining Pictures*; Hur, *Death and Social Order*; Vesey, "The Buddhist Clergy and Village Society"; Williams, *The Other Side of Zen*.

[50] Winston Davis, "Pilgrimage and World Renewal: A Study of Religion and Social Values in Tokugawa Japan, Part One," *History of Religions* 23, no. 2 (1983): 97–116; Laura Nenzi, "To Ise at All Costs: Religious and Economic Implications of Early Modern Nukemairi," *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 33, no. 1 (2006): 75–114; Marcia Yonemoto, *Mapping Early Modern Japan: Space, Place, and Culture in the Tokugawa Period, 1603–1868* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003); Barbara Ambros, *Emplacing a Pilgrimage: The Ōyama Cult and Regional Religion in Early Modern Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008); Sarah Thal, *Rearranging the Landscape of the Gods: The Politics of a Pilgrimage Site in Japan, 1573–1912* (The University of Chicago Press, 2005).

Conclusion

Large-scale religious change in early modern times often coincided with changes in leadership in China, Korea, and Japan, as, for example, in the religious reforms of the Ming founder, the promotion of Neo-Confucianism by the Chŏson state, or the anti-Christian policy of the Tokugawa shogunate. Nevertheless, the effects of these policy changes took decades, even centuries, to affect people at lower levels of society. This lengthy process often started during the dynamic transitional periods between changes in regime, when social upheaval and questioning of established ways facilitated the embracing of new practices and the assimilation of new beliefs. The Ming restructuring of Buddhist monastic institutions, for example, led to the creation of new clerical networks and forms of lay practice that continued to develop long after the seventeenth century. The imposition of the parishioner system in Tokugawa Japan, partly emerging as a response to Christian presence, took decades, and the new funerary practices this change inspired altered family structures and relationships to the ancestors. In Korea, the rejection of Buddhism as a religion that could support the state enabled Buddhist monks and nuns to flourish in rural areas and to develop new ways to serve the religious needs of the common folk.

Religious change, however, did not take place exclusively from the top down. Not only did the responses to state policy drive innovation, such as the worship of government-approved deities in China and Korea, but new practices originating among commoners and peasants, such as the worship of regional deities like Mazu in China, the practice of forming lay Buddhist associations in Korea, or the practice of large-scale pilgrimage, all helped to drive religious change, including efforts to co-opt these popular practices in China and Japan. Some of these popular practices, such as Chinese millenarian movements, contained an explicit critique of the state and status quo, but even less overtly subversive activities such as pilgrimage, travel, or shamanic ritual often existed in tension with state-approved religion.

Finally, religious change also derived from contact between China, Japan, and Korea, and other parts of the world, in particular Europe, Central Asia, and the Indian Ocean region. Islam and Christianity arrived in China in the early medieval period, but reached a broader portion of the population in the period 1400–1800. Muslims and Christians remained minority groups and adapted to native ways, but also challenged the existing socio-religious framework of the Chinese Empire, with consequences that, as in the case of the Taiping Uprising, could be cataclysmic. Iberian Christianity had an important impact in Japan, where it spurred the strict anti-foreign and

religious policies of the Tokugawa shogunate. In Korea, where foreign missionaries were not a factor in early conversion, Christianity was perceived as heterodox and destabilizing, yet it attracted a number of intellectuals, a prologue to Protestant success in modern times.

In sum, in spite of government interference, the religious landscape of East Asia in the period examined in this essay was vivacious and dynamic. Clerical establishments and religious practitioners engaged in continuous adaptation and transformation of their traditions. Notwithstanding the tremendous transformation of the religious landscape that began in the latter part of the nineteenth century, many of the experiences and experiments of the early modern period continue to have a bearing on the state of religion in East Asia today. Understanding that past remains crucial to illuminate contemporary government policies and social responses toward religion.

FURTHER READING

China

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PART FOUR

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QUESTIONS OF METHOD

On early modern historiography

SANJAY SUBRAHMANYAM

I.

Contrary to the prejudices of many influential European thinkers from the early nineteenth century onwards, perfectly recognisable forms of historiography – that is to say of the writing of history – had existed over very long periods of time and in many diverse societies, not only those of Europe, the Mediterranean, and China. However, they had equally undergone significant changes over the *longue durée*, which are worthy of our attention. This chapter describes and analyses the rise of new forms of large-scale history writing in the early modern period, that is between about 1400 and 1800. Its principal argument is that from the fifteenth century onwards, such innovative writings can be discerned which partly derive from, but also clearly differentiate themselves from, earlier works of "universal history", some of which went back as far as antiquity. These historiographical changes can in turn be related to the new material circumstances of the early modern period, notably changes in patterns of long-distance travel and imperial conquest, as well as more generally in contacts between human societies that in the preceding centuries had largely been isolated from one another. To be sure, not all written cultures participated equally in these changes, and some cultures also acquired distinctly new forms of writing in the process. Further, transformations in historiography must also be linked with changes in other related spheres of knowledge making, notably cartography and ethnography. And finally, we must also bear in mind that while the project of historiography concerns the written sphere above all, there was a significant intersection between this domain and that of orality.

In the mid-1780s, when the German philosopher Hegel was still in his teens, a middle-aged historian in the southern Indian kingdom of Arcot completed a Persian history called *Tuzak-i Walajahi*. The author in question was a certain Sayyid Burhan Khan ibn Hasan Handi, a long-term resident of

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the fortress-town of Tiruchirappalli, and his work ostensibly concerned the deeds and circumstances of the Walajah family which had taken over the rule of Arcot in the middle decades of the eighteenth century.[1] The founder figure of this lineage in Arcot was a certain Anwar-ud-Din Khan, originally from the small town of Gopamau in northern India, who had pursued a successful and peripatetic career as a Mughal administrator, until the 1740s, when he eventually was able to manoeuvre his way into taking charge of a minor state in peninsular India. Anwar-ud-Din Khan was killed in battle in 1749, and was eventually succeeded after a protracted struggle by his son Muhammad 'Ali Khan Walajah, and it was during the latter's long reign that the *Tuzak* was composed. Muhammad 'Ali's court had close relations with a number of European powers, as well as with individuals such as the Scottish doctor and adventurer George Paterson; these individuals and the East India Company effectively managed over the course of several decades to reduce Muhammad 'Ali to a state of political and cultural dependence using both military and financial means. Yet the Arcot court even in the 1780s retained a measure of cultural pride and autonomy, and texts like the *Tuzak* are a manifestation of that fact.

What then does such a text – produced by a fairly ordinary Indo-Persian intellectual when the long shadow of colonial rule had begun to creep over the Indian subcontinent – look like? The *Tuzak-i Walajahi* is of course a family and dynastic history, and must therefore begin with the distant origins of the founder-figure's family in the Central Asian city of Bukhara, from where it was expelled by the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century. The family then took refuge in northern India, emerging eventually from a milieu of minor provincial notables to occupy a position of prominence in the Mughal administration during the reign of the Mughal emperor Shahjahan in the middle of the seventeenth century. By the time of Anwar-ud-Din Khan's exploits in the Deccan in the early decades of the following century, it is clear that the family had become Shi'ites, and this is also the broad sectarian orientation of the *Tuzak* itself. Over a series of pages, Burhan Khan describes the emergence of Arcot as a polity in the eighteenth century, recounts the history of earlier Mughal notables who had ruled over it, and then eventually comes to the moment when – after an extended period of dynastic and familial struggles in the 1730s – Anwar-ud-Din Khan was able to

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[1] For a discussion of this text and its context, see Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Reflections on State-Making and History-Making in South India, 1500–1800", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, vol. xiv, No. 3, 1998: 382–416.

seize control of the polity. Here, he draws upon a mix of Persian materials, such as the poetic narrative entitled *Anwar Nama* of Mir Isma'il Khan Abjadi, and oral narratives that circulated in camp and court.

But these struggles, as Burhan Khan was well aware, involved not just participants from the region or from the Mughal north. They also involved an important exotic group, the Europeans or Franks (*firangiyan*), a broad category that included both the English and the French, and was also sometimes designated as "hat-wearers" (*kulah-poshan*). The historian therefore took it upon himself to provide the reader with at least some sense of what the European East India Companies were, and how this group of lowly merchants who had "made a covenant with their own *padshah* (emperor)" for the purposes of trade had now emerged as such formidable political actors. He noted that the Frankish groups (*ahl-i Firang*) on the coast of southern India were five in number, and that they had managed some 300 years earlier to replace the Arab traders who had once dominated this line of commerce. The chief innovator he mentions is a certain Columbus, "an expert in the science of astronomy and geometry (. . .) the first to understand the qualities of a magnet, the maker of the mariner's compass, who was well acquainted with the rules by which to find his way in all four directions at sea". This man of genius, supported by the wife of the ruler of Spain, had written down all his discoveries, which included various islands and the American mainland. Despite his being denigrated by rivals, he had set in motion a process that the Portuguese had then followed, with the other Europeans imitating them in turn. Of these other European nations, Burhan Khan considers the English to be the most important, and he therefore provides a brief history of England to the time of George III. This includes not only a rough political genealogy, but a description of the chief administrative institutions (*intizam-i saltanat*). He equally draws a sketch of the European inter-state system, including the curious character of the Papacy in the "ancient city of Rum".

Burhan Khan Handi, as we have already noted, was certainly not one of the great intellectuals of his age. He simply cannot measure up even to another of his Shi'ite contemporaries with a taste for xenology, namely Tafazzul Husain Khan (1727–1800), who in the late 1780s translated Newton's *Principia Mathematica* into Arabic, while resident in Bengal. But it is precisely the ordinariness of Burhan Khan that may be the point. It implies that an exercise such as that of the *Tuzak* was actually within the reach of a broad range of intellectuals in South Asia at this time. But we must equally bear in mind that such works of a wide geographical scope existed within a diverse field of historiographical activity. As an inheritor of the long Mughal tradition

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of historical writing, Burhan Khan certainly had access to a number of key works from the preceding centuries. From hesitant beginnings in the second quarter of the sixteenth century, Mughal historical works had bloomed especially in the period after about 1570. By the middle of the eighteenth century, we can not only obtain lists of such works in various courtly libraries and collections, but can even gain a sense of what was available for purchase on the manuscript market (since Persian entered into print only at the very end of that century). If one considers the English East India Company servant James Fraser, who was active in the western Indian port of Surat in the 1730s and 1740s, we gather that he was able to acquire a wide swathe of historiographical works for his personal use over a couple of decades.[2] These included dynastic chronicles from the reigns of the emperors Akbar, Jahangir and Shahjahan, but also other texts that ranged further in terms of ambition. A particular favourite amongst collectors of the time was the *Gulshan-i Ibrahimi*, written by the Indo-Iranian chronicler Muhammad Qasim Firishta in the early seventeenth century. This work encompassed the history of a wide range of regional kingdoms over several centuries, and was in effect a synthesis of a body of earlier work. Equally prized was the *Akbar Nama* of Shaikh Abu'l Fazl, the official chronicler and ideologue of the Mughal emperor Akbar. But we also find more eccentric works like the *Rauzat al-Tahirin*, a work written by a middle-rung Mughal official who incorporated materials concerning Southeast Asia and even Europe into his chronicle. The author of this work, a certain Tahir Muhammad Sabzwari, had served in different parts of the Mughal Empire and also been the Mughal envoy to the Portuguese in Goa in the late sixteenth century. It is thus easy to see how he might have come upon a wider spectrum of written and oral materials than many of his contemporaries among Mughal courtiers.

But these great imperial and dynastic works represent only a part of Indo-Persian historiography of the period. Other works focus on a single sub-dynastic figure, like the great patron and general 'Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan in the early seventeenth century; and some move easily between the genres of autobiography and history, like the texts of Asad Beg Qazwini

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[2] James Fraser, *The History of Nadir Shah, Formerly Called Thamas Kuli Khan, the Present Emperor of Persia: To which is prefix'd a Short History of the Moghol Emperors, at the End is inserted a Catalogue of about Two Hundred Manuscripts in the Persic and other Oriental Languages, collected in the East*, 2nd edn. (London: A. Millar, 1742).

and Bhimsen Saksena. Some authors eschew the scale of the empire or even the kingdom, and prefer to write works of local patriotism, including chorographies that focus on a single city or town. Moreover, it is frequently the case that authors do not specialise in a single sub-genre of historiography, but instead show considerable flexibility in moving from one type of text to another, at different moments in their careers and as a function of shifting patterns of patronage. It is therefore important to think constantly of each text in relation to others, and of each author as being in conversation with others, whether their contemporaries or their predecessors. It would also be an error to imagine that the world of Mughal historians knew nothing of other historiographies. Certainly, the world of classical Arabic historiography was accessible to these writers as part of their education, and some of them also knew of contemporary works from Central Asia, Iran, the Ottoman Empire, and even – as we have seen with both Burhan Khan and Tahir Muhammad – writings from Europe.

In order to understand how one arrives at such a moment in the late eighteenth century, a long intellectual excavation is necessary. In the following paragraphs, I shall present a somewhat schematic long view of evolution, beginning with some of the earliest works of "universal history". Rather than take a single and conventional point of departure, namely that of classical Greek historiography in the form of authors such as Herodotus and his successor Thucydides (both fifth century BCE), we may begin slightly later with a comparison of the complex and more or less contemporary figures of Polybius in the Mediterranean and Sima Qian in China. Polybius, heir to the tradition of Herodotus and Thucydides, was a rather long-lived Greek (as his very name suggests) under Roman domination in the 2nd century BCE. A man of both the pen and the sword, we know that he himself participated actively in Roman campaigns against Carthage and other Mediterranean rivals. As a member of a subject people, Polybius seems to have had a particularly keen interest in understanding just how Roman hegemony had been established over such a vast space, and in such a short span of time. Thus, while working within a Greek intellectual tradition for the most part, he sought to place himself neither with the victors nor with the vanquished but at a vantage point above the two. As he wrote quite early in his work, *The Histories*:

> My history possesses a certain distinctive quality which is related to the extraordinary spirit of the times in which we live, and it is this. Just as Fortune (*tychê*) has steered almost all the affairs of the world in one direction and forced them to converge upon one and the same goal, so it is the task of

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the historian to present to his readers under one synoptical view the process by which she has accomplished this general design. It was this phenomenon above all which originally attracted my attention.[3]

To Polybius is often attributed the privilege of being the first practitioner of "universal history". It is certainly a claim that he implicitly makes himself, noting that it is "the fact that none of my contemporaries have undertaken to write a general history" which has led him to take this task in hand. But what in fact does the adjective "universal" mean here? Certainly, Polybius does not cover the entire world known to the Romans, for that would have taken him considerably further east than he actually ventured, indeed at least as far as India – with which the Romans had extensive trade. Rather, it seems that "universal" here is meant to suggest the capacity to embrace at least two traditions, namely one's own and that of a complementary opposite. In other words, a universal history is one that is symmetrical in its conception, with one part being egoistical and the other xenological. The synopsis is thus one achieved between Self and Other, and does not imply by any means that the coverage of the history is "total" in some literal sense. This is a helpful point of departure from which to consider Sima Qian, who was born when Polybius was roughly sixty years of age.

Like Polybius, Sima Qian too combined the pen with the sword, and participated in the military campaigns of the emperor Wu against the Xiongnu in Central Asia. Like his father before him, he was employed by the state in the multiple capacities of astrologer, librarian and adviser; he also travelled extensively, and these travels left a mark on his major work, *Shiji*, which extends over some two thousand years of Chinese history. If Polybius's work represents a curious version of the "vision of the vanquished" (to cite Nathan Wachtel's celebrated phrase), one cannot see Sima Qian as quite writing an official history either. Rather, we know that the historian was in and out of favour, and was imprisoned and rather severely punished because of suspicions cast on his political loyalties. Yet, even so, he maintains an interesting balance, in which the idea of a structuring Han imperial order remains more or less paramount.[4] At the same time, the Xiongnu, who are ostensibly "barbarians", are shown to have redeeming qualities of their own, and it is implied that their

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[3] Cited in John Burrow, *A History of Histories: Epics, Chronicles, Romances and Inquiries from Herodotus and Thucydides to the Twentieth Century* (London: Allen Lane, 2007), p. 69.
[4] Siep Stuurman, "Common Humanity and Cultural Difference on the Sedentary-Nomadic Frontier: Herodotus, Sima Qian and Ibn Khaldun", in Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori (eds.), *Global Intellectual History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), pp. 33–58.

way of life is in fact quite appropriate to their circumstances. Reading these historians from two very different traditions together, we can thus see both the common characteristics and the possible variations in ideas of "universal history" that were handed down from classical times.

As it turns out, the two authors in question had very different effects on the historiographies that followed them. Sima Qian was rapidly enshrined in the pantheon of great Chinese authors and continued to be cited and used as a model not only in China, but in the penumbra of the Chinese world, as we see for instance in Korea in the twelfth century. On the other hand, though Polybius was read and used by the likes of Cicero and Livy, he then passed into a relative oblivion for many centuries and had to be recovered as an author in the fifteenth century, in the context of the Italian Renaissance. However, whatever his fate as an individual author, the notion of the universal history that he had practised continued to resurface periodically in a Mediterranean context. In the sixth century CE, the encyclopaedic work of the churchman Isidore of Seville can be classified in this category. Though largely based on compiling earlier materials, this work began a tradition amongst Christian writers who followed in the footsteps of Isidore. As it happens, the dates of Isidore also coincide very closely with those traditionally attributed to the life of the Prophet Muhammad at the other extreme of the Mediterranean world. In effect, this represents a sort of notional passage of the historiographical baton, as it was really Muslim writers – above all in Arabic – who kept up the tradition and standard of universal histories in the centuries that followed. These writers in turn made use of earlier historiographical traditions in Greek and Syriac to build a considerable edifice.[5] The first of the great names in this tradition is probably that of Abu Jaʿfar al-Tabari, who lived in Baghdad in the late ninth and early tenth century CE. Tabari, who helped firmly establish the tradition that came to be known as *tarikh*, was concerned with both religious and secular traditions, as we gather from the title of his work: *Tarikh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk* ("History of Prophets and Kings"). Amongst his contributions is a preoccupation with the reliability of oral transmission, a matter of particular concern in relation to the *hadith*, or sayings of the Prophet, but which could equally be extended to other forms of knowledge transmission. In the centuries that followed, Tabari would remain a crucial point of reference for all those with a pretension to writing history, both within the Arabic-speaking world and at its limits.

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[5] See Chase F. Robinson, *Islamic Historiography* (Cambridge University Press, 2002).

II.

An important centre, today all too often neglected, for the further spread and consolidation of this Islamic historiographical tradition, which extended progressively from Arabic into Persian, was Ghazna in Afghanistan in the tenth and eleventh centuries CE. It was here that the great intellectual from Kharizm, Abu Raihan al-Biruni, produced his *Kitab al-Hind* ("Book of India"), based on conversations and dealings with Brahmin intellectuals in northern India. It was equally in this broad context that the great verse-epic of Firdausi, the *Shah Nama*, was produced, and thus gave a major impetus to the reconstruction of the pre-Islamic past of the Iranian world. A third work of enormous significance that emerged from the same intellectual milieu was the *Tarikh-i Mas'udi* of Abu'l Fazl Baihaqi, which may be considered as one of the first truly monumental works of Perso-Islamic historiography.[6] The consistent production of such works implied that as the centre of gravity of the Islamic world moved eastwards from Syria and the eastern Mediterranean, to Iraq and Baghdad, and eventually to Khorasan, the early dominance of Arabic eventually gave way to a situation where Persian too had to be given a proper place at the table. To be sure, Arabophone writers often grumbled at this, considering Persian itself to be intrinsically inferior, and Persophone writers to be given to inveterate embellishment and fantasy. But the establishment of the Sultanate of Delhi in around 1200 CE only helped to consolidate the hold of Persian amongst Muslim literati in the eastern part of the Islamic world, as we see from the composition of texts like the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* of Minhaj-i Siraj Juzjani, and the *Taj al-Ma'asir* of Hasan Nizami.

The point of no return was probably passed on account of Mongol dominance in a good part of the Islamic world in the thirteenth century CE. The collapse of the Abbasid Caliphate in 1258 had already been prefigured by close contacts between the expanding Mongols and the world of Baghdad. It has been remarked by modern historians that already in the 1230s and 1240s, the notables of Khorasan had begun to flirt with the new great power; some became teachers to the Mongol princes, while others learnt Mongolian as well as the Uighur script. After 1258, a steady traffic came to be established between Iran and China through the Mongol corridor.[7] This is visible not only in ceramics and textiles, but in the rich illustrations of the most

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[6] Julie Scott Meisami, *Persian Historiography to the End of the Twelfth Century* (Edinburgh University Press, 1999).

[7] Jean Aubin, *Émirs mongols et vizirs persans dans les remous de l'acculturation* (Paris: Association pour l'avancement des études iraniennes, 1995).

important of the universal histories produced at the time, namely Rashid-ud-Din Fazlullah Hamadani's Persian work *Jami' al-Tawarikh*. This work was composed by a figure of great importance, possessing medical skills, as well as those of the chancery, and known during his lifetime as a great political manipulator. Rashid-ud-Din did eventually overplay his hand, and ended his life on the scaffold in August 1318. But by this time, he had managed to produce a work of vast ambition. Begun under the Ilkhanid ruler Ghazan Khan in the 1290s, the *Jami' al-Tawarikh* would be completed in the 1310s; the later sections, completed under Ghazan's successor Öljeitü, include a notable part on Europe, or the world of the Franks. This section is made up of a political and geographical description, with a fairly scrupulous account of European institutions, and it also used the writings of the Dominican bishop Martin of Troppau to produce a broad chronological narrative of European history. In addition, Rashid-ud-Din also made sure to include materials, often of quite superior quality, concerning India, China and the Mongols before their conversion to Islam, and here he drew both on the Indo-Persian chroniclers and his own immediate predecessors in the western Mongol milieu such as 'Ata Malik Juwaini.

This Persian historiographical efflorescence of the early fourteenth century effectively sets the stage for the next great leap, namely that of the Timurid historiographical revolution.[8] Composed in its first stages of works like Yazdi's *Zafar Nama*, built around the career of the celebrated conqueror Amir Timur (d. 1405), this revolution then continued with successive generations of his descendants, culminating in a last substantial burst at the very end of the fifteenth century in the city of Herat, ruled over by Sultan Husain Baiqara. Among the central figures of this tradition is Hafiz-i Abru (d. 1430), who worked at the court of Mirza Shahrukh and produced an impressive number of quite diverse works. Of these, one that has attracted particular attention is his *Jughrafiya*, a work combining history, geography and cartography. Though drawing on earlier works in Arabic, Hafiz-i Abru extended them considerably, and included detailed and varied information on the parts of the eastern Islamic worlds that he knew well, often because he had travelled there himself. However, for our purposes, the most substantial work written in Herat came two generations later: this was the *Rauzat al-Safa* of Mir Khwand (d. 1498), a work of universal history that extends its ambitions from the world of pre-Islamic Iran, to a detailed history of the

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[8] John E. Woods, "The Rise of Timurid Historiography", *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, vol. XXXVI, No. 2, 1987: 81–108.

prophets of the Abrahamic tradition, and continues with the deeds of the Muslim Caliphs, and various dynasties down to its author's times. This particular work would have a far-reaching influence, extending as far as the Ottoman court (where both Rashid-ud-Din and Mir Khwand were read, as were many other Central Asian authors writing in Persian), and that of the Mughals in northern India, but even beyond the limits of the world of Islam. When European collectors in the sixteenth century began their first attempts to constitute a body of Persian materials, it was often to Mir Khwand that they turned as offering a relatively coherent and comprehensive chronology.

We can gather this from a close reading of a somewhat unexpected text, namely the official sixteenth-century Portuguese chronicle of João de Barros (c.1496–1570).[9] As we are aware, Barros was not merely a historian but an author in a number of different areas and genres, ranging from panegyrics and grammars, to polemical and allegorical works, to a curious chivalric romance which he (like his Castilian contemporary Fernández de Oviedo) wrote as a relatively young man in around 1520, called the *Crónica do emperador Clarimundo*. His chief work for our purposes is however *Da Ásia* ("Of Asia"), a work which claimed in its subtitle to deal with "the deeds (*dos feitos*) that the Portuguese did in the discovery and conquest of the seas and lands of the Orient". Divided following a well-known classical model, that of Livy, into ten book-long segments, the work is sometimes therefore known as the *Décadas da Ásia*; its first three volumes appeared in print during Barros's lifetime, in 1552, 1553 and 1563, but the fourth was only cobbled together posthumously from manuscript fragments by a later editor and eventually appeared in 1615. This is how Barros begins the first chapter of the first *Década*, entitled: "Of how the Moors came to capture Spain; and after Portugal was entitled a kingdom, how its Kings launched themselves over-seas, where they went on to conquer, both in the parts of Africa, and in Asia: and the reason for the title of this work."

> There having arisen in the land of Arabia that great Anti-Christ Mafamede [Muhammad], more or less in the year 593 of Our Redemption, he so worked the fury of his iron, and the fire of his infernal sect by means of his captains and caliphs, that in the space of a hundred years they conquered in Asia, all of Arabia, and part of Syria, and Persia; and in Africa all of Egypt before and beyond the Nile. And as the Arabs write in their *Tarigh*, which is a summary of deeds which their caliphs accomplished in the conquest of

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[9] António Alberto Banha de Andrade, *João de Barros: Historiador do pensamento humanista português de quinhentos* (Lisbon: Academia Portuguesa da História, 1980).

those parts of the Orient, at the same time there arose from there and advanced great numbers of them in order to populate these [lands] of the west, which they call *Algarb*, and we corrupt into Algarve, beyond the straits; and with the force of their arms they devastated and laid waste the lands, and made themselves lords of the greater part of Mauretania Tingitana, in which is included the kingdoms of Fez and Morocco, though at this time our Europe had not felt the persecution of this plague.[10]

At various moments in his text, Barros returns to this same *Tarigh*. At one point, he states that he has largely been "following what the Persians and Arabs write in their *Tarigh* (...) which we have in our power in the Persian language"; at another moment in his text, he refers to the "General Chronicle of the Persians, which is the *Tarigh* of which we made mention in the beginning, which we possess together with other volumes of history and Persian cosmography from those parts". Again, in a brief digression on the origins and long history of chess, he mentions "a book written in Persian called *Tarigh*, which we have had translated into our language, which is a summary of all the kings that have been in Persia until a certain time when the Arabs with their sect of Mafamede subjugated it". All these references turn out to be directed precisely towards Mir Khwand's work, the *Tarikh-i Rauzat al-Safa*. To be sure, Barros did not possess the erudition to read the text in the original Persian; rather he clearly had a translation – or rather more probably, a digest – made for him. In a similar vein, profiting from his privileged connection with the Portuguese *Casa da Índia* (or India House), Barros seems to have acquired a swathe of material from Kilwa on the Swahili coast, from Hurmuz in the Persian Gulf, from Vijayanagara in southern India, and even from China. In each case, he either had summaries made, or – as in the case of Chinese – acquired a slave to help him cope with the texts. Unfortunately for us, Barros's library was dispersed at his death, and not even a catalogue of its precise contents exists.

It would seem that Barros was rather unusual among the Iberian chroniclers of his time in his desire to approach history through philology, however approximate his methods may have been. His well-known contemporary Fernão Lopes de Castanheda used the official Portuguese archives liberally, but did not venture beyond them while writing his history; and Barros's successor as official chronicler, Diogo do Couto, in fact made far more extensive use of oral materials than is usually recognised. Across the political divide, in Castile, matters were posed in different terms on account of a

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[10] João de Barros, *Da Ásia, Década* I (Lisbon: Livraria Sam Carlos, 1973), Book I, ch. 1, pp. 1–3.

simple fact: in the course of building their empire in America, the Castilians did not encounter a massive body of written textual materials as the Portuguese did in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, the most important of the Castilian chroniclers of the conquest, such as Bernal Díaz del Castillo, Fernández de Oviedo and then López de Gómara, drew either upon personal experience, written materials in Castilian, or passed into the domain of orality to enter tentatively into the world of indigenous materials. However, as the languages of Mesoamerica gradually came to be written in romanized form (as with the celebrated Nahuatl codex produced under the supervision of Fray Bernardino de Sahagún), some of these materials eventually came to be incorporated into Castilian histories of the Americas. Even so, if we take an official chronicler who may be seen as the Castilian equivalent of Barros – such as Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, author of the *Historia general del mundo del tiempo del Rey Felipe II, el prudente* ("General History of the World at the Time of King Philip II, the Prudent"), published in two volumes in 1600 and 1606 – we note a clear gap between the methods of the two. Herrera is far less interested than Barros in philology, and far more traditional in both his methods and his concerns.[11]

By the late 1550s, the existence of a published body of such histories in Portuguese and Castilian emboldened even private individuals without privileged access to official materials and documents to try their hand at composing grand histories. One of these was António Galvão, a former colonial official in Asia and author of a somewhat eccentric work entitled the *Tratado dos Descobrimentos* ("Treatise on the Discoveries"). Galvão decided to depart from his contemporaries on two very substantial counts. First, he took it upon himself to treat "the ancient and modern discoveries that have been made to the year 1550", and then went on to divide his work broadly into two parts, the first extending from ancient times to the late fifteenth century, and the second from the late fifteenth to the mid-sixteenth century. Second, with regard to the period from 1400 to 1550, Galvão organised his work in an annalistic form, where the activities of various nations – and not merely the Portuguese – were treated. Thus, for the year 1496–7, we get an account as much of the deeds of Sebastian Cabot, as of

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[11] For a discussion of Herrera's work and its context, see Richard L. Kagan, *Clio & the Crown: The Politics of History in Medieval and Early Modern Spain* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); for the text itself, Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, *Historia general de los hechos de los castellanos en las islas y tierra firme del mar océano, o, "Décadas",* ed. Mariano Cuesta Domingo, 4 vols. (Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1991).

Christopher Columbus, as of Vasco da Gama. In the 1510s, the activities of the Portuguese in Melaka and the Moluccas are juxtaposed with the arrival of Hernán Cortés in Mexico-Tenochtitlán; and in the 1530s, the arrival of the Spaniards under the Pizarro brothers in the Andes is discussed as part of the same panorama as Galvão's own presence in the fortress of Ternate in the Moluccas. In sum, for the purposes of António Galvão, the history of the discoveries was a movement by which the Pacific anti-meridian that had theoretically been defined during the Luso–Castilian negotiations of the 1490s was progressively attained by means of an expansion in two directions, to the west by the Castilians and to the east by the Portuguese. Somewhat oddly, this seems to be a world view in which the imagined centre lies in fact in the Moluccas, where Galvão had spent four years of his life. Galvão thus concludes his text as follows.

> From all this, what I have arrived at is that the globe (*a redondeza*) is of 360 degrees, in keeping with its geometry, which the ancients claimed were 17 and a half leagues each, which makes a total of 6300. The moderns state that the degree is 16 and two-third leagues, which gives us 6000 leagues in all. However, I hold that a degree is 17 leagues wide, so that the circumference of the earth is 6200 leagues. Whatever be the case, all of it is now discovered from west to east, more or less following the sun, but it is quite different in the north-south direction, for to the north not all that much has been discovered beyond 77 or 78 degrees of latitude, making up about 1300 leagues. And to the south, some 900 leagues, for about 52 or 53 degrees have been discovered, with the Strait through which Magalhães [Magellan] passed, and together these make up 2200 leagues, and if one subtracts this from 6200, one can say that 4000 leagues remain to be discovered.[12]

Galvão's view is thus very much a geo-historical one, and is based on a combination of his own personal experience in Southeast Asia, and his at times rather indiscriminate reading. At one remove from the Iberian peninsula, other authors of the same broad time period based themselves purely on a synthesis of the materials that had begun to appear in print by the mid-sixteenth century, in Castilian, Portuguese and Italian. The great multi-volume compendium by Giambattista Ramusio, *Delle navigazioni e viaggi* ("Of Navigations and Voyages"), had an enormous impact upon its publication in the 1550s, as we see even in east-central Europe. We may point there to the example of the prolific if controversial Polish historian Marcin Bielski (1495–1575), who

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[12] António Galvão, *Tratado dos Descobrimentos*, Visconde de Lagoa and Elaine Sanceau (eds.), 4th edn. (Oporto: Livraria Civilização, 1987), p. 299.

composed a text *Kronika tho iesth Historya swiátá* ("Chronicle of the Whole World"), which claimed to treat the history of the world from the earliest times, and was divided into six periods.[13] By the time of the second and third editions of his work (respectively of 1554 and 1564), Bielski was able to draw upon information concerning both Asia and America from a variety of printed works. He also incorporated a cosmographic section, as well as one on islands that formed a part of his Book IV.[14] Despite its somewhat eccentric quality, a feature it shared with Galvão's *Tratado*, this work seems to have enjoyed a great deal of popularity through the latter half of the sixteenth century. However, his readers may not have been aware that the rather censorious Bielski at times made radical decisions to excise materials from the sources on which he drew, and that he had a marked preference for the activities of the Portuguese in Asia over those of the Spaniards in America.[15]

Nor should we imagine that the circulation of these Iberian and Italian materials ceased at the imaginary frontier between Christendom and the world of Islam. By the second half of the sixteenth century (and in some instances even earlier), some members of the Ottoman elite and literary circles also proved to be eager consumers of such works. Though its author's identity remains a mystery, a late sixteenth-century work like the *Tarikh-i Hind-i Gharbi* ("The History of the Western Indies") is clearly based on sources such as López de Gómara's chronicle and the works of Pietro Martir d'Anghiera. While this text recounts to an Ottoman readership what the nature of the new lands that the Spanish Crown had found to the west was, other roughly contemporary chronicles like that of Seyfi Çelebi were able to provide some significant details concerning parts of the Indian Ocean, such as the Mughal domains or the Sumatran Sultanate of Aceh.[16] Eventually, in the seventeenth century, Katib Çelebi (1609–57) was even in a position to produce a grand synthesis on a world scale, in the form of the *Cihan Numa* ("Mirror of the World"), an ambitious work replete with maps of China,

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[13] Marcin Bielski, *Kronika: tho iesth Historya swiátá* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Artystyczne i Filmowe, 1976).

[14] Jan Kieniewicz, "Nouvelles et merchandises: La perspective polonaise des découvertes portugaises au XVIe siècle", in Jean Aubin (ed.), *La Découverte, le Portugal, et l'Europe* (Paris: Centre Calouste Gulbenkian, 1990), pp. 331–45.

[15] For a somewhat larger perspective on these questions, see Endre Iglói, "Die ersten polnischen, ungarischen und russischen Berichte über die Entdeckung Amerikas", *Slavica: Annales Instituti Philologicæ Slavicæ Universitatis Debrecinensis*, vol. IV, 1964: 121–30.

[16] Joseph Matuz (ed. and trans.), *L'ouvrage de Seyfi Çelebi, historien ottoman du XVIe siècle* (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1968).

Japan and the Philippines, as well as other curious information, and which was one of the first Ottoman texts to enter into print in 1729.[17]

<div align="center">III.</div>

By roughly 1600, then, we may discern a move in a variety of locations to a different set of forms of large-scale history that draw upon but also distinguish themselves from the received tradition of "universal history". A part of this production is directly linked to projects of empire building, as we see with Barros and Herrera, and as would be the case with Richard Hakluyt and others in England as the sixteenth century drew to a close. With the passage of time, even some amongst the conquered people began to participate in this enterprise, as we see from the remarkable case of Domingo Francisco de San Antón Muñón Chimalpáhin Quauhtlehuanitzin (1579–*c*.1650), from Chalco in central Mexico.[18] Chimalpáhin, though he was perfectly conversant with Spanish, nevertheless chose to write in Nahuatl, and was the author, compiler, copyist and translator of a large number of texts. One of these contains a section on "how the lands of the world are divided", and here, Chimalpáhin informs us at the outset that "all the lands of this world that have been discovered until now are divided into four parts", namely Europe, Asia, Africa and the "New World" (for which he uses the Nahua neologism *Yancuic Cemanahuac*). Obviously, Chimalpáhin draws here on his knowledge of materials provided by his interactions with the Spaniards. Thus, in his brief description of Asia, he writes that it "has always been much discussed by writers, because it was here that the first great kingdoms and lordships that there were in the world existed, and had their beginnings, which were ruled over by the Assyrians, the Persians and the Medeans. It is also often mentioned in the holy scriptures, because it was here that Adam, the first man, was created by God Our Lord; and in the same way, Christ, Our Saviour, was born there, and he suffered there to save us." We then find mentions of one part of Asia dominated by the Grand Duke of Muscovy; a second is ruled over by the Great Khan, Emperor of the Tartars; a third is ruled over by the Turk (where the holy city of Jerusalem may be found); a fourth is ruled over by "a great king called the Sofi, King of Persia";

and "the fifth and last part of Asia [which] is formed by Portuguese India and Great China". Chimalpáhin's extensive work may be set side by side with other writings by indigenous American writers such as the Andean nobleman Felipe de Guáman Poma de Ayala (*c.*1535–1616), who for his part preferred to write in Castilian rather than Quechua. Where Guáman Poma was more concerned to elaborate a moral critique of the failings of Spanish rule, in relation to his own ideas of good and proper government, Chimalpáhin's writings are notable for their wide curiosity and range, where events from France to Japan find a place.

These historians and their writings may properly be placed under the category of forced acculturation, produced under conditions of imperial domination. But elsewhere, the context for new and creative forms of xenology and translation was simply inter-imperial rivalry. Everywhere in the Asian world where Europeans posed a threat, from Mughal India to Japan, at least some intellectuals in the seventeenth century sought to understand their history and their origins. An excellent example from the Mughal court is Maulana ʿAbdus Sattar's work *Ahwal-i Firangistan* or *Samrat ul-Falasifa*, completed in the latter half of 1603, late in the reign of the emperor Akbar. ʿAbdus Sattar makes it clear that he was more or less commissioned to produce the work by the emperor himself.

> He gave the order to learn the language of the Franks (*zaban-i Firangi*), to gain a knowledge of the secrets of that community, their rulers, and the philosophers of Yunan [Greece] and Latin [Rome] according to their own books, and render them into Persian. Thus, what had remained hidden from sight on account of the strangeness of their language, and distance, should be brought forth in our own springtime (. . .). I took this order of the Shadow of God as a divine order. I raised the skirt of my courage and became totally dedicated, and began to frequent a Padre by name Jerónimo Xavier, one of the select amongst the knowledgeable persons of the Franks who had recently arrived and kissed the threshold. I determined to learn and to have a command over that language. Since I had total dedication and since I was inspired by the emperor more and more every day, in six months I acquired the ability and strength to comprehend practical and scientific (*ʿilmi*) matters in that language. Because I have spent most of the time in producing translations, and did not have the opportunity to speak much, I still am not capable of conversation.[19]

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[19] Citation in Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Writing the Mughal World: Studies on Culture and Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), pp. 270–1.

'Abdus Sattar thus constructed his own version of the history of Europe from ancient times, drawing on whatever materials the Jesuits at the Mughal court would give him access to. The chief written source he drew upon seems to have been Antonio Pierozzi or St Antoninus (1389–1459), the celebrated Dominican friar who had become Archbishop of Florence. But rather than Antoninus's best-known theological works, 'Abdus Sattar made use of his three-volume *Summa Historialis* or *Chronicon partibus tribus distincta ab initio mundi ad 1360* which had appeared between 1474 and 1479, and been reprinted several times thereafter in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Using this and some other works, the Mughal intellectual was able to piece together a narrative history of ancient Greece and Rome, as well as a more patchy history of medieval Europe.

'Abdus Sattar's enterprise can justifiably be compared with that of his contemporary in central Europe, Johannes Leunclavius, or Hans Löwenklau (1541–94), who was to publish first the *Annales Sultanorum Othmanidarum*, and then the *Historiae Musulmanae Turcorum, de monumentis ipsonum exscriptae*.[20] Löwenklau had spent time as a diplomat in the Ottoman Empire, and had been in close touch with a Hungarian renegade called Tarjuman Murad. Using the latter's help, he was able to obtain and work on a number of key Ottoman narrative sources, including Maulana Mehmed Neşri's *Kitab-i Cihannuma*. In turn, Löwenklau's work would have a long posterity; it was one of the chief sources for what became one of the most celebrated European works on the Ottomans in the seventeenth century, namely Richard Knolles's *The Generall Historie of the Turkes*, which appeared in 1603. Despite the absence of evidence of any direct influence, we may see Löwenklau as continuing the line of philological–historical enquiry begun by Barros in Portugal with two evident differences: Barros was clearly far wider in his interests and capacity to gather diverse materials, and Löwenklau was by far the more serious and rigorous in his philological endeavours. This work concerning the Islamic world in particular would then be consolidated by many hands in the course of the seventeenth century, notably in central Europe, the Low Countries, France, and Britain. Substantial collections of materials in Ottoman, Arabic and Persian would be constituted, analysed and at times translated into Latin or the European vernaculars. This would thus permit the gradual emergence of the conditions to allow a more carefully

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[20] Pál Ács, "*Pro Turcis* and *contra Turcos*: Curiosity, Scholarship and Spiritualism in Turkish Histories by Johannes Löwenklau (1541–1594)", *Acta Comeniana*, No. 25, 2011: 25–45.

crafted and empirically nuanced history written by Europeans, but extending far beyond the limits of Europe.

Yet, these large-scale histories were certainly not welcomed everywhere, nor did they ever become the dominant current in the early modern period. For example, the Russian court of Ivan IV in the sixteenth century certainly witnessed a great expansion in historical writing, with the core work being the so-called *Litsevoi svod* ("Personal Collection") created in the 1570s, in the form of a chronicle with drawings. Of its ten volumes, the first three dealt with a form of universal history, and drew heavily on the earlier *Khronograf*, while the following six volumes treated the centuries of Russian history extending from 1114 to 1569, and the last volume eventually dealt with Ivan's own reign. But this history writing remained heavily circumscribed, not merely on account of its dependence on earlier Byzantine sources, but also because – unlike in the Polish or even Hungarian cases – it would seem that Russian historians of the period remained largely indifferent to the explicit use of great compendia and works produced elsewhere such as those of Ramusio, Oviedo or Barros. Yet, once again, we cannot assume this to be a generalised indifference across the intellectual culture, for as it has been argued from a study of cartography, for example, even chorographic works consistently describe Muscovy as "in between", with the referents being Europe, Asia and America, or Europe and China. In other words, history was only one form through which knowledge of the world at large could be accumulated and also filtered.

A somewhat similar argument can be made for China. Here too, there is certainly little doubt on the nature of transformations in terms of geographical knowledge, and numerous works exist for example on the reception in both China and Japan of the Jesuit Matteo Ricci's "Map of All the Countries of the World" of 1602. In the Japanese case, a scholar of the subject has written "it is no exaggeration to say that almost fifty percent of all world maps published in Japan during the seclusion [after 1640] were, directly or indirectly, Ricci's progeny".[21] In the case of Ming China, written reflections in a xenological mode suggest that, while knowledge of the distant world and its past was available to literati, they did not choose for the most part to shift the terms of either existing dynastic histories or universal histories to

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[21] Shintaro Ayusawa, "Geography and Japanese Knowledge of World Geography", *Monumenta Nipponica*, vol. XIX, Nos. 3–4, 1964: 275–94. For a more general discussion, see Marcia Yonemoto, *Mapping Early Modern Japan: Space, Place, and Culture in the Tokugawa Period (1603–1868)* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003).

accommodate this knowledge. The cartographic work of the Jesuit Giulio Alenio, produced in the early 1620s, certainly provided the Chinese literati with a rather idealised picture of Europe, and also attempted in passing to cover the Indian Ocean world, Africa, and even Peru and Mexico. Yet, whatever Alenio's influence on geographers, Chinese historians tended as a rule to regard his work with disdain and suspicion, and the *Ming Annals* do not bear many traces of this sort of knowledge. On the other hand, the textual knowledge associated with the fifteenth-century Ming expeditions of Zheng He was copied into collections compiled in the 1520s or 1530s, and continued to be printed even in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Thus, early Ming direct knowledge concerning India, Sri Lanka and even Mecca was certainly not forgotten, but rather constantly reproduced, while materials concerning the western and southwestern fringes of China were also gradually being collected. This may be contrasted with the relative indifference shown by Chinese historians – as opposed to their geographers and cartographers – to the history of Europe and, *a fortiori*, America.

To conclude, the early modern centuries saw a substantial transformation at various scales and levels in terms of historiographical practice. This chapter has largely concerned itself with only one of these: that of history written on a larger scale than that of a single kingdom, or polity. To be sure, defenders of the sort of "perfect history" practised in France around 1600 usually looked with disdain at such large histories, preferring the comfortable frameworks that they had inherited. But even they were aware that there were other modes of history that were emerging around them, corresponding to the new geographies that those same centuries had thrown up. Now, debates in the past few decades on the origins of "world history" or "global history" have often tended to look back no further than the early twentieth century, and the writings of recent historians such as Arnold Toynbee and Oswald Spengler. A few other writers, more ambitious in their horizons, have taken matters as far back as the German and Scandinavian contributions to the Enlightenment of the late eighteenth century, in the form of philologically inclined *Aufklärers* such as August Ludwig Schlözer, known for his prolific contributions to a form of *Weltgeschichte*.[22] Yet by a striking paradox, a mere generation after Schlözer, Hegel in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* (*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, 1830–1; published 1837),

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[22] Peter Hanns Reill, *The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 85–8.

famously wrote that "though the recent discoveries of the treasures of Indian Literature have shown us what a reputation the Hindoos have acquired in Geometry, Astronomy, and Algebra (. . .) we find the department of *History* altogether neglected, or rather non-existent. For History requires Understanding – the power of looking at an object in an independent objective light, and comprehending it in its rational connection with other objects. Those peoples therefore are alone capable of History, and of prose generally, who have arrived at that period of development (and can make that their starting point) at which individuals comprehend their own existence as independent, *i.e.,* possess self-consciousness." By means of such sweeping judgments, and furthermore by generalising such views to much of the non-European world, Hegel and those who followed in his footsteps not only wiped the slate clean with regard to the complex historiographical experiments of the previous three centuries, but inaugurated a form of amnesia that melded all too well with the cultural presuppositions of the high European imperialism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[23] The fog of this amnesia is yet to be fully dispersed.

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[23] See, for example, Ranajit Guha, *History at the Limit of World-History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

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Microhistory and world history

CARLO GINZBURG

Microhistory, conceived as an analytical approach to history, far from being opposed to world history, may in fact be regarded as an indispensable tool of it.[1] I will try to develop this point through a case study. But a preliminary scrutiny of the two terms involved – "world history", "microhistory" – is needed.

The potential of microhistory

1. Two related phenomena shape our approach to world history today: the enormous expansion of the human species and the growing fragility of the natural environment. Since the world is threatened, world history must be written as if we were "in a moment of danger".[2] But "history" itself, in its double meaning, is becoming more and more fragile. On the one hand, the ambivalent potentialities of biological engineering open up barely imaginable perspectives, which in a not too distant future might significantly affect the human species and its deeds (*res gestae*) as well as the fabric of social life. On the other, a globalized world challenges the historian's craft (*historia rerum gestarum*) on many levels. More or less disguised ethnocentrically oriented narratives look unacceptable, but analytic approaches based on first-hand evidence are incompatible with the breadth and scope of the enquiry. One may object that a solution exists: comparison. However, Marc Bloch's 1928 essay calling for comparative history looks, retrospectively, to be an unfulfilled

[1] L. Putnam, "To Study the Fragments/whole: Microhistory and the Atlantic World", *Journal of Social History* 39 (2006): 615–30; F. de Vivo, "Prospect or Refuge? Microhistory, History on the Large Scale", *Cultural and Social History* 7 (2010): 387–97; F. Trivellato, "Is there a Future for Italian Microhistory in the Age of Global History?", *California Italian Studies* 2 (2011).

[2] W. Benjamin, "Ueber den Begriff der Geschichte, VI", in G. Bonola and M. Ranchetti (eds.), *Sul Concetto di Storia* (Turin: Einaudi, 1997), p. 26.

promise.[3] Bloch, a sharp critic of erudite scholars who knew more and more about less and less, was also aware that knowing less and less about more and more would not have been an acceptable alternative. "There is only one method in social anthropology, the comparative method – and that is impossible", Evans-Pritchard once famously said. Thus neither comparison nor microhistory should be taken for granted as conceptual tools.

2. In *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739), the Scottish philosopher David Hume analyzed the moral obligation generated by promise, which he regarded as "one of the most mysterious and incomprehensible operations that can possibly be imagin'd, and may even be compar'd to *transubstantiation*, or *holy orders*, where a certain form of words, along with a certain intention, changes entirely the nature of an external object, and even of a human nature". Hume justified this seemingly far-fetched analogy in the following terms: "as those other monstrous doctrines are merely priestly inventions, and have no public interest in view, they are less disturb'd in their progress by new obstacles; and it must be own'd, that, after the first absurdity, they follow more directly the current of reason and good sense".[4] In referring to theology as a cognitive model whose consistency was due to its lack of contact with the real world, Hume was possibly echoing, in inverted form, an argument put forward by Galileo in his *Dialogo dei massimi sistemi*: a mathematical scientist (*filosofo geometra*) who wants to verify his formal models in everyday reality must take away material obstacles.[5] Likewise, in order to identify promise in its purest form, Hume took away the material obstacles of the contradictory effects that promise generates in "the interest of society", looking at the theologians' "monstrous doctrines" as a formal model.

Hume took Galileo as a model; contemporary historians (and particularly microhistorians) may take Hume as a model. But rather than referring to

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[3] M. Bloch, "Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européennes", in Ch.-E. Perrin (ed.), *Mélanges historiques* (Paris: SEVPEN, 1963), vol. I, pp. 16–40.

[4] D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, E. C. Mossner (ed.) (Middlesex: Harmondsworth, 1969), III, v, pp. 576–7. J. L. Austin opened his lectures on the performative dimension of language saying: "I have not found attention paid to it specifically", J. L. Austin, "How to do things with words", in J. O. Urmson and M. Sbisà (eds.), 2nd edn. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 1. Austin was of course familiar with Hume's thought; see p. 29.

[5] G. Galilei, *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems – Ptolemaic and Copernican*, S. Drake (trans.), A. Einstein (intr.), (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1953), p. 207; G. Galilei, *Dialogo dei massimi sistemi*, L. Sosio (ed.) (Turin: Einaudi, 1970), p. 252; L. Congiunti, "Il metodo di Galileo", *Verifiche* 23 (1994): 97–124.

theology, they may refer to a philosophical tradition that reworked theology in a secular perspective.[6]

3. In his early work *On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians* (1710), the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico pointed out that mathematics and geometry, being based on human fictions, are comparable to God's knowledge, since in them *"verum et factum convertuntur"* (what is true and what is made converge). As a general rule, Vico remarked, "the criterion and rule of the true is to have made it". Therefore, physics cannot be regarded as true knowledge, as the objects of their enquiries cannot be truly known by human beings.[7]

This idea was taken from the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, whose Latin works Vico must have read with ambivalent feelings.[8] Mathematics and geometry, Hobbes argued, can be the object of rigorous demonstration insofar as they are the result of human construction. Likewise, justice and good, as objects of politics and ethics, can be an object of knowledge since we made them.[9] Vico's initial reluctance to accept the last point can be attributed to his rejection of Hobbes's mechanistic philosophy. We may imagine Vico pondering over the opening page of *Leviathan* in Latin, which Hobbes had translated from his own English:

> Nature (the Art whereby God hath made and governes the World) is by the Art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an Artificial Animal (...). For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man.[10]

Society as an artefact is also at the very centre of Vico's *Scienza nuova*, but with a major difference, due to the intervention of divine Providence: "for out of the passions of men each bent on his private advantage, for the sake of

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[6] E. De Negri, *La teologia di Lutero: Rivelazione e dialettica* (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1967).
[7] G. Vico, *De antiquissima Italorum sapientia*, M. Sanna (ed.) (Rome: Ed. di Storia e Litteratura, 2005), p. 26; see I. Berlin, "A Note on Vico's Concept of Knowledge", in G. G. Tagliacozzo and H. V. White (eds.), *Giambattista Vico: an International Symposium* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969), p. 371.
[8] M. H. Fisch, in his comments on G. Vico, *The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico*, M. H. Fisch and T. G. Bergin (trans.) (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2nd edn. 1963), p. 211, n. 39, argued, against F. Nicolini, that Vico "must have known Hobbes's Latin works". This has been proven by N. Abbagnano, in his introduction to G. Vico, *La scienza nuova e opere scelte*, N. Abbagnano (ed.) (Turin: Classici UTET, 1952), pp. 14–15; see E. Garin, *Dal Rinascimento all'Illuminismo: studi e ricerche,* 2nd revised edn. (Florence: Le Lettere, 1993), pp. 137–55, 141–4.
[9] T. Hobbes, *De Homine* (Amsterdam: Apud Ioannem Blaeu, 1668), I, 62. Extra info: x (*Opera philosophica*).
[10] T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, C. B. Macpherson (ed.) (London, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p. 81. (= *Opera philosophica*, III, 21).

which they would live like wild beasts [*bestioni*] in the wilderness, it [Providence] has made the civil institutions by which they may live in human society".[11] This emphasis on Providence, evident since the first version of *Scienza nuova* (1725), was due to a large extent to Vico's encounter with the Italian translation of Bossuet's *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* (1681) (as he pointed out in his *Autobiography*, Vico had no French).[12] Bossuet's chronology left an indelible mark – a fingerprint – on Vico's chronology, as both gave the year 2737 after the world's creation as a date for Ninus, the Assyrian king, founder of the city of Nineveh.[13] But Vico's Providence had no overt Christian overtones: in the *Scienza nuova* Jesus has no role whatsoever.

The Hobbesian overtones of Vico's "bestioni" have been repeatedly stressed. But Hobbes is also indirectly evoked at a crucial juncture, to explain the passage of *bestioni*, early brutish humans, to civilization:

> In such fashion the first men of the gentile nations, children of nascent mankind, created things according to their own ideas. But this creation was infinitely different from that of God. For God, in his purest intelligence, knows things, and, by knowing them, creates them; but they, in their robust ignorance, did it by virtue of a wholly corporeal imagination. And because it was quite corporeal, they did it with marvelous sublimity; a sublimity such and so great that it excessively perturbed the very persons who by imagining did the creating (*che fingendo le si criavano*) for which they were called "poets", which is the Greek for "creators" (. . .). Of this nature of human institutions it remained an eternal property, expressed in a noble phrase of Tacitus, that frightened men vainly "no sooner imagine than they believe" (*fingunt simul creduntque*).[14]

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[11] G. Vico, *The New Science: Unabridged Translation of the Third Edition (1744) with the Addition of "Practic of New Science"*, T. Goddard Bergin and M. H. Fisch (trans.) (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 62 (= G. Vico, *Princìpi di scienza nuova*, A. Battistini (ed.) (Milan: Oscar Mondadori, 2011), paragraph 131; henceforth *Scienza*).

[12] J. B. Bossuet, *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* (Amsterdam: E. Roger, 1710), p. 17; (*Discorso sopra la storia universale. . ., trasportato dalla lingua francese all'italiana da Selvaggio Canturani* [i.e. Arcangelo Agostini, a Carmelite friar] [Venice, 1712]); on Vico's "Provvidenza" and Bossuet's "Providence", see B. Croce, *La filosofia di Giambattista Vico* (Bari: Laterza, 1933), p. 120.

[13] Bossuet, *Discorso*, p. 21; see G. Vico, *Scienza*, pp. 84–5 (and already Vico, *De universi iuris uno principio. . .* [1720], in G. Vico, *Opere giuridiche*, P. Cristofolini (ed.) (Florence: Sansoni, 1974), p. 389; this convergence (but not its implications) has been noted by P. Rossi in *Le sterminate antichità* (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1999), pp. 464–5; the same date for Ninus (2737 after the world's creation) was given by J. Usher, *Annales Veteris et Novi Testamenti, a prima mundi origine deducti* (Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1673), p. 24, which is probably the source of Bossuet's chronology (I am indebted to Carmine Ampolo for this suggestion); Vico's emphasis on the unintended consequences of human actions must have also been inspired by Bossuet: see *Discorso*, pp. 459–60.

[14] Vico, *The New Science*, p. 117 (= Vico, *Scienza*, pp. 204–5 [par. 376]).

"Fingendo le si criavano": the Latin verb *fingere*, anticipating Tacitus's powerful line, means "to mould" as well as "to feign", and therefore emphasizes artifice.[15] In the case of those primitive human beings, "poeti" – etymologically "makers" – the act of making is intertwined with self-deception. *Bestioni* became humans by imagining that a false divinity, Jove, watched them and taught them modesty and awe, after which they refrained from copulating in the open air like beasts.[16] Vico shares with Hobbes the idea that society is an artificial construction, which originates from awe.[17]

4. "But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so remote from ourselves, there shines the eternal and never failing light of a truth beyond all question: that the world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and that its principles are therefore to be found within the modifications of our own human mind": Vico's solemn words opened a path that led to a new approach to human history.[18] Although he was departing from Hobbes, he was still taking inspiration from him. The motto *Nosce te ipsum* (Know yourself), one reads in the first *Scienza nuova,* taught the inhabitants of Athens "to meditate upon the nature of their own mind, realizing that human reason is shared by everybody".[19] At the very beginning of *Leviathan* Hobbes commented upon the same motto:

> *Nosce teipsum, Read thy self:* (. . .) the characters of mans heart, blotted and confounded as they are, with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible onely to him that searcheth hearts. And though by mens actions wee do discover their designe sometimes; yet to do it without comparing them with our own (. . .) is to decypher without a key.[20]

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[15] Vico relies upon Varro, *On the Latin Language*, VIII, R. G. Kent (trans.) (London: W. Heinemann; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 77–8.

[16] Vico, *Scienza*, pp. 206–7, par. 379; see also Vico, *Scienza*, pp. 312, par. 554.

[17] A. Funkenstein, *Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century* (Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 280 (alluding, independently, to *De homine*, x, quoted by N. Abbagnano, see note 8); for a different reading, see S. Landucci, *I filosofi e i selvaggi* (Bari: Laterza, 1972), p. 294 and n. 66; on Tacitus's passage as a key for understanding the Vico–Hobbes relationship, see C. Ginzburg, "Fear Reverence Terror: Reading Hobbes Today", Max Weber Lecture Series, European University Institute, S. Domenico di Fiesole, 2008, p. 8, n. 22. (developed by P. Alarcón, "El temor reverencial: un principio político en Hobbes y Vico", *Cuadernos sobre Vico* 23 (2009), 24 (2010): 91–111).

[18] Vico, *The New Science*, p. 96–7 (= Vico, *Scienza*, p. 541–2); see Berlin, "A Note", pp. 370, 373.

[19] G. Vico, *The First New Science*, L. Pompa (Cambridge University Press, 2002); G. Vico, "La scienza nuova prima" (II, LXVI) in *Opere filosofiche*, P. Cristofolini (ed.) (Florence: Sansoni, 1971), pp. 255–6; on "Nosce te ipsum", see already Vico's "orazione inaugurale" in *Opere filosofiche*, p. 709.

[20] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, pp. 82–3.

Reading hearts: Hobbes developed this metaphor (which reworked the traditional one of reading the book of nature) by adding references to "blotted and counfounded characters" and to a "key" needed for decyphering". Vico went a step further, by taking Hobbes's metaphor literally: to decipher the world of history ("questo mondo civile") distant in time and space, written in jotted down (*scribillati*) characters, one must learn its language, relying upon "philology" in a broad sense, which included antiquarianism.[21] Hobbes regarded "histories" as mere collections of facts; Vico's "new science" has been retrospectively identified with historical anthropology.[22] For both of them, the ultimate test of their "reading" was provided by an inward-looking, mental experiment; but their respective aims were different, if not opposite.[23] Hobbes's aim was to find in oneself the same passions read in other hearts: "yet, when I shall have set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be only to consider, if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of Doctrine, admitteth no other Demonstration."[24] Vico's aim was an act of mental appropriation ("we will have a true experiment if things conceived here will become identical with the inner substance of our soul"), which consisted in getting rid of anachronism, of "our tendency to imagine them relying upon our present, rather than their own very ancient ideas".[25] The principles of Vico's new science had to be found "within the *modifications* of our own human mind".[26]

5. Hobbes's and Vico's convergence on the issue of thought experiments can be easily explained. Vico had access to Hobbes's *Dialogus physicus, sive de natura aëris* (1661), an attack on Boyle's experiments based on the air pump, which were dismissed as wrong and philosophically irrelevant. In his *Autobiography* Vico seemingly followed in Hobbes's

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[21] Vico, *De universi iuris*, in *Opere giuridiche*, p. 387. In ancient Greek (Maria Luisa Catoni reminded me) *stoicheia* meant "first elements" as well as "letters of the alphabet".

[22] On Hobbes and "histories", see S. Shapin and S. Schaffer, *Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental Life* (Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 102, 108; Berlin speaks of "anthropological historicism" in "A Note", p. 372.

[23] A. Funkenstein, "Natural Science and Social Theory: Hobbes, Spinoza, and Vico", in G. Tagliacozzo (ed.), *Giambattista Vico's Science of Humanity* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 187–214.

[24] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 83; see D. W. Hanson, "The Meaning of 'Demonstration' in Hobbes's Science", *History of Political Thought*, XI (1990), pp. 578–626.

[25] Vico, *The First New Science*, p. 202.

[26] Vico, *The First New Science*, p. 96; K. Löwith argues that "modificazioni" do not imply diversity ("'Verum et factum convertuntur...', in A. Corsano (ed.), *Omaggio a Vico* (Naples: Morano, 1968), pp. 75–6, but Vico's emphasis on philology necessarily implies diversity.

footsteps, rejecting Boyle and his "experimental physics . . . for it contributed nothing to the philosophy of man".[27]

But here another divergence emerges. In the dedication to the *Dialogus*, Hobbes considers "ingenuity" (*ingenium*) – i.e. Boyle's experiments – as inferior to "method" (*ars*), i.e., his own philosophical approach to nature, based on the study of motion.[28] In another passage he makes a similar opposition, pointing out that the air pump's constructor was "a mechanic, not a philosopher".[29] Vico, by contrast, notes in *De antiquissima* that in Latin "ingenium" and "natura" are synonymous, and follows this with a rhetorical question: "Is this due to the fact that, like nature generates physical objects, human ingenuity (*ingenium*) generates mechanical objects, and like God is the artisan of nature, man is the God of artificial things?"

Here Vico's principle *verum et factum convertuntur* was reworked with a variation: *verum et* fictum *convertuntur*. Theory and practice are contiguous: "Therefore geometry and arythmetic, which teach all this, are the most investigated sciences; and their best practitioners are called in Italian *ingegnieri*".[30]

6. Vico's posthumous European fame began with the French historian Jules Michelet's abridged translation of the third edition of *Scienza nuova* (1827), followed a few years later (1835) by a selection which included the *Autobiography*, the *De antiquissima* and other texts.[31] In Michelet's words, Vico announced that "le monde social (*il mondo civile*) est certainement l'ouvrage des hommes".[32] It seems unlikely that a young German exile living in Paris in 1843–5, with his mind full of Hegelian and neo-Hegelian philosophy – Karl Marx – could have refrained from leafing through a book entitled *Principes de la philosophie de l'histoire* (1827), although he had no particular sympathy for its editor. Marx certainly read (or re-read) Vico in the new, nearly complete translation made by Cristina Trivulzio, Princess of Belgioioso – though

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[27] Vico, *Vita di Giambattista Vico scritta de se medesimo*, in *Opere filosofiche*, p. 14 (*The Autobiography*, p. 128).
[28] Shapin and Schaffer, *Leviathan*, p. 347; see Hobbes, *Dialogus*.
[29] Hobbes, *Dialogus*, p. 31.
[30] Vico, *De antiquissima Italorum sapientia*, in *Opere filosofiche*, p. 83.
[31] J. Michelet (trans.), *Principes de la Philosophie de l'Histoire, traduits de la Scienza Nuova de J. B. Vico, et précédés d'un discours sur le système et la vie de l'auteur* (Paris: J. Renouard, 1827); J. Michelet (trans.), *Mémoires de Vico, écrits par lui même, suivis de quelques opuscules, lettres, etc.: précédés d'une introduction sur sa vie et ses ouvrages* (Brussels: Société belge de librairie, 1837); both works were republished in J. Michelet, *Oeuvres*, I (Brussels: Melines, Cans et Campagnie, 1840), whose frontispiece, echoing *Scienza nuova*'s, suggested the author's self-identification with the Neapolitan philosopher.
[32] Michelet, *Principes*, p. 76.

published without her name – entitled *La Science nouvelle* (1844).[33] In a letter to Ferdinand Lassalle (1862), Marx transcribed the front page and a few passages of this new translation, which he recommended; he must have had a copy of *La Science nouvelle* on his desk at that moment.[34]

But did Marx read it as soon as it was published in 1844 – that is, before writing his *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845)? This question has been raised, and answered in the negative.[35] The critique of Feuerbach's philosophy, developed in the *Theses*, does not seem to imply a reading of Vico's work. But the issue might be re-examined in light of a famous footnote in the first volume of Marx's *Capital* (1867).[36] An allusion to John Wyatt's spinning machine (1735) in the text ignited a quick, compressed, nearly frantic chain of reasoning in the note:

1. Spinning machines probably existed already in Italy.
2. A "critical history of technique", which does not exist yet, would show that eighteenth-century inventions were not due to single individuals.
3. Darwin has shown interest in the "history of natural technology" and in the "organs of plants and animals, which serve as instruments of production for sustaining life". A rhetorical question follows: "Does not the history of the productive organs of man as a social being, of organs that are the material basis of all social organisation, deserve equal attention?"
4. "Such a history would be easier to compile, since, as Vico says, human history differs from natural history in this, that we have made the former, but not the latter."
5. Technology "discloses man's mode of dealing with Nature (. . .) and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of [man's] social relations, and of the mental conceptions that flow from them".

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[33] Vico, *La Science nouvelle: traduite par l'auteur de l'essai sur la formation du dogme catholique* (Paris: J. Renouard, 1844); see G. Mastroianni, "Marx e la Belgioioso", *Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana* 2 (2012): 406–26.

[34] F. Lassalle and K. Marx, *Der Briefwechsel zwischen Lassalle und Marx: nebst Briefen von Friedrich Engels und Jenny Marx an Lassalle und von Karl Marx an Gräfin Sophie Hatzfeldt*, G. Mayer (ed.) (Stuttgart: Dt. Verl.-Anst., 1922), pp. 386–7; A. Pipa, "Marx's Relationship to Vico: A Philological Approach", in G. Tagliacozzo (ed.), *Vico and Marx: Affinities and Contrasts* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1983), pp. 290–325, argued, unconvincingly, that Marx's praise of Vico in his letter to Lassalle is ironic.

[35] E. Kamenka, "Vico and Marxism", in G. Tagliacozzo (ed.), *Vico and Marx: Affinities and Contrasts*, pp. 137–43.

[36] K. Marx and K. Korsch, *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Oekonomie* (Berlin: G. Kiepenheuer, 1932), p. 355, note 4; see Korsch's comments in the introduction, pp. 7–8.

6. "Every history of religion, even, that fails to take account of this material basis, is uncritical." True "materialistic method" which develops religious formations from "the actual relations of life" is opposed to "the abstract materialism of natural science".[37]

In their youthful, unpublished *German Ideology* (1845) Marx and Engels had identified the difference between animals and men in the latter's ability "to *produce* the ways of sustaining their life".[38] Now, under the impact of Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* (1859) Marx extended this ability to animals and plants as well, comparing their organs to "instruments of production". But how did the history of technology lead to Vico's idea that "man makes history"? In the aforementioned letter to Lassalle, Marx quoted from Belgioioso's anonymous translation a remark on ancient Roman jurisprudence as "very poetic (*très poétique*) since it assumed as true facts which were not, and the other way round".[39] The implications of the word "poétique", and the contiguity between *factum* and *fictum* – in the double sense of *fingere*, "to forge" – emerged from the passage of Vico's *Scienza nuova* quoted in English translation above: "les premiers hommes des nations des Gentils . . . appellés *poètes*, mot qui signifie en grec *créateurs* . . . effrayés en vain *fingunt simul creduntque*".[40] Both making and faking (or self-deceiving) were identified as turning points in the civilization process.

Marx might have also come across a praise of technology in a passage of Vico's *De antiquissima*, which Michelet (1835) translated as follows: "Est-ce parce que de même que la nature engendre les choses physiques, de même l'*ingenium* humain engendre les choses mécaniques? En sorte que Dieu est l'artisan de la nature, et l'homme le dieu de l'artificiel?"[41] The possibility that Marx read Vico's *De antiquissima* may seem far-fetched. But a reference to that text, possibly mediated by Marx, emerges from the recollections of his son-in-law, Paul Lafargue: "Vico said: 'things are corporeal only for God, who knows everything; for men, who know only the outside, they are two-dimensional'. Marx conceived things like God."[42] The passage, in

[37] See S. Moore's and E. Aveling's translation: www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/ 1867-c1/ (with minimal changes).
[38] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie*, p. 8.
[39] G. Vico, *Scienza*, p. 559, par. 1036.
[40] G. Vico, *La Science nouvelle*, pp. 102–3 (= *Scienza*, pp. 204–5, par. 376).
[41] Michelet (trans.), *Mémoires de Vico*, p. 292.
[42] P. Lafargue, "Persönliche Erinnerungen an Karl Marx", in *Mohr und General: Erinnerungen an Marx und Engels* (Berlin: Dietz, 1965), p. 331; Fisch quoted Lafargue's passage, mentioning "Vico's theory of knowledge" (Vico, *Autobiography*, p. 107).

Michelet's translation, read: "l'objet est un solide relativement à Dieu qui comprend toutes choses, une surface pour l'homme qui ne comprend que le dehors".[43]

So when did Marx first come across Vico's writings? At the end of *Capital*'s footnote dealing with Darwin and Vico a reworking of the fourth thesis on Feuerbach suddenly emerges: "Every history of religion (. . .) that fails to take account of this material basis, is uncritical etc."[44] Why did that youthful, unpublished text re-emerge twenty years later in a completely different context? Did Vico's name bring back an earlier reflection, a fragment that belonged to the same chronological layer of Marx's intellectual development?

7. These questions are perhaps unanswerable, but they must be raised, because Marx's footnote played a fundamental role in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century interpretations of Vico. The element which came to the forefront was society as an artefact – although with no reference to Hobbes (whose work, as we saw, inspired Vico on this issue). In his lectures on Marx's economic materialism, delivered to a socialist audience in 1884, Paul Lafargue opposed two *milieux*: the cosmic, or natural, and the artificial, "made by human art", which had been analyzed, respectively, by Darwin and Marx – a Marx implicitly inspired by Vico.[45] A decade later, in an exchange with Jean Jaurès, Lafargue stressed the continuity between Vico and Marx.[46] In a *fin-de-siècle* environment impregnated with Marxism, Vico's work had become the focus of feverish exchanges. In the French journal *Le Devenir social* Georges Sorel, a member of the journal's editorial board along with Paul Lafargue, published an essay on Vico, based on Michelet's abridged translation.[47] Once again, Sorel started from the footnote of Marx's *Capital*, as well as from Lafargue's opposition between natural and artificial *milieux*.[48]

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[43] Michelet (trans.), *De l'antique sagesse de l'Italie*, in *Mémoires de Vico*, p. 237; Vico, *Opere filosofiche*, p. 63.

[44] See www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm (W. Lough, trans.).

[45] P. Lafargue, *Le matérialisme économique de Karl Marx: I. L'idéalisme et le matérialisme dans l'histoire; II. Le milieu naturel: théorie darwinienne; III. Le milieu artificiel: théorie de la lutte des classes* (Paris: Henry Oriol, 1884). In Part I, p. 5, Vico is favourably opposed to Bossuet.

[46] A.-M.-J.-J. Jaurès and P. Lafargue, *Idéalisme & Matérialisme dans la conception de l'histoire: conférence de Jean Jaurès et réponse de Paul Lafargue* (Paris: S.I., 1895), p. 18.

[47] G. Sorel, *Étude sur Vico et autres textes*, A.-S. Menasseyre (ed.) (Paris: H. Champion, 2007); G. Pagliano Ungari, "Vico et Sorel", *Archives de Philosophie* 40 (1977): 267–81.

[48] In her introduction (Sorel, *Etude sur Vico*, p. 48, note 73), Menasseyre misses the Vichian overtones in Lafargue's text.

The year before (1895), also in *Le Devenir social*, Antonio Labriola had provided a much more profound approach to Vico in an essay that enthralled the young Trotsky, jailed in Odessa.[49] "Man is the experimental animal *par excellence*" Labriola wrote, "therefore he has a history, or rather that is why he makes his own history".[50] A few pages later Labriola unfolded some implications of this elusive sentence by asking a rhetorical question: "And had not Vico himself, a century before Morgan, turned the whole history into a process which man performs by himself, as it were through a continuous experimentation, i.e. discovering language, religions, manners and law?"[51]

History as a process, Labriola argued, implies discovery through experimentation, but historical knowledge implies experiment as well. On both sides (*historia* and *historia rerum gestarum*) men act in an artificial environment, produced by themselves, in which experiments can take place. In this perspective historical materialism and empirical sciences converge: "Historical materialism ... starts from *praxis*: it is a theory of man as a worker, and regards science itself as a work. In this way it fulfills the meaning which is implicit in empirical sciences: with the experiment we get closer to things in their making, and we realize that things themselves are a kind of making, a production."[52]

But Labriola's reading of Marx was intertwined with his reading of Vico. Understanding the attitudes of men who lived in the past is a difficult endeavour: we need "to reproduce within ourselves" the conditions which made the past possible. This means to acquire the interpretive abilities of "the linguist, the philologist, the critic, the prehistorian" – scholars who, through a long exercise, developed a kind of "artificial consciousness".[53] This slow, painful approach is as remote as possible from both an empathic identification with the past and its resurrection. Interpreting history in a materialist perspective means "to remake in our mind, with

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[49] A. Labriola, "En mémoire du Manifeste du parti communiste"(1895), later included in A. Labriola and G. Sorel, *Essais sur la conception matérialiste de l'histoire* (Paris: V. Giard and E. Brière, 1897): a book read by Trotsky (*Ma vie* [Paris: Gallimard, 1953], pp. 148, 152); see A. Labriola, *Scritti filosofici e politici*, F. Sbarberi (ed.) (Turin: G. Einaudi, 1973); A. Pons, "Da Vico a Labriola", *Bollettino del Centro di Studi Vichiani* 17 (1987): 181–93.

[50] Labriola, *Scritti*, vol. II, p. 511; id., A. Labriola, *Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History*, C. H. Kerr, (trans.) (Chicago: C. H. Kerr and Co., 1904), p. 64, modified.

[51] Labriola, *Scritti*, vol. II, p. 519; (Labriola, *Essays*, p. 76, modified).

[52] Labriola, *Scritti*, vol. II, p. 720; (Labriola, "Discorrendo di socialismo e filosofia", May 28, 1897).

[53] Labriola, *Scritti*, vol. II, p. 756; (Labriola, "Discorrendo di socialismo e filosofia", July 2, 1897).

method, the genesis and the complexity of the human life in its development through the centuries".[54]

8. Reading Marx through Vico, reading Vico through Marx. In his youthful book *La filosofia di Marx* (1899) the Italian philosopher Giovanni Gentile made a distinctive contribution to this double, intertwined approach. Gentile's translation (the first ever) of Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach* was introduced by a commentary interpreting the notion of *praxis* through the lens of Vico's *verum ipsum factum*: we know what we make.[55] Gentile referred, quoting Labriola, to mental experiments – but then distanced himself from Labriola in reinterpreting Marx's *praxis* in idealistic terms, as spiritual activity. Retrospectively, one can identify in this move the precondition of Gentile's mature philosophy, a radical form of idealism that posited thinking as a pure act.[56]

The impact of Gentile's book (which Lenin regarded as one of the most remarkable written by a non-Marxist interpreter) has been repeatedly discussed.[57] The case of Benedetto Croce, Gentile's close friend and associate for many years, and to whom he dedicated *La filosofia di Marx*, is particularly relevant here.

9. At the very beginning of his *Theory and History of Historiography*, Benedetto Croce argued that "all history is contemporary history", a thesis that has become widely accepted. Its meaning seems transparent: historians approach the past starting from the present, asking questions related to the time they live in.[58] But this was only one side of Croce's argument. The other, more esoteric side was articulated as follows:

> But if we think and speak rigorously, the term "contemporaneous" can be applied only to that history which comes into being immediately in the act which is being accomplished, as consciousness of that act (. . .) just because this, like every act of the spirit, is outside time (of before and after) and is formed "at the same time" as the act to which it is linked.[59]

[54] Labriola, *Scritti*, vol. II, p. 535; (Labriola, *Essays*, p. 99, slightly modified).
[55] G. Gentile, *La filosofia di Marx* (1899) (Florence: Le Lettere, 2003), pp. 71–4.
[56] See G. Gentile, "L'atto del pensare come atto puro", *Annuario della Biblioteca Filosofica di Palermo* (1912): 27–42, 42.
[57] Gentile mentioned Lenin's praise in the 1937 reprint of his book (*La filosofia*, p. 9); on the impact of Gentile's thought upon Gramsci, see: C. Riechers, *Antonio Gramsci: il marxismo in Italia* (Naples: Thélème, 1975); G. Bergami, *Il giovane Gramsci e il marxismo (1911–1918)* (Milan: Feltrinelli economica, 1977); S. Natoli, *Giovanni Gentile filosofo europeo* (Milan: Bollati Boringhieri, 1992), pp. 94–109.
[58] E. H. Carr, *What is History?* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961) contributed to the reception of this idea, ultimately inspired by Hegel.
[59] B. Croce, *Teoria e storia della storiografia*, 2nd revised edn. (Bari: G. Laterza, 1920), p. 3 (= D. Ainslie [trans.], *Theory and History of Historiography* [London: G. C. Harrap, 1921],

The idealistic flavour of this passage (first published in 1912) is unmistakable. The act of thinking the past makes the past present – but this present has no chronological meaning, since the act of thinking is, by definition, beyond time. Here Croce was following in the footsteps of Gentile. In 1913 a theoretical divergence between the two thinkers emerged, and later a bitter political feud, due to Gentile's support of Fascism, put an end to their friendship. In the early stages of their debate, Gentile referred to Croce's thesis of "history as contemporary history" as an echo of his own thought – although, he remarked, his friend had refrained from taking the decisive step, identifying in the act of thinking "history and historiography, known and knowing, reality and knowledge, and therefore practice and theory".[60] Gentile's impatience is understandable; he was a much more radical thinker than Croce. The ultimate (and ultimately theological) conclusion of Gentile's philosophy, which he labelled "pure act", was self-creation (*autoctisis*).[61]

All this may seem very abstruse, and utterly remote from the historian's everyday practice. But this story has a sequel, focusing on R. G. Collingwood, the British philosopher and archaeologist, and a concept that played a crucial role in his thought: "re-enactment". This concept has been widely discussed over the last several decades; one book devoted to it dismisses "the common wisdom that he [Collingwood] was little more than a popularizer of Italian ideas".[62] But the rejection of this view often obscures Collingwood's intensive dialogue with Italian idealist philosophy.[63] Collingwood's notion of "re-enactment" was deeply indebted to Croce's idea that history "comes into being immediately in the act which is being accomplished, as consciousness of that act". But was this idea Croce's, or Gentile's? As we have seen, this issue and

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p. 11, slightly modified); an earlier version of this chapter: "Storia, cronaca e false storie", *Atti della Accademia Pontaniana* 42, ser. 2, 17 (1912): 1–32.

[60] The debate between Croce and Gentile is available in A. Romanò (ed.), *La cultura italiana del '900 attraverso le riviste* (Turin: Einaudi, 1960), vol. III, pp. 595–605 (see also p. 616).

[61] G. Gentile, *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act*, W. W. Carr (trans.) (London: Macmillan and Co., 1922).

[62] See for instance W. H. Dray, *History as Re-enactment: R. G. Collingwood's Idea of History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 26–7; H. Saari, "Re-enactment: a study in R. G. Collingwood's Philosophy of History" (Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 1984); see W. J. van der Dussen, *History as Science: the Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981).

[63] In his *Autobiography* (1939) Collingwood did not mention this issue: see A. Momigliano, "La storia antica in Inghilterra" [1945], in *Sesto contributo* (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1980), vol. II, p. 761; H. S. Harris's introduction to G. Gentile, *Genesis and Structure of Society* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1966), pp. 14–20; but see B. Croce, "In commemorazione di un amico inglese, compagno di pensiero e di fede" [1946], in B. Croce, *Nuove pagine sparse* (Naples: R. Ricciardi, 1948), vol. I, pp. 25–39, 32.

its implications crystallized the theoretical divergences between the two philosophers. A closer look at Collingwood's intellectual trajectory will show that he incessantly wavered between them.[64]

In 1921 Collingwood identified a tension between a dualistic and an idealistic attitude within Croce's thought, which he might hopefully overcome through "a kind of philosophical suicide" in order to "reach the point of absolute idealism to which his [Croce's] successors Gentile and De Ruggiero had already carried his thought".[65] In a series of unpublished lectures (1928) Collingwood paid homage to Croce, but then advanced his notion of re-enactment in terms which echoed Gentile's philosophy: "The past as past has no existence whatever, consisting as it does of occurrences no longer occurring, events that have finished happening." Therefore the only way of knowing past events is "through their re-enactment in the mind of the historian".[66]

A decade later (1937) Collingwood expressed his complete agreement with Gentile's essay "The Transcending of Time in History", which he summarized as follows: "Time is transcended in history because the historian, in discovering the thoughts of a past agent, re-thinks that thought for himself. It is known, therefore, not as a past thought, contemplated as it were from a distance through the historian's time telescope, but as a present thought living now in the historian's mind (. . .). This is an important idea, and I believe a true one."[67]

This intellectual identification with Gentile did not last. In his *Autobiography* (1939) Collingwood illustrated what he meant by re-enactment.

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[64] On Gentile's impact see H. S. Harris, "Croce and Gentile in Collingwood's New Leviathan", in D. Boucher *et al.* (eds.), *Philosophy, History, and Civilization: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on R. G. Collingwood* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1995), pp. 115–29; on de Ruggiero's (overrated) impact, see J. Connelly, "Art Thou the Man: Croce, Gentile, or de Ruggiero?", in D. Boucher *et al.* (eds.), *Philosophy, History, and Civilization*, pp. 92–114.

[65] R. G. Collingwood, "Croce's Philosophy of History" (1921) (= R. G. Collingwood, *Essays in the Philosophy of History* [Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1965], pp. 3–22); see A. Greppi Olivetti, *Due saggi su R. G. Collingwood* (Padua: Liviana, 1977).

[66] R. G. Collingwood and J. van der Dussen (eds.), *The Idea of History* (Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 429, 444; Collingwood retrospectively regarded 1928 as a watershed in his intellectual life: R. G. Collingwood, *An Autobiography* (Oxford University Press, 1970 (1939)), pp. 99, 107, 115.

[67] R. G. Collingwood, review of "Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer", *English Historical Review* 52 (1937): 141–6, especially p. 143. This is a review of R. Klibansky and H. J. Paton (eds.), *Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936). Gentile's essay was an implicit attack on Croce: see C. Ginzburg, *Thread and Traces: True, False, Fictive* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2012), pp. 171, 296, note 23.

Referring to British Admiral Horatio Nelson's saying "in honour I won them [his decorations], in honour I will die with them", Collingwood commented: a "re-enactment of Nelson's thought is a re-enactment with a difference (...) in some way there is not one thought, there are two different thoughts. What was the difference? No question in my study of historical method ever gave me so much trouble (...). The difference is one of context."[68] This was Collingwood's solution to the puzzle: "Historical knowledge is the re-enactment of a past thought incapsulated in a context of present thoughts which, by contradicting it, confine it to a plane different from theirs."[69]

Two different thoughts; two contexts. Collingwood was tacitly distancing himself from Gentile (unnamed, presumably for political reasons) who had written that "any act of thinking denies an act of thinking; it is a present in which the past dies; therefore it is a unity of those two moments".[70] But Collingwood was also distancing himself from his own unpublished 1928 lectures, in which he had argued that "to re-enact the past in the present [for instance, reading Dante's poetry] is to re-enact it in a context which gives it a new quality. This context is the negation of the past itself."[71]

10. Difference vs unity: the respective implications of the two perspectives are far-reaching. To conceive of history as an act of presentification is incompatible with the idea of historical research as inquiry (*historia*) and ultimately with the very idea of historical distance.[72] On the contrary, by insisting on the differences between the two contexts – related, respectively, to the re-enactment of the past and to the re-enacted past – one can unfold the implications of Collingwood's remark: historical truth belongs to "a complex consisting of questions and answers".[73] But whose questions, whose answers? The so-called "re-enactment" is, I would argue (against Collingwood), the

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[68] Dray, *History*, p. 53, note 33, regarded Collingwood's question as "perilously close to the caricature of himself"; but the question was ascribed to "a little boy in a jersey: this is my father's study carpet" (Dray, *History*, p. 113).

[69] Collingwood, *An Autobiography*, pp. 112–14; J. Connelly, "Art Thou the Man?", p. 106, misses the gap between this passage and the 1937 review of Gentile's essay; on the ethnocentric implications of the idea of the past as "incapsulated" in the context of the present, see L. Strauss, "On Collingwood's Philosophy of History", *The Review of Metaphysics* 5 (1952): 559–86, 563.

[70] Gentile, "L'atto del pensare", p. 33; in his *Autobiography*, Collingwood implicitly referred to Gentile as "a very able, and distinguished philosopher" before his self-damaging allegiance to Fascism (p. 158).

[71] Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, p. 447.

[72] The neologism "presentification" has been first introduced to translate Husserl's neologism *Gegenwärtigung*.

[73] Collingwood, *An Autobiography*, p. 29 ff., 37; see H. S. Harris's introduction to Gentile, *Genesis*, p. 18.

outcome of an asymmetrical dialogue between the observer's and the actors' respective idioms: between *etic* and *emic* data, as Kenneth Pike has labelled them.[74] Starting from inevitably anachronistic questions, the observer (the historian) may succeed in retrieving the actors' elusive idioms: not through empathy but through philology in a broad sense, as advocated by Vico.[75] The re-enactment of the past, far from being a total resurrection of it, implies a limited, artificial experience – a repetition based on the dialogue between two contexts, the observer's and the actors'.[76] To sum up: all history is comparative history.

The historian may re-enact the past (all kinds of pasts, not only past thoughts) relying upon a more or less successful thought experiment. In the case of "experimental archaeology", this re-enactment may be supplemented by a material reconstruction of some (most often technological) aspects of the past. These experiments should not be confused with "historical re-enactments", those contemporary versions of nineteenth-century pageants, whose actors share the naive illusion of reliving past experiences such as battles or episodes of everyday life by impersonating figures from the past.[77] Historical phenomena cannot (and should not) be staged twice, Marc Bloch wrote, echoing Durkheim. Therefore, he concluded, experiments are forbidden to historians. But thought experiments are accessible to both historians and scientists.

11. A long trajectory, based on an intricate series of readings, connects Hobbes to Vico, Vico to Marx, Marx to Gentile, Gentile to Croce, Croce (and Gentile) to Collingwood. In this trajectory, punctuated by discontinuities, the themes of artificiality and experiment surfaced over and over,

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[74] C. Ginzburg, "Our Words, and Theirs: A Reflection on the Historian's Craft, Today", in S. Fellman and M. Rahikainen (eds.), *Historical Knowledge: In Quest of Theory, Method, and Evidence* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012), pp. 97–119.

[75] Collingwood, who translated Croce's *The Philosophy of Giovanni Battista Vico* (1913), considered himself a disciple of Vico: see T. M. Knox's introduction to *The Idea of History* (Oxford University Press, 1946), Part VIII; presumably Collingwood would not have agreed with the reading of Vico presented here.

[76] H. Gadamer, who had no access to Collingwood's posthumously published 1928 lectures, made a perceptive (and dismissive) comment on this issue (*Truth and Method* [New York: Continuum, 2006], p. 366); see B. Mcintyre, "Historicity as Methodology or Hermeneutics: Collingwood's Influence on Skinner and Gadamer", *Journal of the Philosophy of History* 2 (2008): 138–66.

[77] See J. Brewer, "Re-enactment and Neo-Realism", in I. McCalman *et al.* (eds.), *Historical Reenactment: From Realism to the Affective Turn* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), pp. 79–89; the contiguity between the sophisticated and the naive version emerges from K. Bowan, "R. G. Collingwood, Historical Reenactment and the Early Music Revival", in I. McCalman *et al.* (eds.), *Historical Reenactment*, pp. 134–58.

although their original core (Hobbes interpreted by Vico) was marginalized and forgotten.[78] The neat idealistic model that Collingwood inherited from Croce and Gentile can be reworked (I argue) in two directions: first, to include material obstacles (*impedimenti della materia*, as Galileo labelled them); and second, to focus on the asymmetry between questions and answers, and their respective contexts. The result of this reworking is twofold: 1) all history is comparative history; 2) all history involves experiments – mental or otherwise. But some approaches to history are more experiment-oriented (and comparison-oriented) than others. Microhistory, being based on artificially selected cases, analyzed at a close distance, can be regarded as an extreme case of this experimental approach.[79]

The aim of this admittedly tortuous trajectory was to articulate the cognitive potential of microhistory as a response to the challenge provided by global history. The prefix "micro" has been often referred, misleadingly, to the size (either literal or metaphorical) of its objects, rather than to the analytic approach, which is at the very centre of microhistory as a project. But to say "analytic" is not enough; one should add "artificial". One may evoke in this context the Italian historian Edoardo Grendi's well-known emphasis on the "normal exceptional": the notion that a case-study focusing on an anomaly may be the best strategy to build up a generalization.[80] Likewise, an experiment based on a sample put under a microscope, in artificial conditions, may clarify a hidden norm. A close analysis of a single case study may pave the way to much larger (indeed, global) hypotheses.

A case study

1. A book entitled *Conformité des coutumes des Indiens orientaux avec celles des Juifs et des autres peuples de l'antiquité*, par Mr. De la C. +++, was published in Brussels in 1704.[81] The author, whose name appeared on the front page in a

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[78] In Croce's essay "Le fonti della gnoseologia vichiana" (1912), in *Saggio sullo Hegel* (Bari: G. Laterza and Figli, 1948), pp. 235–62, Hobbes is never mentioned.

[79] Franco Venturi once ironically dismissed microhistory as "history with additives"; in the perspective I am advocating, the artificial character of microhistory should be regarded as a virtue.

[80] C. Ginzburg and C. Poni, "The Name and the Game: Unequal Exchange and the Historiographical Marketplace", in E. Muir and G. Ruggiero (eds.), *Microhistory and the Lost People of Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 2–10; on anomalies, see C. Ginzburg, *Thread and Traces,* pp. 221–2.

[81] S. Subrahmanyam, "Monsieur Picart and the Gentiles of India", in L. Hunt, M. Jacob and W. Mijnhardt (eds.), *Bernard Picart and the First Global Vision of Religion* (Los Angeles, CA: Getty Research Institute, 2010), pp. 197–214, especially pp. 199–201;

truncated way, was a "Monsieur de la Créquinière", a military officer who was said to have spent some time at Pondichéry, the French enclave in Southeastern India.[82] His background is unknown. On the basis of his vast, erudite readings, La Créquinière might be considered an antiquarian. His *Conformité* provides an early, eloquent test of the hypothesis that the Italian historian Arnaldo Momigliano advanced many years ago: that ethnography emerged from antiquarian learning.[83] At the beginning of his book, La Créquinière recalled his initial plan: to collect information concerning different ways of tilling the land, of dressing and eating, different proverbs, language peculiarities, and "relics of antiquity". But having realized that this project would require an exploration of non-coastal regions still immune from contact with Europeans, La Créquinière changed his mind. He decided to rely upon both his readings and his experience to compare the manners and customs of Indians and Jews.

In his *Demonstratio evangelica* (1679), Pierre-Daniel Huet, bishop of Avranches, had argued, with immense erudition, that all myths and rituals, in all religions, can be traced back to the Bible. La Créquinière was familiar with Huet's work, but silently discarded its genetic approach, in favour (we would say today) of a morphological perspective in which he compared customs.[84] At the end of his book La Créquinière left aside ethnographic or antiquarian comparisons, advancing a global reflection on two different, indeed opposed, worlds: Europe and the Orient. In the latter he included both Indians and Jews, considering the differences between them, and even more those between contemporary Jews and Biblical Hebrews, absolutely irrelevant.

As a young man Claude Fleury, later to become a famous church historian, read Homer's poems and the Bible through the lens of the *Querelle des anciens et des modernes* as oriental books.[85] Twenty-five years later La

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C. Ginzburg, "Provincializing the World: Europeans, Indians, Jews (1704)", *Postcolonial Studies* 14 (2011): 135–50 (here developed on the basis of new evidence).

[82] In a letter dated "Pondichéry, October 1st", La Créquinière refers to a testimony in his favour by François Martin (1634–1706), Pondichéry's first governor (Archives Nationales, Colonies, C² 65, 100–1) (many thanks are due to Sanjay Subrahmanyam, who sent me a copy of the document).

[83] A. Momigliano, "Ancient History and the Antiquarian" (1950), in *Contributo alla storia degli studi classici* (Rome: Edizione di storia e letteratura, 1979), pp. 67–206; A. Momigliano, "Prospettiva 1967 della storia greca" (1967), in *Quarto contributo alla storia degli studi classici e del mondo antico* (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1969), pp. 43–58.

[84] P. Alphandéry, in *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 47 (1923): 294–305.

[85] N. Hepp, *Deux amis d'Homère au XVIIᵉ siècle* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1970); C. Fleury, *Ecrits de jeunesse*, N. Hepp and V. Kapp (eds.) (Paris: Champion, 2003), pp. 153–81; see also M. Finkelberg and G. G. Stroumsa, *Homer, the Bible, and Beyond: Literary and Religious Canons in the Ancient World* (Leiden: Brill, 2003); G. G. Stroumsa, *A New Science: The*

Créquinière, unaware of Fleury's unpublished notes on Homer, looked at Europe and the Orient in terms of an opposition between modernity and antiquity. Europe, La Créquinière argued, was dominated by fashions imposed by courts, by luxury, by an endless search for novelty. The Orient was dominated by a submissive attitude towards the law, and a rejection of all sorts of change – which implied, La Créquinière remarked, giving suddenly (and ambiguously) voice to "an Antiquary or an Austere Man", a life closer to nature.[86] La Créquinière's contradictory attitude may be compared to a shadow cast by the Enlightenment: Europe spoke on behalf of colonized people at the very moment at which it was colonizing the world.

One year after its publication in Brussels, *Conformité* was translated into English and also included in a strategic position, as an anonymous text, in *Cérémonies et coutumes religieuses de tous les peuples du monde* (1723), the huge, highly influential work edited by Jean-François Bernard and illustrated by Bernard Picart.[87]

2. La Créquinière's *Conformité* had an ill-fated sequel, documented by a volume preserved at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris (ms. occidentaux français 9723).[88] The opening page displays a royal privilege, dated Versailles, April 9, 1707, authorizing "Sieur de La Créquinière" to publish a book entitled *Des Indiens orientaux et de la Conformité de leurs Coutumes avec celles des Juifs et des autres Peuples de l'Antiquité*. This was, a handwritten front page explained, "the second edition, revised and augmented by the author" of the book published, under a slightly different title, in Brussels in 1704, "by an officer who had spent several years in India". (La Créquinière not only preserved his anonymity but to a certain extent reinforced it.) Each page from the first edition of *Conformité* had been pasted onto a large sheet of paper, including corrections in the margins as well as additions, which, in some cases, covered several pages. They can be attributed to three different hands: a copyist, La Créquinière himself and a professional reader who left his statement and signature on page 162, after the last page of the first edition: "I read, following the orders of Mr Chancellor, a book entitled *Des Indiens*

Discovery of Religion in the Age of Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), pp. 49–61.

[86] La Créquinière, *The Agreement of the Customs of the East Indies with those of the Jews* (London, 1705; reprint New York: AMS Press, 1999), pp. 136–7.

[87] J.-F. Bernard and B. Picard, *Cérémonies et coutumes religieuses de tous les peuples du monde* (Amsterdam: Chez J. F. Bernard, 1723), Part I, Part II, pp. 7–50; the attribution of the English translation of La Créquinière's *Conformité* to John Toland is questionable (many thanks to Giovanni Tarantino for his remarks on this issue).

[88] I follow the most recent pagination, amounting to 251 pages (recto and verso).

orientaux etc. I found it full of erudition; it deserves to be delivered to the public. Done in Paris, July 28, 1705. Raguet."

However, despite the approval of Gilles-Bernard Raguet, the Royal Censor, duly followed by the Royal privilege, the second, revised edition of the *Conformité* was never published. This may have been because at that time, La Créquinière was for unknown reasons jailed in the Bastille.[89]

3. The Parisian manuscript preserves the traces of a dialogue between Raguet and La Créquinière, the censor and the censored. Presumably the two men belonged, at very different levels, to the same institution: the Compagnie des Indes Orientales. Raguet was the Company's spiritual director, La Créquinière a minor officer. They shared a passion for learning, but whether they ever met, we do not know.

Born in Namur in 1668, Raguet died in Paris in 1748. Having become a priest, he entered the St Sulpice Company. Cardinal Fleury put him, along with other men of learning, in charge of the education of the Dauphin, later to become Louis xv. Between 1705 and 1721 Raguet was a member of the board of the *Journal des sçavans*, the oldest academic journal in Europe. He published a translation, with additions and appendices, of Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis*.[90] Moreover, he wrote (although the attribution is contested) a dialogue, which intervened in an ongoing debate, elicited by Mabillon's *De re diplomatica*, on different methods of distinguishing ancient charters from forgeries.

Later, as a spiritual director of the Compagnie des Indes, Raguet wrote a tract entitled *Du domaine et des limites de la Louisiane*, which remained unpublished, stressing the legitimacy of French pretensions to Louisiana against the British attempt to colonize it (Louisiana had been entrusted to Raguet's spiritual care on May 30, 1724). One of the arguments Raguet put forward against the British read: "Instead of inspiring [natives] with the principles of religion and civilization, the only things that we can give them in exchange for their lands and their liberty, they [the British] increase their corruption and enslave them through unheard of vices."[91]

Raguet unhesitatingly presented the diffusion of Christian faith and civilization (*police*) as the only justifications for colonial expansion. The natives' "natural rights" to their own lands and bodies were recognized at the very

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[89] I will deal with this topic in a forthcoming paper.
[90] M. Raguet, *La Nouvelle Atlantide de François Bacon, Chancelier d'Angleterre* (Paris: Chez Jean Musier, 1702).
[91] Bibliothèque nationale de France (henceforth BnF), ms. Z-1499 (16): *Du domaine et des limites de la Louisiane*, de l'abbé Raguet, pp. 13–14.

moment at which they were suppressed. One detects an ambivalent attitude, comparable to the one displayed in La Créquinière's *Conformité*, censored by Raguet himself nearly twenty years earlier.

4. The handwritten materials assembled for the second, never published, edition of *Conformité* show that La Créquinière knew not only Latin but Greek as well. The range of his erudite references is astonishing. He shifted from Greek and Latin pagan texts to the Fathers, including St Augustine and Clement of Alexandria, and then to contemporary scholars, disregarding confessional affiliations – from the Dominican friar Noël Alexandre, to the Calvinist pastor Etienne Morin, the professor of oriental languages in Amsterdam, to the great Anglican hebraist John Spencer, and so forth.

One example will illustrate La Créquinière's way of working. In a chapter on perfumes, to be included in the second edition, he advanced textual emendations to the Vulgate and to the Septuagint for their translations of *Isaiah*, 18:2 and 18:7. La Créquinière (who had no Hebrew) substituted Jerome's "dilaceratam" (torn) with "depilatam" (shaven), comparing the custom of head shaving among ancient Egyptians and present-day Moors faithful to Islam.[92] On the next page, La Créquinière commented upon the word "sisoën" (*krobulon*, a hairknot on the top of one's head) used in the Septuagint translation of *Leviticus* 19:27, on the one hand evoking Mongolian and Indian headdresses, and on the other quoting passages from Martial, Petronius, Juvenal and "an ancient scholiast".[93] La Créquinière also implicitly referred to Samuel Bochart's *Geographia sacra*, whose comment on *Leviticus* 18:27 must have inspired his own emendation of *Isaiah* 18:2 and 18:7.[94] This imaginative way of combining different texts was shaped by the experience of a very special kind of antiquarian, a man who could make a passing reference to things he had seen "not only in Guinea but in other parts of America and Asia which I visited".[95]

5. All this might have elicited the curiosity of La Créquinière's censor – especially if he was the author of *Histoire des contestations sur la diplomatique, avec l'analyse de cet ouvrage composé par R. P. dom Jean Mabillon*, first published anonymously in Paris in 1708, then attributed to the Jesuit Lallemant and

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[92] BnF, ms. occ. fr. 9723, 175 v–176 r; La Créquinière remarked on the inconsistency of the Septuagint, which has two different translations for *Isaiah* 18:2, 18:7; in the *Traduction oecuménique de la Bible*, new edition (Paris: Cerf, 1996), the word in both passages is translated as "glabre".

[93] BnF, ms. occ. fr. 9723, 176 r.

[94] S. Bochart, *Geographia sacra* (Frankfurt: J. D. Zunneri, 1674), pp. 379–91 (esp. 381).

[95] BnF, ms. occ. fr. 9723, 187 v; for other allusions to his stay in Guinea, see c. 111 r, 186 v.

finally (and more convincingly) to the abbé Raguet.[96] One of the participants in the dialogue is an abbé, who apparently expressed the author's point of view. He openly criticized Barthélemy Germon, the Jesuit who had opened hostilities against *De re diplomatica*, the founding text of diplomatics written by the Benedictine erudite Jean Mabillon: "Unfortunately Father Germon (. . .) is not familiar enough with antiquity, and therefore he regards as monstrous what has no conformity with our customs [*moeurs*]."[97] What does "conformity of customs" mean? – a reader of La Créquinière's *Conformité des coutumes* might ask. It means, explained the counsellor (another participant in the dialogue) orthographic usages: "Father Germon . . . apparently knows that customs [*moeurs*] change according to the differences of times and places. . . The difference in time shows that our ancestors spoke and wrote in ways which were different from ours."[98]

Perhaps the abbé Raguet, who in his youth had sent a letter to Mabillon, transmitting the decipherment of an inscription concerning "the ancient, and nearly unknown city of Alauna, which is in the process of coming back to light", was not the author of *Histoire des contestations*.[99] And the author of *Histoire des contestations* possibly never read La Créquinière's *Conformité des coutumes*. But the semantic density of the word *moeurs* is indisputable, and revealing. The same attention to orthographic particularities related to specific times and places, minutely analyzed in *Histoire des contestations*, could be used to analyze customs shared by populations different from one's own. In his *Moeurs des Israélites*, Cardinal Fleury, Raguet's protector, mentioned Hebrews, Turks, Indians and Chinese, arguing that temporal and spatial distance reinforced each other:

> If we take into account these two kinds of distance, we will not be surprised to find that the people who lived in Palestine three thousand years ago had customs different from ours; on the contrary, we would be surprised by any practices that were similar (*conforme*).[100]

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[96] *Histoire des contestations sur le diplomatique, avec l'analyse de cet ouvrage composé par Jean Mabillon* (Paris: F. Delaulne, 1708) (all quotations are from this edition). This was translated in B. German, S. J., *Aurelianensis Disceptationes Diplomaticae* (Vienna: Typis J. nobilis de Kurzbeck, 1790), but the Latin translation does not do justice to the brilliant style of the original.

[97] *Histoire*, p. 153; see B. Germon, *De veteribus regum Francorum diplomatibus et arte secernendi antiqua diplomata vera a falsis, disceptatio* (Paris: apud Joannem Anisson, 1706), pp. 52 ff.

[98] *Histoire*, p. 154.

[99] BnF, ms. fr. 17681 (vol. IV), 81 r–83 r; Alauna is today's Valogne (Normandy).

[100] C. Fleury, *Les Moeurs des Israélites* (Brussels: E. H. Frik, 1712), pp. 9–10.

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Antiquarian knowledge (and philology) gave birth to ethnography – forms of knowledge which have been forms of domination as well.

6. The second edition of La Créquinière's book was supposed to include a new chapter entitled "On the Indians' ideas concerning the Europeans and their way of living with them". A passage from this will show the direction taken by La Créquinière's thoughts: "The Greeks and later the Romans, notwithstanding their intelligence and civilization, have been the most unfair and the most blind in their judgement of other populations, regarding them as barbarians simply because they were not like them, and they did not display the same richness, luxury, grandeur and magnificence."[101]

La Créquinière's gesture, distancing himself from the ancient roots of European civilization, paved the way for a general reflection:

> If there is some something which requires a preliminary suppression of our prejudices before expressing our judgement, this is the way of living of other populations. We have to free ourselves from our assumptions, insofar as they are always very favourable to ourselves, and very hostile towards what is different from us; but rarely are we able to form a disinterested judgement on this issue; and all populations share this weakness with us.

These remarks introduced an effort to reverse the perspective, putting the observer – 17 years before Montesquieu's *Lettres persanes* – in the place of the other:

> In Europe there is grandeur and magnificence everywhere; social relationships are stronger, and at the same time more relaxed than in the Oriental countries; there are among us people profoundly learned in every possible field; fine arts never were as sublime as they are today in Europe. But, all this notwithstanding, Indians consider themselves superior to us, and wiser than us; they look at us as if we were infinitely inferior to them, and believe they are right in judging us this way.[102]

A long tradition, from Herodotus to Montaigne and onwards, focused on the diversity of customs among different populations. La Créquinière relied upon it, although, as he dryly pointed out, only a few people are able to hide, behind a veil of civilization and courtesy, an "essence" shared by all humans: the implacable search for one's interest. Indians are not an exception; they are, like La Bruyerè said about courtiers, comparable to marble –

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[101] BnF, ms. occ. fr. 9723, 121 r; the words "Grecs et ensuite" were added above the line by La Créquinière.
[102] BnF, ms. occ. fr. 9723, 121 v.

polished and hard.[103] Recalling his own experiences, La Créquinière commented on the Indians' attitude: "First of all, we must say that Indians consider us as profane and polluted people, and limit their exchanges with us as much as possible, and only within the limits of their interests (. . .). They cannot have familiarity with people who eat all kinds of animals, and especially cows; with people who drink wine and sometimes can be seen drunk in public" and so on. His Indian servant, La Créquinière recalled in admiration, preferred to fast the whole day rather than share food with him.[104] A remarkable exercise in ethnographic fieldwork.

7. Sometimes Raguet expressed his disagreement on the margins of the manuscript. "Where did he find this?" Raguet impatiently wrote, reacting to La Créquinière's suggestion that Jacob's dream (*Gen.* 28:18) was an example of a widespread ancient practice before starting a journey.[105] But La Créquinière's reflections on the Indians' attitude towards the Europeans bear no signs of censorship. The reversal of perspective – a potentially subversive gesture – did not challenge God's revelation. But when La Créquinière dared to make a gesture in that direction, albeit in a twisted and tortuous way, Raguet did not fail to react. After a detailed survey of a long series of texts on the diffusion of circumcision among Egyptians and other populations, La Créquinière had written:

> It would be possible to find more reasons to prove that Jews received circumcision from Heaven as a mark of distinction from other populations which had imitated them in that practice [*what follows in the manuscript has been crossed over*] but it seems to me that those I have presented will suffice to make clear the danger which would emerge if we would admit the opposite argument; therefore I am surprised that the latter has been shared by so many people, including two notable contemporaries; because those assumptions, if accepted, would lead to some dangerous consequences for a partisan of novelty, who could conclude that Abraham, and then Moses, shaped their cults by mixing up other religions: and since they took from Gentiles the main seal of their justification, they could have also taken everything else. Deists used those arguments without relying upon other weapons offered by our theologians; in fact, I am convinced that if the famous book *De tribus impostoribus* (On the Three Impostors) were not a

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[103] BnF, ms. occ. fr. 9723, 147 r. [104] BnF, ms. occ. fr. 9723, 122 r.
[105] BnF, ms. occ. fr. 9723, 18 v.

ghost, which never existed in reality, its possible author would not have refrained from using arguments as effective as these.[106]

By referring to the non-existent author of an allegedly non-existent book (since the Middle Ages only its scandalous title had been circulating) La Créquinière advanced, through a hypothetical sentence articulated in the mode of unreality, a quasi-deist thesis. The diffusion of circumcision was just one example of practices that biblical Judaism shared with other religions. The implication was obvious: the very idea of revelation was absurd. In a chapter on idolatry and its causes, rewritten for the second edition, La Créquinière explained that in the domain of religion all evils were originally something good, "all lies sung by poets were born from truth, from the source of the religion we are still professing".[107]

Which religion? Who are "we"? Here is La Créquinière's answer: "Heaven, earth, the regular movement of stars is an eyewitness of the existence of a God, but the strongest and most convincing evidence the humans had consisted in the secret movements of their heart which directed them, even unwillingly, towards something higher and larger" than the ephemeral creatures they saw before them. "The unanimous consensus of all nations and all centuries", La Créquinière went on, should refute the atheists and their frivolous arguments, compelling them to "acknowledge a Supreme Being (un Être suprême) on which everything depends".[108] The expression "Être suprême" recurs twice in the same page. It obviously excluded divine revelation.

The abbé Raguet read the page and refrained from commenting on it. No words, no signs, no cross overs. At the end of the manuscript Raguet wrote that La Créquinière's book was "full of erudition" and recommended its publication.

8. The case analyzed here is doubly anomalous. First of all, in terms of evidence: in early modern Europe censorship was a widespread practice, but examples of such a documented dialogue between the censor and the

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[106] BnF, ms. occ. fr. 9723, 188 v; the "two notable contemporaries" are presumably John Marsham and John Spencer: see P. Hazard, *La crise de la conscience éuropéenne* (Paris: Boivin, 1935), vol. III, pp. 34–5; La Créquinière had read Spencer's *De legibus Hebraeorum ritualibus*: see BnF, ms. occ. fr. 9723, 108 v.

[107] BnF, ms. occ. fr. 9723, 18 v.

[108] BnF, ms. occ. fr. 9723, 19 r; see also Jean-François Bernard's "Dissertation préliminaire" to Bernard and Picard, *Cérémonies et coutumes*; the second tome of the first volume included a somewhat truncated version of La Créquinière's *Conformité*.

censored are rare.[109] Second, in terms of content: La Créquinière stands out as a precocious, isolated figure, in part because we know so little about his background, his activities, or his connections. But one might turn this relative lack of information into a virtue, by stressing the artificiality of the experiment. The Parisian manuscript would configure itself like a space in which two forces clash, alternating conflict and interaction. We may test our interpetation over and over, and possibly disprove it.

The ultimate, unexpected complicity between Raguet and La Créquinière qualifies the hypothesis advanced above. What appeared as an ambivalence within the Enlightenment must be understood in the framework of the Enlightenment's Christian roots.

9. Ambivalence, a unique and durable feature of Christianity, is the result of Christianity's relationship with Judaism. A considerable part of the Gospels is, literally, a reworking of fulfilled prophecies – first of all, passages from Isaiah – into narratives. The Christian appropriation of the Hebrew Bible, and the notion of Christianity as *verus Israel*, implied a reversal of the historical relationship between the two religions. What emerged from it was a combination of continuity and discontinuity, deference and contempt, inclusion and denial. This ambivalent attitude produced not only two reading perspectives (allegorical and literal) for the Hebrew Bible, but the construction of the very notion of historical perspective. The undoubtedly much weaker Christian ambivalence towards pagan images and texts shows that we are not facing an imaginary "essence", but a lasting historical phenomenon. These cognitive tools – distance, perspective, different reading strategies – worked as weapons in European colonial expansion.[110]

The relationship between an experiment and its potential implications is always asymmetrical. La Créquinière's tendency to speak, alternatively, on behalf of the colonizers and the colonized can be inscribed in a much larger phenomenon. An individual case may contribute to the reformulation of an infinitely larger question: what made Europe's conquest of the world

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[109] See A. Raz-Krakotzkin, *The Censor, the Editor, and the Text: The Catholic Church and the Shaping of Jewish Canon in the Sixteenth Century* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005).

[110] I explored these themes in "Ecce: On the Scriptural Roots of Christian Devotional Imagery", in C. Ginzburg, *Wooden Eyes: Nine Reflections on Distance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), pp. 79–93; "Distance and Perspective: Two Metaphors", in Ginzburg, *Wooden Eyes*, pp. 139–56; "The Letter Kills: On some Implications of 2 Corinthians 3:6, *History and Theory* 49 (2010): 71–89.

possible? Microhistory and macrohistory, close analysis and global perspective, far from being mutually exclusive, reinforce each other.

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